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Translator’s	  Preface	  	   This	  work	  began	  several	  years	  ago	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  question.	  A	  reader	  of	  my	  translation	   of	   Fa-­‐tsang’s	   Commentary	   on	   the	   Awakening	   of	   Faith	   (Edwin	   Mellen	  Press,	  2004)	  wrote	  to	  question	  my	  interpretation	  of	  Fa-­‐tsang’s	  thought.	  The	  reader	  wondered	  whether	   I	  had	   incorrectly	   injected	  Madhyamaka	  thought	   into	  Fa-­‐tsang’s	  interpretation	  of	   the	  Awakening	  of	  Faith.	  As	   it	   turned	  out	   that	   idea	   stuck	  with	  me	  and	  pondering	  whether	   that	  might	  be	   the	  case	   led	  me	   to	  wonder	  about	  Fa-­‐tsang’s	  familiarity	  with	  Madhyamaka	  views.	  His	  Commentary	  on	  the	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  
Gates	  was	  a	  natural	  place	  to	  look	  for	  answers	  and	  the	  result	  is	  this	  effort.	  	  After	   working	  my	   way	   through	   his	   Commentary	   I	   decided	   to	   translate	   the	  
Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates	  as	  well.	  It	  is	  not	  included	  in	  Fa-­‐tsang’s	  text	  and	  I	  find	  it	  much	  easier	  to	  follow	  his	  Commentary	  with	  the	  orginal	  at	  hand.	  I	  expect	  that	  will	  be	  true	  for	  most	  readers	  as	  well.	  To	  ease	  the	  task	  of	  flipping	  back	  and	  forth	  between	  the	  two	  I	  divided	  the	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates	  into	  chapters	  and	  inserted	  each	  before	  Fa-­‐tsang’s	  corresponding	  explanations.	  	   Both	  translations	  are	  based	  on	  the	  Taisho	  versions	  of	   the	  texts.	  For	  readers	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  follow	  along	  in	  the	  Buddhist	  Chinese	  I	  have	  included	  Taisho	  page	  and	  row	  numbers	  throughout	  both	  texts.	  They	  are	  bracketed	  and	  boldfaced	  in	  both	  texts	   	   -­‐	   e.g.,	   [167a].	   I	   have	  also	  utilized	  parentheses	   to	  more	  precisely	  distinguish	  between	   the	   content	   of	   the	   original	   and	   additions	   necessary	   for	   comprehensible	  English.	   Brackets	   are	   used	   to	   mark	   additions	   I	   have	   inserted	   in	   order	   to	   clarify	  content	  and/or	  structure.	   I	  have	  dispensed	  with	  diacritical	  marks	   in	   transliterated	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terms.	  They	  are	  cumbersome	  and	  add	  no	  information	  that	  is	  not	  already	  familiar	  to	  scholars.	  	  	   I	   have	   elected	   to	   avoid	   any	   discussion	   of	   the	  Author	   of	   the	  Treatise	   on	   the	  
Twelve	  Gates.	  There	  is	  some	  debate	  about	  that	  but	  it	  seems	  irrelevant	  here.	  There	  is	  no	  question	  that	  the	  work	  is	  a	  Madhyamaka	  text.	  Furthermore,	  the	  primary	  focus	  of	  this	   translation	   is	   Fa-­‐tsang’s	   Commentary	   and	   clearly,	   as	   far	   as	   Fa-­‐tsang	   was	  concerned,	   the	  work	  was	  written	   by	   Nagarjuna.	   I	   have	   adopted	   that	   view	   for	   the	  translation	  and	  the	  various	  references	  to	  its	  Author.	  	   I	   want	   to	   thank	   Maryanne	   Leagans	   for	   proofreading	   the	   manuscript.	   Her	  sharp	  eye	  for	  detail	  has	  been	  a	  tremendous	  help.	  	   As	   for	   the	   original	   question	   that	   first	   motivated	   my	   interest	   in	   these	   two	  texts,	   I’ll	   simply	  note	   that	  while	   the	   views	   found	   in	  Fa-­‐tsang’s	  Commentary	   on	   the	  
Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates	  may	  not	  apply	  to	  his	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Awakening	  of	  
Faith,	   I	   think	   it	   is	   clear	   to	   see	   from	   his	   explanation	   that	   he	   understood	   what	  Madhyamakans	  mean	  by	  “emptiness.”	   	  Finally,	   this	  translation	  is	  posted	  on	  the	  web	  to	  make	  it	  available	  to	  anyone	  interested.	  Please	  feel	  free	  to	  use	  it	  for	  any	  noncommercial	  purpose.	  	   	   	   	   	   Dirck	  Vorenkamp	  	   	   	   	   	   Associate	  Professor	  of	  Religious	  Studies	  	   	   	   	   	   Lawrence	  University	  	   	   	   	   	   Feb.	  2015	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[212b]	  First	  section	  (of	  the)	  roll	  (containing)	  	  
A	   Record	   Conveying	   the	   Meaning	   of	   the	   Tenets	   of	   the	   Treatise	   on	   the	   Twelve	  
Gates	  By	  Fa-­‐tsang,	  renunciant	  Dharma	  exegete	  of	  Ch’ang-­‐an’s	  Western	  Temple	  of	  the	  Great	  Vow1	  	  	   Now	  due	  to	  (this	  text’s)	  treatment	  of	  the	  profound	  severing	  of	  attachments,	  the	   ultimate	   and	   conventional	   thereby	   both	   interfuse	   (and)	   ordinary	   convention	  transcends	   sensation.	  Emptiness	  and	  existence	  are	  by	   this	  both	  destroyed.	  Yet,	   by	  the	  emptiness	  of	  (a	  self)	  nature	  (the	  conventional,)	  that	  no	  means	  does	  not	  exist,	  is	  an	   existence	   thereby	   differentiated	   in	   emptiness.	   An	   illusory	   existence	   that	   has	  never	   begun	   to	   be	   not	   empty	   is	   an	   emptiness	   thereby	   clarified	   in	   existence.	  Existence	   is	   empty	   –	   existence	   therefore	   does	   not	   exist.	   Emptiness	   exists	   –	  emptiness	   therefore	   is	   not	   empty.	   	   Grasping	   of	   extremes	   is	   then	   destroyed.	  (Erroneous)	   hearing	   and	   seeing	   is	   accordingly	   lost.	   (This	   approach	   also)	   exhausts	  the	  erroneous	  offerings	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  (fundamental)	  source	  and	  accordingly	  the	  clouds	  of	  the	  four	  attachments	  are	  cleared	  away.	  It	  erects	  the	  True	  Dharma’s	  lack	  of	  deficiency	  and	  accordingly	  the	  Two	  Truths	  are	  then	  present.	  (As	  the	  Two	  Truths	  are	  present	  and	  clear,)	  therefore	  the	  Tathagata	   is	  in	  the	  world,	  shining	  wisdom	  on	  the	  dark	  thoroughfares	  (of	  the	  road	  to	  understanding).	  The	  flow	  of	  a	  superior	  grade	  (of	   understanding)	   matches	   with	   the	   profound	   stream	   beyond	   the	   accumulated	  (confusions	  of	  ignorance).	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After	  the	  Great	  Teacher	  was	  gone	  (his	  followers	  became)	  differently	  attached	  and	  confused.	  Some	  advanced	  toward	  heterodox	  ways,	  some	  ran	  to	  Hinayana	  sutras.	  In	   this	   ninety-­‐five	   types	   of	   (doctrinal)	   quarrels	   fanned	   the	   winds	   of	   heterodoxy.	  Eighteen	  sects	  wrangled	  in	  a	  blazing	  fire	  (of	  disagreement).	  As	  a	  result	  (they)	  caused	  the	   sun	   of	   the	   wisdom	   of	   true	   emptiness	   to	   be	   hidden	   by	   dark	   clouds	   (and)	   the	  profound	   pearl	   of	   wisdom	   (became	   obscured	   by)	   delusion	   muddied	   fish	   eyes.	  Thereupon	   (came)	   a	   great	  master.	   He	  was	   called	  Nagarjuna	   and	   ascending	   to	   the	  position	  of	  extreme	  joy,	  he	  responded	  with	  a	  million	  golden	  words.	  (He)	  regretted	  these	   debased	   nets	   (of	   delusion	   and	  was)	   aggrieved	   over	   these	   ruinously	   sunken	  (perspectives).	  He	  took	  up	  a	  desire	  to	  accordingly	  (use)	  the	  torch	  of	  the	  true	  Dharma	  to	  overthrow	  the	  sunscreens	  of	  heterodoxy.	  As	  a	  result	   (he)	  caused	  a	  multitude	  of	  compositions	   to	   overflow	   India	   and	   of	   (his)	   profound	   narrations	   (concerning	  ultimate	  truth),	  this	  [212c]	  Treatise	  is	  foremost.	  	  Presenting	   twelve	   expansive	   principles	   (this	   work)	   lays	   bare	   dark	   paths	  while	  revealing	  the	  real	  (and)	  leading	  (the	  deluded)	  into	  returning	  to	  the	  origin	  (so	  they	   might)	   blend	   with	   profound	   tranquility.	   It	   reveals	   the	   lustrous	   principles	  (found	  within	   all)	   sensation	   and	   accordingly	   (those	   principles)	   are	   designated	   as	  “gates.”	  (As	  the	  text)	  ranges	  to	  and	  fro	  (over	  a	  variety	  of	  topics)	  providing	  proofs,2	  it	  is	   also	   called	  a	   “treatise.”	   (As	   for	   the)	  gates,	   there	  are	   twelve	  and	  so	   it	   takes	   (that	  number)	   as	   (part	   of	   the	   text’s)	   name.	   Additional	   meanings	   will	   be	   specifically	  explained	  below.	  	   Now	   in	   taking	   up	   an	   explanation	   of	   this	   Treatise	   (I	  will)	   briefly	   create	   ten	  points	  (to	  clarify	  the	  text’s	  background	  and	  content):	  1.	  (To	  begin	  I	  will)	  clarify	  the	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causes	  for	  the	  arising	  of	  this	  teaching.	  2.	  (I	  will	  then	  clarify)	  the	  division	  of	  the	  canon	  (within)	  which	   (this	   text)	   is	   encompassed.	   3.	   (I	   can	   then)	   reveal	   (its	   place	   among	  the)	  divisions	  of	   the	   teachings.	   4.	   (That,	   in	   turn,	  will	   allow	  an	   explanantion	  of	   the	  range	  of	  karmic)	  potentials	   that	   its	   teaching	  covers.	  5.	  The	  essence	  of	   the	  teaching	  (its	   ideas)	   can	   expound	   (will	   follow).	   6.	   (Then	   I	   can	  detail)	   the	   central	   tenets	   and	  paths	  that	  are	  expounded	  (by	  the	  text).3	  7.	  (Next	  I	  will	  explain)	  the	  time	  of	  the	  text’s	  composition.	  8.	  (An	  examination	  of	  the	  various	  factors	  that)	  conditionally	  gave	  rise	  to	   transmitting	   the	   translation	   (will	   follow).	   9.	   (I	  will	   then)	   explain	   the	   Treatise’s	  title.	  10.	   (Finally,)	  an	  exegetical	  explanation	  (closely)	   following	   the	   text	   (will	  wrap	  up	  the	  explanation).	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[I.	  Reasons	  for	  the	  Arising	  of	  this	  Teaching]	  As	   for	   the	   first	   point,	   the	   reasons	   for	   the	   arising	   of	   this	   teaching,	   briefly	  (speaking)	  there	  are	  ten	  reasons	  to	  compose	  this	  type	  of	  treatise.	  The	  first	  is	  due	  to	  the	  power	  of	  the	  fundamental	  vow	  of	  this	  text’s	  Author.	  	  Due	  to	  this	  (vow’s	  power)	  Nagarjuna	  abided	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  (of	  a	  Bodhisattva’s	  spiritual	  development).4	  As	  a	  matter	   of	   principle	   due	   to	   the	   power	   of	   the	   vows,	   in	   the	   time	   after	   the	   Buddha’s	  
nirvana,	   (the	   task	   of)	   spreading	   a	  Dharma	   that	   included	   (blessings	   for	   all)	   beings	  was	   (a	   focus)	  of	  his	   activity.	  Moreover,	   the	  Author	   saw	   texts	   like	   the	  Lankavatara	  (wherein)	   the	   Buddha	   then	   noted,	   “I	   will	   come	   so	   that	   the	   torch	   of	   the	   correct	  Dharma	  will	  destroy	  the	  screen	  of	  heterodoxies.”	  Therefore	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  principle	  (he	  was	  bound	  to)	  spread	  (the	  Dharma	  and	  so)	  composed	  various	  treatises.	  Thereby	  (he)	  supported	  the	  praiseworthy	  cries	  (for	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  Dharma).	  	   Second,	   because	   following	   the	   Buddha’s	   extinction	   heterodox	   paths	   and	  quarrels	   flourished,	   (producing	   a)	   confusion	   of	   erroneous	   discourse	   (that	   also)	  slandered	   the	   Buddha’s	   Dharma,	   (he	   wrote)	   in	   order	   to	   destroy	   that	   sort	   of	  (confusion)	  and	  bring	  about	  a	  return	  to	  correct	  (understanding).	  	  	   Third,	   because	   (adherents	   of)	   various	   (forms	   of	   the)	   Two	   Vehicles	   do	   not	  believe	   in	   the	   Mahayana,	   (he	   wrote)	   to	   break	   their	   different	   (and	   various)	  attachments	  and	  cause	  them	  to	  turn	  towards	  the	  Mahayana.	  	   Fourth,	   because	   in	   regards	   to	   the	   Mahayana	   (there	   were)	   warped	  understandings	  of	  true	  emptiness,	  (errors	  that)	  obstructed	  (correct	  understanding)	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  attachments	  of	  the	  sensations,	  (he	  wrote)	  to	  cause	  them	  to	  break	  (attachment	  to	  those)	  sensations	  and	  perceive	  the	  correct	  principle	  (of	  emptiness).	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   Fifth,	   	   (he	  wrote)	   in	   order	   to	   reveal	   the	   (extreme)	   limits	   of	   the	  Mahayana	  (concept	  of)	  Thusness,	  and	  bring	  about	  (the	  situation	  where)	  they	  faithfully	  accept	  (it	  and)	  do	  not	  doubt	  it	  (or	  remain)	  deluded	  (about	  it).	  	   Sixth,	   (he	   wrote)	   because	   he	   desired	   to	   summarily	   reveal	   that	   the	   true	  emptiness	   of	   the	   wisdom	   of	   the	  Mahayana	   is	   the	  most	   profound	   (teaching	   of	   all.	  Those	  who)	  depend	  on	  it	  come	  to	  complete	  the	  myriad	  practices.	  	   Seventh,	  (he	  wrote)	  because	  of	  a	  desire	  to	  explain	  the	  profound	  meanings	  in	  
Mahayana	  texts	  (and	  thereby)	  bring	  about	  their	  revelation.	  	   Eighth,	   (he	  wrote)	   in	   order	   to	   bring	   about	   (the	   enlightenment	   of)	   the	   one	  type	   (of	   individual	  who,)	   based	   on	   an	   explanation	   of	   treatises,	   attains	   insight	   and	  owing	  to	  this	  (insight)	  attains	  entry	  into	  the	  True	  Dharma.	  	   Ninth,	   (he	  wrote)	   because	   in	   the	   (period)	   after	   the	   Buddha’s	   extinction	   he	  desired	  to	  assist	   the	  Buddha	  (by)	  spreading	  and	  protecting	  the	  Mahayana	  Dharma	  and	  cause	  it	  to	  long	  abide	  (in	  the	  world).	  	   Tenth,	  (he	  wrote)	  because	  (he	  desired	  to	  use)	  beautiful	  words	  and	  wondrous	  verses	   to	   widely	   spread	   this	  Mahayana	   Dharma	   (and	   thereby)	   complete	  Dharma	  offerings	  (that)	  repay	  the	  Buddha’s	  kindness.	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[II.	  The	  Text’s	  Place	  in	  the	  Canon]	  As	   for	   the	   second	   (major	   point	   for	   explanation,	   the	   place	   of	   the	   text’s)	  inclusion	   in	   the	   sections	   of	   the	   canon,	  within	   the	   (categorization	   of	   a)	   two	   (part)	  canon,	  (i.e.,	  a	  canon	  with)	  Hearer	  and	  Bodhisattva	  (sections),	  the	  Bodhisattva	  canon	  includes	   (this	   text).	   In	   the	   (categorization	   of	   a)	   three	   (part)	   canon,	   (i.e,	   the	   canon	  with)	   sutra,	   (vinaya,	   and	   abhidharma	   sections),	   the	   abhidharma	   (section	   of	   the)	  canon	   receives	   (this	   text).	   In	   the	   (categorization	   of	   a)	   twelve	   section	   (canon,	   the	  section	  with)	  “discursive”	  texts	  includes	  (this	  work).5	  	   Question:	  Since	  (the	   text)	   is	  not	  a	  discourse	  of	   the	  Buddha,	  how	   is	   it	   that	   it	  comes	  to	  be	  so	  (included	  in	  the	  canon)?	  	   Answer:	   (That	   is)	  because	  of	   two	   (points	  of)	   significance.	   First,	   due	   (to	   the	  fact)	  it	  is	  that	  type	  (of	  text	  indicated	  by	  the	  corresponding	  sections),	  therefore	  those	  (sections	  have	  come	  to)	  include	  (it).	  	  Second,	  (it	  is)	  simply	  (because)	  there	  are	  three	  varieties	   of	   the	   Dharma	   that	   Buddhas	   expound.	   (That	   is	   to	   say,	   1.	   there	   is	   the	  
Dharma)	   Buddhas	   personally	   expound,	   2.	   (there	   is	   the	   Dharma)	   others	   (so)	  empowered	   expound,	   and	   3.	   (there	   is	   the	   Dharma	   of)	   expositions	   permitted	   by	  prophecy.	  [213a]	  This	  Treatise	  matches	  the	  permitted	  by	  prophecy	  type.	  By	  means	  of	  (content)	  in	  the	  Lankavatara	  sutra	  and	  Maya	  sutra	  (we	  see)	  the	  Buddha	  foretold	  Nagarjuna	   would	   light	   the	   torch	   of	   the	   True	  Dharma.	   Therefore	   (we)	   know	   (this	  
Dharma)	  promised	  (by)	  prophecy	  is	  expoundable.	  Because	  of	  this	  it	  is	  also	  entered	  into	   the	   collection	   of	   the	   canon	   (that	   includes)	   collected	   Dharmas	   on	   doctrinal	  reasoning.	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[III.	  The	  Text’s	  Place	  Among	  Divisions	  of	  the	  Doctrine]	  As	   for	   the	   third	  (major	  point	   for	  explanation),	  determining	  (the	   text’s	  place	  among)	   the	   divisions	   of	   the	   doctrine,	   (in)	   this	   (matter	   when	   we)	   compare	   the	  various	  masters	  of	  the	  south	  and	  north,	  (their)	  different	  explanations	  are	  confusing.	  Without	  laboring	  (over)	  the	  record	  of	  their	  rankings,	  but	  to	  still	  distinguish	  (among	  the	  views)	   transmitted	  by	   the	  virtuous	  (teachers	  of)	   India,	   I	  asked	  (for	  help	   from)	  the	  Temple	  of	  the	  Great	  Vow’s	  translator,	  central	  Indian	  Tripitaka	  Master	  Divakara.	  The	   T’ang	   (Chinese)	   pronunciation	   (of	   his	   name	   is)	   “Re-­‐chao.”6	   He	   said	   presently	  	  two	   sastra	   masters	   of	   great	   virtue	   are	   both	   at	   India’s	   Nalanda	  monestary.	   One	   is	  named	   Silabhadra	   and	   one	   is	   named	   Jnanaprabha.7	   Both	   (have)	   a	   spiritual	  understanding	   that	   transcends	   the	   ordinary	   (and	   their)	   reputations	   are	   high	  (throughout	   the)	   five	   (regions)	   of	   India.	   (He	   said	   that)	   the	   six	   teachers	   (of	  heterodoxies	   all)	   bow	   (to	   them).	   Different	   sects	   return	   to	   and	   rely	   on	   (their	  understanding	   and	   even)	  Mahayana	   scholars	   look	  up	   (to	   them)	   as	   to	   the	   sun	   and	  moon.	  (Nevertheless)	  in	  India	  they	  walk	  alone	  (on	  separate	  paths.	  Their	  observance	  of)	   the	   regulations	   constitutes	   (a	   moral)	   compass	   (for	   others)	   even	   though	   each	  maintains	   a	   school	   (of	   tenets)	   that	   mutally	   are	   (like)	   a	   spear	   and	   shield	   [i.e.,	  mutually	  opposed].	  	  	   (If	  we)	  speak	  of	  Silabhadra,	  then	  he	  inherited	  (the	  teachings	  of)	  Maitreya	  and	  Asanga	  from	  long	  ago	  (while	  more)	  recently	  following	  the	  footsteps	  of	  Dharmapala	  and	  Nanda.	   	   (He)	   relies	  upon	   sutras	   like	   the	  Sandhinirmocana	   and	   sastras	   like	   the	  
Yogacarabhumi	  (to)	  clarify	  the	  Fa-­‐hsiang	  (school	  of)	  Mahayana.	  The	  broad	  divisions	  that	   designate	   (his)	   enumeration	   (of	   the	   periods	   of	   the	   Dharma)	   uses	   three	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teachings	   to	   explain	   the	   (various)	   schools	   and	   reveal	   that	  which	   they	   individually	  rely	   upon	   as	   the	   true	  meaning	   (of	   the	  Dharma).	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   (according	   to	   this	  view)	  initially	  at	  Deer	  Park	  the	  Buddha	  turned	  the	  Dharma	  wheel	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  
Hinayana	   of	   the	   Four	   Noble	   Truths.	   Although	   he	   expounded	   the	   emptiness	   of	  persons	  to	  overturn	  various	  heterodoxies,	  even	  so	  in	  regards	  to	  dependently	  arising	  (dharmas),	   he	   definitively	   expounded	   (their)	   real	   existence.	   In	   the	   second	   period	  though,	   relying	   upon	   (objects)	   which	   are	   grasped	   at	   by	   the	   understanding	   that	  universally	  reckons	  (all	  objects	  have	  an	  essential	  nature),8	  and	  explaining	   that	   the	  self	   nature	   of	   the	   various	   dharmas	   are	   all	   empty	   (of	   own	   being,	   he	   thereby)	  overturned	  those	  Hinayana	   (views).	  Even	  so,	   in	  regards	  to	  the	  dependent	  (nature)	  and	   the	  perfected	   (nature	  he)	   still	   as	  yet	  expounded	   their	   (essential)	  existence.	   In	  the	   third	   period	   then	   (he	   reached)	   the	   correct	   principle	   of	   the	   Mahayana	   and	  completely	   expounded	   the	   Three	   Natures	   and	   the	   Three	   Non	   (self-­‐)	   natures	   that	  then	   actually	   constitute	   the	   exhaustive	   principle	   (of	   true	   emptiness).	   Therefore,	  regarding	  dharmas	  produced	  by	  causes	  and	  conditions,	  in	  the	  initial	  period	  he	  only	  expounded	   (their	   real)	   existence	   and	   accordingly	   fell	   to	   the	   existence	   side	   (of	  extreme	  views).	  Next	  he	  expounded	  on	  (their)	  emptiness	  and	  accordingly	  fell	  to	  the	  emptiness	   side	   (of	   extreme	   views).	   Since	   each	   (of	   these	   two	   options)	   falls	   (to	   an	  extreme)	   side,	   neither	   is	   the	   final	  meaning	   (of	   the	  Dharma.	   So)	   in	   the	   subsequent	  period	  (he)	  completely	  expounded	  the	  emptiness	  of	  the	  natures	  that	  are	  grasped	  at.	  The	  other	   two	   (earlier	   views)	   constitute	   (views	  of	   essential)	   existence	   (while	   this	  view)	  unites	  (them	  with)	  the	  Middle	  Path	  and	  actually	  constitutes	  the	  final	  meaning	  (of	  the	  Dharma).	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   Therefore,	   based	   on	   (classifications)	   that	   this	   (view)	   expounds,	   (we	   can)	  judge	   sutras	   like	   the	  Prajnaparamita	   (and	   texts	   like	   the	   present	   one	   that)	  mostly	  expound	   emptiness	   tenets	   as	   included	   in	   the	   Second	   (period)	   Teachings.	   (These	  texts	   then)	   do	   not	   constitute	   the	   final	   meaning	   (of	   the	   Dharma.	   Of	   course)	   this	  depends	  upon	  the	  decisions	  (and	  views)	  of	  the	  Sandhinirmocana	  (sutra).	  	   (As	   for)	   the	   second	   (view,	   that	  of)	  Sastra	  Master	   Jnanaprabha,	  he	   inherited	  the	  (views)	  of	  Manjusri	  and	  Nagarjuna	  from	  old	  (and	  more)	  recently	  received	  (the	  teachings	  of)	  Aryadeva	  and	  Bhavaviveka.9	  Based	  on	  sutras	   like	  the	  Prajnaparamita	  
sutra	   and	   sastras	   like	   the	   Madhyamaka-­‐sastra	   (he)	   reveals	   the	   Mahayana	   of	   no	  characteristics,	  broadly	  distinguishes	  (the	  teaching	  of)	  true	  emptiness,	  and	  also	  uses	  three	  (periods	  of)	  teaching	  to	  express	  tenets	  (and)	  reveal	  that	  which	  he	  personally	  depends	  upon	  as	  constituting	  the	  final	  meaning	  (of	  the	  Dharma).	  	   That	   is	   to	   say	   (according	   to	   this	   view)	   initially	   at	   Deer	   Park	   the	   Buddha	  turned	   the	   Hinayana	   Dharma	   wheel	   in	   regards	   to	   the	   Four	   (Noble)	   Truths	   for	  individuals	   of	   less	   (well	   developed)	   faculties.	   (At	   that	   time	   he)	   expounded	   (the	  teaching	   that)	   the	  mind	   and	   its	   objects	   both	   exist.	   Next,	   in	   the	   second	   period,	   for	  those	   of	   moderately	   (developed)	   faculties,	   (he)	   expounded	   the	   Mahayana	   of	  Dharma-­‐characteristics	  –	  (namely,	  the	  view	  that)	  objects	  are	  empty	  while	  the	  mind	  exists.	   Accordingly	   (this	   teaching	   includes	   various)	   ideas	   like	   consciousness	   only.	  Because	  (at	  that	  time	  people’s)	  faculties	  were	  still	  (relatively)	  inferior,	  (they)	  were	  as	   yet	   unable	   to	   completely	   enter	   (an	   understanding	   of)	   universal	   [213b]	   true	  emptiness.	   Therefore	   he	   created	   these	   (sorts	   of	   provisional)	   explanations.	   In	   the	  third	  period	  then	  (he)	  expounded	  this	  Mahayana	  of	  no-­‐characteristics	  for	  (those	  of)	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superior	  faculties.	  (At	  that	  time	  he)	  revealed	  that	  the	  mind	  and	  its	  objects	  are	  both	  empty,	   (and	  that	   the)	  universal,	   single	  “flavor”	  (of	  emptiness)	  constitutes	   the	   true,	  complete	  meaning	  (of	  the	  Dharma).	  	  Furthermore,	  (according	  to	  this	  view)	  the	  initial	  (teaching)	  then	  was	  in	  order	  to	  break	  heterodox	   (notions	   like)	  a	   self-­‐nature	  and	   such.	  Therefore	  he	  expounded	  (the	   idea	   that)	  dharmas	   produced	  by	   causes	   and	   conditions	   certainly	   are	   existent.	  Subsequently	  then	  in	  order	  to	  break	  Hinayana	  (notions	  of	  essentially)	  real	  existence	  he	   expounded	   (the	   idea	   that)	   these	   dependently	   produced	   (dharmas)	   are	   only	  provisionally	   existent.	   Because	   they	   feared	   and	   dreaded	   this	   true	   emptiness	   he	  therefore	   still	   preserved	   (the	   notion	   of)	   existence	   while	   guiding	   them	   (to	   true	  emptiness).	  The	  third	  period	  then	  concerns	  the	  final	  Mahayana	  (and	  at	  that	  time	  he)	  expounded	   (the	   idea	   that)	   these	   dependently	   produced	   (dharmas)	   are	   exactly	   the	  emptiness	  of	   a	   (self)	  nature,	   a	  universal	   single	   characteristic.	  This	   (progression	  of	  the	   teachings)	   is	   also	   a	   gradual	   sequence	   of	   entering	   (final	   understanding	   of)	   the	  
Dharma.	  	   Accordingly,	   based	   on	   this	   explanation	   (Jnanaprabha)	   judges	   Fa-­‐hsiang	  
Mahayana	  (school	  ideas)	  such	  as	  an	  existent	  (consciousness	  and	  the	  empty	  dharmas	  it)	   appropriates	   as	   constituting	   second	   period	   teachings,	   and	   not	   as	   the	   complete	  purport	  (of	  the	  Dharma.	  As	  for)	  this	  progression	  of	  three	  teachings,	  (it	  is)	  that	  which	  
Dharma	   Master	   Jnanaprabha	   explained	   in	   his	   Prajnapradipa-­‐mulamadhyamaka-­‐
vritti,	   drawing	   on	   the	   Ta-­‐ch’eng	   miao-­‐chih	   ching.10	   Therefore,	   based	   on	   these	  doctrinal	  principles,	  Prajnaparamita	   type	  sutras	  are	  the	  true,	  complete	  purport	  (of	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the	  Dharma.	  All)	  the	  other	  designations	  and	  enumerations	  of	  dharma	  characteristics	  are	  expedient	  explanations	  and	  nothing	  more.	  	   Question:	   If	   it	   is	   as	   the	  preceding	   two	  masters	  have	  expounded,	  which	  one	  has	  attained	  (the	  truth)	  and	  which	  one	  has	  erred?	  	   Answer:	  If	  we	  use	  (the	  principle	  of	  karmic)	  potential	   to	  unite	  the	  teachings,	  the	   two	  expositions	  both	   attain	   (the	   truth)	  because	   each,	   depending	  on	   the	  Noble	  Teaching,	  constitutes	  (valid)	  direct	  and	  inferential	  (understanding).11	  	   (Question:)	  How	  so?	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  these	  two	  expound	  a	  (different)	  sequence	  of	   three	   teachings.	   (Taken)	   together	   it	   is	  not	  possible	   to	  determine	   (the	  case)	  and	  select	  (one)	  by	  means	  of	  the	  temporal	  succession	  of	  the	  three	  periods.	  (So)	  how	  can	  we	  understand	  it?	  	   (Answer:)	  It	  is	  like	  the	  Vajrapani	  sutra	  says:	  At	  Deer	  Park	  the	  Buddha	  initially	  turned	   the	   Dharma	   wheel	   of	   the	   Four	   Noble	   Truths	   (and)	   innumerable	   sentient	  beings	  attained	  the	  first	  fruit	  (of	  understanding),	  the	  second	  fruit,	  and	  so	  on	  even	  to	  the	  fruit	  of	  (becoming	  an)	  Arhat.12	  (Also)	  innumerable	  sentient	  beings	  aroused	  the	  mind	  of	  insight	  and	  innumerable	  bodhisattvas	  attained	  patience	  (with	  the	  truth	  of)	  
dharmas	   that	   are	  not-­‐produced.	   (Those	  bodhisattvas)	   abided	   in	   the	   first	   stage,	   the	  second	  stage,	  and	  so	  on	  even	  to	  (the	  stage	  of	  competence	  with)	  broad	  exposition.	  In	  the	   Ta-­‐p’in	   sutra	   (we)	   also	   (find	   passages)	   that	   agree	   with	   this	   explanation.	  Therefore	  we	  cannot	  definitively	  explain	  (the	  sequence	  of)	  before	  and	  after.	  We	   only	   know	   that	   when	   the	   Tathagata13	   set	   up	   the	   Teaching	   then	   (it	  contained)	   complete	   and	   incomplete	  meanings	   (and)	   has	   its	   two	   (types	   of)	   gates.	  The	   first	   (of	   those	   two	  gates)	  corresponds	   to	  (teachings	   that)	  encompass	  (karmic)	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potentials	   (both)	   broadly	   and	   narrowly.	   (These	   expositions)	   express	   the	   teaching	  wholly	   and	  with	   omissions	   to	   thereby	   clarify	   (views	  which	   are)	   complete	   and	   (in	  other	   cases,)	   incomplete.	   The	   second	   (gate)	   corresponds	   to	   (teachings	   that)	  encompass	   (those	   karmic)	   potentials	   (which	   can	   fully)	   enter	   the	   (complete)	  
Dharma.	   (It)	   reveals	   the	  principle	   (of	  emptiness)	  with	   increasing	  subtlety,	   thereby	  (fully)	  clarifying	  (that	  which	  is)	  complete	  and	  incomplete.	  The	  first	  (of	  these	  two)	  is	  that	  which	  Silabhadra’s	  (view)	  attains.	  	  	   How	  so?	  	   That	   is	   to	  say,	   it	   is	   like	   (it	   says)	   in	   the	  Sandhinirmocana	  sutra.	   Initially	   (the	  Buddha)	   established	   the	   Deer	   Park	   (teachings)	   only	   for	   advancing	   those	   of	   the	  Hearer’s	   Vehicle.	   (Accordingly,)	   by	   (using)	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	   Four	   Noble	  Truths	  (he)	  turned	  the	  wheel	  of	  the	  correct	  Dharma.	  The	  second	  period	  was	  only	  for	  advancing	   those	  who	   cultivate	   the	  Mahayana.	   Relying	  upon	   (the	   teaching	   that)	   all	  
dharmas	  lack	  a	  self-­‐nature	  (he)	  thereby	  (used	  previously)	  hidden	  characteristics	  (of	  
dharmas)	  to	  turn	  the	  wheel	  of	  the	  correct	  Dharma.	  (In)	  the	  third	  period	  in	  order	  to	  universally	   advance	   all	   vehicles,	   (he)	   relied	   upon	   (the	   teaching	   that)	   all	   dharmas	  lack	  a	   self-­‐nature,	   (extending	   the	   idea)	  even	   to	   the	  nature	  of	   lacking	  a	   self-­‐nature.	  (By	  this	  teaching	  he)	  thereby	  revealed	  the	  complete	  characteristic	  (of	  dharmas	  and	  the	  teaching	  about	  dharmas)	  to	  turn	  the	  wheel	  of	  the	  correct	  Dharma.	  	   (We	   can)	   explain	   this	   (by)	  noting	   (that	   if	  we)	  weigh	   this	   text’s	  passage	   the	  first	   (period)	   then	   only	   includes	   Hearers.	   The	   next	   (period)	   then	   only	   includes	  
Bodhisattvas.	   Because	   (these	   two)	   encompass	   (karmic)	   potentials	   (that	   are	  relatively)	   narrow,	   (their	   teachings)	   are	   designated	   as	   not	   (expressing	   the)	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complete	  meaning.	   The	   final	   (period)	   includes	   both	  Hinayana	   and	  Mahayana	   and	  hence	   (it)	   mentions	   the	   phrase	   “universally	   [213c]	   for	   advancing	   all	   vehicles.”	  Furthermore,	   (we	   can	   note	   that	   during)	   the	   first	   (period	   he)	   only	   expounded	   the	  
Hinayana.	   (In	   the)	   next	   (period	  he)	   only	   (expounded)	   the	  Mahayana.	   	   (But)	   these	  two	  expressed	  teachings	  are	  each	  mutually	  deficient.	  Accordingly	  (they)	  are	  (both)	  designated	  “not	  complete.”	  (So,	  during)	  the	   last	  (period	  he)	  completely	  expounded	  the	   two	   teachings	   (thereby)	  utilizing	  and	  encompassing	   the	   two	   (types	  of	  karmic)	  potential.	   This	   (third	   period	   teaching)	   then	   is	   the	   whole	   of	   the	   teachings	   (and)	  accordingly	  it	  is	  designated	  as	  the	  “complete	  teaching.”	  (So,	  in	  light	  of	  this	  we	  see)	  it	  is	  not	  that	  the	  principles	  (taught)	  have	  shallow	  and	  profound	  aspects.	  	  (If	   we)	   further	   weigh	   (the	   implications	   of)	   this	   passage	   (we)	   also	   cannot	  certainly	   classify	   (texts)	   such	   as	   the	   Prajnaparamita	   (sutras)	   as	   second	   period	  teachings.	  (For	  example,	  consider	  this	  point)	  by	  what	  the	  Ta-­‐p’in	  sutra	  says:	  	  If	   a	   person	  wants	   to	   attain	   the	   fruit	   of	   a	   stream-­‐winner	   then	   (that	   person)	  ought	   to	  study	  the	  perfection	  of	  wisdom.	  (One	  ought	   to	  study	  this	  wisdom)	  even	   (if	   one	   has)	   a	   desire	   to	   attain	   (the	   goal	   of)	   the	   fruit	   of	   an	  Arhat,	   and	  (goals)	  such	  as	  unsurpassed	  insight.	  All	   (of	   these	   texts)	   say	   (one)	   should	   study	   the	   perfection	   of	  wisdom	   so	  we	   know	  (texts)	   like	   the	   Prajnaparamita	   sutras	   also	   completely	   encompass	  Mahayana	   and	  
Hinayana	   and	   are	   universal	   expositions	   for	   arousing	   the	   tendency	   toward	  (developing	   an	   understanding	   of)	   all	   the	   vehicles.	   The	  Chih-­‐lun	   also	   says:	   “Within	  this	  Mahayana,	   (its	   teachings	   are	   “great”)	   because	   it	   completely	   encompasses	   the	  two	  groups	  of	  Bodhisattvas	  and	  Hearers.”	  (We	  can)	  explain	  (this	  by)	  noting	  since	  it	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completely	  (contains)	  the	  Two	  Truths,	  (the	  two)	  together	  encompass	  both	  (karmic)	  potentials.	   So,	   (since	   that	   is	   the	   case)	   how	   could	   (this	   text)	   come	   to	   be	   definitely	  classified	  as	  a	  second	  (period)	  teaching?	  For	  this	  reason,	  if	  (we)	  definitively	  classify	  (this	  text)	  as	  a	  perfection	  of	  wisdom	  (teaching)	  then	  (that	  classification)	  opposes	  the	  (idea)	  quoted	  (in)	  the	  (view	  of	  Silabhabhra	  mentioned)	  above.	  (On	  the	  other	  hand,)	  if	  we	  definitively	  take	  hold	  of	  the	  (idea	  of	  a	  temporal	  progression	  of)	  previous	  and	  subsequent	  (teachings),	  then	  (we)	  oppose	  the	  passage	  from	  the	  Vajrapani	  	  sutra.	  For	  this	   reason,	   (we	   might	   note	   that	   the	   first	   classification	   of	   the	   teachings)	   only	  corresponds	  to	  (the	  notion	  that	  in)	  encompassing	  (karmic)	  potentials	  (it)	  has	  broad	  and	  narrow	  (aspects).	  As	  for	  saying	  that	  the	  teachings	  have	  complete	  and	  deficient	  (aspects,	   if	   one	   then)	   classifies	   these	   three	   teachings	   as	   having	   complete	   and	  incomplete	  (qualities,	  it	  means)	  the	  teaching	  of	  the	  principle	  (of	  true	  emptiness)	  is	  lacking	  (in	  those	  teachings	  classified	  as	  “deficient”).	  	   The	   second	   (idea	   of	   the	   teaching)	   corresponds	   to	   encompassing	   (karmic)	  potential	   and	   entering	   the	   Dharma.	   As	   for	   (this	   one),	   the	   gate	   of	   revealing	   the	  increasing	   subtlety	  of	   the	  principle	   (of	   true	  emptiness),	   it	   is	   the	  position	   that	  was	  inherited	   by	   Jnanaprabha.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   (on	   this	   view	   the	   Buddha)	   initially	  expounded	  (the	  idea	  that)	  the	  mind	  and	  its	  objects	  both	  exist.	  (This	  teaching)	  does	  not	  reach	  to	  the	  emptiness	  of	  (self-­‐)	  nature.	  (In	  the)	  next	  (period	  he)	  revealed	  that	  objects	   are	   empty	   (of	   a	   self-­‐nature	   while	   still	   teaching	   that)	   the	   mind	   exists.	  (Accordingly	   then	   at	   this	   point	   he)	   had	   revealed	   one	   portion	   of	   the	   emptiness	   of	  (self-­‐)	  nature.	  Subsequently	  (then	  the	  idea	  that)	  mind	  and	  its	  objects	  are	  both	  empty	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was	  universally	  and	  completely	  revealed.	  (That	  teaching)	  then	  constitutes	  the	  final	  meaning	  (of	  the	  Dharma).	  	  Furthermore,	   (considering	   this	   sequence)	   in	   regards	   to	   conditioned	  production,	   (he)	   initially	   expounded	   (essentially)	   real	   existence,	   next	   (he)	  expounded	   a	   semblance	   of	   existence,	   and	   subsequently	   he	   then	   expounded	   the	  emptiness	   (of	   any	   essential	   nature.	  Now,)	   this	   text	   is	   also	   (one	   that	   expounds	   the	  idea	  that)	  entering	  the	  (final)	  Dharma	  has	  successive	  (stages	  and	  that)	  revealing	  the	  principle	  (of	  emptiness)	  has	  increasing	  (levels	  of)	  subtlety.	  (It	  uses	  this	  notion	  of	  a	  progression)	   to	   thereby	   clarify	   the	   three	   teachings	   (in	   terms	   of)	   complete	   and	  incomplete	  meanings.	  (Now)	  if	  (we)	  determinedly	  grasp	  (at	  the	  particular	  sequence	  of)	  before	  and	  after	  (and)	  determinedly	  classify	   the	  texts	  and	  (their)	  passages	  (thusly,	   then	  these	  texts	  all)	  also	  have	   (points)	  of	  opposition	  and	   injurious	   (contradiction).	  But	   (if	  we	  are	   flexible	   and	   simply)	   adjust	   (them)	   it	   is	   (all)	   understandable.	   Furthermore,	  Silabhadra’s	   (view)	   corresponds	   to	   a	   classification	   of	   the	   teachings	   that	   takes	   (all	  the)	  teachings	  together	  as	  the	  final	  meaning	  (of	  the	  Dharma).	  Jnanaprabha’s	  (view)	  corresponds	   to	   a	   classification	   of	   the	   principle	   (of	   emptiness	   and)	   takes	   the	  profundity	  of	  (that)	  principle	  as	  the	  final	  meaning	  (of	  the	  Dharma).	  For	  this	  reason	  that	  upon	  which	  the	  two	  expositions	  rely	  is	  different.	  The	  divisions	  revealed	  thusly	  (each	  have	  their)	  superior	  and	  inferior	  (points.	  Accordingly)	  shallow	  and	  profound	  (aspects)	  regarding	  these	  (ways	  of	  approaching	  the	  question)	  are	  evident.	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[IV.	  The	  Karmic	  Potentials	  Covered	  by	  this	  Text]	  As	   for	   the	   fourth	   (major	   point	   for	   explanation,)	   the	   (range	   of	   karmic)	  potentials	  that	  this	  teaching	  covers,	  regarding	  (karmic	  types)	  within	  the	  Mahayana,	  I	  personally	   divide	   it	   into	   two	   teachings.	   If	   we	   depend	   upon	   (my	   category	   of)	   the	  Initial	   Teaching	   of	   the	   Mahayana,14	   (among)	   all	   sentient	   beings	   (there	   are)	  distinctions	  of	  five	  natures.15	  Among	  them,	  only	  the	  Bodhisattva	  type	  nature	  and	  the	  undetermined	  nature	  are	  (those)	  this	  text	  is	  (suited)	  for.	  The	  others	  are	  not	  right	  for	  (this	   text)	  and	  combined	  there	   is	  no	  opposition	  (between	  the	  two	  types	   for	  whom	  this	   text	   is	   intended).	   Considering	   this	   Treatise’s	   tenets	   (to	   be)	   the	   same	   as	   the	  perfection	   of	   wisdom,	   it	   thusly	   combines	   and	   benefits	   the	   two	   teachings	   (for	   the	  sake	  of	  certain)	  men	  and	  Gods.	  If	  we	  depend	  upon	  (my	  category	  of)	  the	  Final	  Teaching	  of	  the	  Mahayana,	  then	  all	  sentient	  beings	  (without	  exception	  are	  those)	  this	  text	  is	  (suited)	  for.	  Taking	  the	  recent	  expositions	  of	  the	  five	  natures,	  although	  there	  are	  distinctions	  (among	  them),	  because	   distant	   (older)	   treatises	   each	   (say)	   they	   [i.e.,	   sentient	   beings]	   will	   (all)	  attain	  insight,	  (we	  can)	  take	  (this	  as	  meaning)	  [214a]	  all	  (sentient	  beings)	  have	  the	  mind	  (that	  seeks	  insight	  and)	  each	  has	  Buddha-­‐nature.	  Regarding	   people	   who	   slander	   the	  Mahayana,	   in	   the	  Buddha-­‐nature	   sastra	  because	   for	   an	   immeasurable	   period	   these	   (individuals)	   are	   unable	   to	   arouse	   the	  mind	   (that	   seeks	   insight),	   it	   explains	   (this	   by)	   designating	   (them	   as)	   “lacking	  Buddha-­‐nature.”	   (Nevertheless)	   it	   does	   not	   claim	   that	   ultimately	   they	   lack	   a	   pure	  (Buddha-­‐)nature	  because	  each	  (and	  everyone	  does	  eventually)	  attain	  unsurpassed	  insight.	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(If	   we)	   rely	   upon	   (texts)	   like	   the	   Ratnagotravibhaga	   and	   the	  Wu-­‐shang	   yi	  
sutra,	  after	  establishing	  (clear	  understanding	  of)	  the	  two	  vehicles’	  (idea)	  of	  entering	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[V.	  The	  Nature	  of	  the	  Teachings	  Illustrated	  by	  the	  Text]	  
As	  for	  the	  fifth	  (major	  point	  for	  explanation,)	  analyzing	  the	  essential	  (nature)	  of	   the	   teaching	  (this	   text)	  can	   illustrate,	   (by)	   taking	  names,	  phrases,	  passages,	  and	  the	   sounds	   that	   are	  dependent	   (on	   them)	  as	   constituting	   the	  particular	  nature	   (of	  the	   Dharma),	   some	   say	   five	   principles	   constitute	   (the	   essential)	   nature	   (of	   the	  Buddha’s	   teaching.	   The	   five	   principles	   are:)	   1.	   names,	   2.	   phrases,	   3.	   recitation,	   4.	  letters,	   (and)	   5.	   sounds.	   Accordingly,	   (if	   we)	   thoroughly	   discuss	   these	   essential	  (natures	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  the	  Dharma,)	   in	  general	  there	  are	  four	   levels	  (of	  understanding	   possible	   for	   the	   five	   principles).	   The	   first	   (level	   of	   understanding)	  corresponds	   to	   phenomena	   (and)	   completely	   (includes)	   the	   two	   teachings	   of	   the	  false	   and	   real	   as	   analyzed	  above.	  The	   second	   corresponds	   to	   the	   real	   (as	  ultimate	  and	   this	   level)	   takes	   the	   false	   as	   returning	   to	   the	   real.	   (This	   understanding)	   only	  considers	  sound	  as	  the	  (essential)	  nature	  (of	  the	  Dharma).	  The	  third	  corresponds	  to	  a	  semblance	  of	  (the	  real).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (according	  to	  this	  understanding)	  only	  the	  seemingly	   (real)	   sounds	   manifested	   by	   consciousness	   constitute	   the	   (essential)	  nature	  (of	  the	  Dharma).	  The	  fourth	  (level)	  corresponds	  to	  (an	  understanding	  of	  the	  essentially	   empty)	   nature	   (of	   all	   arisings).	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   these	   sounds	   (of	   the	  
Dharma)	  are	  exactly	  empty	  (of	  essential	  nature,	  so)	  there	  is	  no	  nature,	  no	  names,	  no	  sound.	   Lacking	   no-­‐names,	   lacking	   no-­‐sound,	   (this	   idea	   then)	   constitutes	   the	  particular	  nature	  (of	  the	  Dharma).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (with	  this	  level	  one	  understands)	  the	  nature	  of	  abandoning	  (an	  essential)	  nature	  (-­‐	  even	  a	  no-­‐nature	  nature).	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[VI.	  Central	  	  Tenets	  and	  Paths	  Covered	  by	  the	  Text]	  
As	   for	   the	   sixth	   (major	  point	   for	   explanation),	   the	   central	   tenets	   and	  paths	  that	  are	  illustrated	  (by	  the	  text),	  this	  means	  that	  which	  the	  words	  present	  is	  referred	  to	  as	   “tenets”	  and	   that	   to	  which	   the	   tenets	   return	   is	   called	   the	   “path.”	  Accordingly	  (we	  can)	   take	   (the	   text’s)	   twelve	  gates’	   (various	   forms	  of)	  breaking	  attachment	  as	  (its)	   tenets,	   and	   (their	   process	   of)	   revealing	   the	   principle	   (of	   emptiness),	   of	  completing	  practice,	  and	  of	  entering	  the	  Dharma	  as	  the	  paths.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  turning	  (the	  followers	  of)	  the	  two	  vehicles	  (from	  their	  erroneous	  views)	  and	  causing	  (them)	  to	  enter	  the	  Mahayana	  is	  its	  intention.	  	  
Generally	   speaking,	   although	   it	   is	   as	   (just	   outlined),	   in	   that	   (broad	   idea	  we	  might	  further)	  differentiate	  and	  in	  brief	  make	  (note	  of)	  four	  aspects	  (concerning	  the	  Author’s	   intent.	  1.	   (He	   intends	  to)	  generally	  clarify	  (sutras	  and	  sastras	   in	  order	  to)	  establish	  and	  refute	  conventional	  modes	  (of	  thinking).	  2.	  (He	  intends	  to)	  specifically	  select	   (and	  deal	  with	   the	  particular	  misunderstandings)	   that	  are	  refuted	  herein.	  3.	  (He	  intends	  to)	  generally	  report	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  three	  treatises.	  4.	  (He	  intends	  to)	  unite	  various	  different	  expositions.	  
[General	  Clarification]	  
As	   for	   the	   first,	   generally	   clarifying	   the	   sutras	   and	   sastras	   to	   establish	   (key	  propositions)	  and	  refute	  conventional	  modes	   (of	   thinking,	  within)	   the	  great	  net	  of	  the	   Buddha	  Dharma	   there	   are	   two	   types	   (of	   teachings).	   The	   first,	   for	   (those	   of	   a)	  superior	  grade	  of	  unadulterated	  (karmic)	  potential,	  directly	  reveals	  the	  meaning	  of	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the	   Dharma.	   (This	   version)	   does	   not	   establish	   (key	   propositions)	   and	   does	   not	  refute	  (conventional	  modes	  of	  thinking).	  The	  second,	  for	  (those	  of)	  intermediate	  and	  low	  grade	  assorted	  (karmic)	  potentials,	  (uses)	  skilfull	  means	  to	  reveal	  (the	  meaning	  of	  the	  Dharma.	  With	  this	  version)	  there	  is	  establishment	  (of	  key	  propositions)	  and	  there	   is	   refutation	   (of	   conventional	  modes	  of	   thinking).	   	  When	   the	  Buddha	  was	   in	  the	  world	  (he)	  mostly	  clarified	  the	  first	  meaning	  and	  along	  with	  that,	  (secondarily)	  clarified	  the	  latter.	  (The	  primary	  meaning	  is)	  like	  that	  which	  is	  distinguished	  in	  the	  various	   sutras.	   After	   the	   Buddha’s	   nirvana	   (followers)	   mostly	   clarified	   the	   latter	  meaning	   and	   along	   with	   that	   (only	   secondarily)	   clarified	   the	   first	   meaning.	   (This	  secondary	  meaning)	  is	  as	  that	  which	  is	  distinguished	  in	  the	  various	  sastras.	  	  Now	   regarding	   this	   (text)	   there	   are	   established	   (propositions)	   and	  refutations	  and	  therein	  (we	  can)	  briefly	  note	  three	  phrases	  to	  reveal	  its	  divisions	  (in	  approaching	   truth).	   1.	   (It)	   clearly	   refutes	   (erroneous	   thinking).	   2.	   (It)	   clearly	  establishes	   (correct	   meaning).	   	   3.	   (It	   clarifies	   that)	   both	   distinctions	   lack	  obstruction.	  
[Clear	  Refutation]	  As	   for	   the	   first,	   by	   means	   of	   great	   compassion	   Noble	   Ones	   falsify	   various	  (incorrect)	   words	   and	   treatises,	   refute	   and	   eliminate	   attachments	   to	   views,	   and	  attend	  to	  driving	  off	  their	  illnesses.	  (If	  we)	  speak	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  (technically)	  correct	  determination	   (in	   some	   of	   the	   refutations,	   and)	   now	   relate	   (that)	   to	   the	  characteristic	  (forms	  of	  typical	  refutation),	  there	  are	  five	  (types	  to	  note.)	  The	  first	  is	  refutation	  by	  absurd	  evidence.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (this	  is)	  like	  (when)	  the	  Buddha	  refuted	  the	  long-­‐nailed	  Brahmacarin17	  saying	  [214b]	  if	  you,	  (in	  regards	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to)	   every	   (proposition,)	   do	   not	   accept	   (them),	   do	   (you)	   also	   accept	   this	   “do	   not	  accept”?	   As	   this	   type	   (of	   person)	   already	   has	   mature	   faculties,	   (this	   sort	   of	  approach)	  consequently	  produces	  shame	  (at	  one’s	  own	  ignorance.	  At	  that	  time	  the	  individual)	  attains	  the	  effect	  (of	  correct	  and	  determinate	  understanding).	  The	  second	  is	  refutation	  in	  accord	  with	  what	  is	  suitable.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (this	  is)	   like	   (when)	   the	  Buddha	  observed	   the	   suitability	  of	   sentient	  beings’	   faculties.	   If	  (they	   might)	   by	   that	   power	   attain	   entry	   into	   the	   Dharma,	   then	   accordingly	   (he)	  would	  use	   that	  and	  refute	   their	   (incorrect)	  reckonings,	   leading	   them	  to	  awaken	  to	  the	  Path.	  (That	  sort	  of	  approach)	  certainly	  does	  not	  yet	  present	  the	  various	  rules	  of	  formal	   reasoning.18	   This	   (sort	   of	   refutation)	   is	   for	   (those	   of	   the)	   superior	   roots	  rarely	   produced	   in	   the	   preceding	   (type	   of	   individual.	   Even	   so	   these	   individuals)	  await	  the	  Buddha’s	  many	  words	  and	  (only)	  then	  are	  faithful	  and	  submit	  (to	  correct	  thinking.	   For	   example,	   this	   type	   of	   case	   is)	   just	   like	   (when	   he)	   refuted	   the	   senika	  heterodoxy.19	  These	  above	   two	   types	   (of	   refutation	  and	   their	   illustrations)	   correspond	   to	  (methods	  of)	  refuting	  heterodox	  (ideas).	   If	   (we)	  relate	  (them)	  to	  refuting	  (ideas	  of	  the)	  Two	  Vehicles,	  it	  is	  as	  in	  the	  Lotus	  Sutra	  (where	  it	  says,)	  “The	  nirvana	  your	  types	  attain	   is	   not	   a	   true	   extinction	   of	   (samsaric)	   passage.”	   Accordingly	   (and	   as	   above,	  upon	  hearing	   this	  sort	  of	  pronouncement	   the	  errors)	  are	  refuted.	  Similarly,	   (those	  passages	   that)	   refute	   the	   equality	   of	   the	   three	   refuges	   also	   conform	   to	   this	  (approach).	  	   The	  third	  (form	  is)	  refutation	  in	  accord	  with	  attachments.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (this	  is)	   as	   (the	   approach	   taken	   in)	   the	   Three	   Treatises	   composed	   by	   Nagarjuna	   and	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Aryadeva.	   (This	   approach)	   counters	   those	   heterodoxies	   and	  Hinayana	   (views)	   in	  accord	  with	  that	  to	  which	  they	  are	  attached.	  By	  means	  of	  assorted	  reasonings	  (this	  approach)	   subtly	   refutes	   their	   reckonings.	   (This)	   necessarily	   causes	   the	   attached	  mind	   to	   lack	   a	   lodging	   (point	   so	   that	   it)	   accords	  with	   and	   enters	   true	   emptiness.	  (This	  realization)	  then	  completes	  the	  benefits	  (of	  refutation.	  Since	  the	  point	  has	  then	  been	  realized,)	  what	  need	  is	  there	  to	  complete	  the	  three	  aspect	  and	  five	  part	  (forms	  of	   formal,	   technically	   accurate)	   inferential	   reasoning?	   Because,	   moreover,	   (the)	  faculties	   (of	   these	   individuals)	   are	   superior,	   (they)	   easily	   accept	   (the	   refutations,)	  enter	  (correct	  understanding,	  and)	  are	  not	  falsely	  influenced.	  	   The	   fourth	   is	   refutation	  by	  presenting	   illustrative	   reasoning.	  That	   is	   to	   say,	  (this	   is)	   like	   the	  Fang-­‐pien	  hsin	   lun	   and	   the	  Hui-­‐cheng	   lun	   composed	  by	  Nagarjuna	  and	   the	   Tarka-­‐sastra	   composed	   by	   Vasubandhu.	   Together	   each	   presents	   worldly	  causes	  and	  clarifies	  the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  three	  aspect	  and	  five	  part	  (forms	  of	  formal)	  inference.	   (Such)	   sharp	   edged	   inference	   refutes	   (erroneous)	   reckoning	   and	   will	  certainly	   reveal	   the	   true	  Dharma	   while	   also	   not	   preserving	   (attachments	   to)	   this	  
Dharma	  of	  comparative	  inference.	  For	  this	  reason,	   in	  this	  Treatise	  a	   later	  (section)	  itself	  refutes	  this	  (very	  sort	  of	  reasoning).	  The	  faculties	  which	  this	  (approach)	  is	  for	  are	  (only)	  slightly	  inferior	  to	  the	  preceding	  so	  the	  functional	  merits	  are	  plentiful.	  	   The	   fifth	   is	   refutation	   by	   direct	   reasoning.	   	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   (this	   is)	   like	   the	  
Hetu-­‐vidya	   sastra	   and	   others	   composed	   by	   Dignaga	   and	   the	   Prajnapradipa-­‐
mulamadhyamaka-­‐	   vritti	   and	   the	   Tarka-­‐jvala	   composed	   by	   Bhavaviveka.	   (These	  texts)	   together	   rely	   on	   the	   reckoning	   of	   direct	   reasoning	   such	   as	   (precisely)	  determining	   the	   proposition,	   reason,	   and	   example	   (for	   the	   three	   part	   syllogistic	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form.	  When	  these	  reasonings)	  depart	  from	  the	  errors	  of	  other	  propositions	  and	  lack	  mistakes	  of	  contradiction	  then	  (they)	  come	  to	  constitute	  a	  refutation	  (that	  is)	  truly	  capable	   (of	   establishing	   truth.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,)	   in	   regards	   to	   the	   proposition	  (and/or	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  syllogism,)	  if	  they	  do	  not	  expertly	  depart	  from	  errors	  (of	  logical	  analysis,	  then	  they	  are)	  designated	  refutations	  that	  are	  seemingly	  capable	  (of	  establishing	   truth)	   and	   are	   (rightly	   considered)	   refutations	   that	   do	   not	   complete	  (the	  requirements	  of	  formal	  reasoning).	  Because	  the	  faculties	  that	  are	  countered	  by	  this	   (form	   of	   reasoning)	   are	   the	   most	   inferior	   (of	   all,	   their)	   attached	   views	   are	  deeply	  layered	  and	  as	  a	  result	  it	  is	  difficult	  (for	  such	  individuals)	  to	  accept	  and	  enter	  (into	   truth).	   	  Broadly	   (speaking)	  by	  means	  of	   the	   logical	   reasoning	   (found)	  within	  the	  five	  worldly	  illuminations20	  (these	  individuals)	  squarely	  reason	  (the	  distinctions	  between)	   “is”	   and	   “is	   not”	   and	   then	   begin	   to	   believe	   (in	   the	  Dharma)	   and	   subdue	  (misunderstanding).	   If	   (one)	   reaches	   this	   stage	   (of	   explanation)	   and	   (the	   student)	  still	  does	  not	  believe	  (in	  the	  Dharma)	  and	  subdue	  (misunderstanding,)	  the	  extreme	  (degree)	  of	  their	  stupidity	  is	  inexpressible.	  As	  a	  result	  (at	  this	  point	  one	  has	  reached	  the	   end	   of	   applicable	   approaches	   and	   these	   forms	   of	   refutation)	   do	   not	   further	  extend	  to	  a	  sixth	  aspect.	  	   [Establishing	  Correct	  Meaning]	   	  	   As	  for	  the	  second	  (phrase	  I’m	  using	  to	  note	  divisions	  in	  this	  text’s	  approach	  to	   truth,	   that	   of)	   establishing	   (correct)	   meaning,	   (even	   though)	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  
Dharma	  departs	  from	  words,	  (with	  the	  appropriate	  karmic)	  potential	  and	  conditions	  a	   rare	   awakening	   (can	   occur.	   Accordingly,)	   sages	   compassionately	   and	   skillfully	  elicit	   (that	  karmic	   potential)	   and	   earnestly	   cause	  hidden	  benefits	   (that),	   in	   accord	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with	   conditions,	   lead	   to	   establishing	   (correct)	   meaning	   (and)	   influentially	  transforming	  many	  points	  (of	  the	  student’s	  circumstances).	  	  (However,	  to)	  broadly	  summarize	  and	  speak	  (of	  the	  many	  possible	  forms	  of	  eliciting	  karmic	  potential,	  we	  might	  note	  they)	  also	  have	  their	  five	  (basic	  types).	  	  First,	   (teachers)	   establish	   (correct	   meaning)	   in	   response	   to	   (karmic)	  potential.	  (This	  approach	  is)	  as	  in	  the	  Nirvana	  sutra	  (where)	  heterodox	  (followers)	  view	   the	  Buddha’s	  golden	   forms,	  body,	  etc.,	   and	  say,	   “Although	  Gautama	   is	  a	  good	  person,	   (he)	  distorts	  principles	   and	   expounds	   emptiness	   -­‐	   a	   view	   that	   severs	   (the	  
karmic	  continuum).”	  The	  Buddha	  [214c]	  then	  informed	  them	  saying,	  “I	  do	  not	  speak	  of	  emptiness.	  Because	  all	  sentient	  beings	  have	  Buddha-­‐nature,	  they	  have	  eternal	  joy,	  personal	   purity,	   and	   so	   forth.”	   Hearing	   (this	   and	   having)	   already	   entered	   the	  
Dharma,	  (they)	  subsequently	  awaken	  to	  the	  traces	  of	  the	  Path.	  And	  yet,	  actually,	  in	  the	   literature	   “Buddha-­‐nature”	   connotes	   emptiness’	   first	   (level)	   of	   meaning.	   For	  those	  who	  fear	  emptiness	  like	  this	  type	  the	  Lankavatara	  sutra	  expounds	  (ideas	  such	  as	   that)	   the	  Tathagatagarbha	   has	   thirty-­‐two	   characteristics.	   (This)	   text’s	   intent	   is	  the	  same	  and	  (its	  point	  is)	  completely	  like	  the	  (Nirvana)	  sutra’s	  exposition.	  	   Second,	   (teachers)	  establish	  (correct	  meaning	  by)	  refutation.	  That	   is	   to	  say,	  this	  is	  as	  Nagarjuna’s	  (approach)	  in	  the	  three	  treatises.	  (There,)	  in	  accord	  with	  (the	  practice	   of)	   refuting	   their	   attachments	   to	   the	   point	   of	   complete	   extinction,	   (he	  produces	   circumstances	   where)	   the	   mind	   lacks	   (any	   place	   to)	   lodge	   and	   so	   true	  emptiness	  is	  conveniently	  revealed.	   	  (Accordingly,	  this)	  then	  constitutes	  (a	  method	  of)	   establishing	   (correct	   meaning).	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   it	   is	   an	   establishing	   without	  establishment.	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   Third,	  (teachers)	  establish	  (correct	  meaning)	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  time	  period.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  is	  like	  when	  the	  Buddhas	  and	  Bodhisattvas	  of	  a	  time	  period	  (notice)	  there	   are	   heterodox	   criticisms	   (of	   the	  Dharma	   and	   so,	   for	   example,)	   conveniently	  establish	   two	   collections	   (of	   dharmas.	   In	   doing	   so,	   they)	   take	   countering	   (the	  anxieties	  of)	  the	  burdened	  as	  (the	  occasion	  for	  pointing	  out	  the	  existence	  of)	  proven	  meaning.21	   It	   is	   like	   (when)	   a	   person’s	   two	   shoulders	   have	   a	   load	   (and	   they	   are	  unable	  to	  carry	  anymore.	  At	  times	  like	  that,)	  the	  meaning	  is	  (presented	  as)	  already	  ultimately	  complete.	  Subsequently	  (though),	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  Great	  Assembly22	  they	  conveniently	  establish	  (a	  more	  complete)	  five	  collections	  (of	  dharmas.	  At	  that	  time,	  regarding)	   its	  basis,	   the	  heterodox	  (believers)	  then	  ask,	  “If	   it	   is	   thus,	   then	  why	  did	  you	   previously	   establish	   (only)	   two?”	   The	   answer	   (to	   this	   question	   is	   that)	   the	  previous	  (version	  was	  for)	  responding	  to	  (anxieties	  of)	  the	  burdened	  (and)	  further,	  (to	  help)	  those	  without	  knowledge.	  Now,	  (this	  version)	  responds	  to	  the	  assembly	  of	  the	   knowledgeable	   (and	   so)	   then	   completely	   expounds	   (the	   five	   collections.	   The	  third	  approach	  to	  teaching)	  is	  like	  this	  type	  (of	  method).	  	   Fourth,	  (teachers)	  establish	  (correct	  meaning	  by)	  overthrowing	  evil.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (this)	  is	  as	  (when)	  the	  Buddhas	  and	  Bodhisattvas	  respond	  to	  heterodoxies	  of	  the	  eight	  directions	  and	  establish	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  Three	  Jewels.	  If	  (they	  find	  that)	  the	   (various)	   views	   of	   existence	   oppress	   (people),	   then	   (they	   rightly)	   ought	   to	  behead	   (those	   views,	   putting	   them)	   to	   death.	   Although	   they	   attack,	   the	   group	  opposing	  (will	  find	  that)	  the	  principles	  (of	  the	  Dharma	  are)	  unsinkable.	  Accordingly,	  this	  causes	  the	  heterodox	  to	  return	  to	  faith	  and	  enter	  the	  Dharma.	  (The	  arguments)	  which	  are	  established	  (by)	  this	  sort	  (of	  approach)	  do	  not	  necessarily	  have	  the	  three	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member,	   five	   part	   (form	   of	   formal)	   analytical	   reasoning.	   Yet,	   by	   means	   of	   a	  revelatory	  exposition	  of	  superior	  analysis	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  time,	  (they)	  cause	  the	  meaning	  (of	  the	  Dharma)	  to	  be	  firmly	  (established)	  and	  lead	  (the	  deluded)	  to	  faith	  and	  submission	  (to	  the	  truth).	  	  Also,	  as	  a	  result,	  (their)	  words	  lack	  (any	  essential	  and	  therefore	  contradictory)	  positions.	  	   Fifth,	   (teachers)	   establish	   (correct	  meaning)	  by	  direct	   reasoning.	  That	   is	   to	  say,	   	  (this	  approach)	  must	  rely	  on	  the	  worldly	  logic	  of	  (formal)	  reasoning	  (that,)	  in	  regards	   to	   propositions,	   reasons,	   and	   examples,	   lacks	   the	   various	   types	   of	  (technical)	   errors.	   (Accomplishing	   that	   means)	   the	   principle	   is	   ultimately	  completed.	  (This	  approach	  is)	  designated	  as	  “truly	  capable	  of	  proving.”	  If	  in	  regards	  to	   the	   proposition,	   etc.,	   there	   is	   erroneous	   slippage,	   (this)	   is	   designated	   as	  “seemingly	  capable	  of	  proving.”	  	  (This	  approach)	  is	  incomplete	  proof.	  Furthermore,	  (this	   is)	   like	  using	   the	  eight	   types	  of	   reasoning	  by	  comparative	   inference	   to	  verify	  that	   the	  Mahayana	   sutras	   truly	   are	   the	   Buddha’s	   words.	   Therefore	   (you)	   should	  know	  (this)	  is	  like	  the	  meaning	  of	  establishment	  and	  refutation	  expounded	  above.	  	  	  Together	   (these	   forms	   of	   teaching)	   are	   all	   skillful	  means.	   (They)	   attend	   to	  leading	  the	  preceding	  (types	  of	  karmic)	  potentials	  to	  return	  (to	  the	  Dharma),	  submit	  (to	   truth),	   and	   produce	   faith.	   (Even	   so,	   they)	   do	   not	   necessarily	   come	   to	   the	  profound	   purport	   of	   the	   complete	   Buddha	  Dharma.	   Moreover,	   (they	   can	   be)	   like	  (proofs	   of)	   Thusness	   that	   lack	   examples	   (showing	   it)	   is	   the	   same	   as	   dharmas.	  Consequently,	   (due	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   an	   example,)	   these	   (cases)	   do	   not	   attain	   (the	  technical	   status	  of)	  proven,	   (but)	  how	   is	   it	  possible	  Thusness	   is	  not	  dharmas?	  For	  this	  reason	  (one)	  ought	  to	  (eventually)	  leave	  these	  debates	  on	  establishing	  (correct	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meaning)	  and	  refuting	  (errors.	  Only	  by	  doing	  so	  will	  understanding)	  then	  constitute	  the	  ultimate	  meaning	  that	  accords	  with	  the	  Real.	  
[Nonobstruction	  of	  Establishing	  Truth	  and	  Refuting	  Errors]	  	   As	  for	  the	  third	  (phrase	  I	  am	  using	  to	  denote	  divisions	  in	  this	  text’s	  approach	  to	  truth,	  that	  of)	  the	  nonobstruction	  of	  establishing	  (correct	  meaning)	  and	  refuting	  (errors,	  if	  one)	  considers	  (the	  possibility)	  that	  sensuous	  attachments	  do	  not	  (refute)	  the	  principle	  (of	  emptiness,	  one)	  then	  will	  (see	  that	  their)	  essence	  is	  emptiness.	  (In	  turn,	   that)	  brings	   about	   (an	  understanding	  of)	   the	  nonrefuting	   refutation,	   (or,	   put	  another	  way,)	  that	  refutation	  is	  nonrefutation.	  If	  (one)	  is	  attached	  to	  the	  refutation	  of	  existence,	  (that	  attachment)	  in	  turn	  is	  the	  same	  as	  that	  which	  is	  refuted.	  For	  this	  reason	  (the	  refutation	  itself)	  is	  not	  refutation.	  Now,	  since	  there	  is	  not	  that	  which	  is	  refuted,	   therefore	   consider	   nonrefutation	   as	   refutation	   and	   accordingly	  (attachments	   to)	   that	   which	   can	   (refute)	   and	   that	   which	   is	   (refuted)	   are	   both	  severed.	  A	  mind	  lacking	  (any	  place)	  of	  lodging	  constitutes	  ultimate	  refutation.	  Take	  up	  this	  idea	  and	  consider	  it	  (but)	  do	  not	  latch	  on	  to	  the	  words.	  	  Furthermore,	   considering	   (the	   fact)	   that	   the	   Dharma	   surpasses	   sensation,	  (in)	  what	  [215a]	  mode	  (could	  it)	  come	  to	  be	  established?	  (If	  it)	  corresponds	  to	  the	  “seemingly	   established”	   of	   sensation,	   (then	   the)	   established	   is	   exactly	   the	  nonestablished.	   If	   (one)	   can	   comprehend	   that	   this	   establishment	   is	  nonestablishment,	   	   (this)	   establishment	   of	   nonestablishment	   constitutes	   final	  establishment.	   If	   (however,)	  as	  words,	  (one)	  takes	  up	  “establishment,”	   then	  that	   is	  the	   reckoning	   of	   sensations.	   Because	   (such	   “establishment”)	   is	   not	   that	   which	   is	  established,	  accordingly	  nonestablishment	   is	   (ultimately	   the	  case).	  For	   this	   reason	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(all	  reckoning)	  within	  sensations	  also	  lacks	  establishment	  and	  because	  (of	  this,	  such	  reckoning)	  is	  not	  the	  (final)	  Dharma.	  (But	  reckoning)	  outside	  sensations	  also	  lacks	  establishment	  because	  it	  lacks	  (the)	  dependently	  (produced)	  contrasts	  (required	  for	  establishment).	  Yet,	  (even	  so	  one)	  may	  consider	  sensations	  and	  (thereby)	  enter	  the	  
Dharma.	  Establishment	  is	  exactly	  the	  absence	  of	  establishment	  (and)	  the	  absence	  of	  establishment	  is	  exactly	  establishment.	  (If	  one)	  takes	  up	  the	  idea	  and	  thinks	  about	  it,	  the	  point	  may	  be	  seen.	  	   This	   (point)	   refers	   to	   establishment	   and	   refutation	   being	   confused	   (by	   the	  deluded).	   As	   yet	   there	   has	   not	   been	   an	   exposition	   (so	   that	   those	  with)	   concealed	  (karmic)	  potential	   (might)	  enter	   the	  Dharma.	   (But	  consider	   this:)	  what	  opposition	  could	  there	  be?	  Furthermore,	  by	  driving	  off	  (the	  false	  reckoning	  of)	  sensation,	  there	  is	   nothing	   that	   does	   not	   correspond	   to	   the	   principle	   (of	   emptiness).	   Therefore,	  (with)	  refutation	  there	  is	  no	  nonestablishment	  and	  (with)	  establishing	  the	  Dharma	  there	   is	  no	  noncancellation	  of	  sensation.	  Therefore,	  with	  establishment	  there	   is	  no	  nonrefutation.	   (Given)	   this,	   because	   refutation	   is	   exactly	   establishment,	   therefore	  there	   is	   no	   refutation.	   (Because)	   establishment	   is	   exactly	   refutation,	   there	   is	   no	  establishing.	  Nonestablishment	  and	  nonrefutation	  do	  not	  obstruct	  establishing	  and	  refuting.	  For	  this	  reason,	  establishing	  and	  refuting	  are	  one	  while	  yet	  constantly	  two;	  two	  while	   yet	   always	  one.	  Existence	  does	  not	   obstruct	   emptiness,	   emptiness	  does	  not	   obstruct	   existence.	   This	   refers	   to	   the	   great	   idea	   of	   the	   nonobstruction	   of	  establishment	  and	  refutation.	  
[Specific	  Selection	  of	  Points	  for	  Refutation]	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   As	   for	   the	   second	   (of	   the	   four	   points	   concerning	   the	   Author’s	   intentions),	  determining	  that	  which	  it	  refutes,	  there	  are	  masters	  who	  explain	  saying	  this	  Three	  Treatise	  school	  only	  refutes	  the	  “real	  self”	  and	  “real	  dharmas”	  that	  are	  grasped	  at	  by	  the	   Hinayanas’	   and	   heterodoxies’	   (erroneous)	   universal	   reckonings23	   (about	  
dharmas.	  Those	  masters	  claim	  that	  this	  school)	  does	  not	  refute	  the	  Mahayana	  (view)	  of	  a	  nature	  that	  arises	  dependent	  on	  another.	  (They	  say	  this	  school	  does	  not	  refute	  dependent	  arisings)	  because	  this	  illusory	  existence	  [i.e.,	  dependence	  on	  another]	  is	  not	   an	   error	   and	   if	   this	   (view)	   is	   also	   refuted,	   then	   (such	   an	   approach	   must	   be	  considered)	   the	   evil	   of	   nihilism	   that	   takes	   collected	   (notions)	   of	   (absolute)	  emptiness	  (as	  ultimately	  true.	   It	   is	  not	  surprising	  then	  that	  they	  claim	  such	  views)	  are	  not	  the	  true	  Dharma	  as	  a	  result.	  (On	  the	  other	  hand)	  there	  are	  (those	  who)	  state	  (that	  in)	  the	  Three	  Treatise	  (school)	  everything	  is	  refuted.	  (On	  this	  view	  the	  school)	  sets	  up	   (proofs	  where	   the	  various	  notions	  of)	  dependence	  upon	  another,	   (such	  as	  those)	  established	  (by)	  treatises	  like	  (those	  of)	  the	  Mahayana	  Yogacara,	  (are)	  herein	  also	  refuted.	  (They	  assert	  this)	  because	  (according	  to	  this	  view,	  among	  the)	  various	  dependent	  productions	  there	  is	  no	  (arising	  which)	  is	  not	  empty.	  (According	  to	  this	  view)	   if	   (this	  misunderstanding)	   is	  not	   refuted,	   (illusory)	  perception	   is	  not	   ruined	  and	  the	  principle	  (of	  the	  true	  Dharma)	  is	  not	  exhausted.	  	   Question:	  (With)	  two	  explanations	  like	  this,	  is	  there	  a	  (way	  to)	  harmoniously	  combine	  them	  or	  not?	  	   Answer:	   There	   are	   masters	   who	   say	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   harmoniously	  combine	   (them.	   They)	   also	   (say)	   do	   not	   expect	   a	   strong	   combination	   (to	   emerge	  from	   any	   such	   effort).	   Taking	   this	   (view)	   then,	   within	   the	  Mahayana	   the	   various	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sections	  are	  not	  the	  same,	  and	  this	  leads	  to	  (a	  situation	  where)	  there	  are	  conflicting	  debates.	   (This	   is	   just)	   like	   the	   various	   Arhats	   within	   the	  Hinayana	   (whose	   views	  found	  in)	  different	  	  sections	  (of	  the	  canon)	  do	  	  extend	  to	  (one	  another).	  One	  should	  know	  the	  different	  sections	  of	  the	  Bodhisattva	   (canon)	  are	  also	  thus.	  Consequently	  (we)	  may	  not	  (take	  it)	  as	  strange	  (that	  there	  is	  disagreement	  in	  the	  canon).	  For	  good	  reason	   the	   Buddha	  Dharma’s	   ultimate	   (truth)	   is	   exceedingly	   profound,	   pervading	  (all)	   their	  different	  debates.	  Each	  (view)	  has	  a	  principle	  of	   the	   teachings	  (and)	   the	  meanings	  (of	  those	  views	  are)	  individually	  and	  ultimately	  complete.	  Therefore,	  they	  may	  not	  be	  combined.	  	  Now,	  	  (going	  even)	  further,	  (with	  these	  variously)	  layered	  explanations	  there	  is	   nothing	   that	   may	   not	   be	   combined	   because	   the	   principle	   (of	   true	   emptiness)	  individually	  pervades	  (them	  all).	  	   (Question:)	  How	  so?	  	   (Answer:)	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   if	   (one)	   does	   not	   refute	   the	   illusory	   existence	   of	  dependence	  upon	  another,	  leading	  to	  (an	  understanding	  that	  such	  existents)	  do	  not	  (ultimately)	   exist,	   as	   a	   consequence	   attachments	   to	   those	   universally	   reckoned	  (illusions)	   are	   not	   eternally	   exhausted.	   Because	   this	   illusory	   existence	   is	   a	  “nonexisting	   existence,”	   if	   (one)	   does	   not	   accept	   not	   existing,	   that	   (view	   then)	   is	  exactly	   that	   to	   which	   (one)	   is	   attached.	   Therefore,	   (in	   order	   to)	   refute	   (such)	  attachments,	   desiring	   to	   bring	   about	   exhaustion	   of	   (the	   mind’s)	   agitation,	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  reach	  the	  boundary	  of	  the	  nonexistence	  of	  illusory	  existence.	  (It	  is	  due	  to	   the)	   need	   to	   refute	   illusory	   existence	   to	   cause	   its	   eternal	   exhaustion	   (that	   one	  can)	  then	  reach	  the	  boundary	  of	  the	  nonexisting	  (illusory	  existence)	  to	  which	  one	  is	  
	   36	  
attached.	  For	  this	  reason	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  two	  expositions	  (mentioned	  above)	  do	  not	  mutually	  (conflict).	  	  Furthermore,	  that	  Hinayana	  (doctrine)	  is	  a	  “Half	  Letter”	  teaching	  (in	  that)	  the	  meaning	   of	   the	   principle	   (of	   emptiness)	   is	   not	   exhausted	   and	   allows	   for	   different	  
[215b]	  debates.	  (With)	  the	  “Whole	  (Letter)”	  teaching	  of	  the	  Mahayana	  the	  meaning	  of	   the	   principle	   (of	   emptiness)	   is	   replete.	   How	   (in	   light	   of	   this,	   could	   it	   not)	   also	  agree	  with	   those	   (other	   views)	  while	   still	   yet	   having	   (its	   own	  different)	   sections?	  Furthermore,	  the	  various	  Arhats	  do	  not	  come	  to	  (understand)	  the	  various	  dharmas’	  
dharmadhatu	   of	   one	   “flavor.”24	   (Considering	   it	   this	  way,	   various	   partial	   views	   of)	  
dharmas	   and	   attachments	  mutually	   correspond	   (through	   dependent	   arising.	   Such	  dependency)	  produces	  (various)	  views	  and	  (leads	  individuals	  to)	  compose	  treatises.	  Therefore	   there	   is	   mutual	   opposition.	   (But,	   if	   we	   take	   an	   example)	   like	   the	  
Bodhisattvas	   who	   enter	   the	   (Ten)	   Stages25	   and	   completely	   penetrate	   the	   real	  characteristics	  of	  the	  “Middle	  Path	  of	  the	  Dharma,”	  how	  could	  (their	  understanding)	  also	  be	  the	  same	  as	  the	  mutual	  opposition	  of	  those	  (found	  in	  the	  various	  partial	  and)	  attached	   views?	   For	   this	   reason	   (the	   fact)	   that	   Nagarjuna,	   Asanga,	   (and	   all)	   the	  authors	   of	   various	   great	   treatises	   do	   not	   mutually	   oppose	   (one	   another)	   is	  exceedingly	  evident.	  
[Generally	  Reporting	  on	  the	  Meaning	  of	  the	  Three	  Treatises]	  	   As	   for	   the	   third	   (of	   the	   four	   points	   concerning	   the	   Author’s	   intentions,	   his	  intention	  to)	  generally	  report	  on	  the	  school’s	  ideas	  and	  thoroughly	  distinguish	  (key	  points	  of	   the)	  three	  treatises,	  (we	  can)	  generally	  take	  the	  “Middle	  Path	  of	   the	  Two	  Truths”	  as	  the	  (key	  to	  their)	  tenets	  and	  path.	  Now,	  to	  explain	  the	  meaning	  of	  this,	  in	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brief	  (I	  will)	  create	  three	  (key)	  aspects.	  1.	  (I	  will)	  reveal	  the	  meanings	  of	  the	  (key)	  principles.	   2.	   (I	   will)	   relate	   (those	   points	   to	   the	   process	   of)	   completing	  contemplation.	  3.	  (I	  will)	  reveal	  the	  virtuous	  function	  (of	  these	  contemplations).	  
[Revealing	  the	  Meanings	  of	  Key	  Principles]	  	   Within	   the	   first	   aspect	   (we	   can)	   again	   create	   three	   (points	   to	   explain	   its)	  meanings.	  1.	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  “dependent	  on	  other	  arisings”	  nature26	  (I	  will)	  clarify	  (this	   school’s	   doctrine	   of)	   the	   “Middle	   Path	   of	   Two	   Truths.”	   2.	   In	   relation	   to	   the	  remaining	  two	  natures	  (I	  will	   further	  expand	  on	  the	  preceding	  point).	  3.	  (Finally,	   I	  will	  finish	  by	  explaining	  this	  point)	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  entire	  Three	  Natures.	  	  
[The	  “Dependent	  on	  Other	  Arisings”	  Nature]	  As	   for	   the	   first	  meaning,	   that	   is	   to	  say,	   the	  arising	  of	  dharmas,	   there	  are	  no	  (such	   arisings)	   that	   do	   not	   follow	   from	   conditions.	   (Since	   they	   are)	   existents	   that	  follow	  from	  conditions,	  therefore	  (they)	  certainly	  have	  no	  individual	  nature.	  Due	  to	  lacking	   an	   individual	   nature	   and	   thereby	   following	   from	   conditions,	   conditionally	  (arisen	  dharmas)	  exist	  (while	  an	  individual	  dharmic)	  nature	  does	  not.	  Furthermore,	  there	   is	   no	   second	  dharma	   (that	   constitutes	   an	   “other”	   nature).	   Yet,	   (even	   so,)	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  conditionally	  existent	  myriad	  distinctions,	  (these)	  are	  designated	  as	  “conventional	   truths.”	   In	   relation	   to	   the	   single	   “flavor”	   of	   a	   lack	   of	   (an	   individual)	  nature,	   (it	   is)	   designated	   as	   ultimate	   truth.	   For	   this	   reason,	   in	   regards	   to	   a	   single	  dependent	   arising,	   the	   two	   principles	   do	   not	  mix	   (and)	   are	   designated	   the	   “two”	  truths.	  (However)	  dependent	  arisings	  lack	  duality	  (and	  when	  considered)	  together,	  apart	   from	   the	   two	   boundaries	   (just	   mentioned,	   that)	   is	   designated	   the	   “Middle	  Path.”	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Generally	  speaking	  it	   is	   like	  this.	  (But)	   if	  we	  further	  specifically	  explain	  (we	  can)	  in	  brief	  create	  three	  (additional)	  aspects	  (to	  elaborate	  upon.)	  1.	  (We	  can)	  relate	  (the	   above	   point	   to	   the	   twofold	   qualities	   of)	   separate	   and	   combined.	   2.	   (We	   can)	  relate	  it	  to	  unity	  and	  difference.	  3.	  (We	  can)	  relate	  it	  to	  existence	  and	  nonexistence.	  
	   	   	   	   [Separate	  and	  Combined]	   	  
[Separate]	  Within	   the	   first,	   initially	   (we	   will	   cover)	   separate,	   then	   combined.	   	   As	   for	  separate,	   in	   regards	   to	   a	   single	   dependent	   arising,	   separate	   consists	   of	   two	  meanings.	  1.	  (It	  refers	  to)	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  illusory	  existence	  of	  the	  dependently	  arisen.	  2.	  (It	  refers	  to)	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  true	  emptiness	  of	  lacking	  an	  (individual)	  nature.	  	  
[Illusory	  Existence]	  Within	  the	  first	  meaning	  there	  are	  also	  two	  (further)	  meanings.	  1.	  (The	  first	  is)	  the	  meaning	  of	  “is	  not	  existent.”	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (if	  we)	  bring	  forth	  the	  essence	  (of	  arisings)	   as	   completely	   empty	   (of	   any	   individual	   nature,	   then)	   there	   is	   nothing	  which	  exists	  as	  a	  result.	  2.	  (The	  second	  is)	  the	  meaning	  of	  “does	  not	  not	  exist.”	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (this	  existence	  of	  dharmas)	  is	  because	  (their	  dependent	  arising)	  does	  not	  await	   (an	   emptiness	   which)	   destroys	   those	   (very	   same)	   characteristics	   of	  differentiation.	  The	  Ta-­‐p’in	  sutra	  says:	  The	  various	  dharmas	  lack	  that	  which	  exists.	  For	  this	  reason	  existents	  like	  this	  are	   not	   existent,	   are	   not	   not	   existent,	   (and)	   are	   designated	   as	   “illusory	  existents.”	  
[True	  Emptiness]	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Second,	  within	  (the	  meaning	  of	  the)	  true	  emptiness	  (of	  lacking	  an	  individual	  nature,)	   there	  are	  also	   two	  meanings.	  1.	   (First	   is)	   the	  meaning	  of	   “are	  not	  empty.”	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (dharmas	  are	  not	  empty)	  because	  emptiness	  lacks	  the	  characteristic	  of	  emptiness.	  2.	  (Second	  is)	  the	  meaning	  of	  “are	  not	  not	  empty.”	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (of)	  all	   the	   other	   characteristics	   (of	   arisings),	   there	   are	   none	   (this	  meaning)	   does	   not	  exhaust	  (or	  describe).	  For	  this	  reason,	  “are	  not	  empty”	  and	  “are	  not	  not	  empty”	  are	  designated	  as	  “true	  emptiness.”	  	  A	  sutra	  says:	  Empty	  and	  not	  empty	  –	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  attain	  (either.	  This)	  is	  designated	  as	  “true	  emptiness.”	  The	  Madhymaka-­‐sastra	  states:	  	   Dharmas	  without	  a	  nature	  are	  also	  lacking.	  	   All	  dharmas	  are	  empty	  therefore.	  	   	   	   	   	   [Combined]	  	   As	  for	  combined,	  this	  has	  five	  levels.	  	  1.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (given)	  that	  (dharmas)	  “are	  not	  existent,”	  then	  “is”	  (and)	  “is	  not”	  do	  not	  exist.	   (We	  can)	  consider	   this	   “lack	  of	  duality”	  as	   illusory	  existence.	  For	  this	  reason	  the	  Mahayana-­‐sutralamkara	  says:	  Lacking	  an	  essence	   is	  not	   (the	  quality	  of	   a)	   “lack	  of	   essence.”	   (This)	   “is	  not	  (the	  quality	  of	  a)	  lack	  of	  essence”	  is	  exactly	  the	  essence	  (in	  question).	  Lacking	  essence,	  (the	  notion	  of	  an)	  essence	  (itself)	  lacks	  duality	  (and)	  for	  this	  reason	  (we)	  say	  it	  is	  “illusory.”	  The	   point	   of	   this	   text	   considers	   the	   lack	   of	   an	   essence	   as	   illusory	   essence.	  Therefore	   it	   refers	   to	   “lacking	  duality.”	  Due	   to	   this	   lack	  of	  duality,	   (the	   concept	  of	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lacking	  duality)	  does	  not	  fall	  to	  one	  side	  (or	  the	  other	  and)	  therefore	  is	  designated	  the	  “Middle	  Path”.	  This	  is	  the	  [215c]	  “Middle	  Path	  of	  Conventional	  Truths.”	  2.	  (Given	  that)	   in	  ultimate	  (truth	  arisings)	  are	  “not	  empty,”	  then	  “is”	  and	  “is	  not”	   are	   “not	   empty.”	   (We	   can)	   consider	   this	   lack	   of	   duality	   as	   true	   emptiness.	  Together	   the	   two	  depart	   from	   the	   two	   (extreme)	   sides	   (and	   this)	   is	  designated	  as	  the	  “Middle	  Path.”	  This	  is	  the	  “Middle	  Path	  in	  Ultimate	  Truth.”	  	  3.	  Within	  illusory	  (existence	  arisings)	  are	  “not	  existent.”	  Accordingly,	  within	  ultimate	   (truth	  we	   find	   the)	  meaning	  of	   “are	  not	  not	  empty.”	   (On	   the	  other	  hand,)	  within	   illusory	   existence	   (arisings)	   are	   “not	   nonexistent.”	   Accordingly,	   this	   is	   the	  meaning	  of	  within	  ultimate	  (truth	  arisings)	  are	  “not	  empty.”	  Because	  together	  (these	  aspects)	   lack	   duality,	   due	   to	   this	   lack	   of	   duality,	   along	  with	   the	   preceding	   lack	   of	  duality,	   (this	   gives)	   a	   further	   (level	   of	   a)	   lack	   of	   duality.	   For	   this	   reason	   the	   Two	  Truths	  both	  fuse	  and	  do	  not	  fall	  to	  one	  side	  (or	  the	  other.	  This)	  is	  designated	  as	  the	  “Middle	  Path.”	  This	  is	  the	  “Middle	  Path	  of	  the	  Two	  Truths.”	  4.	  Within	  illusory	  (existence	  arisings)	  are	  “not	  existent.”	  Along	  with	  (arisings	  as)	   “are	   not	   empty”	   within	   ultimate	   (truth	   this	   allows	   the	   two)	   to	   fuse	   without	  duality.	  (This	  is	  also)	  designated	  the	  “Middle	  Path.”	  This	  is	  the	  “Middle	  Path	  of	  Is	  Not	  Existent,	  Is	  Not	  Empty.”	  A	  sutra	  says:	  (Arisings)	  are	  not	  existent	  (and)	  are	  not	  nonexistent.	  (This	  is)	  designated	  the	  “Middle	  Path.”	  	   5.	  Within	  illusory	  (existence	  arisings)	  are	  “not	  nonexistent.”	  Accordingly,	  this	  is	  (the	  meaning	  of)	  within	  ultimate	  (truth	  arisings)	  are	  “not	  not	  empty.”	  This	  is	  the	  “Middle	  Path	  of	  Is	  Not	  Not	  Existent	  and	  Is	  Not	  Nonexistent.”	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (this)	  is	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the	  middle	  within	  the	  severing	  (of	  all	  views).	  For	  this	  reason	  the	  Two	  Truths	  fuse.	  The	  wondrous	  severing	  of	  (all	  notions	  associated	  with	  a)	  middle	  and	  boundaries	  is	  its	  point	  (here).	  	  
[Unity	  and	  Difference]	  	   Second	  as	  for	  relating	  it	  to	  the	  aspect	  of	  their	  unity	  and	  difference,	  there	  are	  four	  phrases	  (marking	  the	  key	  points).	  	  
[Not	  Different]	  1.	  As	  for	  the	  meaning	  of	  “not	  different,”	  (dharmas	  are	  not	  different)	  because	  if	  (dharmas)	   were	   not	   conditionally	   produced,	   they	   would	   not	   lack	   (an	   individual)	  nature.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  as	  for	  conditional	  existence,	  (it)	  reveals	  (that	  dharmas)	  are	  not	  individually	  existent.	  (Now	  if	   it	   is	   the	  case	  they)	  are	  not	   individually	  existent,	   then	  (that	  means)	   they	   are	   lacking	   (a	   self)	   nature.	   Further,	   as	   for	   lacking	   an	   individual	  nature,	   (it)	  reveals	  (they)	  are	  not	   individually	  (self)	  existent.	   (Dharmas)	  which	  are	  not	  individually	  existent	  accordingly	  are	  lacking	  (a	  self)	  nature.	  Furthermore,	  as	  for	  lacking	   an	   individual	   nature,	   it	   reveals	   (they)	   are	   not	   individually	   (self)	   existent.	  (Arisings)	  which	  are	  not	  individually	  existent	  are	  accordingly	  conditionally	  existent.	  For	  this	  reason	  the	  (Heart)	  sutra	  says:	  	  Form	  is	  exactly	  emptiness.	  Emptiness	  is	  exactly	  form.	  A	  (related)	  sastra	  says:	  The	  extreme	  darkness	  of	  the	  obstruction	  of	  knowledge	  refers	  to	  attachments	  of	  ultimate	  and	  conventional	  differentiations.	  This	  is	  what	  it	  means.	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Also,	   it	   does	   not	   obtain	   that	   because	   of	   the	   emptiness	   of	   (an	   individual)	  nature,	   (that	   emptiness)	   does	   not	   allow	   for	   conditioned	   production.	   (This	   is	   the	  case)	   because	   without	   conditionally	   produced	   (dharmas),	   emptiness	   (of	   an	  individual	  nature)	  is	  not	  established.	  A	  sastra	  says:	  	   (Dependent)	  existence	  constitutes	  the	  emptiness	  of	  dharmas	  	   because	  (the	  emptiness	  of	  dharmas)	  is	  produced	  from	  conditions.	  	   Furthermore,	   this	   is	   the	   emptiness	   of	   ultimate	   (truth)	   and	   is	   not	   the	  emptiness	  (derived	  from)	  severing	  (the	  ultimate	  from	  the	  conventional).	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	   that	   (we	   must)	   wait	   on	   extinguishing	   conditioned	   production	   to	   only	   then	  count	   that	   as	   emptiness,	   this	   (notion	   of	   emptiness)	   then	   is	   an	   emptiness	  wrongly	  grasped	  within	  the	  (realm	  of	  the	  false	  reckonings	  of	  the)	  sensations.	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  also	  does	  not	  obtain	  that	  allowing	  for	  conditioned	  production	  opposes	   and	  harms	   the	   emptiness	   of	   true	   emptiness.	   (This	   is	   the	   case)	   because	   if	  (dharmas)	   are	   not	   empty	   (of	   an	   individual	   nature,	   they)	   are	   not	   conditionally	  produced.	   As	   for	   an	   individual	   (nature),	   if	   (it	   is	   self)	   existent,	   it	   is	   not,	   as	   a	  consequence,	  conditionally	  produced.	  	  Furthermore,	  (if	  we	  are	  referring	  to)	  an	  emptiness	  that	  does	  not	  differ	  from	  (conditional)	   existence,	   that	   then	  constitutes	   true	  emptiness.	   (On	   the	  other	  hand,)	  existence	  that	  does	  not	  differ	  from	  emptiness	  is	  then	  an	  illusory	  existence.	  For	  this	  reason	   these	   two	   are	   not	   two.	   Therefore	   lacking	   difference	   is	   (the	   case).	   A	   sutra	  says:	   	  (As	   for)	   forms	  and	   the	  emptiness	  of	   forms	  constituting	  a	  duality,	   forms	  are	  exactly	   empty	   (of	   an	   individual	   nature).	   It	   is	   not	   that	   form	   extinguishes	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emptiness.	   	   The	   nature	   of	   forms	   and	   the	   emptiness	   of	   individuality,	   to	   be	  among	   them	   and	   yet	   universally	   penetrate	   (both	   aspects),	   this	   constitutes	  entering	  the	  Dharma	  gate	  of	  non-­‐duality.	  Furthermore.	  The	  Ta-­‐p’in	  sutra	  says:	  It	   is	   not	   because	   of	   emptiness	   and	   form	   (constituting	   a	   duality	   that	   we)	  designate	  (the	  relationship	  as)	  the	  “emptiness	  of	  forms.”	  But	  rather	  because	  form	  is	  exactly	  emptiness	  and	  emptiness	  is	  exactly	  form.	  Furthermore	  verse	  389	  of	  the	  Mahaprajnaparamita	  sutra	  says:	  Subhuti,	  consider	  (the	  fact	  that	  the	  state	  of	  being)	  causally	  conditioned	  does	  not	  differ	  from	  the	  emptiness	  of	  a	  fundamental	  nature.	  (Also,)	  the	  emptiness	  of	   a	   fundamental	   nature	   does	   not	   differ	   from	   (the	   state	   of	   being)	   causally	  conditioned.	  Causally	  conditioned	  is	  exactly	  the	  emptiness	  of	  a	  fundamental	  nature	   and	   the	   emptiness	   of	   a	   fundamental	   nature	   is	   exactly	   (the	   state	   of	  being)	  causally	  conditioned.	  (That	  text)	  also	  says:	  Subhuti,	   consider	   (the	   fact	   that	   the)	   various	   dharmas	   which	   are	   produced	  from	   conditions	   do	  not	   differ	   from	   the	   emptiness	   of	   a	   fundamental	   nature.	  
[216a]	   (Also,	   then)	   the	   emptiness	   of	   a	   fundamental	   nature	   does	   not	   differ	  from	   the	   various	  dharmas	   produced	   from	   conditions.	   The	   various	  dharmas	  produced	  from	  conditions	  are	  exactly	  the	  emptiness	  of	  a	  fundamental	  nature	  and	   the	   emptiness	   of	   a	   fundamental	   nature	   is	   exactly	   the	   various	  dharmas	  produced	  from	  conditions.	  Passages	  like	  these	  clarify	  this	  aspect	  of	  “not	  different.”	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   Question:	  If	  it	  is	  so	  (then	  this	  notion)	  should	  destroy	  the	  Two	  Truths.	  Because	  causes	   and	   effects	   are	   just	   empty	   (we)	   lose	   illusory	   existence	   and	   destroy	  conventional	  truth.	  Because	  emptiness	  is	  just	  causes	  and	  conditions,	  (we)	  lose	  true	  emptiness	  and	  destroy	  ultimate	  truth.	  	   Answer:	   The	   correct	   (way	   to	   understand	   this	   is	   that	   precisely)	   due	   to	   not	  being	  different,	  the	  Two	  Truths	  come	  to	  be	  preserved.	  If	  it	  were	  not	  so	  then	  (as	  you	  suggest,	  we	  would	  in	  fact)	  lose	  the	  Two	  Truths.	  	   (Question:)	  How	  so?	  	   (Answer:)	   Causes	   and	   effects	   that	   differ	   from	   emptiness	   are	   not	   illusory	  
dharmas	   and	   so	   (if	   that	   were	   the	   case	   there	   would	   be	   a	   real)	   loss	   regarding	  conventional	   truth.	   Emptiness	   that	   differs	   from	   causes	   and	   effects	   is	   not	   true	  emptiness	  and	  so	   (if	   that	  were	   the	  case	   there	  would	  be	  a)	   loss	   regarding	  ultimate	  truth.	  For	   this	  reason	  the	  Two	  Truths	  come	  to	  be	  preserved	  due	   to	  (the	   fact	   they)	  are	  not	  different.	  (That)	  “not-­‐different”	  then	  is	  the	  equality	  of	  the	  Middle	  Path.	  Given	  this,	   then	  due	   to	   (the	   fact	   this	   relationship	   constitutes	   the	   equality	   of	   the)	  Middle	  Path	  even	  while	   there	  are	  still	  Two	  Truths,	  accordingly	   this	   (relationship	  between	  the	  ultimate	  and	  the	  conventional)	  is	  the	  “Two	  Truths	  of	  the	  Middle	  Path.”	  	   	   	   	   	   [Not	  One]	   	  As	   for	   the	  second	  (phrase	  marking	  a	  key	  point	  about	  unity	  and	  difference),	  the	  aspect	  of	  “not	  one,”	  due	  to	  the	  emptiness	  of	  (an	  individual)	  nature	  (the	  arising	  of)	   these	   conditionally	   arisen	   dharmas	   leads	   to	   (a	   situation	   where)	   those	   (very	  same)	  illusory	  existents	  do	  not	  come	  to	  (essentially)	  exist.	  Therefore,	  everything	  is	  only	  true	  emptiness.	  A	  sutra	  says:	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The	   various	   dharmas	   are,	   in	   the	   end,	   empty.	   Lacking	   even	   the	   minutest	  characteristics,	   emptiness	   (itself)	   is	   (also)	   lacking	  distinctions.	   (This	   lack	  of	  characteristics)	  is	  the	  same	  as	  if	  (we	  were	  referring	  to)	  a	  void.	  Furthermore,	  a	  sutra	  says:	  The	  emptiness	  of	  all	  dharmas	   is	  like	  (the	  void	  left	  by)	  the	  fires	  at	  the	  end	  of	  an	  eon.	  The	  Mahaprajnaparamita	  sutra	  says:	  	   Because	  of	  the	  emptiness	  of	  forms,	  etc.,	  within	  emptiness	  there	  are	  no	  forms.	  (This	  point	  designated	  “not	  one”)	  is	  like	  these	  types	  (of	  explanations).	  	  Depending	  on	  that	  (idea),	  illusory	  existence	  is	  the	  aspect	  of	  “is	  not	  existent”	  and	   (again)	   depending	   (on	   that	   idea),	   true	   emptiness	   is	   the	   aspect	   of	   “is	   not	   not	  empty.”	  (So	  we	  can)	  say	  that	  true	  emptiness	  forever	  destroys	  illusory	  existence.	  For	  this	   reason	   it	   consequently	   leads	   to	   conventional	   characteristics	   being	   forever	  exhausted	  while	  constituting	  ultimate	  truth.	  Furthermore,	  these	  conditionally	  arisen	  
dharmas	  are	  due	  to	  characteristics	  of	  illusory	  existence	  and	  (this)	  leads	  to	  (the	  case	  where)	  that	  true	  emptiness	  also	  becomes	  “not	  empty.”	  (In	  that	  case	  true	  emptiness)	  is	   only	   a	   distinction	   of	   conditionally	   arisen	   illusory	   existence.	   For	   this	   reason	   the	  
Lankavatara-­‐sutra	  says:	  It	  is	  not	  a	  checked	  extinction	  that	  is	  again	  produced,	  (but	  rather)	  a	  mutually	  continuous,	  causally	  conditioned	  arising.	  	   Furthermore,	   in	   (texts)	   like	   the	   Samgrahabhasya	   and	   Yogacara	   (bhumi	  
sastra)	   they	   clarify	   (the	   point	   that)	   dharmas	   arisen	   dependent	   upon	   others	   are	  always	  not	   lacking	   (existence).	   In	   this	   fashion,	   (taken	   together,)	  depending	  on	   the	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aspect	   that	   true	  emptiness	   is	  not	  empty	  and	  depending	  on	  the	  aspect	   that	   illusory	  existence	  is	  not	  not	  existent,	  (one	  can)	  say	  that	  conditioned	  existence	  always	  is	  not	  empty.	  	  Because	  of	  “always	  is	  not	  empty,”	  then	  (this)	  constitutes	  conventional	  truth.	  (With)	   the	   Two	   Truths	   (understood)	   like	   this,	   final	   characteristics	   and	   forms	   are	  determined	  and	  (they)	  then	  become	  (an	  expression	  of	  the)	  fundamental	  nature	  (of	  all	  arisings.	  	  This	  is)	  like	  the	  (the	  passage	  in	  the)	  Yinglo	  (sutra	  which)	  says:	  	   Worldly	  truth	  exists	  therefore	  it	  is	  not	  empty.	  	   Ultimate	  truth	  is	  empty	  therefore	  it	  does	  not	  exist.	  These	  types	  (of	  views)	  are	  all	  distinctions	  that	  rely	  on	  the	  aspect	  of	  “not	  one.”	  	   Question:	   If	   we	   rely	   upon	   the	   preceding	   gate,	   taking	   true	   emptiness	   as	  extinguishing	   illusory	   existence	   and	   causing	   it	   to	   not	   exist,	   this	   then	   annihilates	  conventional	   truth,	   and	   because	   it	   destroys	  karmic	   effects,	   is	  wrongly	   grasping	   at	  emptiness.	  Furthermore,	  this	  emptiness	  of	  (an	  individual)	  nature,	  since	  it	   is	  due	  to	  illusory	  existence,	   if	   it	   leads	  to	  (a	  situation	  where)	   illusory	  existence	  also	  does	  not	  exist,	   illusory	  existence	  is	   lacking	  as	  a	  result.	  Based	  on	  what	  (then	  do	  we)	  come	  to	  establish	   that	   tenet	   of	   the	   emptiness	   of	   (an	   individual)	   nature?	   (Given)	   this	  (problem)	   then	   (we)	   also	   lose	   the	  meaning	  of	   the	   true	   emptiness	  of	   an	   individual	  (nature).	  	  Furthermore,	   within	   (the	   discussion)	   of	   the	   preceding	   aspect	   of	   “are	   not	  different,”	   (you)	   clarified	   that	   it	   does	   not	   destroy	   illusory	   existence.	   (But	   in)	   this	  aspect	   (you)	   alternate	   and	   destroy	   it.	   How	   is	   it	   not	   the	   case	   that	   the	   two	  explanations	  individually	  (and)	  mutually	  oppose	  (one	  another)?	  Furthermore,	  if	  we	  rely	   on	   the	   latter	   meaning,	   and	   consider	   that	   existence	   taking	   away	   [216b]	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emptiness	  leads	  to	  a	  case	  (where)	  emptiness	  is	  not	  empty,	  this	  then	  is	  (a	  case	  where	  
dharmas	  are)	  truly	  existent	  and	  are	  not	  illusorily	  existent.	  (This	  cannot	  be	  though)	  because	   this	   perverts	   true	   emptiness	   and	   is	   (a	   case	   of)	   sensations	   (generating)	  attachments	   to	  existence.	  Further,	   this	  conditioned	  existence,	  since	   it	   is	  due	  to	   the	  emptiness	   of	   (an	   individual)	   nature,	   if	   this	   (emptiness)	   is	   lacking,	   conditioned	  existence	  is	  also	  destroyed.	  (In	  that	  case)	  then	  (we)	  lose	  the	  meaning	  of	  conditioned	  existence.	  Further,	  in	  (your	  explanation	  of)	  the	  preceding	  aspect	  of	  “are	  not	  different,”	  (you)	   clarified	   (this)	   does	   not	   injure	   true	   emptiness.	   This	   aspect	   (however,)	  alternately	  destroys	  it.	  	  How	  is	  it	  they	  do	  not	  mutually	  oppose	  (one	  another)?	  	   Answer:	   We	   can	   explain	   these	   various	   difficulties	   (by)	   clarifying	   (the	  relationships	   between)	   the	   “emptiness/existence”,	   “allowed	   for/taken	   away,”	   and	  “preserved/destroyed”	   (aspects)	   of	   ultimate	   and	   conventional	   (truth).	   There	   are	  four	  parts	  for	  (each	  of	  the	  following)	  two	  aspects	  (of	  the	  first	  relationship).	  	   	   	   	   	   	   [Emptiness/Existence]	  	   1.	  “Only	  True	  Emptiness.”	  (This)	  has	  four	  meanings.	  1.	  Due	  to	  this,	  emptiness	  therefore	   does	   not	   destroy	   conditioned	   emptiness.	   Consider	   that	   a	   (particular,	  essential)	   nature,	   if	   it	   exists,	   is	   therefore	   not	   an	   existence	   (dependently	   derived)	  from	   conditions.	   2.	   Due	   to	   this,	   emptiness	   therefore	   destroys	   and	   exhausts	  conditioned	   existence.	   Because	   emptiness	   certainly	   must	   damage	   conditioned	  existence,	   	   (conditioned)	   existence,	   if	   not	   exhausted,	   is	   not	   truly	   empty.	   3.	  Due	   to	  (this),	  emptiness	  therefore	  also	  destroys	  true	  emptiness.	  Because	  this	  emptiness	  of	  (an	   individual)	   nature	   is	   due	   to	   conditioned	   existence,	   [i.e.,	   only	   the	   conditionally	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existent	   are	   “empty”	   of	   a	   nature]	   conditioned	   existence	   is	   preserved.	  Accordingly,	  there	  is	  no	  true	  emptiness	  (other	  than	  the	  emptiness	  of	  the	  conditionally	  existent).	  As	   for	   lacking	   true	   emptiness,	   it	   is	   due	   to	   (emptiness	   being)	   truly	   empty	   (of	   any	  nature).	   4.	   Due	   to	   (this),	   emptiness	   therefore	   does	   not	   destroy	   true	   emptiness.	  Because	  destruction	   in	  regards	   to	  conditioned	  existence	  (means)	  exhausting	   those	  empty	  characteristics,	  (that)	  then	  is	  true	  emptiness.	  
	   2.	  “Only	  Illusory	  Existence.”	  (This)	  also	  has	  four	  meanings.	  1.	  Due	  to	  (the	  fact	  that	   dharmas	   are	   illusory	   existents,)	   conditioned	   existence	   therefore	   does	   not	  damage	  the	  emptiness	  of	  (a	  self)	  nature.	  Because	  existents	  derived	  from	  conditions	  must	  be	  empty	  of	  a	  nature,	  (conditioned	  existents)	  definitely	  lack	  a	  nature.	  2.	  Due	  to	  (this,)	   conditioned	   existence	   certainly	   subverts	   the	   emptiness	   of	   a	   (self)	   nature.	  (This	   is)	   because	   conditioned	   existence	   is	   not	   nonexistent.	   3.	   Due	   to	   (this,)	  conditioned	  existence	  accordingly	  destroys	  conditioned	  existence.	  Because	  existents	  derived	   from	   conditions	  must	   be	   empty	   of	   a	   nature,	   the	   emptiness	   of	   a	   nature	   is	  manifest	   (and	   that)	   certainly	   damages	   conditioned	   existence.	   As	   for	   damaging	  conditioned	   existence,	   it	   is	   due	   to	   (being)	   conditionally	   existent.	   4.	   Due	   to	   (this,)	  conditioned	   existence	   does	   not	   destroy	   conditioned	   existence.	   Because	   existents	  derived	  from	  conditions	  certainly	  damage	  the	  exhaustion	  of	  emptiness,	  (whatever)	  exists	   then	  constitutes	  the	  conditionally	  existent	  (and	  conditional	  existence)	   is	  not	  nonexistent.	  In	   this	   fashion	   conditional	   existence	   and	   emptiness	   of	   a	   nature	   are	   either	  mutually	   taken	   away	   and	   completely	   exhausted,	   or	   mutually	   allowed	   and	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completely	   preserved,	   or	   (one	   is)	   individually	   destroyed	   and	   (one)	   individually	  preserved.	  (Notice	  that	  these	  various	  relational	  states)	  lack	  obstruction.	  	  
[Allowed	  for/	  Taken	  Away]	  (1.)	   For	   this	   reason	   if	   we	   concern	   (ourselves	   with)	   the	   gate	   of	   “mutually	  allowed,”	   then	   (that)	   “emptiness	   that	   does	   not	   destroy	   existence”	   allows	   for	   that	  “existence	   that	  does	  not	  destroy	  emptiness.”	  Because	   the	  principles	  are	  not	  mixed	  this	  is	  not	  a	  gate	  of	  oneness.	  	   2.	   If	   (we)	  concern	  (ourselves	  with)	   the	  gate	  of	   “mutually	   taken	  away,”	   then	  (as	   for)	   this	   “emptiness	   that	   destroys	   existence”	   along	  with	   (that)	   “existence	   that	  exhausts	   emptiness,”	   (each	   aspect)	   completely	   takes	   away	   (the	   other)	   and	   (again,	  they)	  are	  not	  one.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   [Preserved/Destroyed]	  3.	  If	  (we)	  concern	  (ourselves	  with)	  the	  gate	  of	  “each	  individually	  preserved,”	  then	  “not	  mutually”	  (related)	  is	  (the	  case)	  and	  therefore	  they	  are	  not	  one.	  	   4.	  If	  (we)	  concern	  (ourselves	  with)	  the	  gate	  of	  	  “each	  individually	  destroyed,”	  then	  there	  is	  no	  (other)	  one	  that	  might	  be	  united	  and	  (again,)	  therefore	  there	  is	  no	  unity.	  	   (However),	   because	  preservation	   and	  destruction	   lack	  obstruction,	   the	   two	  principles	  are	  not	  mixed	  (and)	  do	  not	  fall	  to	  (either	  extreme)	  boundary.	  (Given	  this,	  we)	  do	  not	   lose	   the	  Middle	  Path	  and	   this	   is	   referred	   to	  as	   the	   “Middle	  Path	  of	   the	  Two	  Truths.”	  
[Not	  One	  is	  Not	  Different]	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As	   for	   the	   third	   (phrase	   marking	   a	   key	   point	   about	   unity	   and	   difference),	  (considering)	   this	   “not	   one”	   along	   with	   the	   preceding	   “not	   different,”	   alternately	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  –	  because	  the	  conditionally	  arisen	  lack	  duality.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  an	   “emptiness	   that	   destroys	   existence”	   is	   exactly	   an	   “existence	   that	   exhausts	  emptiness.”	  In	  this	  fashion	  emptiness	  and	  existence	  lack	  obstruction	  and	  so	  mutual	  opposition	  of	  the	  extremes	  flips	  and	  returns	  to	  mutual	  accord	  of	  the	  extremes.	  For	  this	  reason	  “	  mutual	  taking	  away”	  and	  “mutual	  allowing	  for”	  alternately	  lack	  duality.	  (This)	  is	  the	  reason	  conditionally	  arisen	  (dharmas)	  interfuse	  with	  the	  meaning	  and	  principle	  (of	  true	  emptiness)	  without	  obstruction.	  [216c]	  Due	  to	  (the	  fact	  that)	  “not	  one”	  is	  exactly	  “not	  different,”	  therefore	  the	  Two	  Truths	  constitute	  the	  Middle	  Path.	  Due	  to	  (the	  fact	  that)	  “not	  different”	  is	  exactly	  “not	  one,”	  therefore	  the	  Middle	  Path	  constitutes	  the	  Two	  Truths.	  
[Not	  One	  is	  Not	  Not	  Different]	  As	  for	  the	  fourth	  (phrase	  marking	  a	  key	  point	  about	  unity	  and	  difference,	  as	  for	  the	  relationship	  of)	  this	  “not	  one”	  along	  with	  “not	  different,”	  (it	  is)	  also	  (the	  case	  that	  they)	  are	  not	  one.	  For	  this	  reason	  then	  (they	  constitute)	  a	  “not	  different	  that	  is	  exactly	   not	   one”	   (that	   also)	   then	   allows	   for	   a	   “not	   one	   that	   is	   not	   different.”	   As	   a	  result	   the	   (two)	  meanings	  are	  not	  mixed	  even	  while	   (they)	  are	  not	  one.	  That	   is	   to	  say,	   (this	   is)	   a	  duality	   that	  does	  not	  differ	   from	  a	   (unified)	  middle	   and	  a	   (unified)	  middle	  that	  does	  not	  differ	  from	  a	  duality.	  Although	  the	  meanings	  fuse	  completely,	  the	   principles	   do	   not	  mix	   so	   (they)	   are	   “not	   a	  middle	   and	   are	   not	   a	   duality”	   (and	  also)	   are	   “completely	   a	   middle	   and	   a	   duality.”	   This	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   “non-­‐
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hindrance	   and	   non-­‐obstruction	   of	   the	  middle	   and	   the	   boundaries.”	   Think	   about	   it	  and	  it	  may	  be	  seen.	   	  
[Existence	  and	  Nonexistence]	  (Now,	   returning	   to	   the	   categories	   of	   my	   more	   detailed	   explanation	   of	   the	  “dependent	  on	  other”	  arising	  of	  dharmas,)	  as	   for	   the	   third	   (point,	   that)	   relating	   to	  existence	  and	  nonexistence,	  there	  are	  two	  aspects.	  Initially	  (I	  will)	  relate	  (this	  point)	  to	  being	  “manifest”	  then	  (I	  will)	  relate	  (it)	  to	  being	  “hidden.”	  
[Manifest]	  In	   the	   preceding	   (of	   these	   two	   points,	   i.e.,	   “manifest”,	   there	   are)	   two	  (subpoints):	   first	   (I	  will)	   “generally”	   (explain	   the	   ideas)	   then	   (I	  will)	   “specifically”	  (focus	  on	  a	  key	  distinction).	  	   As	   for	   generally	   (explaining),	   in	   a	   single	   conditioned	  arising	   (existence	  and	  nonexistence)	  fuse	  and	  form	  four	  aspects	  (even	  as)	  each	  (arising)	  does	  not	  fall	  to	  a	  boundary.	  (1.)	  That	   is	   to	  say,	  (every	  dharma	  manifests	  an)	  existence	  that	  does	  not	  obstruct	   emptiness.	   	   Although	   	   (that	  dharma)	   exhausts	   emptiness	   (and)	   is	   simply	  existent,	   yet	   it	   does	   not	   fall	   to	   the	   (extreme)	   boundary	   of	   (essential)	   existence.	   2.	  (That	   dharma)	   is	   an	   emptiness	   that	   does	   not	   obstruct	   existence.	   Although	   (it)	  exhausts	   existence	   (and)	   is	   only	   empty,	   yet	   (it)	   does	   not	   fall	   to	   the	   (extreme)	  boundary	   of	   (nihilistic)	   emptiness.	   3.	   (That	   dharma	   is)	   an	   “empty	   existence”	   that	  lacks	   differentiation	   (between	   the	   two	   aspects).	   Although	   the	   extremes	   mutually	  oppose,	   yet	   even	   (as)	   both	   are	   differentiated	   (they)	   do	   not	   fall	   to	   the	   (extreme)	  boundary	   of	   dualism.	   4.	   (That	   dharma	   is	   an)	   “empty	   existence”	   of	   an	   extreme	  contrast	  (between	  the	  two	  aspects).	  Although	  (in)	  lacking	  duality	  both	  (aspects)	  are	  
	   52	  
muddled	  (together),	  yet	  (the	  condition	  of)	  both	  (together	  is)	  negated	  (and	  they)	  do	  not	  fall	  to	  a	  boundary	  (of	  simply	  lacking	  distinction).	  For	  this	  reason	  the	  four	  parts	  (are)	  successive	  yet	  do	  not	  fall	  to	  (any	  of)	  the	  four	  extreme	  boundaries.	  	  	   Furthermore,	  based	  on	   the	  gate	  of	   the	  above	  meanings	   it	  also	  might	  obtain	  that	  the	  four	  parts	  together	  come	  to	  express	  an	  extreme.	  Therefore,	  some	  (say	  it)	  is	  neither	  middle	  nor	   extreme	   (but	   a)	   replete	   “middle-­‐extreme.”	   (Consider	   the	  point	  and	  it)	  may	  be	  known.	  	   As	   for	   the	   second	   (part),	   specific	   (explanation	   of	   a	   key	   point),	   either	   (we)	  consider	   illusory	   existents	   as	   existence	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   an	   (individual)	   nature	   as	  emptiness,	  or	  (we)	  consider	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  (individual)	  nature	  as	  existence	  -­‐because	  of	   the	  reality	  of	   the	  principle	  (of	  emptiness),	  and	  illusory	  existents	  as	  emptiness	   	   -­‐	  because	   they	   are	   not	   real.	   Each	   (of	   these	   two	   taken)	   together	   fuse	   and	   both	  (become)	   mixed	   (even	   as)	   each	   individually	   does	   not	   fall	   to	   an	   extreme.	   This	   is	  designated	  the	  “Middle	  Path	  of	  Existence	  and	  Nonexistence.”	  	  Therefore	  the	  Nirvana	  
sutra	  says:	  “(Being)	  both	  existent	  and	  nonexistent	  is	  designated	  as	  the	  Middle	  Path.”	  (This	  type	  of	  comment)	  also	  adjusts	  for	  the	  above	  (issue).	  Consider	  it	  (and	  the	  point	  will	  be	  evident).	  
[Hidden]	   	  As	   for	   the	   second	   (point	   of	   this	   discussion	   about	   the	   existence	   and	  nonexistence	  of	  dependent	  arisings,	  the	  point)	  relating	  (the	  two)	  to	  being	  “hidden,”	  (I	  will)	  also	  initially	  (discuss	  the)	  general	  (features),	  then	  specific	  (ones).	  	   (Now)	   within	   the	   (discussion	   of	   the)	   general	   (features	   we	   will	   begin	   with	  several)	  questions:	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   (Question:)	  Dependent	  others	  are	  existent	  aren’t	  they?	  	   Answer:	  (They)	  are	  not	  because	  (they)	  lack	  a	  particular	  nature.	  	   (Question:	  Then	  they)	  are	  empty	  aren’t	  they?	  	   (Answer:	   They)	   are	   not	   because	   (emptiness)	   does	   not	   destroy	   conditioned	  characteristics.	  	   (Question:	  Then	  they)	  are	  both	  existent	  and	  nonexistent	  aren’t	  they?	  	   (Answer:	  They)	  are	  not	  because	  in	  lacking	  a	  principle	  of	  duality,	  (the	  two)	  do	  not	  mutually	  oppose.	  	   (Question:	  Well,	  then	  they)	  are	  neither	  existent	  nor	  nonexistent	  aren’t	  they?	  	   (Answer:	  They)	  are	  not.	  Because	  (in	  regards	  to)	  existence	  and	  nonexistence,	  since	  (we’ve)	  departed	  (from	  both)	  there	   is	  no	  (other	  alternative)	  waiting.	  (Notice	  too	   that	   such	   an	   understanding)	   does	   not	   obstruct	   the	   two	   (original)	   meanings.	  Therefore,	  due	  to	  the	  preceding	  three	  parts,	  departing	  from	  existence	  and	  departing	  from	  nonexistence	   consequently	  does	  not	  don	   (the	   guise	   of	   yet	   another)	   extreme.	  Due	  to	  the	  fourth	  part,	  departing	  from	  neither	  existence	  nor	  nonexistence	  does	  not	  don	  (the	  guise	  of	  a	  previously	  excluded)	  middle.	   In	   this	   fashion	   “does	  not	  don	   the	  middle	   and	   does	   not	   don	   an	   extreme”	   then	   constitutes	   a	   “Middle	   Path	   Without	  Lodging.”	  	  	   As	  for	  the	  second	  (part	  here,)	  “specific”	  (features),	   the	  first	  (point	  to	  cover)	  relates	  to	  illusory	  existence.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   [Illusory	  Existence]	  	   Question:	  Illusory	  existents	  are	  existent	  aren’t	  they?	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   Answer:	  (They)	  are	  not.	  (They)	  are	   illusory	  existents	  (and)	  certainly	  do	  not	  exist	  as	  a	  result.	  	   (Question:	  Then	  they)	  are	  nonexistent	  aren’t	  they?	  	   (Answer:	   No,	   they)	   are	   not.	   Because	   existents	   do	   not	   (essentially)	   exist,	  (they)	  lack	  (any	  quality)	  that	  might	  (be	  considered)	  nonexistent.	  Furthermore	  (such	  a	   lack	   of	   essential	   qualities)	   does	   not	   obstruct	   illusory	   phenomena	   and	   is	   not	   a	  (nihilistic)	  extinction	  severed	  (from	  existence).	  	   (Question:	  Then	  they)	  are	  both	  existent	  and	  nonexistent	  aren’t	  they?	  	   (Answer:	  No,	  they)	  are	  not.	  Because	  both	  the	  forms	  (associated	  with)	  the	  two	  meanings	  are	  snatched	  away	  and	  are	  not	  preserved	  (one	  cannot	  say	  they	  exist	  and	  do	  not	  exist).	  	   (Question:	   Then	   they)	   are	   neither	   existent	   nor	   nonexistent	   [217a]	   aren’t	  they?	  	   (Answer:	  No,	   they)	   are	   not.	   Because	   in	   lacking	   existence	   and	  nonexistence,	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  that	  with	  which	  to	  deal.	  (Accordingly,	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that)	  these	  two	  meanings	   are	   completely	   illusory	   existence	   and	   for	   this	   reason	   simply	   concern	  illusory	  existents.	  (When	  the	  various	  reckonings	  attached	  to)	  the	  four	  parts	  are	  each	  severed,	  (the	  result)	  is	  also	  (called)	  the	  “Middle	  Path	  Without	  Lodging.”	  	   	   	   	   	   	   [True	  Emptiness]	   	  As	  for	  the	  second	  (point,	  the	  point)	  relating	  to	  true	  emptiness,	  (here	  again	  we	  will	  begin	  by	  addressing	  several	  questions).	  	   Question:	  True	  emptiness	  is	  empty	  isn’t	  it?	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   Answer:	  It	  is	  not.	  Because	  it	  is	  true	  emptiness,	  it	  is	  not	  an	  emptiness	  severed	  (from	  everything).	  	   (Question:	  Then)	  it	  is	  existent	  isn’t	  it?	  	   (Answer:)	  It	  is	  not	  because	  (in	  regards	  to	  all)	  characteristics,	  there	  are	  none	  not	  exhausted	  (by	  emptiness).	  	   (Question:	  Then)	  it	  is	  both	  isn’t	  it?	  	   (Answer:)	   It	   is	   not.	   Because	   there	   is	   no	   principle	   of	   duality,	   they	   do	   not	  mutually	  oppose	  (and	  there	  is	  no	  “both”).	  	   (Question:	  Then	  it	  is)	  both	  “neither/nor”	  isn’t	  it?	  	   (Answer:)	  It	   is	  not.	  Because	  (“neither/nor”)	  severs	  (any	  further	  option	  with	  which)	  to	  deal.	  	  (These	   are	   the)	   complete	  meanings	   of	   true	   (emptiness).	   For	   these	   reasons	  true	  emptiness	  also	  severs	  (all)	  four	  parts	  (of	  the	  tetralemma)	  and	  is	  the	  reason	  (it)	  completely	  reveals	  the	  Middle	  Path.	  	   The	   above	   general	   (summary)	   relates	   to	   the	   arising	   of	   a	   nature	   in	  dependence	  upon	  another.	  Clarifying	  the	  “Middle	  Path	  of	  the	  Two	  Truths”	  (in	  regard	  to	  that	  nature)	  is	  (now)	  finished.	  
[In	  Relation	  to	  the	  Remaining	  Two	  Natures]	  	   As	  for	  the	  second	  (part	  of	  this	  discussion	  of	  key	  principles	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Three	   Natures,	   the	   part)	   relating	   to	   the	   remaining	   two	   natures,	   first	   	   (I	   will)	  specifically	  (explain),	  then	  generally	  (distinguish	  key	  points).	  
[Specific	  Explanation]	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In	   the	   specific	   (explanation),	   the	   initial	   (point)	   relates	   to	   “that	   to	   which	  	  	  general	  reckoning	  is	  attached.”27	  This	  has	  two	  meanings.	  Accordingly	  the	  Yogacara	  (bhumi	  sastra)	  states:	  (As	  for)	  “that	  to	  which	  general	  reckoning	  is	  attached,”	  (it	  means)	  sensations	  exist,	  (while	  the)	  principle	  (of	  emptiness)	  does	  not.	  In	  this	  (text,	  the	  point)	  relates	  to	  (that	  which)	  deluded	  sensation	  says	  exists.	  (Such	  constructions	   seem	   real,)	   like	   empty	   (sky)	   flowers	   to	   diseased	   eyes.	   (These	  constructions)	  are	   that	  which	   the	  common	  deluded	   (person)	  clutches	  at	   (and)	  are	  considered	  conventional	  truths.	  	  (Now)	   relating	   this	   to	   the	   nonexistence	   of	   real	   (conventions)	   within	   the	  principle	  (of	  emptiness),28	  it	  is	  like	  empty	  (sky)	  flowers	  to	  clear	  eyes.	  (This)	  is	  what	  “that	   known	   by	   the	   sages’	   wisdom”	   takes	   as	   real.	   This	   nonexistence	   and	   that	  existence	   reciprocally	   penetrate	   without	   obstruction,	   mixing	   as	   one	   nature.	  Therefore	  in	  the	  Satasastra	  (it	  says:)	  It	  is	  like	  a	  crabapple	  -­‐	  (relative)	  to	  a	  melon	  it	  is	  small,	  but	  (relative)	  to	  a	  date	  it	   is	   large.	   Big	   and	   small	   lack	   obstruction	   and	   (this	   state)	   is	   designated	   as	  “one	  crabapple.”	  (You)	  should	  know	  the	  existence	  and	  nonexistence	  herein	  are	  also	  thus.	  	  Lacking	  duality	   like	  this	   is	  designated	  as	  the	  “Middle	  Path.”	  Accordingly	  the	  Treatise	  says:	  “Lacking	   duality”	   and	   “there	   is	   this	   lack,”	   these	   two	   are	   designated	   as	   the	  “Middle	  Path.”	  The	  Treatise	  auto	  commentary	  states:	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As	  for	  “lacking	  duality,”	  it	  is	  lacking	  (any)	  existent	  that	  can	  grasp	  or	  which	  is	  grasped.	   As	   for	   “there	   is	   this	   lack,”	   it	   is	   (the	   fact	   that)	   there	   is	   this	  nonexistence	  of	   that	  which	  can	  grasp	  and	  of	   that	  which	   is	  grasped.	   (As	   for)	  this	  “existence”	  and	  that	  “nonexistence,”	   lacking	  (these)	   two	  constitutes	   the	  Middle	  Path.	  	   (Now)	   as	   for	   “there	   is	   this	   lack,”	   in	   this	   (text)	   it	   is	   just	   a	   consequence	   of	  lacking	  that	  existence.	  This	  is	  an	  exposition	  of	  (the	  constructions	  of)	  sensation	  and	  the	   principle	   (of	   emptiness)	  mutually	   facing	   (one	   another).	   If	   the	   sole	   concern	   is	  sensation,	   everything	   is	   sensation	   referencing	   vacuous	   emptiness.	   If	   (it	   is)	   only	  related	  to	  the	  principle	  (of	  emptiness),	  all	  existence,	  nonexistence,	  etc.,	  together	  lack	  that	  which	  exists	  (and	  this)	  “lacking	  that	  which	  exists”	  also	  lacks	  that	  which	  exists.	  (Accordingly,)	   each	   and	   every	   (option)	   is	   severed.	   Also,	   there	   is	   no	   middle	   and	  (there	  are)	  no	  boundaries.	  	   Second,	  as	  for	  relating	  to	  the	  perfectly	  complete	  real	  (emptiness),29	  this	  has	  three	  levels.	  	  The	   first	   relates	   to	   words	   as	   regards	   explanation	   and	   (words)	   coming	   to	  constitute	  conventional	  (truth).	  Departing	  from	  words	  (is	  to)	  abandon	  explanation	  and	  is	  not	  settling	  (upon	  another)	  standpoint	  as	  a	  result.	  (That	  understanding)	  then,	  thereupon	   constitutes	   (ultimate)	   truth.	   (With	   that	   understanding,)	   both	   fuse	  without	  obstruction	  (and	  that)	  is	  considered	  as	  the	  Middle	  Path.	  The	   second	   relates	   to	   the	   severing	   of	   characteristics	   (and)	   is	   therefore	  (concerned	  with)	  the	  meaning	  of	  “empty.”	  (This	  second	  also)	  relates	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  qualities	  of	  ultimate	  (truth	  and)	  therefore	  is	  (also	  concerned	  with)	  the	  meaning	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of	  “not	  empty.”	  The	  lack	  of	  duality	  of	  this	  “empty”	  and	  “not	  empty”	  constitutes	  the	  Midddle	  (Path).	  As	  (it	  states)	   in	  a	  sutra,	   “the	  empty/not	  empty	  tathagatagarbha	   is	  (the	  Middle).”	  The	  third	  relates	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  obstruction	  of	  this	  Thusness	  and	  the	  present	  body	   (of	   forms.	   Given	   that,	   then)	   accordingly	   the	   lack	   of	   that	   which	   (essentially)	  exists	  constitutes	  emptiness.	  (Given	  that,)	  then	  this	  Thusness-­‐body	  (of	  empty	  forms)	  cannot	   be	   destroyed.	   So	   it	   is	   designated	   as	   “not	   empty.”	   This	   “empty”	   and	   “not	  empty”	  (that)	  are	  not	  two	  constitutes	  the	  Middle	  (Path).	  
[General	  Explanation]	  As	   for	   the	   second	   (part	   of	   this	   explanation,	   the	   part	   that)	   generally	  distinguishes	  (key	  points,	  this)	  also	  has	  two	  levels.	  	  The	  first	  relates	  to	  a	  delusory	  ultimate	  giving	  rise	  to	  the	  false	  as	  [217b]	  the	  conventional.	   (With	   this	  view,)	  collecting	   the	   false	  and	  returning	   it	   to	   the	  ultimate	  constitutes	   the	   ultimate.	   (In	   this	   case)	   the	   ultimate	   and	   the	   false	   both	   fuse,	  reciprocally	   penetrating	   without	   obstruction.	   (This	   state)	   may	   be	   considered	   the	  Middle	   Path.	   (This)	   is	   the	   ultimate	   containing	   the	   false	   derivative	   (and)	   the	   false	  (derivative)	  penetrating	  into	  the	  ultimate	  origin.	  	  The	  ultimate	  and	  conventional	  mix	  and	  fuse	  (and	  this)	  is	  considered	  the	  Middle	  Path.	  Second,	  (if	  we)	  encompass	  the	  ultimate	  from	  the	  false,	  then	  the	  conventional	  exists	  and	  the	  ultimate	  does	  not	  exist.	  (If	  we)	  encompass	  the	  false	  from	  the	  ultimate,	  then	  the	  conventional	  does	  not	  exist	  and	  the	  ultimate	  does	  exist.	  In	  this	  fashion	  the	  existence	  and	  nonexistence	  of	   the	  ultimate	  and	  conventional	   lack	  obstruction	  (and	  this	  lack	  of	  obstruction)	  is	  considered	  the	  Middle	  Path.	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[In	  Relation	  to	  all	  the	  Three	  Natures]	  As	   for	   the	   third,	  wholly	   relating	   (these	   points)	   to	   distinctions	   of	   the	   Three	  Natures,	  initially	  (I	  will)	  reveal	  (the	  Three	  Natures,	  then)	  subsequently	  unite	  (them).	  	  As	   for	   revealing	   (the	   Three	   Natures),	   “That	   which	   is	   grasped”	   [i.e.,	  
parikalpita]	  has	   two	  meanings.	  That	   is	   to	  say,	   (this	   refers	   to)	   the	  existence	  of	   (the	  illusory	   constructs	   of	   the)	   sensations	   and	   the	   nonexistence	   of	   the	   principle	   (of	  emptiness).	  “Dependent	  upon	  other”	  [i.e.,	  paratantra]	  also	  has	  two	  meanings.	  That	  is	  to	   say,	   (it	   refers	   to)	   the	   (dependent)	   existence	   of	   the	   illusory	   (constructs	   of	  sensation)	  and	   the	  emptiness	  of	   (any	   individual)	  nature.	   “Perfectly	   complete”	   [i.e.,	  
parinispanna]	  also	  has	  two	  meanings.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (it	  refers	  to)	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  essential,	   (empty	   dependency)	   and	   the	   nonexistence	   of	   (any	   essential)	  characteristics	  (of	  such	  dependency).	  	  As	  for	  uniting	  them,	  (we	  can)	  consider	  the	  existence	  of	  (the	  constructions	  of	  the)	   sensations	   that	   are	   grasped	   at,	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   illusory	   dependent	   upon	  other,	  and	  the	  nonexistence	  of	  characteristics	  of	  the	  perfectly	  complete	  (so	  that)	  in	  this	   fashion	   the	   nonduality	   of	   existence	   and	   nonexistence	   constitutes	   the	   “Middle	  Path	   of	   Conventional	   Truth.”	   (Also,	   we	   can	   consider)	   the	   nonexistence	   of	   an	  (essential)	  principle	   (of	   the	  constructions	  of	   the	  sensations)	  which	  are	  grasped	  at,	  the	  emptiness	  of	   the	  nature	   that	   is	  dependent	  upon	  other,	  and	   the	  existence	  of	  an	  essence	  of	  the	  perfectly	  complete	  (so	  that)	  in	  this	  fashion	  the	  nonduality	  of	  existence	  and	   nonexistence	   is	   designated	   as	   the	   “Middle	   Path	   of	   Ultimate	   Truth.”	   In	   this	  fashion	   the	   ultimate	   and	   the	   conventional	   are	   united	   while	   eternally	   separate,	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separate	  while	   eternally	   united.	   The	   lack	   of	   obstruction	   of	   (their)	   separation	   and	  unity	  is	  the	  “Middle	  Path	  of	  Two	  Truths.”	  These	   above	   two	   gates	   also	   have	   (aspects)	   like	   “same-­‐different,”	   “hidden-­‐manifest”,	  etc.	  Each	  (of	  those	  aspects	  also)	  has	  a	  number	  of	  aspects.	  Also	  (if	  you	  will)	  weigh	  the	  first	  gate	  (in	  light	  of	  them	  you)	  should	  know	  (the	  key	  points).	  The	   above	   presentation	   (revealing	   the	  meanings	   of	   key)	   principles	   is	   now	  finished.	  
[Completing	  Contemplation]	  As	   for	   the	   second	   (of	   the	   three	   sections	  devoted	   to	   explaining	   the	  Author’s	  intention	   to	   report	   on	   the	  meaning	   of	   the	   three	   treatises,	   the	   section)	   relating	   to	  completing	  contemplation,	  this	  two	  truths	  of	  the	  equality	  of	  truly	  empty	  dharmas	  is	  that	   upon	  which	   the	  Buddhas	   of	   (all)	   three	   time	  periods	   have	   likewise	   depended.	  And	  all	  Bodhisattvas	  departing	  from	  this	  lack	  a	  road	  (leading	  to	  enlightenment).	  For	  this	   reason	   if	   one	   desires	   to	   seek	   out	   the	   essentials	   in	   regard	   to	   this	   ultimate	  
Mahayana	   (then)	   in	   regards	   to	   this	   profound	   emptiness	   (and)	   the	   constructed	  notions	  that	  biasedly	  attack	  (it),	  contemplate	  and	  judge	  (them)	  for	  a	  long	  while	  and	  then	  (you)	  can	  illuminate	  the	  principle	  (of	  truth)	  and	  prostrate	  delusion	  (before	  it).	  Now,	   (I	   will)	   briefly	   clarify	   this	   contemplation	   of	   ultimate	   emptiness	   by	  creating	  three	  gates.	  	  	   	   [The	  First	  Gate	  of	  Contemplating	  Emptiness]	  The	  first	  (gate	  pertains	  to)	  illnesses	  of	  awareness.	  This	  has	  two	  (subaspects).	  	  1.	  (Karmic)	  dust.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (this	  refers	  to	  the	  results	  of)	  having	  cultivated	  activities	   for	   seeking	   fame,	   pursuing	   profit,	   etc.	   (Such	   actions	   may)	   skillfully	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resemble	   (true	   practice	   but)	   are	   not	   truly	   for	   causing	   other	   (types	   of)	   knowledge	  and	  (they)	  do	  not	  safeguard	  (morally)	  disciplined	  action.	  This	  sort	  of	  (karmic)	  type	  is	  not	  capable	  of	  attaining	  entry	  into	  this	  contemplation	  of	  true	  emptiness.	  2.	  (Lacking)	  the	  minutely	  (and	  unremittingly	  attentive	  mind).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  even	   if	   (practitioners	   occasionally)	   have	   the	   mind	   that	   is	   straightforward	   and	  advances	  towards	  the	  principle	  (of	   truth,	   they)	  are	  not	  aware	  of	   the	  selfish	  mind’s	  grasping	  at	  views,	  errors,	  and	  troubles.	  For	  this	  reason	  (such	  practitioners)	  lack	  the	  (attentive)	  mind’s	  (ability	  to)	  overturn	  (deluded)	  sensation	  and	  enter	  the	  principle	  (of	  emptiness).	  Therefore	  (they)	  also	  cannot	  enter	  this	  contemplation.	  Therefore,	  (for	  any)	  practitioner	  who	  wishes	  to	  enter	  this	  contemplation,	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  above	  troubles	  of	  (karmic)	  dust	  and	  (the	  lack	  of	  a)	  minutely	  (attentive	  mind,	   they	  have)	  a	  surpassing	  need	  (for	   the)	  good	  awarenesses	   that	  seek	  distance	  from	  those	  (difficulties).	  	   	   [The	  Second	  Gate	  of	  Contemplating	  Emptiness]	  As	  for	  the	  second	  (gate,)	  selecting	  objects	  (for	  contemplation,	  this	  gate)	  also	  has	  two	  (subaspects).	  	  1.	  Perverted	  objects.	  That	   is	   to	   say,	  hearing	   (of)	   “emptiness,”	   (this	  problem	  arises	  when	  one	  takes	   it)	   to	  mean	  an	  absolute	  nonexistence.	  (Alternately,)	  hearing	  of	   “existence,”	   (one	   takes	   it)	   to	   mean	   an	   actual,	   (essential)	   existence.	   (Taken)	  together	   (these	   objects)	   are	   as	   those	  which	   the	   sensations	   grasp	   at.	   They	   are	   not	  
Dharmic	  objects.	  2.	   Real	   objects.	   As	   the	   above	   explained	   emptiness	   and	   existence	   both	   fuse,	  (the)	  Dharma	   of	   nonobstruction	   (that)	   is	   difficult	   to	   designate	   is	   (the	   real	   object,	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and)	   it	   is	   absolutely	   necessary	   to	   (intentionally)	   select	   it	   (as	   an	   object	   of	  contemplation).	  	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  (one)	  does	  not	  thusly	  (approach	  it),	  then	  that	  is	  the	  reason	  (one)	  enters	  the	  nets	  of	  Mara.	  	   	   [The	  Third	  Gate	  of	  Contemplating	  Emptiness]	  As	  for	  the	  third	  (gate),	  meditative	  wisdom,	  (it)	  also	  has	  two	  (subaspects).	  1.	   Understanding.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   in	   regards	   to	   the	   preceding	   ultimate	  emptiness,	  one	  ably	  divides	  (the	  true	  and	  false)	  and	  selects	  (the	  true)	  and	  does	  not	  associate	  with	  the	  three	  types	  of	  confused	  ideas	  about	  emptiness.	  Furthermore,	  one	  also	  comprehends	  that	  this	  understanding	  and	  practice	  are	  not	  the	  same.	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	   (one)	   does	   not	   [217c]	   thusly	   (proceed)	   regarding	   this	   Dharma	   above,	   (one	  will)	  fall	  into	  (a	  state	  of)	  not	  producing	  understanding.	  (If	  that	  happens)	  then	  in	  that	  case	  that	  means	  this	  (so-­‐called)	  understanding	  is	  the	  active	  mind.	  (Such	  a	  mindset)	  is	  not	  the	  correct	  principle	  so	  it	  is	  not	  designated	  as	  “understanding.”	  2.	  Active	  (contemplation	  of	  the	  ultimate).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  when	  contemplating	  the	   true	  principle	  by	  means	  of	   the	  active	  mind,	   (that	  mindset)	  certainly	   is	  not	   like	  (the	   mindset)	   which	   is	   understood	   by	   the	   preceding	   (category	   designated	  “understanding”).	   Because	   understanding	   (alone)	   cannot	   reach	   (all	   the	   way),	   the	  active	   mind	   accords	   with	   the	   Dharma	   and	   destroys	   the	   conceptualizations	   of	  sensations	  as	  a	  result.	  That	   is	   to	  say,	   in	  regards	   to	  ultimate	  objects,	   (this	  mindset)	  does	   not	   create	   interpretations	   of	   emptiness,	   does	   not	   create	   interpretations	   of	  existence,	   does	   not	   create	   interpretations	   of	   both,	   and	   also	   does	   not	   create	  interpretations	  of	  both	  neither/nor.	   In	   the	   interval	  of	  a	   single	   thought-­‐moment	  all	  the	  active	  conceptualizations	  of	   the	   interpreting	  mind	  are	  completely	   severed	  and	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also	  there	  are	  no	  “does	  not	  move”	  interpretations	  (generated).	  The	  (objects)	  which	  are	   (so)	   interpreted	   are	   also	   severed.	   This	   “severing”	   is	   also	   severed.	  Objects	   and	  knowledge	  both	  fuse	  in	  the	  interval	  of	  a	  single	  thought-­‐moment.	  This	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  opening	  of	  sensation	  and	  manifestation	  of	  principle	  (that	  accompanies	  this	  insight)	  is	   difficult	   to	   express	   and	   as	   for	   reaching	   it,	   (one)	   should	   know	   that	   (regarding)	  Nagarjuna’s	  expounding	  emptiness,	  the	  point	  is	  found	  in	  this	  (insight).	  
[Functions	  of	  These	  Contemplations]	  As	   for	   the	   third	   (of	   the	   three	   sections	   devoted	   to	   explaining	   the	   Author’s	  intention	  to	  report	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  three	  treatises,	  the	  part	  that)	  reveals	  the	  virtuous	  functions	  (of	  these	  contemplations),	  the	  Madhyamaka-­‐karika	  says:	  Because	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  emptiness	  of	  existence,	  all	  dharmas	  come	  to	  be	  formed.	  (It)	  further	  says:	  Because	   of	   the	   emptiness	   of	   all	   dharmas,	   (there)	   comes	   to	   be	   the	   Three	  Jewels,	  4	  (Noble)	  Truths,	  etc.	  The	  Ta-­‐p’in	  sutra	  says:	  If	  all	  dharmas	  were	  not	  empty,	  then	  there	  would	  be	  no	  Path	  and	  no	  fruits	  (of	  the	  Path).	  It	  further	  says:	  If	   the	   various	   dharmas,	   as	   the	   least	   (of	   everything,)	   are	   granted	   existence,	  then	  the	  various	  Buddhas	  do	  not	  leave	  the	  world.	  Texts	  like	  this	  all	  clarify	  (the	  point	  that)	  because	  there	  is	  true	  emptiness,	  only	  then	  are	  there	  the	  various	  dharmas.	  Furthermore,	  due	  to	  contemplating	  true	  emptiness,	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only	  then	  	  (does	  one)	  complete	  the	  various	  practices.	  	  For	  this	  reason	  practices	  like	  the	   Ten	   Perfections	   are	   all	   completed	   due	   to	   emptiness.	   Fruits	   like	   insight	   are	   all	  established	  due	  to	  emptiness.	  For	  this	  reason,	  from	  this	  lack	  of	  a	  dwelling	  (place)	  of	  true	  emptiness,	   (one)	   establishes	   the	  various	  dharmas.	   Furthermore,	   (this)	   causes	  the	   various	  dharmas	   to	   attain	   characteristics	  which	  mutually	   enter	   (one	   another)	  without	   obstacle,	   without	   obstruction,	   and	   so	   on.	   Together	   (all	   the	   completing,	  establishing,	  interpenetrating,	  etc.)	  is	  the	  great	  functioning	  of	  this	  gate.	  
[Uniting	  Different	  Expositions]	  As	   for	   the	   fourth	   (of	   the	   four	   sections	   devoted	   to	   explaining	   the	   Author’s	  intentions,	   the	   part	   concerning	   his	   intention	   to)	   unite	   the	   different	   explanations,	  therein	   (we	   can	   note)	   two	   (points).	   First	   (he	   intends	   to)	   rank	   the	   different	  explanations	  then,	  (secondly,	  to)	  unite	  them	  without	  opposition.	  
[Ranking	  the	  Explanations]	  Within	   the	   former,	   in	   this	  Mahayana	   (branch	   of	   Buddhism	   there	   is	   a)	   rich	  debate	  (concerning)	  two	  principles	  regarding	  conditionally	  produced	  dharmas.	  (The	  debate	  involves	  questions	  about)	  1,	  grasping	  at	  existents	  (and)	  2,	  explanations	  as	  to	  the	  emptiness	  (of	  dharmas).	  
[Grasping	  at	  Existents]	  	  Moreover,	  as	   for	  grasping	  at	  existents,	   (some)	  explain	   that	   this	  conditioned	  production	   certainly	   is	   not	   empty	   because	   there	   are	   those	   (dharmas)	   that	   causes	  and	   conditions	   produce.	   (This	   view	   claims)	   even	   though	   (such	   dharmas)	   are	   like	  illusory	   phenomena,	   (one)	  may	   not	   say	   (they)	   do	   not	   exist.	   If	   it	   is	   the	   case	   (one)	  speaks	  of	  emptiness,	  (that)	  necessarily	   is	  not	  the	  conditionally	  produced	  –	   like	  the	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horns	  of	  a	  hare	  (for	  example).	  If	  it	  were	  so	  then	  (that	  would)	  further	  annihilate	  (the	  principle	  of)	  cause	  and	  effect	  (and)	  destroy	  the	  two	  truths.	  (They	  claim	  this	  must	  be	  the	  case)	  because	  if	  there	  were	  no	  mind	  (or)	  dharmas	  of	  the	  mind	  what	  (then	  could	  be)	  severed?	  What	  verified?	  What	  (Path	  could	  be)	  cultivated?	  What	  benefits	  (could	  obtain)?	  Accordingly	  the	  Wei-­‐shih	  lun	  says:	  If	  everything	  is	  empty,	  how	  (can)	  there	  be	  the	  wisdom	  for	  eliminating	  the	  opposition	  of	  illusion?	  (Such	  a	  case	  is	  like)	  seeking	  the	  sons	  of	  barren	  women	  (and)	  considering	  them	  a	  military	  brigade.	  As	  this	  type	  (of	  passage	  suggests,)	  those	  who	  establish	  existent	  ayatanas30	  (or)	  expound	  the	  emptiness	  of	  conditionally	  produced	  (dharmas)	  should	  know	  this	  concerns	  that	  which	  is	  grasped	  at	  by	  universal	  reckoning.31	  (This	  is)	  the	  reason	  (they)	  explain	  (the	  idea	  that)	  conditionally	  produced	  dharmas	  lack	  the	  two	  (forms	  of)	  self	  (essence).	  The	  implicit	  point	  (in)	  speaking	  of	  emptiness	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  Dharma	  brings	  up	  an	  essence	  that	  is	  completely	  nonexistent.	  If	  it	  were	  a	  case	  of	  this	  (complete)	  nonexistence,	  then	  it	  is	  a	  severed	  nonexistence,	  a	  view	  that	  wrongly	  grasps	  at	  emptiness.	  The	  Shen	  Wei	  K’o-­‐wei	  sutra	  says:	  Rather	  than	  arousing	  the	  view	  of	  an	  existent	  (emptiness),	  which	  (once	  aroused)	  is	  like	  (having	  to	  destroy)	  Mt.	  Sumeru,	  (better	  to)	  not	  arouse	  a	  view	  of	  emptiness,	  which	  is	  like	  (eliminating)	  a	  mustard	  seed.	  The	  Madhyamaka-­‐karika	  says:	  	   If	  again	  [218a]	  (one	  constructs	  a)	  view	  regarding	  emptiness,	  	   (such	  views)	  are	  those	  which	  the	  Buddhas	  cannot	  transform.	  
	   66	  
A	  view	  of	  emptiness	  like	  this	  is	  actually	  a	  profound	  error.	  Clearly	  understand	  that	  conditioned	  production	  is	  certainly	  not	  nonexistence.	  The	  Samgraha,	  
Yogarcara,	  and	  Sandhinirmocana	  sutras	  definitely	  expound	  (dependent)	  existence	  and	  (this,	  they	  say,)	  is	  the	  reason	  it	  may	  not	  be	  opposed.	  	   	   	   [Explanations	  of	  the	  Emptiness	  of	  dharmas]	  Second,	  as	  for	  grasping	  at	  the	  emptiness	  (dharmas),	  speaking	  of	  these	  conditionally	  produced	  dharmas,	  (they)	  certainly	  are	  empty	  (of	  own	  being).	  Because	  (they)	  are	  produced	  from	  conditions,	  (they)	  definitely	  lack	  a	  self-­‐nature.	  Although	  they	  are	  like	  illusory	  phenomena,	  (one)	  may	  not	  say	  they	  exist.	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  (one)	  says	  (they	  essentially)	  exist,	  then	  (they)	  are	  not	  (derived)	  from	  conditions.	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  (being)	  not	  (derived)	  from	  conditions,	  then	  (such	  existents)	  are	  not	  conditionally	  arisen	  dharmas.	  As	  for	  establishing	  existent	  ayatanas	  (and)	  expounding	  (the	  idea	  that)	  the	  essence	  of	  conditionally	  produced	  dharmas	  is	  (essentially)	  existent,	  (we)	  should	  know	  (such	  notions)	  are	  only	  provisional	  expositions	  that	  accord	  with	  conventional	  (truth).	  It	  is	  not	  a	  claim	  that	  the	  essence	  (of	  ayatanas	  and	  dharmas)	  actually	  is	  not	  empty.	  (This	  must	  be	  the	  case)	  because	  if	  (they	  had)	  an	  existent	  essence,	  then	  (they	  could)	  not	  come	  from	  conditions.	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  not	  coming	  from	  conditions,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  knowledge	  of	  severing	  	  (delusion	  or)	  verifying	  cultivation.	  Also,	  (in	  such	  a	  case	  there	  is)	  destruction	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  two	  truths.	  The	  Ta-­‐pin	  sutra	  says:	  	   If	  the	  various	  dharmas	  are	  not	  empty,	  	   then	  there	  is	  no	  Path	  and	  there	  are	  no	  fruits	  (of	  the	  Path).	  The	  Madhyamaka-­‐karika	  says:	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   If	  all	  (arisings)	  are	  not	  empty,	  	   then	  there	  are	  no	  Three	  Jewels,	  Four	  Truths,	  (etc.).	  	   (Such	  an	  understanding)	  constitutes	  a	  great	  heterodoxy.	  The	  Chih	  Lun	  says:	  Contemplate	  that	  all	  dharmas	  are	  produced	  from	  causes	  and	  conditions.	  (Because	  they)	  are	  produced	  from	  causes	  and	  conditions,	  accordingly	  (they)	  lack	  a	  self-­‐nature.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  lacking	  a	  self-­‐nature,	  in	  the	  end	  (they)	  are	  all	  empty.	  Furthermore,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  we	  say	  these	  illusory	  phenomena	  are	  not	  empty,	  (then	  we	  might)	  now	  ask	  (if	  it)	  is	  like	  an	  illusory	  scroll	  (painting	  of	  a	  rabbit)	  constituting	  a	  (real)	  rabbit.	  (Should	  we	  consider)	  this	  (so-­‐called	  real)	  rabbit	  as	  located	  in	  the	  scroll?	  As	  located	  outside	  the	  scroll?	  As	  exactly	  and	  just	  the	  scroll?	  As	  separate	  from	  the	  scroll’s	  existence?	  As	  having	  skin	  and	  hair?	  As	  having	  bones	  and	  flesh?	  Since	  (the	  “real”	  rabbit	  is)	  also	  decidedly	  nonexistent	  (apart	  from	  the	  scroll),	  based	  on	  what	  (might	  we)	  grasp	  (its)	  existence?	  (We)	  should	  know	  this	  (so-­‐called	  real)	  rabbit	  does	  not	  await	  (an)	  extinction	  of	  individual	  death.	  (It	  is)	  originally	  not	  produced	  even	  while	  emptily	  becoming	  (present	  as	  a	  painting).	  For	  this	  reason,	  (we)	  must	  (understand)	  that	  due	  to	  the	  emptiness	  of	  a	  nature	  there	  come	  to	  be	  the	  two	  truths.	  	  Furthermore,	  (they	  note,)	  “As	  for	  you	  taking	  my	  point	  (about	  emptiness)	  as	  a	  view	  of	  emptiness,	  this	  error	  belongs	  to	  you	  (and	  is	  not	  part	  of	  my	  point).”	  	   (Question:)	  How	  so?	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   (It	  is	  as	  they	  note.)	  If	  you	  grasp	  at	  existence	  then	  (those	  existents)	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  conditions.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  not	  relying	  on	  conditions,	  (this	  view)	  accordingly	  severs	  (the	  dependent	  relationship	  between)	  causes	  and	  effects.	  	  How	  is	  this	  not	  a	  view	  of	  emptiness?	  (And)	  conversely,	  grasping	  at	  existent	  dharmas,	  how	  is	  (that)	  not	  a	  view	  of	  existence?	  The	  two	  views	  of	  existence	  and	  nonexistence	  both	  support	  your	  point.	  How	  (does	  this	  contradiction)	  not	  produce	  apprehension	  (about	  your	  position)?	  Further,	  you	  do	  not	  comprehend	  that	  the	  emptiness	  I	  expound	  departs	  from	  the	  views	  of	  existence	  (and)	  emptiness.	  As	  for	  attaching	  to	  it	  as	  a	  view	  of	  emptiness	  and	  producing	  fear,	  this	  is	  your	  particular	  view	  of	  emptiness.	  It	  is	  not	  related	  to	  my	  principles.	  	  	  Moreover,	  you	  contradictorily	  fear	  the	  view	  of	  self	  while	  grasping	  at	  the	  existence	  of	  sensations.	  (This)	  again	  forms	  a	  view	  of	  existence.	  Both	  (views)	  lose	  (the	  point	  of)	  the	  Buddha’s	  Dharma	  regarding	  reversing	  sensations	  even	  as	  they	  constantly	  flow.	  Supposing	  that	  (views	  which)	  contaminate	  the	  Dharma	  and	  the	  robed	  (ones)	  always	  lie	  outside	  the	  Dharma	  is	  your	  error.	  	  Further,	  you	  say	  “How	  is	  there	  wisdom	  such	  as	  eliminating	  illusory	  enumerations,	  and	  so	  on?”	  (Just	  consider)	  the	  various	  Mahayana	  sutras	  –	  in	  what	  place	  (do	  they)	  not	  expound	  (the	  idea)	  that	  the	  various	  dharmas	  are	  like	  (illusory)	  transformations?	  That	  Bodhisattvas	  cultivate	  the	  wisdom	  of	  illusion?	  Sever	  illusory	  delusions?	  Complete	  illusory	  practices?	  Acquire	  illusory	  effects?	  And	  so	  forth.	  A	  Noble	  Teaching	  like	  this,	  how	  does	  it	  not	  oppose	  harm?	  How	  (does	  it)	  not	  produce	  fear	  (of	  error)?	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Furthermore,	  you	  think	  (this)	  means	  there	  is	  a	  realization	  that	  ends	  (illusions)	  and	  so	  it	  is	  not	  like	  an	  illusion.	  (But)	  because	  (such	  a	  realization)	  is	  not	  like	  an	  illusion,	  it	  is	  not	  produced	  from	  conditions.	  Because	  it	  is	  not	  produced	  from	  conditions,	  how	  is	  there	  a	  realization	  that	  ends	  (illusions)?	  For	  this	  reason,	  overturn	  this	  great	  heterodoxy.	  	  Moreover,	  [218b]	  your	  (great	  teacher,)	  the	  Bodhisattva	  Asanga	  accorded	  with	  (the	  ideas)	  within	  the	  Madhyamaka-­‐karika.	  (He)	  venerably	  inherited	  Nagarjuna’s	  (ideas),	  was	  in	  accord	  with	  (that)	  Acarya’s	  (practices,	  and)	  taught	  what	  he	  expounded.	  (He)	  interpreted	  those	  other	  treatises,	  even	  further	  protecting	  the	  
Dharma,	  while	  unceremoniously	  destroying	  (their)	  slander.	  In	  the	  Lankavatara	  (sutra)	  the	  Buddha	  prophesied	  (that)	  Nagarjuna,	  abiding	  in	  the	  first	  stage,	  (the	  stage)	  of	  joy,32	  would	  be	  able	  to	  smash	  views	  of	  existence	  and	  nonexistence,	  (thus	  allowing	  progress)	  towards	  birth	  in	  the	  land	  of	  peace	  and	  joy.	  Since	  this	  is	  (a	  process	  of)	  refuting	  views	  of	  existence	  and	  nonexistence,	  how	  (can	  it	  be)	  understood	  as	  a	  (view	  of)	  emptiness?	  If	  we	  say	  that	  Nagarjuna	  was	  (an	  advocate	  of)	  a	  view	  of	  emptiness,	  (then	  we)	  come	  to	  profoundly	  slander	  (his	  point).	  This	  (approach)	  is	  exactly	  that	  which	  the	  Buddhas	  praise.	  (However)	  other	  folks	  destructively	  slander	  (it	  and)	  contrarily	  contend	  with	  the	  Buddhas’	  (idea.	  They)	  do	  not	  then	  (correctly)	  interpret	  (this)	  sort	  (of	  thinking).	  	  	   	   [Combining	  the	  Explanations]	  As	  for	  the	  second	  (point	  of	  this	  explanation	  concerning	  the	  Author’s	  intention	  to	  unite	  various	  explanations,	  the	  part	  on)	  “combining	  (them	  so	  they)	  lack	  opposition,”	  the	  various	  conditionally	  arisen	  dharmas	  have	  never	  yet	  had	  an	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essence,	  never	  yet	  been	  destroyed.	  Lacking	  an	  essence	  (and)	  lacking	  destruction	  lacks	  duality	  without	  obstruction	  (and	  this	  is	  what	  is)	  considered	  to	  be	  “conditionally	  arisen	  dharmas.”	  For	  this	  reason	  Nagarjuna,	  and	  so	  on,	  although	  they	  expound	  an	  emptiness	  that	  exhausts	  existence,	  yet	  (that	  emptiness)	  does	  not	  wait	  on	  extinguishing	  existence.	  Since	  it	  does	  not	  destroy	  existence,	  it	  is	  exactly	  a	  “does-­‐not-­‐oppose-­‐existence	  emptiness.”	  Therefore	  the	  emptiness	  Nagarjuna	  expounded	  departs	  from	  existence	  and	  departs	  from	  nonexistence	  and	  (ought	  to	  be	  understood)	  as	  true	  emptiness.	  	  Asanga,	  and	  so	  on,	  although	  (they)	  expounded	  an	  “existence	  that	  exhausts	  emptiness,”	  yet	  (that	  existence)	  does	  not	  destroy	  true	  emptiness.	  	  Since	  (it)	  does	  not	  destroy	  emptiness,	  it	  is	  exactly	  an	  existence	  that	  does	  not	  oppose	  emptiness.	  Therefore	  (it	  is)	  also	  an	  illusory	  existence	  that	  departs	  from	  (essential)	  existence	  and	  (nihilistic)	  nonexistence.	  	  (Question:)	  How	  do	  (these)	  mutually	  opposing	  (views	  agree)	  then?	  	   (Anwer:	  You)	  should	  know	  the	  two	  expositions’	  entire	  essences	  (are)	  mutually	  associated	  (and	  the	  extreme)	  boundaries	  lack	  opposition.	  Although	  each	  narrates	  a	  single	  (particular)	  idea,	  yet	  they	  (both)	  bring	  up	  the	  perfect	  completion	  of	  the	  essence.	  Therefore	  they	  lack	  (essential)	  opposition.	  (Taking	  them)	  as	  if	  they	  are	  not	  so,	  (and)	  dreadfully	  falling	  into	  empty	  (nihilistic)	  nonexistence,	  (only)	  encourages	  thought	  to	  establish	  (essential)	  existence.	  (Precisely	  because	  emptiness)	  does	  not	  oppose	  this	  (dependent)	  existence	  is	  the	  reason	  (it	  is)	  an	  existence	  that	  is	  not	  different	  from	  emptiness.	  Therefore	  do	  not	  accept	  that	  (erroneous	  notion	  of)	  emptiness	  contrarily	  omitting	  individual	  existence.	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As	  for	  omitting	  individual	  existence,	  now	  that	  is	  due	  to	  grasping	  at	  (essential)	  existence.	  Furthermore,	  if	  (one)	  fears	  falling	  into	  that	  which	  comes	  (with	  erroneous	  notions	  of)	  existence,	  (one	  might)	  therefore	  courageously	  encourage	  and	  establish	  (correct	  views	  of)	  emptiness.	  Not	  opposing	  this	  emptiness	  is	  the	  reason	  (it	  is)	  an	  emptiness	  that	  does	  not	  differ	  from	  existence.	  For	  this	  reason	  do	  not	  accept	  that	  conditioned	  existence	  contrarily	  omits	  true	  emptiness.	  	   As	  for	  omitting	  true	  emptiness,	  now	  that	  is	  due	  to	  grasping	  at	  (erroneous	  notions	  of	  nihilistic)	  emptiness.	  For	  this	  reason	  (these	  masters)	  bring	  up	  the	  (idea	  that)	  the	  essence	  (is	  an)	  entirely	  empty	  existence	  and	  bring	  up	  (the	  idea	  that)	  the	  essence	  (is	  a)	  completely	  existent	  emptiness.33	  Asanga’s	  expositions	  and	  Nagarjuna’s	  expositions	  are	  not	  merely	  two	  (different	  types)	  of	  exposition	  that	  together	  do	  not	  mutually	  oppose,	  (but)	  also	  then	  are	  two	  meanings	  mutually	  (existent)	  due	  to	  (one	  another	  and	  which)	  completely	  encompass	  (one	  another).	  Therefore,	  they	  lack	  duality.	  	   Question:	  If	  it	  is	  thus,	  why	  do	  Bhavaviveka,	  Dhamapala,	  and	  (other)	  sastra	  masters	  of	  later	  periods	  mutually	  refute	  (one	  another’s	  views)?	  	   Answer:	  These	  (activities)	  then	  are	  (actually	  their)	  mutual	  completion!	  It	  is	  not	  mutual	  refutation.	  	   (Question:)	  How	  so?	  	   (Answer:)	  As	  (it	  is	  now)	  the	  final	  period	  (of	  the	  Dharma	  when)	  there	  is	  a	  gradual	  dulling	  of	  capacity	  in	  sensation	  and	  faculties,	  hearing	  expositions	  about	  illusory	  existence,	  (some	  take)	  the	  meaning	  as	  (referring	  to)	  definitive	  (essential)	  existence.	  Therefore,	  Bhavaviveka,	  et	  al,	  refuted	  existence,	  leading	  (those	  in	  error	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to)	  exhaust	  (that	  view),	  reach	  final	  emptiness,	  and	  thereupon	  come	  to	  (understand)	  that	  conditionally	  arisen	  illusory	  existence.	  If	  (one)	  does	  not	  reach	  this	  final	  emptiness	  of	  (an	  essential)	  nature,	  then	  (one)	  does	  not	  complete	  (an	  understanding	  of)	  that	  conditionally	  arisen	  illusory	  existence.	  For	  this	  reason,	  in	  order	  to	  complete	  (correct	  understanding	  of)	  existence,	  (their)	  refutations	  (were	  directed)	  toward	  (erroneous	  notions	  of)	  existence.	  	  Furthermore,	  those	  (individuals,)	  hearing	  expositions	  about	  the	  emptiness	  of	  conditionally	  produced	  nature,	  (took	  the)	  meaning	  as	  a	  severed	  nonexistence.	  Accordingly	  Dharmapala,	  et	  al,	  refuted	  emptiness	  and	  preserved	  existence.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  preservation	  of	  illusory	  existence,	  thereupon	  (they)	  come	  to	  (understand)	  that	  emptiness	  that	  does	  not	  differ	  from	  existence.	  Consider	  that	  if	  it	  is	  not	  (the	  case	  that	  the)	  [218c]	  complete	  essence	  extends	  to	  these	  illusory	  existents,	  then	  (it)	  is	  not	  that	  emptiness	  of	  a	  true	  nature.	  For	  this	  reason,	  in	  order	  to	  complete	  (understanding	  of)	  emptiness	  (these	  later	  masters’)	  refutations	  (were	  directed)	  towards	  (that	  misunderstood)	  emptiness.	  If	  we	  lacked	  masters	  of	  the	  later	  period	  like	  these	  (who)	  consider	  the	  two	  principles	  interpenetrating	  and	  the	  complete	  essence	  as	  mutually	  determined,	  (we	  would)	  lack	  a	  reason	  to	  come	  to	  realize	  the	  profundities	  of	  conditioned	  arising.	  For	  this	  reason	  (their)	  mutual	  refutations	  are,	  contrarily,	  mutual	  completions.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  true	  emptiness	  of	  the	  illusory	  existence	  of	  conditionally	  arisen	  
dharmas	  there	  are	  two	  meanings	  (to	  note).	  The	  first	  (point	  concerns	  the)	  absolute	  mutual	  accord	  (of	  all	  dharmas).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (dharmas)	  profoundly	  combine	  (as)	  a	  single	  characteristic.	  (This	  meaning)	  brings	  forth	  the	  entirely	  encompassing	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(nature)	  of	  the	  essence	  (of	  dharmas	  as	  empty).	  The	  second	  (point	  concerns	  the)	  absolute	  mutual	  opposition	  (of	  all	  dharmas).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  each	  (dharma)	  mutually	  injures	  the	  other,	  completely	  taking	  away	  and	  forever	  exhausting	  (its	  opposite).	  If	  (they)	  did	  not	  mutually	  take	  away	  and	  forever	  exhaust	  (one	  another	  then	  reality	  would)	  lack	  the	  means	  whereby	  to	  bring	  forth	  (arisings	  that)	  completely	  garner	  (all	  aspects	  of)	  the	  essential	  (absence	  of	  a	  self-­‐nature).	  For	  this	  reason	  absolute	  opposition	  is	  exactly	  absolute	  accord.	  Nagarjuna’s	  and	  Asanga’s	  (ideas)	  concern	  the	  gate	  of	  absolute	  accord.	  Therefore	  there	  is	  no	  mutual	  refutation	  (between	  their	  views).	  Bhavaviveka’s	  and	  Dharmapala’s	  (replies)	  rely	  upon	  the	  gate	  of	  absolute	  opposition.	  Therefore,	  (mutual)	  accord	  is	  mutual	  refutation.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  opposition	  and	  accord	  lacking	  obstruction,	  that	  then	  is	  conditioned	  arising.	  For	  this	  reason	  it	  is	  (the	  case	  that)	  earlier	  and	  later	  (views)	  do	  not	  mutually	  oppose	  (one	  another.	  As	  for	  the)	  other	  meanings,	  weigh	  the	  above	  and	  think	  about	  it.	  (In	  light	  of	  this,	  as	  for	  the)	  various	  (different)	  expositions	  (of	  the	  Dharma),	  is	  it	  not	  the	  case	  they	  lack	  disharmony?	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[VII.	  The	  Time	  of	  the	  Text’s	  Composition]	  As	  for	  the	  seventh	  (of	  the	  ten	  major	  topics	  covered	  in	  this	  commentary,)	  the	  period	  of	  the	  text’s	  composition,	  there	  (are	  sources	  that)	  say	  Nagarjuna	  came	  800	  years	  after	  the	  Buddha’s	  nirvana	  (but)	  based	  on	  the	  Mahamayasutra	  he	  came	  700	  years	  after	  the	  Buddha’s	  nirvana.	  Recently	  (I)	  asked	  Tripitaka	  (Master	  Divakara	  who)	  said	  western	  regions	  have	  transmitted	  Nagarjuna’s	  (teachings	  and	  they	  say)	  after	  the	  Buddha’s	  nirvana	  300	  years	  (passed	  before	  Nagarjuna)	  emerged	  in	  Southern	  India.	  (This	  version	  claims	  that	  Nagarjuna,)	  along	  with	  the	  King	  of	  one	  country,	  maintained	  (himself)	  by	  (magical)	  medicine,	  intending	  to	  await	  Maitreya,	  and	  reached	  800	  years	  (following	  the	  Buddha’s	  nirvana).	  That	  King’s	  sons	  all	  died	  (very)	  old.	  Lacking	  successors,	  a	  later	  heir	  regretted	  (the	  fact	  that)	  there	  was	  no	  (one	  to)	  ascend	  the	  throne.	  His	  mother	  instructed	  him	  saying,	  “Your	  father	  did	  not	  die,	  (he)	  is	  supported	  by	  Nagarjuna.	  You	  (should)	  implore	  that	  patron	  (as	  your)	  father	  is	  accordingly	  (and	  otherwise	  forever)	  lost.	  Relying	  on	  (his	  mother’s)	  words	  the	  son	  then	  went	  to	  (Nagarjuna)	  and	  implored	  (him	  for	  his	  father).	  The	  Bodhisattva	  (Nagarjuna	  heard	  him,	  took	  pity,)	  cut	  (his	  own)	  throat	  and	  presented	  (his	  life	  to	  the	  son	  to	  save	  the	  father).	  With	  that	  (final	  act	  of	  compassion	  Nagarjuna	  then)	  died.	  With	  that	  then	  (there	  were)	  500	  years	  (for	  Nagarjuna)	  on	  this	  earth.	  Therefore,	  the	  various	  explanations	  all	  combine.	  Thus,	  that	  which	  he	  composed	  (in	  this	  Treatise	  and	  its	  later	  commentaries),	  although	  (the	  ideas	  cover)	  a	  broad	  multiplicity	  (of	  texts),	  only	  in	  this	  Treatise	  did	  he	  personally	  compose	  the	  original	  verses	  while	  still	  personally	  composing	  the	  (later)	  interpretations.	  Since	  it	  then	  does	  not	  intermix	  other	  words	  (the	  commentary	  is)	  also	  upheld	  as	  extremely	  profound.	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[VIII.	  Historical	  Conditions	  of	  the	  Text’s	  Transmission]	  As	  for	  the	  eighth	  (of	  the	  ten	  major	  topics	  here),	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  Treatise’s	  transmission,	  Tripitaka	  Dharma	  Master	  Kumarajiva	  said	  (of)	  this	  (text,	  that	  from)	  youth	  to	  old	  age,	  the	  Sanskrit	  original	  (was	  handed	  down)	  to	  this	  (time).	  By	  the	  initial	  year	  of	  the	  Great	  Ch’in’s	  (era	  of)	  Expansion,	  at	  the	  Hsiao-­‐yao	  monastary	  (in	  Ch’ang-­‐an,	  Kumarajiva)	  along	  with	  various	  virtuous	  (monks	  like	  his	  four	  great	  disciples)	  Buddhajiva,	  Seng-­‐chao,	  Tao-­‐jung,	  and	  Seng-­‐jui,	  together	  translated	  this	  Treatise.	  Seng-­‐jui	  publically	  recorded	  (the	  text)	  received	  (by	  dictation).	  The	  Madhyamaka-­‐karika,	  Satasastra,	  and	  Chih-­‐lun	  were	  likewise	  translated.	  As	  a	  result,	  (thereafter)	  Seng-­‐chao	  (would	  occasionally	  and)	  publically	  take	  out	  and	  inspect	  the	  four	  treatises.	  (He)	  cherished	  (them)	  as	  	  (the	  keys	  to)	  entry	  of	  (that	  wisdom	  which	  is	  like	  the)	  sun	  and	  moon.	  That	  (master)	  discussed	  them	  saying	  the	  Satasastra	  broadly	  refutes	  heterodoxy,	  the	  Dvadasanikaya34	  broadly	  refutes	  Hinayana	  (views),	  the	  Madhymakakarika	  thoroughly	  refutes	  internal	  and	  external	  (errors,	  while)	  the	  Chih-­‐lun	  interprets	  Mahayana	  (views).	  The	  influence	  of	  these	  texts	  is	  like	  this	  (and)	  for	  this	  reason	  the	  profound	  purport	  of	  the	  Three	  Treatise	  (school)	  spread	  to	  the	  nine	  regions.	  The	  principles	  of	  Nagarjuna	  [219a]	  were	  transmitted	  (by)	  the	  power	  of	  Kumarajiva.	  Still	  (yet	  these	  were)	  again	  translated	  at	  Kuan-­‐ho	  and	  so	  amply	  transmitted	  to	  (areas)	  south	  of	  the	  Yangtse	  (river).	  Accordingly,	  (they)	  brought	  forth	  the	  merits	  of	  supreme	  clarity.	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[IX.	  The	  Text’s	  Title]	  [Nagarjuna’s	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates:]35	  [159c]	  
The	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates	  The	  Gate	  of	  Contemplating	  Causes	  and	  Conditions	  The	  First	  (Gate)	  Composed	  by	  the	  Bodhisattva	  Nagarjuna	  Translated	  by	  Tripitaka	  Master	  Kumarajiva	  
	  As	  for	  the	  ninth	  (of	  the	  ten	  major	  topics	  here),	  explaining	  the	  text’s	  title,	  now	  these	  three	  treatises	  (from	  which	  the	  school	  takes	  its	  name)	  come	  to	  have	  designations	  that	  are	  not	  the	  same.	  Either	  (the	  text)	  regards	  that	  which	  is	  revealed	  as	  the	  name	  –	  like	  (for	  example)	  the	  Madhyamaka-­‐sastra	  because	  it	  takes	  the	  Middle	  Path	  as	  that	  which	  is	  revealed.	  Or	  (the	  text)	  matches	  that	  which	  is	  bestowed	  and/or	  that	  which	  is	  requested	  with	  the	  title	  –	  like	  this	  Treatise	  because	  it	  takes	  the	  “Dharma	  of	  the	  Twelve	  Gates”	  as	  that	  which	  is	  bestowed.	  	  Alternately,	  (the	  text	  may)	  match	  enumerations	  with	  the	  name	  –	  like	  the	  Satasastra,	  because	  that	  Treatise	  has	  100	  verses.	  As	  for	  the	  twelve	  (gates)	  in	  this	  (text),	  there	  are	  individuals	  who	  interpret	  it	  saying	  this	  is	  one	  great	  (single)	  number	  as	  in	  accord	  (with	  usage)	  in	  (common)	  speech.	  (In	  this	  case	  the	  meaning	  would	  be	  the	  same	  as	  phrases)	  like	  the	  “twelve	  hours	  of	  a	  day”	  and	  “twelve	  months	  of	  a	  year.”	  Furthermore,	  (as	  for	  concerns	  that)	  displaying	  the	  twelve	  (problems	  to	  be	  cured	  leads	  to	  falling)	  into	  the	  twelve	  (problematic)	  conditions,	  and	  so	  on,	  these	  fears	  are	  not	  the	  case.	  	  Now,	  (as	  for)	  interpreting	  the	  (number)	  “twelve”	  (in	  the	  title),	  there	  are	  three	  meanings.	  The	  first	  (holds	  it)	  correlates	  to	  that	  which	  is	  banished.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  myriad	  extremes,	  which	  are	  (objects	  of)	  attachment,	  (are)	  specifically	  dispelled	  (so	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the)	  difficulties	  (of	  each	  are)	  exhausted.	  Therefore	  (in	  this)	  present	  (text	  they	  are	  all)	  generally	  encompassed.	  (The)	  twelve	  (in	  the	  title)	  gathers	  (them	  all	  together)	  without	  specifically	  displaying	  (each).	  The	  second	  (interpretation	  holds	  it)	  correlates	  to	  that	  which	  is	  trusted	  -­‐	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  many	  methods	  of	  crossing	  to	  awakening.	  (The	  text)	  enumerates	  and	  exhausts	  eighty	  thousand	  (errors	  of	  thought),	  essentially	  summarizing	  that	  (understanding)	  which	  is	  relied	  upon.	  “Twelve”	  is	  the	  number	  (of	  those	  trustworthy	  understandings).	  Like	  the	  passage	  below	  says,	  “By	  means	  of	  the	  Twelve	  Gates	  (one	  may)	  enter	  into	  the	  meaning	  of	  emptiness.”	  These	  are	  superior	  skillful	  means	  of	  entering	  true	  emptiness.	  The	  third	  (interpretation)	  unites	  these	  two	  meanings.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (if	  the	  twelve)	  are	  not	  (a	  means)	  to	  banish	  attachments,	  (one)	  lacks	  (that)	  by	  which	  to	  enter	  emptiness.	  	  (Accordingly,	  the	  understandings	  that)	  banish	  (error)	  are	  exactly	  (those	  which	  are)	  trusted.	  (And,	  if	  they)	  are	  not	  (a	  means	  to)	  enter	  emptiness,	  (one	  then)	  lacks	  (that)	  by	  which	  to	  banish	  attachments.	  (So,	  that	  which	  is)	  trusted	  is	  exactly	  (that	  which)	  banishes.	  As	  for	  (the	  word)	  “gate,”	  it	  also	  has	  three	  meanings.	  First	  is	  the	  meaning	  of	  “gathering	  together.”	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  these	  Twelve	  (Gates),	  by	  means	  of	  a	  one	  by	  one	  (progression),	  gather	  together	  various	  other	  immeasurable	  doctrines	  which	  are	  (thereby)	  banished.	  Therefore	  they	  are	  taken	  as	  “gates.”	  (In	  this	  sense	  they	  are)	  like	  the	  introduction	  to	  a	  section	  (of	  a	  larger	  text).	  The	  second	  is	  the	  meaning	  of	  “opening.”	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  because	  in	  these	  Twelve	  (Gates	  the	  text)	  reveals	  and	  manifests	  the	  principle	  of	  true	  emptiness,	  (we	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can)	  consider	  these	  “gates.”	  (It	  is)	  just	  as	  opening	  the	  gate	  of	  skillful	  means	  reveals	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  ultimately	  real.	  	  The	  third	  is	  the	  meaning	  of	  “penetrate	  into.”	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  because	  (the	  text)	  leads	  (the	  reader),	  based	  on	  these	  musings,	  to	  penetrate	  into	  that	  true	  emptiness,	  the	  twelve	  (discussions	  found)	  herein	  are	  “gates.”	  (These	  gates)	  take	  (the	  reader)	  into	  numerous	  explanations	  (that	  penetrate	  ultimate	  truth).	  Also	  there	  is	  a	  basis	  (upon	  which	  one	  can	  then)	  engage	  in	  contemplating	  the	  Twelve	  Gates.	  	  As	  for	  “contemplation,”	  (this	  word	  carries)	  the	  meaning	  of	  “to	  scrutinize.”	  Moreover,	  “to	  scrutinize”	  has	  two	  (connotations).	  The	  first	  (connotation	  is)	  “to	  illuminate	  the	  conventional.”	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (one)	  contemplates	  and	  illuminates	  these	  twelve	  types	  of	  Dharma.	  The	  second	  (connotation	  is)	  “to	  contemplate	  the	  ultimate.”	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  since	  refutation	  of	  characteristics	  is	  revealed	  based	  on	  these	  twelve	  Dharmas,	  (and	  that	  in	  turn)	  illuminates	  and	  penetrates	  true	  emptiness,	  leading	  the	  mind	  to	  lack	  lodging,	  therefore	  it	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  “contemplation.”	  In	  this	  (explanation	  I	  present)	  an	  exposition	  that	  relies	  on	  later	  meanings	  (from	  the	  text).	  Contemplation	  accordingly	  then	  is	  (a	  form	  of)	  wisdom	  (and)	  the	  Twelve	  Gates	  are	  “objects”	  (of	  that	  wisdom).	  Object-­‐wisdom	  unites	  the	  (various)	  topics	  and	  in	  this	  fashion	  object-­‐wisdom	  is	  that	  meaning	  which	  is	  illustrated	  (by	  the	  text).	  As	  for	  (the	  meaning	  of	  the	  word)	  “treatise,”	  it	  (means)	  a	  teaching	  which	  can	  illustrate	  (key	  points).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  by	  means	  of	  (reasoning	  and)	  principles	  (it)	  exhaustively	  investigates	  (the	  topics,)	  causing	  the	  eternal	  exhaustion	  of	  the	  various	  (erroneous	  and	  misunderstood)	  characteristics.	  Therefore	  it	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  “treatise.”	  Furthermore,	  by	  means	  of	  skilfull	  disputation	  it	  proves	  (its	  points	  and)	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rebukes	  (error),	  leading	  the	  attached	  mind	  to	  lack	  lodging.	  (For	  this	  reason)	  too	  it	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  “treatise.”	  As	  for	  “The	  Gate	  of	  Contemplating	  Causes	  and	  Conditions,”36	  it	  concerns	  a	  specific	  topic.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  essential	  (nature)	  of	  dharmas	  that	  are	  closely	  distinguished	  (as	  immediately	  influential	  factors)	  constitute	  “causes.”	  (More)	  distant	  (dharmas	  that)	  still	  assist	  in	  manifesting	  (effects)	  constitute	  “conditions.”	  Investigating	  (their)	  lack	  of	  (self-­‐)nature	  [219b]	  constitutes	  “contemplation.”	  (That	  which)	  reveals	  true	  emptiness	  is	  called	  a	  “gate.”	  (This	  gate	  is)	  the	  start	  of	  the	  twelve	  so	  it	  is	  referred	  as	  “the	  first.”	  As	  for	  “Composed	  by	  the	  Bodhisattva	  Nagarjuna,”	  the	  Sanskrit	  name	  is	  created	  with	  “naga”	  (and)	  “arjuna.”	  “Naga”	  refers	  to	  a	  dragon.	  	  As	  for	  “arjuna,”	  	  Kumarajiva	  translates	  it	  as	  “tree”	  (while)	  Tripitaka	  (Master)	  Kuei-­‐chi	  translates	  it	  as	  “ferocious.”	  Both	  (of	  these	  interpretations)	  do	  not	  match	  up	  opposite	  the	  correct	  translation.	  Hence,	  knowing	  (this	  I)	  recently	  asked	  Divakara	  (about	  it	  and	  he	  said):	  In	  western	  countries	  it	  is	  conventionally	  exhausted	  speech	  [i.e.,	  outdated].	  In	  a	  previous	  period	  there	  was	  a	  ferociously	  strong	  individual	  named	  “Arjuna”	  (and	  his	  name)	  was	  translated	  as	  “ferocious”.	  (The	  name)	  only	  indicated	  that	  individual	  and	  is	  not	  a	  correct	  translation	  of	  his	  name.	  Furthermore,	  western	  countries	  have	  a	  type	  of	  tree	  that	  is	  also	  designated	  “arjuna.”	  	  This	  
Bodhisattva	  [i.e.,	  Nagarjuna]	  was	  born	  under	  (that	  type	  of)	  tree	  and	  consequently	  (he)	  was	  called	  “Arjuna.”	  For	  this	  reason	  translating	  it	  as	  “tree”	  also	  indicates	  that	  (type	  of)	  tree	  and	  does	  not	  correctly	  translate	  the	  name.	  (As	  for	  these)	  “arjunas”,	  although	  both	  (versions)	  are	  lacking	  correct	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translation,	  regarding	  the	  meanings	  as	  indicating	  the	  matter,	  (the	  meaning	  of)	  tree	  is	  attained	  (but)	  the	  (actual)	  person	  is	  lost.	  (But)	  by	  (taking	  the	  meaning	  of)	  “born	  under	  an	  (arjuna)	  tree,”	  (the	  phrase	  connotes	  a)	  “dragon	  palace	  (where	  he)	  awakens	  to	  the	  (true)	  Path.”	  Accordingly	  (he	  is)	  referred	  to	  as	  “Dragon	  Tree.”	  As	  for	  (the	  abbreviation)	  “P’usa”,	  if	  it	  were	  complete	  it	  should	  read	  “P’u-­‐ti-­‐sa-­‐
ta”	  [i.e.,	  Bodhisattva].	  Various	  treatises	  thoroughly	  explain	  (this	  word	  but)	  generally	  (speaking)	  it	  has	  three	  meanings.	  	  1.	  	  (Regarding)	  “bodhi,”	  this	  refers	  to	  “awakening”	  and	  accordingly	  is	  that	  which	  is	  sought.	  (Regarding)	  “sattva,”	  this	  refers	  to	  “birth”	  and	  accordingly	  is	  that	  which	  is	  traversed.	  These	  two	  are	  both	  objects	  which	  are	  (causally)	  conditioned	  (and)	  accordingly	  from	  the	  objects	  (in	  question,	  we)	  get	  the	  name.	  (This	  is	  like	  other	  descriptive	  phrases)	  such	  as	  “Bone	  Pile	  Contemplation”,	  etc.	  2.	  (As	  with	  the	  first	  interpretation	  just	  covered,	  in	  the	  second	  interpretation)“bodhi”	  is	  the	  same	  as	  above	  and	  is	  the	  object	  sought.	  “Sattva”	  (however)	  is	  (understood	  as)	  the	  active	  (wisdom)	  that	  can	  seek	  (that	  object).	  Accordingly,	  (that	  which)	  can	  (seek	  the	  object)	  and	  (that	  object)	  which	  is	  (sought)	  are	  combined	  topics	  (in	  this	  reading	  of	  the	  term.	  This	  version	  takes)	  the	  object	  (sought)	  and	  wisdom	  (seeking	  it)	  as	  the	  designation.	  3.	  (In	  the	  third	  interpretation)	  “sattva”	  refers	  to	  the	  intrepid	  (practitioner).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  regarding	  great	  bodhi,	  they	  intrepidly	  seek	  (it).	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(As	  for	  these	  three	  interpretations),	  by	  (the	  meanings	  derived)	  from	  “P’u,”	  (they)	  abbreviate	  “ti”	  and	  from	  “sa”	  (they)	  abbreviate	  “ta.”	  Consequently	  (the	  text)	  refers	  to	  (the	  abbreviated	  compound)	  “P’usa”.	  As	  for	  (the	  word)	  “composed,”	  it	  is	  (the	  same	  as)	  “created	  by.”	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[X.	  Exegetical	  Interpretation	  of	  the	  Text]	  
[The	  Gate	  on	  Contemplating	  Causes	  and	  Conditions	  
The	  First	  Gate]	  [The	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  [T.	  159c]	  	  The	  expositor	  states:	  “Now	  (I)	  will	  briefly	  explain	  the	  meanings	  of	  “Mahayana.”	  Question:	  As	  for	  explaining	  Mahayana,	  what	  are	  the	  benefits	  of	  its	  meanings?	  Answer:	  As	  for	  Mahayana,	  it	  is	  the	  exceedingly	  profound	  Dharma-­‐store	  of	  the	  Buddhas	  of	  the	  ten	  directions	  and	  three	  time	  periods.	  It	  is	  expounded	  for	  those	  of	  great	  merit	  and	  sharp	  faculties.	  Sentient	  beings	  of	  this	  final	  period	  (of	  the	  Dharma)	  have	  scant	  blessings	  and	  dull	  faculties.	  Although	  they	  seek	  (the	  meaning)	  of	  sutras,	  they	  cannot	  penetrate	  it.	  I	  sympathize	  with	  these	  types	  (of	  individuals)	  and	  desire	  to	  bring	  about	  an	  awakening	  (so	  they	  might	  understand).	  Furthermore,	  I	  wish	  to	  illuminate	  and	  spread	  the	  Tathagata’s	  unsurpassed	  great	  Dharma.	  For	  these	  reasons	  I	  will	  briefly	  explain	  the	  meanings	  of	  Mahayana.	  Question:	  (The	  meanings	  of)	  Mahayana	  are	  without	  measure,	  lacking	  limit,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  count	  them.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact	  even	  (just)	  the	  Buddha’s	  sayings	  cannot	  be	  exhausted.	  (So,	  how	  can	  one)	  explain	  and	  lay	  out	  (all	  the)	  meanings?	  Answer:	  (It	  is	  precisely)	  because	  of	  (all)	  these	  (immeasurable)	  meanings	  (that)	  I	  initially	  stated	  (this	  will	  be)	  a	  “brief”	  explanation.	  Question:	  (Okay.	  Now)	  for	  what	  reason	  is	  it	  designated	  “Mahayana?”	  Answer:	  As	  for	  (the	  designation)	  “Mahayana,”	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  two	  vehicles,	  it	  constitutes	  the	  superior	  one	  and	  so	  is	  called	  the	  Mahayana	  [i.e.,	  “great	  vehicle”].	  (If	  we	  consider)	  the	  Buddhas’	  greatness,	  it	  is	  a	  vehicle	  that	  can	  reach	  (that	  very	  same	  state).	  Therefore	  is	  is	  designated	  as	  “great.”	  The	  greatest	  individuals	  and	  Buddhas	  ride	  this	  vehicle	  so	  it	  is	  designated	  as	  “great.”	  Furthermore,	  it	  can	  eliminate	  the	  great	  sufferings	  of	  sentient	  beings	  and	  confer	  advantageous	  matters	  of	  great	  benefit.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  designated	  as	  “great.”	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  the	  vehicle	  that	  was	  ridden	  by	  great	  individuals	  and	  Bodhisattvas	  such	  as	  Avalokitesvara,	  Mahastamaprapta,	  Manjusri,	  and	  Maitreya.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  designated	  as	  “great.”	  Furthermore,	  by	  this	  vehicle	  one	  can	  exhaust	  the	  deepest	  limits	  of	  all	  dharmas.	  Therefore	  it	  is	  designated	  as	  “great.”	  Furthermore,	  as	  (we	  find)	  in	  the	  Prajnaparamita	  sutras,	  Buddha	  personally	  states	  the	  meanings	  of	  Mahayana	  are	  without	  measure	  and	  lacking	  limits.	  Because	  of	  (all)	  these	  (above)	  causes	  and	  conditions	  it	  is	  designated	  as	  “great.”	  The	  (most)	  profound	  meaning	  of	  the	  great	  part	  (of	  “Great	  Vehicle”)	  is	  that	  (idea)	  which	  is	  called	  “emptiness.”	  If	  (one)	  can	  penetrate	  this	  meaning	  then	  (one	  will	  have)	  penetrated	  the	  Mahayana,	  (understood)	  all	  six	  perfections,	  and	  lack	  that	  which	  obstructs	  (clarity).	  For	  these	  reasons	  I	  now	  (intend	  to)	  only	  explain	  (the	  meaning	  of)	  emptiness.	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As	  for	  explaining	  emptiness,	  (I)	  will	  use	  twelve	  gates	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  (the	  various)	  meanings	  of	  emptiness.	  The	  first	  (of	  the	  twelve)	  is	  the	  gate	  on	  causes	  and	  conditions.	  	  [The	  Gate	  on	  Contemplating	  Causes	  and	  Conditions]	  	  That	  is	  to	  say:	  
Dharmas	  are	  produced	  of	  collected	  conditions,	  (they)	  are,	  then,	  lacking	  a	  self-­‐nature.	  (But,)	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  there	  is	  no	  self-­‐nature,	  how	  (can	  we)	  say	  there	  are	  these	  dharmas?	  	  
Dharmas	  that	  are	  produced	  of	  collected	  conditions	  are	  of	  two	  types.	  The	  first	  (type)	  is	  internal	  and	  the	  second	  (type)	  is	  external.	  Collected	  conditions	  also	  are	  of	  two	  types.	  (Here	  too)	  the	  first	  (type)	  is	  internal	  and	  the	  second	  (type)	  is	  external.	  	  As	  for	  external	  causes	  and	  conditions,	  it	  is	  like	  a	  coil	  of	  clay	  [160a],	  a	  cord	  for	  turning	  (the	  potter’s	  wheel),	  and	  a	  potter.	  (When	  these	  factors)	  come	  together	  there	  is,	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  production	  of	  a	  vase.	  Also,	  it	  is	  like	  yarn,	  a	  loom,	  and	  a	  weaver.	  (When	  these	  factors)	  come	  together	  there	  is,	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  production	  of	  a	  rug.	  Also,	  it	  is	  like	  managing	  a	  (building)	  location,	  constructing	  a	  foundation,	  (adding)	  ridge	  (beams),	  rafters,	  mud	  grass,	  human	  labor,	  and	  so	  on.	  (When	  these	  factors)	  come	  together	  there	  is,	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  production	  of	  a	  dwelling.	  Also	  it	  is	  like	  buttermilk,	  a	  vessel,	  agitator,	  and	  human	  labor.	  (When	  these	  factors)	  come	  together	  there	  is,	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  production	  of	  cheese.	  Also	  it	  is	  like	  seed,	  earth,	  water,	  warmth,	  wind,	  space,	  the	  seasons,	  and	  human	  labor.	  (When	  these	  factors)	  come	  together	  there	  is,	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  production	  of	  a	  sprout.	  One	  should	  know	  the	  various	  dharmas	  of	  external	  (causes	  and)	  conditions	  are	  all	  like	  this.	  As	  for	  internal	  causes	  and	  conditions,	  (they	  include)	  so-­‐called	  ignorance,	  action,	  awareness,	  name	  and	  form,	  the	  six	  sense	  faculties,	  sensation,	  feeling,	  desire,	  grasping,	  being,	  production,	  old	  age,	  and	  death.	  Each	  (of	  these)	  is	  an	  antecedent	  cause	  and	  subsequent	  product.	  	  In	  this	  fashion	  internal	  and	  external	  dharmas	  are	  all	  produced	  from	  collected	  conditions.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  being	  produced	  from	  collected	  conditions	  is	  it	  not	  then	  (the	  case	  that)	  they	  lack	  a	  self-­‐nature?	  (And)	  if	  a	  self-­‐nature	  of	  dharmas	  is	  lacking,	  (is	  it	  not	  the	  case)	  that	  an	  other-­‐nature	  is	  also	  lacking?	  And	  (further,	  is	  it	  not	  the	  case	  then)	  that	  (both)	  a	  self-­‐nature	  and	  an	  other-­‐nature	  is	  also	  lacking?	  (Question:)	  What	  is	  the	  reason	  (for	  this	  conclusion)?	  (Answer:	  It	  must	  be	  so)	  because	  the	  other-­‐nature	  (also)	  lacks	  a	  self-­‐nature.	  If	  we	  claim	  that	  by	  means	  of	  an	  other-­‐nature	  therefore	  (a	  different	  effect)	  exists,	  then	  cows	  (might)	  exist	  by	  means	  of	  horse-­‐nature	  and	  horses	  (might)	  exist	  by	  means	  of	  cow-­‐nature.	  A	  pear	  (might)	  exist	  by	  means	  of	  crabapple-­‐nature	  and	  a	  crabapple	  (might)	  exist	  by	  means	  of	  pear-­‐nature.	  All	  the	  remaining	  (possibilities)	  ought	  to	  be	  thus	  (as	  well)	  and	  yet,	  in	  fact,	  that	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  If	  we	  claim	  it	  is	  not	  by	  means	  of	  an	  other-­‐nature	  that	  therefore	  (effects)	  exist,	  but	  (rather)	  it	  is	  just	  due	  to	  others	  that	  therefore	  they	  exist,	  (this)	  too	  is	  not	  so.	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(Question:)	  What	  is	  the	  reason?	  (Answer:)	  If	  it	  were	  the	  case	  that	  by	  means	  of	  rushes	  therefore	  there	  are	  mats,	  then	  rushes	  and	  mats	  would	  (constitute)	  a	  single	  substance.	  (In	  that	  case	  the	  rushes)	  should	  not	  be	  designated	  as	  an	  other.	  If	  we	  claim	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  rushes	  constitute	  an	  other	  in	  respect	  to	  mats,	  (then	  we)	  do	  not	  get	  to	  claim	  that	  by	  means	  of	  rushes	  therefore	  there	  are	  mats.	  Furthermore,	  rushes	  also	  lack	  a	  self-­‐nature.	  (Question:)	  What	  is	  the	  reason?	  (Answer:)	  Rushes	  also	  emerge	  from	  collected	  conditions.	  Therefore	  (they)	  lack	  a	  self-­‐nature.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  lacking	  a	  self-­‐nature	  (we)	  do	  not	  get	  to	  say	  that	  by	  means	  of	  rush-­‐nature	  therefore	  there	  are	  mats.	  For	  this	  reason	  mats	  ought	  not	  (be	  thought)	  to	  take	  rushes	  as	  their	  substance.	  All	  the	  remaining	  dharmas	  produced	  of	  external	  causes	  and	  conditions,	  such	  as	  jars,	  cheese,	  etc.,	  are	  also	  like	  this	  (and)	  do	  not	  come	  to	  be	  (produced	  by	  an	  other-­‐nature).	  	  
Dharmas	  produced	  of	  internal	  causes	  and	  conditions	  are	  also	  like	  this	  (and)	  do	  not	  come	  to	  be	  (produced	  by	  an	  other-­‐nature).	  It	  is	  as	  stated	  in	  the	  Sunyata-­‐
saptati	  sastra:	  	  Conditionally	  (arisen)	  dharmas	  in	  fact	  lack	  production.	  If	  (one)	  claims	  (dharmas)	  are	  (that	  which)	  has	  production,	  are	  (they	  that	  which	  is	  produced)	  in	  one	  moment	  of	  thought,	  (or)	  are	  (they	  that	  which	  is	  produced)	  in	  (the	  span	  of)	  many	  moments	  of	  thought?	  	  These	  twelve	  (types)	  of	  causally	  conditioned	  dharmas	  in	  fact	  individually	  lack	  production.	  If	  (one)	  claims	  there	  is	  production,	  is	  (that	  production)	  existent	  in	  one	  moment	  of	  thought	  (or)	  is	  it	  existent	  in	  (the	  span	  of)	  many	  moments	  of	  thought?	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  (production)	  exists	  in	  one	  moment	  of	  thought	  then	  causes	  and	  effects	  are	  produced	  together	  at	  a	  single	  time.	  Furthermore,	  (if	  this	  were	  so	  then)	  causes	  and	  (their)	  effects	  (would)	  exist	  at	  one	  time.	  (But)	  this	  situation	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  Because	  all	  things	  are	  antecedent	  causes	  (and/or)	  subsequent	  effects.	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  (production)	  exists	  in	  (the	  span	  of	  many)	  collected	  moments	  of	  the	  mind,	  	  (then)	  the	  twelve	  (types	  of)	  causally	  conditioned	  dharmas	  are	  each	  individually	  separate	  and	  different.	  (In	  such	  a	  case,	  when)	  the	  antecedent	  (dharmas)	  and	  the	  (associated	  moments	  of)	  mind	  are	  extinguished,	  (for	  the)	  subsequent	  (dharmas	  and	  moments	  of	  mind),	  what	  then	  constitutes	  their	  causes	  and	  conditions?	  Extinguished	  dharmas	  lack	  (any	  quality)	  which	  exists	  (so)	  how	  might	  (they)	  come	  to	  constitute	  a	  cause?	  (So	  we	  can	  see	  that	  as	  for)	  the	  twelve	  types	  of	  causally	  conditioned	  [160b]	  dharmas,	  whether	  (production	  takes	  place	  in)	  one	  moment	  of	  thought	  or	  (over	  the	  span	  of)	  many	  moments	  of	  thought,	  neither	  (possibility)	  is	  the	  case.	  	   For	  these	  reasons	  collected	  conditions	  are	  all	  empty.	  (As	  all	  causal)	  conditions	  are	  empty,	  therefore	  subsequent	  conditionally	  produced	  dharmas	  are	  also	  empty.	  For	  this	  reason	  one	  should	  know	  all	  (karmically)	  functional	  dharmas37	  are	  empty.	  If	  even	  (karmically)	  functional	  dharmas	  are	  empty,	  how	  much	  more	  so	  the	  self?	  It	  is	  because	  of	  the	  (karmically)	  functional	  dharmas	  of	  the	  five	  skandhas,	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twelve	  ayatanas,	  and	  eighteen	  dhatus	  that	  one	  says	  there	  is	  a	  self.	  (The	  relationship)	  is	  like	  (those	  cases	  where)	  due	  to	  (the	  existence	  of)	  that	  which	  can	  burn	  we	  therefore	  say	  there	  is	  burning.	  (But)	  if	  (the	  dharmas	  of)	  the	  skandhas,	  ayatanas,	  and	  
dhatus	  are	  empty,	  then	  again,	  in	  lacking	  existent	  dharmas,	  (what)	  can	  one	  say	  constitutes	  a	  self?	  (This)	  is	  like	  (a	  case	  where)	  if	  (we)	  lack	  that	  which	  can	  burn	  (then	  we)	  cannot	  speak	  of	  burning.	  (It)	  is	  like	  the	  sutra	  states:	  	  The	  Buddha	  intoned	  to	  the	  monks:	  As	  a	  result	  of	  “I,”	  there	  is	  that	  which	  is	  “mine.”	  If	  there	  is	  no	  “I,”	  then	  there	  is	  nothing	  which	  is	  “mine.”	  	   In	  this	  fashion	  (we	  know	  karmically)	  functional	  dharmas	  are	  empty.	  Consequently	  (we)	  should	  (also)	  know	  the	  (karmically)	  nonfunctional	  dharma	  of	  
nirvana	  is	  also	  empty.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  The	  extinction	  of	  (the	  dharmas	  of)	  the	  five	  skandhas	  does	  not	  further	  produce	  an	  additional	  five	  skandhas.	  This	  is	  designated	  “nirvana.”	  (Since)	  the	  five	  skandhas	  are	  themselves	  fundamentally	  empty,	  what	  then	  is	  that	  which	  is	  extinquished	  (such	  that)	  therefore	  we	  refer	  to	  and	  designate	  (the	  state	  of	  extinction)	  	  “nirvana?”	  Furthermore,	  (since)	  the	  “I”	  is	  also	  empty,	  who	  (then)	  attains	  nirvana?	  Again,	  (to	  reiterate,)	  dharmas	  that	  lack	  production	  are	  designated	  as	  “nirvana.”	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  produced	  dharmas	  are	  established,	  (then)	  dharmas	  without	  production	  also	  ought	  to	  be	  established.	  (But)	  produced	  dharmas	  are	  not	  established	  (for	  reasons)	  previously	  explained	  already	  (in	  the	  discussion	  of)	  causes	  and	  conditions.	  Subsequently	  (I)	  will	  again	  explain	  (this	  in	  detail.	  But,	  for	  now,)	  because	  of	  (the	  fact	  that)	  produced	  dharmas	  are	  not	  established,	  “produced	  
dharmas”	  are	  therefore	  (more	  properly)	  designated	  as	  “lacking	  production.”	  If	  produced	  dharmas	  are	  not	  established	  how	  can	  one	  say	  dharmas	  without	  production	  are	  established?	  For	  these	  reasons	  (karmically)	  functional	  (dharmas),	  (karmically)	  nonfunctional	  (dharmas),	  and	  the	  self	  are	  all	  empty.	  	   [End	  of	  the	  First	  Chapter	  of	  the	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  	  
[Commentary	  by	  Fa-­‐tsang]	  As	  for	  the	  tenth	  (of	  our	  ten	  topics	  here,)	  an	  interpretation	  that	  follows	  the	  text,	  the	  headings	  of	  various	  texts	  each	  (typically)	  have	  verses	  of	  reverence.	  As	  for	  this	  Treatise	  lacking	  them,	  it	  is	  for	  preserving	  brevity.	  	  It	  is	  because	  this	  Treatise	  is	  a	  summary	  text.	  Also	  it	  is	  (an	  example	  of)	  the	  Author	  according	  with	  (the	  main)	  idea:	  (namely	  that)	  existence	  and	  nonexistence	  lack	  definitive	  (essential	  states	  to	  explain).	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Now,	  as	  for	  (the	  contents)	  in	  this	  Treatise,	  the	  text	  specifically	  has	  two	  (main	  parts).	  Initially	  it	  presents	  the	  principle	  (and)	  distinquishes	  (key)	  ideas.	  Secondly,	  from	  “as	  for	  explaining	  emptiness,”	  it	  presents	  an	  explanation.	  	  
[The	  Principle	  and	  Key	  Ideas]	  In	  the	  preceding	  (of	  the	  above	  two	  parts	  there	  are)	  three	  (subparts).	  	  First	  it	  presents	  the	  principle.	  Second,	  from	  “Question,”	  it	  distinquishes	  (key)	  ideas.	  Third,	  from	  “great	  part,”	  it	  assembles	  the	  ideas	  (and)	  returns	  to	  the	  principle.	  
	   	   [The	  Principle]	  	  In	  the	  beginning	  (of	  Nagarjuna’s	  text),	  as	  for	  (the	  phrase)	  “The	  expositor	  states,”	  the	  question	  and	  answer	  (format	  of	  the	  text	  that	  follows)	  is	  styled	  a	  “discussion”	  while	  direct	  expression	  (of	  ideas)	  is	  called	  “exposition.”	  Also,	  (texts	  that)	  form	  the	  teachings	  and	  transmit	  them	  universally	  are	  called	  “treatises.”	  Individuals	  who	  indirectly	  hand	  down	  the	  gates	  are	  called	  “expositors.”	  As	  for	  “states,”	  (it	  refers	  to	  expression	  by)	  words.	  As	  for	  (the	  phrase)	  “briefly	  explain,”	  “briefly”	  has	  four	  meanings.	  The	  first	  corresponds	  to	  the	  individual	  (explaining).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  compared	  to	  the	  great	  unobstructed	  arguments	  of	  the	  perfect	  voice	  of	  the	  fruit	  of	  Buddhahood,	  (a	  voice	  that)	  broadly	  expounds	  the	  20,000	  verses	  of	  the	  Prajna(paramita	  sutras),	  	  the	  present	  position	  this	  Nagarjuna	  occupies	  is	  not	  complete,	  (his)	  realization	  of	  the	  
Dharma	  not	  yet	  perfect,	  (and	  accordingly)	  that	  which	  he	  expounds	  is	  not	  “broad.”	  Accordingly	  (the	  text)	  refers	  to	  (the	  fact	  it	  is)	  “brief.”	  The	  second	  (meaning	  of	  “briefly”)	  corresponds	  to	  the	  teaching.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (consider)	  the	  10,000	  verses	  of	  the	  Treatise	  on	  Great	  Fearlessness	  composed	  by	  
	   87	  
Nagarjuna,	  compared	  to	  (the	  length	  and	  depth	  of)	  that	  exposition,	  this	  [219c]	  can	  (only)	  be	  considered	  a	  “summary.”	  The	  third	  (meaning	  of	  “briefly”)	  refers	  to	  the	  meanings	  (expressed).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  emptiness	  constitutes	  the	  basis	  of	  dharmas	  (while)	  existence	  constitutes	  (the	  nature	  of)	  derivative	  characteristics.	  If	  (one)	  addresses	  the	  basis	  from	  the	  derivatives,	  following	  the	  myriad	  differentiations	  of	  conventional	  (truth	  for	  the	  explanation,	  then	  one	  can)	  consider	  (such	  an	  approach)	  a	  broad	  exposition.	  If	  (however,	  one)	  gathers	  (all	  the)	  derivatives	  (and)	  returns	  (them	  to)	  to	  the	  basis,	  concerning	  (oneself)	  with	  the	  essential	  subtlety	  of	  the	  (main)	  principle,	  (then	  we	  can)	  consider	  	  (that	  approach)	  a	  brief	  exposition.	  Accordingly,	  (and	  furthermore,	  this	  text)	  is	  a	  summary	  of	  a	  summary	  of	  essential	  (points).	  Therefore	  the	  text	  says	  (it)	  “only	  explains	  the	  meaning	  of	  emptiness.”	  This	  is	  what	  is	  meant	  (by	  the	  phrase	  “briefly	  explain”).	  The	  fourth	  (meaning	  of	  “briefly”)	  corresponds	  to	  the	  (karmic)	  potential	  (of	  those	  individuals	  towards	  whom	  the	  text	  is	  directed).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (when)	  the	  Buddha	  was	  in	  the	  world	  that	  which	  (he)	  expounded	  was	  broad	  for	  great	  individuals	  of	  superior	  faculties.	  (In	  this	  period)	  after	  the	  Buddha’s	  nirvana,	  Bodhisattvas	  (teach)	  for	  the	  dull	  faculties	  (of	  individuals	  living	  during)	  this	  final	  period	  (and)	  that	  which	  (they)	  expound	  is	  brief.	  Now,	  in	  this	  text	  (it	  is)	  endowed	  with	  these	  four	  meanings	  and	  accordingly	  is	  referred	  to	  (as	  a)	  “summary.”	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Speaking	  of	  “explain,”	  its	  (meaning)	  is	  “to	  distinguish.”	  Still,	  (as	  for)	  that	  which	  is	  expounded	  by	  the	  Buddha’s	  sutras,	  the	  principles	  have	  many	  aspects	  and	  (we)	  do	  not	  yet	  know	  what	  meanings	  the	  present	  (text)	  distinguishes.	  	  In	  order	  to	  note	  those	  Hinayana	  (ideas	  that)	  are	  not	  those	  explained	  by	  this	  (text),	  it	  accordingly	  refers	  to	  the	  “meaning	  of	  Mahayana.”	  “Maha”	  –	  this	  refers	  to	  “great.”	  	  As	  for	  “yana,”	  this	  refers	  to	  a	  “vehicle.”	  	  (Regarding)	  this	  designation	  “Mahayana,”	  later	  the	  Treatise	  will	  investigate	  and	  explain.	  As	  for	  “meaning,”	  it	  is	  the	  “that	  for	  which”	  (the	  text	  is	  expounded).	  Accordingly,	  it	  is	  the	  principle	  which	  is	  expounded.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  is	  “true	  emptiness.”	  
[Key	  Ideas]	  	  In	  the	  second	  (subpart,	  the	  subpart	  that)	  distinguishes	  ideas,	  there	  are	  three	  rounds	  of	  questions	  and	  answers	  (used)	  in	  order	  to	  distinguish	  his	  (key)	  notions.	  The	  first	  one	  clarifies	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  meanings	  of	  Dharma.	  The	  next	  one	  presents	  a	  brief,	  not	  a	  broad,	  (explanation	  of	  those	  benefits).	  The	  last	  one	  reveals	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  designation	  “Dharma.”	  
[First	  Question	  and	  Answer]	  Within	  the	  first	  (round	  of	  question	  and	  answer	  he)	  initially	  (raises)	  a	  question,	  then	  (he	  provides)	  an	  answer.	  In	  the	  answer	  (there	  are)	  two	  (parts).	  First	  (he)	  extols	  the	  superlative	  profundity	  of	  the	  fundamental	  Dharma.	  Then	  (he)	  clarifies	  the	  intention	  (behind)	  composing	  the	  text.	  In	  the	  preceding	  (of	  these	  two	  subparts)	  there	  are	  two	  types	  of	  superlative	  profundity.	  First	  (he)	  extolls	  the	  superlative	  profundity	  of	  realization.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (he	  extols	  it)	  because	  it	  is	  (the	  realization)	  which	  Buddhas	  possess.	  Second,	  (he)	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extols	  the	  superlative	  profundity	  of	  the	  Agamas.38	  (He	  praises	  the	  Agamas)	  because	  (they)	  were	  expounded	  for	  those	  of	  great	  virtue	  and	  sharp	  faculties.	  Furthermore	  (if	  we	  consider	  the)	  first	  (type	  of	  profundity	  above)	  then	  (as	  the)	  Lord	  (Buddha)	  was	  a	  superior,	  consequently	  the	  Dharma	  (he	  expounded)	  was	  profound.	  (If	  we	  consider	  the)	  latter	  (type	  of	  profundity)	  then	  (since	  the	  Authors’	  karmic)	  potentials	  were	  superior,	  consequently	  the	  Dharma	  (they	  expounded)	  was	  (also)	  superior.	  Consider	  that	  if	  there	  were	  no	  Buddha	  mahasattvas	  (the	  world)	  would	  lack	  that	  by	  which	  (the	  
Dharma)	  could	  be	  expounded.	  If	  there	  were	  no	  Bodhisattva	  mahasattvas,	  (the	  world)	  would	  lack	  that	  by	  which	  (the	  Dharma)	  is	  sustained	  and	  received.	  Therefore	  the	  wonder	  of	  the	  abstruse	  patterns	  of	  this	  Dharma	  accordingly	  lack	  (anything	  which	  is)	  not	  superlatively	  profound.	  Consequently	  it	  is	  designated	  as	  the	  “Dharma.”39	  Accordingly	  “Dharma”	  implicitly	  encompasses	  the	  (dharmas	  of	  the)	  
skandhas.	  It	  (also)	  includes	  the	  various	  superior	  virtues	  and	  so	  (we)	  designate	  it	  as	  a	  “treasury.”	  “Great	  Merit”	  is	  then	  (a	  reference	  to	  the)	  superiority	  of	  the	  joy	  (the	  Dharma	  produces)	  and	  “sharp	  faculties”	  is	  the	  profundity	  of	  (their)	  wisdom.	  “Those”	  is	  (a	  reference	  to	  these	  types	  of)	  individuals.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  is	  (a	  reference	  to)	  those	  who,	  having	  prepared	  superior	  joy	  and	  profound	  wisdom,	  thereupon	  sustain	  (understanding)	  as	  (one	  might	  wield	  a)	  tool	  and	  (thereby)	  reveal	  the	  profundity	  of	  the	  Dharma.	  Finally,	  (as	  for)	  clarifying	  the	  intention	  of	  composing	  the	  Treatise,	  therein	  (we	  find)	  two	  (parts):	  The	  first	  answer	  (regards	  the)	  benefits	  (of	  the	  Mahayana)	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then,	  from	  “illuminate	  and	  spread…”	  (the	  second)	  answer	  (regards	  the)	  meaning	  (of	  
Mahayana).	  As	  for	  why,	  in	  this	  (section,	  he)	  initially	  (deals	  with)	  benefits,	  then	  with	  meaning,	  this	  means	  (first)	  presenting	  (the	  practice	  of)	  Bodhisattva	  mahasattvas.	  (He	  does	  so)	  because	  they	  rightly	  take	  (the	  act	  of)	  embracing	  (all	  living)	  things	  as	  primary.	  Further	  explaining,	  the	  first	  (point	  here,	  i.e.,	  benefits,)	  is	  (a	  reference	  to)	  enriching	  sentient	  beings,	  the	  latter	  (point,	  i.e.,	  meaning,)	  is	  (a	  reference	  to)	  completing	  the	  Buddha’s	  Dharma.	  Based	  on	  treatises	  like	  the	  Yogacara	  (bhumi-­‐
sastra),	  given	  that	  from	  (the	  time	  when	  they)	  initially	  arouse	  the	  mind	  (seeking	  insight)	  various	  Bodhisattvas	  constantly	  cultivate	  two	  types	  of	  correct	  practices	  such	  as	  these,	  (his	  presentation	  of	  benefits	  and	  means)	  is	  also	  (a	  reference	  to)	  two	  beneficial	  practices.	  	  In	  the	  preceding	  (of	  the	  above	  two	  there	  are)	  two	  (subparts).	  First	  (the	  text)	  clarifies	  the	  inferior	  faculties	  which	  are	  covered.	  Subsequently	  it	  clarifies	  the	  teachings	  established	  by	  the	  Author.	  In	  the	  preceding	  part	  (of	  the	  above	  two),	  as	  for	  	  (the	  phrase)	  “final	  period,”	  it	  is	  (a	  reference	  to)	  the	  inferiority	  of	  the	  (current)	  era.	  	  This	  has	  two	  meanings.	  First,	  (the	  time	  period)	  from	  the	  Buddha’s	  nirvana	  is	  generally	  designated	  as	  the	  “final	  period.”	  Second,	  (this	  phrase)	  is	  (a	  way)	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  five	  hundred	  years	  after	  the	  (period	  of	  the)	  correct	  Dharma.	  (This	  latter	  period)	  is	  generally	  designated	  [220a]	  the	  “final	  period.”	  As	  for	  “sentient	  beings…	  scant	  blessings,”	  (it	  is	  a	  reference	  to)	  inferior	  people.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  six	  great	  (elements	  and)	  five	  skandhas	  (combined)	  form	  	  (so-­‐called)	  “collective	  productions”	  and	  hence	  are	  referred	  to	  as	  “sentient	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beings.”	  “Scant	  blessings”	  contrasts	  (with)	  the	  above	  (mentioned)	  “great	  merit.”	  “Dull	  faculties”	  reveals	  the	  inferiority	  of	  (their)	  wisdom	  (and)	  contrasts	  (with)	  the	  above	  (mentioned)	  “sharp	  faculties.”	  As	  for	  “seek	  (the	  meaning)	  of	  sutras	  (but)	  cannot	  penetrate,”	  it	  means	  	  although	  (they)	  investigate	  texts,	  yet	  (they)	  do	  not	  penetrate	  their	  meaning.	  Hearing	  (the	  texts)	  expound	  the	  nonexistence	  of	  existence,	  each,	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  words	  (they	  hear)	  determines	  an	  interpretation.	  Therefore	  (this	  sort	  of	  understanding)	  is	  an	  error	  of	  delusion.	  From	  “I	  sympathize	  with	  these…”,	  (the	  text)	  clarifies	  (that)	  the	  Author	  aroused	  compassion	  (and	  so)	  established	  (this)	  teaching.	  The	  cause	  of	  the	  rousing	  of	  the	  Treatise	  is	  to	  respond	  (to	  their	  needs),	  sharpen	  (their	  faculties,	  and	  generate)	  benefits.	  In	  the	  second	  answer	  (regarding	  the)	  meaning	  (of	  Mahayana),	  it	  means	  this	  
Bodhisattva	  illuminates	  and	  displays	  the	  unsurpassed	  great	  Dharma.	  	  (He	  thereby)	  causes	  it	  to	  long	  abide	  in	  the	  world	  and	  repays	  the	  Buddha’s	  kindness	  as	  a	  result.	  This,	  among	  the	  Yogacara	  bhumi	  sastra’s	  six	  intentions	  for	  Bodhisttvas	  to	  compose	  a	  treatise,	  is	  to	  cause	  errors	  to	  die	  (so	  that)	  assorted	  gates	  of	  meaning	  are	  repeatedly	  revealed	  as	  a	  result.	  This	  is	  its	  meaning.	  
[Second	  Question	  and	  Answer]	  In	  the	  second	  (round	  of)	  question	  and	  answer	  that	  reveals	  (the	  text	  is)	  a	  brief	  exposition,	  first	  (it	  raises)	  a	  question,	  then	  (provides	  an)	  answer.	  (Both	  of	  these	  points)	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  
[Third	  Question	  and	  Answer]	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In	  the	  third	  (round	  of	  question	  and	  answer	  the	  Author)	  reveals	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  name	  (Mahayana).	  In	  (this	  round	  that)	  first	  (raises	  a)	  question,	  then	  (presents	  the)	  answer,	  (the	  word)	  “maha”	  (in	  “Mahayana”),	  has	  seven	  meanings.	  1.	  (It	  is	  great)	  because	  compared	  to	  the	  small	  (vehicle)	  [i.e.,	  Hinayana,]	  (Mahayana)	  is	  transcendent.	  2.	  (It	  is	  great)	  because	  (it)	  can	  reach	  a	  great	  place.	  3.	  (It	  is	  great)	  because	  it	  is	  that	  which	  is	  ridden	  by	  great	  individuals.	  Also,	  it	  is	  (a	  reference	  to)	  the	  greatness	  of	  its	  conveyance	  of	  (their)	  understanding.	  	  4.	  (It	  is	  great)	  because	  of	  the	  expansive	  greatness	  of	  its	  beneficial	  functions.	  5.	  (It	  is	  great)	  because	  (it	  is	  the	  vehicle)	  which	  is	  ridden	  by	  many.	  Also,	  it	  is	  (a	  reference	  to)	  the	  greatness	  of	  its	  conveyance	  of	  (their)	  realization.	  6.	  (It	  is	  great)	  because	  its	  expansiveness	  is	  exceedingly	  profound.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  expansively	  exhausts	  its	  (own)	  boundaries.	  Accordingly,	  it	  is	  a	  boundary-­‐less	  boundary	  and	  is	  the	  object	  of	  the	  wisdom	  of	  analysis.40	  It	  profoundly	  exhausts	  its	  foundation	  and	  accordingly	  is	  a	  foundation-­‐less	  foundation.	  It	  is	  the	  object	  of	  the	  wisdom	  of	  the	  (fundamental)	  principle	  (of	  emptiness).	  7.	  Because	  of	  the	  greatness	  of	  (the	  way	  it)	  encompasses	  (great)	  merit,	  the	  Buddha’s	  sutras	  individually	  (all)	  expound	  (it).	  	  Furthermore,	  as	  the	  (Mahayana-­‐	  abhidharma-­‐)	  sammucaya-­‐vyakhya	  (states),	  “yana”	  (in	  “Mahayana,”	  also)	  has	  seven	  meanings.	  (But)	  in	  the	  Awakening	  of	  Faith	  (there	  are)	  three	  meanings.41	  All	  (the	  versions)	  have	  the	  meaning	  of	  “to	  turn	  around.”42	  This	  vehicle	  takes	  the	  wisdom	  without	  differentiation	  as	  its	  nature.	  Broadly	  (speaking,	  the	  meaning)	  is	  as	  specifically	  discussed.	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In	  the	  third	  (subpart	  of	  the	  first	  of	  the	  two	  main	  sections	  of	  the	  text,	  the	  subpart	  that)	  assembles	  the	  ideas	  and	  returns	  to	  the	  principle,	  (there	  are)	  also	  three	  (subsections).	  First	  it	  brings	  up	  the	  essence	  of	  dharmas.	  As	  for	  the	  (phrase)	  “great	  part”	  (of	  the	  Dharma),	  it	  is	  only	  an	  expression	  for	  the	  “Great”	  [i.e.	  “Mahayana”]	  section	  (of	  the	  canon).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (regarding)	  the	  myriad	  distinctions	  of	  the	  various	  dharmas	  (and)	  the	  general	  characteristics	  of	  the	  Mahayana	  (Dharma),	  because	  there	  are	  none	  that	  are	  not	  empty,	  it	  does	  not	  obstruct	  the	  various	  dharmas.	  (All	  these)	  have	  never	  yet	  been	  not	  empty	  so	  (the	  Author)	  expounds	  (the	  notion	  of)	  “true	  emptiness.”	  (That)	  designation	  (can	  be)	  taken	  as	  the	  meaning	  of	  (the	  word)	  “profound.”	  As	  for	  the	  second	  (part	  of	  this	  section	  that	  assembles	  the	  ideas	  and	  returns	  to	  the	  principle,	  the	  part)	  that	  clarifies	  its	  superior	  function,	  if	  one’s	  (understanding)	  penetrates	  this	  “truly	  empty,”	  then	  the	  myriad	  practices	  are	  all	  perfectly	  complete.	  (At	  this	  point	  the	  Author)	  briefly	  brings	  up	  the	  six	  perfections,	  taking	  them	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  practice.	  As	  for	  “lack	  (that	  which)	  obstructs,”	  this	  has	  three	  meanings.	  The	  first	  relates	  to	  the	  “objective,”	  (external	  aspect	  of	  practice).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  true	  emptiness	  does	  not	  obstruct	  the	  myriad	  practices	  (and)	  the	  myriad	  practices	  do	  not	  obstruct	  true	  emptiness.	  Therefore	  it	  states	  (they)	  “lack	  obstruction.”	  Also	  then,	  since	  (we	  must	  take)	  true	  emptiness	  as	  the	  myriad	  practices,	  myriad	  practices	  have	  never	  yet	  not	  been	  empty.	  (Also)	  since	  (we	  must	  take)	  the	  myriad	  activities	  as	  truly	  empty,	  true	  emptiness	  has	  never	  yet	  not	  been	  practice.	  Accordingly,	  it	  states	  (they)	  “lack	  obstruction.”	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The	  second	  (meaning	  of	  “lacking	  obstruction”)	  relates	  to	  (the	  subjective	  component	  of	  experience,	  i.e.,)	  wisdom.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (it	  refers	  to)	  the	  wisdom	  that	  illuminates	  emptiness	  and	  accordingly	  all	  the	  myriad	  practices	  (are	  understood	  in	  light	  of	  this.	  When	  that	  is	  the	  case)	  the	  myriad	  practices	  are	  exactly	  wisdom	  (and	  the	  two)	  lack	  obstruction.	  Therefore	  it	  states,	  “If	  one	  (can)	  penetrate.”	  “Penetrating”	  accordingly	  then	  is	  (a	  reference	  to	  this)	  wisdom.	  The	  third	  (meaning	  of	  “lacking	  obstruction”)	  relates	  to	  “both	  interfusing.”	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  wisdom	  has	  two	  meanings.	  First,	  because	  of	  the	  vacancy	  (of	  everything	  arisen)	  from	  conditions,	  vacancy	  lacks	  (that	  which	  it)	  does	  not	  exhaust	  (and)	  wisdom	  is	  the	  same	  as	  (its)	  objects.	  Second,	  vacancy	  exhausts	  only	  (that	  which	  is	  already)	  empty	  and	  has	  never	  yet	  erroneously	  [220b]	  illuminated	  (objects	  as	  essentially	  separate.	  Accordingly,)	  objects	  are	  exactly	  the	  wisdom	  (which	  illuminates	  them).	  Considering	  (that	  that	  illumination)	  is	  exactly	  the	  wondrous	  wisdom	  of	  emptiness,	  (then)	  in	  return	  illumination	  is	  exactly	  the	  true	  emptiness	  of	  (that)	  wisdom.	  For	  this	  reason,	  after	  all,	  (he)	  speaks	  (of)	  illumination	  while	  still	  lacking	  illumination,	  (and)	  after	  all,	  (he)	  speaks	  of	  objects	  while	  still	  lacking	  objects.	  (This	  is	  a	  case	  of)	  lacking	  objects	  and	  lacking	  wisdom	  even	  while	  	  (finding)	  objects	  and	  wisdom	  as	  if	  (they	  are	  as	  they	  appear).	  Therefore	  (this	  sort	  of	  understanding	  is)	  designated	  as	  “penetrating”	  and	  is	  also	  said	  to	  “lack	  obstruction.”	  From	  “For	  these	  reasons…”	  onwards	  the	  third	  (part	  of	  this	  section	  that	  assembles	  the	  ideas	  and	  returns	  to	  the	  principle,	  the	  part	  that)	  concludes	  (these)	  ideas	  and	  returns	  to	  the	  main	  proposition,	  (the	  key	  points)	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	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[Explanation]	  The	  second	  (of	  the	  two	  main	  sections	  of	  the	  first	  chapter	  of	  the	  text	  is	  the)	  large	  section	  (which)	  reveals	  (his)	  explanation	  of	  the	  main	  principle.	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  two	  (subsections).	  Initially	  (he)	  presents,	  enumerates,	  and	  reveals	  the	  gates.	  Subsequently,	  from	  “The	  first	  is…”	  the	  Twelve	  Gates	  form	  twelve	  sections	  (of	  text)	  within	  (a	  sequence	  of)	  specific	  explanations	  (that)	  accord	  with	  (each	  of	  the)	  gates.	  The	  Gate	  of	  Contemplating	  Causes	  and	  Conditions	  The	  First	  Gate	  In	  the	  First	  Gate	  (there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  First	  he	  marks	  the	  gate	  of	  the	  chapter	  on	  arising.	  Secondly,	  (he)	  establishes	  a	  verse	  (that)	  briefly	  indicates	  (the	  key	  points).	  Subsequently	  (and	  thirdly,	  he)	  explains	  the	  verse	  (to)	  broadly	  reveal	  (the	  ideas).	  	  In	  the	  verse	  (section)	  the	  top	  half	  (of	  the	  verse)	  brings	  up	  (the	  production	  of)	  
dharmas.	  The	  bottom	  half	  seeks	  (evidence	  for)	  the	  circumstances	  (claimed).43	  Furthermore,	  the	  top	  half	  clarifies	  (that	  dharmas	  are)	  conditionally	  produced	  and	  therefore	  lack	  an	  (essential)	  nature.	  The	  bottom	  half	  reveals	  (that	  such	  dharmas)	  lack	  a	  nature	  and	  therefore	  are	  exactly	  empty.	  If	  (we)	  completely	  discuss	  (the	  points)	  in	  this	  (entire	  verse	  then)	  there	  are	  two	  types	  of	  comparative	  inferences	  	  (that)	  use	  the	  first	  (point)	  to	  complete	  the	  subsequent	  (point).	  (Question:)	  How	  so?	  (Answer:)	  The	  top	  half	  clarifies	  that	  all	  (karmically)	  functional	  dharmas	  lack	  a	  self-­‐nature.	  (This	  is	  the)	  proposition.44	  Because	  (they)	  are	  produced	  from	  conditions	  (is	  the)	  reason.	  The	  example	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	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The	  bottom	  half	  clarifies	  that	  (karmically)	  functional	  dharmas	  are	  certainly	  empty.	  (This	  is	  the)	  proposition.	  Because	  (they)	  lack	  a	  self-­‐nature	  (is	  the)	  reason.	  Again	  the	  example	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  In	  the	  third	  (part	  of	  this	  first	  gate,	  the	  part	  where	  he)	  explains	  the	  verse	  to	  broadly	  reveal	  (the	  ideas,	  there	  are)	  two	  (subsections).	  The	  first	  clarifies	  the	  emptiness	  of	  (karmically)	  functional	  (dharmas).	  The	  subsequent	  (section)	  categorizes	  (other	  types	  of	  dharmas	  and)	  reveals	  that	  the	  self	  and	  the	  (karmically)	  nonfunctional	  (dharmas)	  are	  all	  empty.	  
[Karmically	  Functional	  Dharmas]	  In	  the	  preceding	  (of	  the	  two	  subsections	  there	  are)	  three	  (further	  subpoints).	  First	  (he)	  labels	  and	  brings	  up	  (two	  types	  of)	  effects.	  Second,	  from	  “In	  this	  fashion…”,	  (he)	  refutes	  (the	  errors	  to)	  reveal	  (such	  effects)	  lack	  a	  (self-­‐)nature.	  Third,	  from	  “For	  these	  reasons…”,	  (he)	  concludes	  (the	  point	  showing)	  the	  emptiness	  of	  (karmically)	  functional	  (dharmas).	  
[Types	  of	  Effects]	  In	  the	  first	  (of	  the	  subpoints	  mentioned	  above	  there	  are)	  three	  (elements).	  (First	  he)	  lays	  out	  (the	  idea	  that)	  effects	  have	  internal	  and	  external	  (varieties).	  Secondly	  (he)	  lays	  out	  (that)	  conditions	  also	  have	  internal	  and	  external	  (varieties).	  Thirdly,	  (he)	  explains	  (the	  above	  two	  and)	  reveals	  (the	  conclusions	  about)	  internal	  and	  external	  conditions	  and	  effects.	  	  Herein	  (he)	  initially	  distinguishes	  external	  phenomena.	  There	  are	  five	  (such)	  phenomena	  and	  each	  has	  causes	  and	  conditions	  that	  extend	  to	  dharmas	  that	  are	  produced	  (by	  those	  causes	  and	  conditions).	  This	  is	  all	  (readily)	  understandable	  (and	  so	  there	  is	  no	  need	  for	  further	  comment	  here).	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Subsequently	  he	  reveals	  internal	  (forms	  of	  karmic)	  recompense.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (he	  refers	  to	  the)	  twelve-­‐fold	  (chain	  of)	  causes	  and	  conditions.	  Based	  upon	  
Hinayana	  propositions,	  each	  preceding	  branch	  (of	  the	  twelve)	  constitutes	  a	  cause	  producing	  the	  subsequent	  branch.	  So,	  all	  together	  there	  are	  causes	  and	  conditions	  that	  amount	  to	  the	  dharmas	  that	  are	  produced.	  (This	  is)	  also	  understandable	  (without	  further	  discussion	  here).	  Also,	  (this	  is)	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  paragraph	  in	  (the	  section	  that)	  explains	  the	  verse.	  
[Refuting	  Errors]	  Second,	  (in	  the	  next	  section	  where	  he)	  refutes	  (errors	  to)	  reveal	  (all	  
dharmas)	  lack	  a	  (self-­‐)nature,	  (there	  are)	  two	  (subpoints).	  Initially	  (he)	  generally	  reveals	  (the	  point).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  internal	  and	  external	  dharmas,	  since	  each,	  in	  this	  fashion	  are	  formed	  (based	  on)	  supporting	  conditions,	  how	  is	  it	  (they)	  are	  not	  then	  exactly	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  self-­‐nature?	  If	  they	  have	  a	  particular	  substantial	  (self-­‐essence),	  how	  (could	  they	  be)	  further	  conditioned?	  As	  a	  result	  the	  Nirvana-­‐sutra	  says,	  It	  is	  like,	  for	  instance,	  blue	  and	  yellow	  combining	  to	  form	  green.	  (We)	  should	  know	  (green)	  is	  two	  (combined	  colors)	  and	  fundamentally	  lacks	  an	  (essential)	  green-­‐nature.	  If	  it	  is	  fundamentally	  the	  case	  that	  there	  is	  (such	  a	  nature),	  why	  (is	  it)	  necessary	  to	  combine	  (blue	  and	  yellow	  to	  get	  green)?	  Second,	  from	  “	  if	  a	  self-­‐nature	  of	  dharmas	  is	  lacking…”,	  (he)	  specifically	  reveals	  (details	  about	  this)	  lack	  of	  a	  (self-­‐)nature.	  	  Therein,	  initially	  (he	  deals	  with)	  external	  (dharmas),	  then	  (he	  deals	  with)	  internal	  (dharmas).	  	  
[External	  dharmas]	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In	  the	  (section	  on)	  external	  (dharmas	  there	  are)	  two	  (subpoints):	  first,	  (he)	  correctly	  refutes	  (errors),	  then	  (he)	  categorically	  concludes.	  	  
[Refuting	  Errors]	  In	  the	  preceding,	  first	  (he)	  presents	  (the	  key	  point.	  There	  he)	  arranges	  (the	  possibilities	  of	  a	  nature	  as)	  self,	  other,	  and	  (both)	  combined.	  The	  three	  sections	  (that	  deal	  with	  these	  possibilities	  show)	  all	  (of	  them)	  lack	  (self)	  existence.	  Second,	  from	  “By	  what	  reason…”,	  (he	  provides	  an)	  explanation	  of	  the	  evidence.	  Therein	  first	  (he	  provides	  the)	  evidence,	  then	  the	  explanation.	  	  In	  the	  explanation,	  first	  (he)	  explains	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  self-­‐nature.	  Then	  (he)	  explains	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  other-­‐nature.	  (He)	  does	  not	  explain	  the	  third	  –	  the	  production	  of	  both	  together.	  (He	  does	  not	  explain	  it)	  because	  [220c]	  if	  self	  and	  other(-­‐nature)	  are	  refuted,	  there	  is	  no	  separate	  (and	  third	  possibility	  of)	  “both	  together.”	  	  
[Self-­‐nature]	  Regarding	  (the	  point)	  in	  the	  first	  (part)	  of	  the	  explanation,	  (it)	  claims	  if	  self-­‐nature	  exists	  then	  it	  does	  not	  cause	  others.	  (But)	  because	  (it)	  does	  cause	  others,	  a	  self-­‐nature	  is	  lacking.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   [Other-­‐nature]	  In	  the	  second	  (section)	  from	  “if	  we	  claim…”,	  (he)	  explains	  the	  lack	  of	  other-­‐nature,	  there	  are	  three	  (subpoints).	  Initially	  (he	  notes)	  the	  other	  forms	  a	  separate	  substance	  and	  therefore	  is	  not	  a	  cause.	  Second,	  from	  “if	  we	  claim…”,	  (he	  notes)	  a	  cause	  that	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  effect	  therefore	  is	  not	  an	  other.	  Third,	  from	  “(If	  it	  were	  the	  case…)	  rushes…”,	  (he	  notes)	  a	  cause	  that	  again	  lacks	  a	  nature	  (means	  one)	  loses	  (both)	  self(-­‐nature	  and)	  other(-­‐nature).	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Further	  explaining	  these	  three	  (above	  points),	  the	  first	  relates	  to	  remote,	  (unrelated	  causation),	  the	  second	  relates	  to	  familial,	  (related	  causation,	  and	  the)	  third	  (notes	  that)	  both	  are	  not	  (the	  case).	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [Remote	  Causation]	  In	  the	  first	  (of	  the	  above	  three	  there	  are)	  two	  (subpoints).	  The	  initial	  (point)	  corresponds	  to	  refutation	  of	  (the	  notion	  that)	  gives	  rein	  to	  (unrelated	  distant	  objects	  of)	  sensation.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  (objects	  are)	  produced	  by	  an	  other,	  then	  oxen	  ought	  to	  produce	  horses,	  a	  pear	  seed	  (might)	  produce	  a	  crab-­‐apple,	  and	  so	  on.	  As	  for	  “…and	  yet	  in	  fact	  that	  is	  not	  the	  case”,	  it	  is	  then	  a	  refutation	  (that)	  denies	  the	  reasonableness	  (of	  the	  premise).	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [Familial	  Causation]	  Second,	  from	  “if	  we	  claim…”,	  is	  then	  a	  refutation	  of	  familial,	  (related	  causation).	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  (an	  argument)	  clarifying	  (the	  idea	  that)	  causes,	  (which)	  are	  the	  same	  substance	  as	  effects,	  are	  therefore	  not	  an	  other.	  Therein	  (he	  makes)	  three	  (subpoints).	  	  
[Rejoinders]	  First	  (he)	  notes	  the	  rejoinders45	  (to	  this	  issue)	  are	  generally	  not	  (viable).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  reckoning	  of	  (some)	  heterodox	  (thinkers)	  says	  there	  are	  two	  types	  of	  others.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  other	  that	  is	  not	  a	  cause.	  (For	  example,	  this)	  is	  like	  oxen	  in	  regards	  to	  horses.	  (Oxen)	  may	  not	  similarly	  produce	  (a	  horse).	  The	  second	  (type)	  are	  causal	  others.	  As	  (for	  example,)	  rushes	  in	  regards	  to	  mats.	  (If	  this	  is	  the	  case	  then)	  how	  does	  it	  come	  (to	  be	  that	  rushes)	  do	  not	  (naturally)	  produce	  (mats)?	  Because	  the	  preceding	  section	  only	  says	  the	  other	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  a	  cause,	  (and)	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herein	  it	  speaks	  of	  causes	  while	  not	  referring	  to	  an	  other,	  this	  rejoinder	  is	  not	  reasonable.	  Consequently,	  (the	  Author)	  says	  (this	  view)	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  Second,	  (he)	  investigates	  (the	  reasons)	  why	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  (that	  the	  rejoinders	  are	  viable).	  The	  third	  (part	  regarding	  the	  rejoinders)	  is	  a	  refutation	  (that	  is	  based	  upon)	  a	  correct	  explanation.	  Therein	  first	  (he	  shows	  that)	  preserving	  causes	  (while)	  omitting	  the	  other	  consequently	  (means	  such	  so-­‐called	  “causes”)	  are	  not	  (actually)	  causes.	  	  (This)	  is	  a	  refutation	  that	  denies	  (the	  premise.	  He	  notes	  that)	  if	  (one	  claims)	  it	  is	  the	  case	  (causes)	  are	  causes	  while	  not	  an	  other,	  (then)	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  effect,	  the	  cause	  is	  exactly	  and	  still	  not	  an	  other.	  	  Accordingly,	  (for	  example,	  in	  such	  a	  case)	  rushes	  and	  mats	  are	  one	  substance.	  (If	  their)	  substances	  are	  exactly	  one	  (substance),	  there	  is	  (now)	  an	  omission	  in	  regards	  to	  a	  (distinct)	  cause.	  (As)	  the	  cause	  is	  indeed	  omitted,	  where	  is	  the	  meaning	  of	  production	  by	  another	  (now)?	  	  Second,	  (he)	  preserves	  the	  other	  and	  omits	  causes.	  This	  is	  a	  refutation	  of	  conditions.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  (a	  cause)	  is	  an	  other,	  as	  a	  consequence	  (it	  is)	  the	  same	  as	  not	  a	  cause	  (because	  it	  is,	  instead	  an	  “other.”)	  	  (Now,)	  the	  preceding	  (view	  above	  that)	  accordingly	  takes	  a	  cause	  as	  an	  other	  is	  not	  established.	  (And	  this)	  subsequent	  (view	  that)	  accordingly	  takes	  the	  other	  as	  a	  cause	  (is	  also	  not	  established).	  Furthermore,	  (with)	  the	  preceding	  (view),	  due	  to	  (the	  fact	  the	  two	  are)	  one	  (substance),	  therefore	  (that	  view)	  does	  not	  establish	  production.	  (And	  with	  this)	  subsequent	  (view),	  due	  to	  their	  difference,	  therefore	  (it)	  also	  does	  not	  (establish)	  production.	  For	  this	  reason	  the	  other	  does	  not	  produce.	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Also,	  it	  is	  possible	  in	  the	  preceding	  (he	  may)	  inferentially	  say	  causes	  certainly	  do	  not	  produce	  effects	  because,	  compared	  with	  effect	  dharmas,	  (cause	  dharmas)	  are	  not	  separate,	  (and	  so	  it	  is)	  as	  if	  (they	  are	  in	  fact	  already)	  effect	  dharmas.	  (In	  the)	  subsequent	  idea	  (he	  may)	  inferentially	  claim	  causes	  certainly	  do	  not	  produce	  effects	  because,	  compared	  with	  effects	  (they	  are)	  different,	  (and	  so	  it	  is)	  as	  if	  they	  are	  not	  cause	  dharmas.	  
	  Third,	  he	  deduces	  (that	  when)	  causes	  lack	  a	  (self-­‐)nature,	  (one)	  loses	  an	  other(-­‐nature).	  Therein	  he	  checks	  heterodox	  rejoinders	  saying	  (having)	  brought	  up	  (the	  points	  that)	  either	  (they)	  are	  different,	  (in	  which	  case	  causes)	  are	  the	  same	  as	  not	  a	  cause,	  or	  (they)	  are	  one	  (and	  the	  same,	  in	  which	  case	  causes)	  are	  the	  same	  as	  effects,	  both	  (forms)	  do	  not	  come	  to	  produce	  (effects).	  And	  yet	  (since	  there	  is)	  the	  principle	  of	  production	  (they	  must	  be)	  neither	  one	  nor	  different.	  Therefore,	  (we)	  come	  to	  mutual	  production.	  Now,	  he	  refutes	  (this)	  idea	  saying	  if	  there	  is	  this	  cause,	  it	  may	  be	  granted	  that	  (relative	  to	  such	  a	  cause)	  the	  effect	  (is)	  neither	  one	  nor	  different,	  even	  as	  (that	  cause)	  is	  capable	  of	  production	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  effect.	  Now,	  if	  we	  investigate	  and	  seek	  this	  cause	  (we	  find	  it)	  also	  lacks	  a	  self-­‐nature.	  Because	  it	  is	  established	  from	  collected	  conditions,	  it	  is	  like	  an	  effect	  dharma.	  For	  this	  reason	  it	  lacks	  an	  (essential)	  substance	  that	  might	  be	  able	  to	  produce	  (the	  effect).	  	  	  In	  (this	  passage)	  there	  are	  four	  (points):	  First,	  (he)	  presents	  (the	  idea);	  second,	  (he)	  investigates	  (it);	  third,	  (he)	  explains	  (it);	  and	  fourth,	  (he)	  concludes.	  In	  the	  explanation	  (he)	  first	  explains	  rushes	  lack	  a	  self-­‐essence.	  Subsequently	  he	  distinguishes	  (the	  point	  that	  accordingly	  rushes)	  lack	  the	  (functional,	  karmic)	  power	  to	  form	  a	  mat.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (if)	  a	  self-­‐essence	  is	  also	  lacking,	  what	  has	  the	  function	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of	  (karmic)	  power?	  	  From	  “Therefore…”,	  (and)	  below,	  the	  conclusion	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  
[Conclusion	  of	  Refuting	  Errors]	  Second,	  from	  “All	  the	  remaining	  [221a]…	  vases…”,	  (and)	  below,	  (he)	  categorically	  (notes)	  all	  the	  remaining	  external	  dharmas	  of	  causes	  and	  conditions	  cannot	  be	  obtained.	  	  
[Internal	  dharmas]	  Within	  the	  second	  explanation	  (that)	  refutes	  the	  conditioned	  effects	  of	  internal	  dharmas	  there	  are	  two	  (parts).	  First,	  (he)	  briefly	  indicates	  (this	  refutation)	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  preceding	  refutation.	  (This	  first	  part)	  also	  anticipates	  the	  refutation	  of	  the	  subsequent	  passage.	  Second,	  (he)	  quotes	  verses	  to	  broadly	  reveal	  (the	  nature	  of	  the)	  refutation.	  In	  this	  (second	  section	  there	  are)	  two	  (parts).	  First	  (he)	  quotes	  (a)	  verse	  and	  transmits	  (ideas	  from)	  the	  Treatise	  of	  Seventy	  (Verses.	  That	  text)	  is	  also	  (one)	  composed	  by	  Nagarjuna.	  It	  has	  seventy	  verses,	  hence	  the	  name.	  	  
[The	  Verse]	  Among	  the	  verses	  the	  first	  sentence	  reveals	  the	  correct	  principle.	  The	  next	  sentence	  documents	  the	  attachment	  (at	  issue).	  The	  following	  two	  sentences	  (form	  a)	  mooting	  refutation.46	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  possible	  the	  first	  sentence	  is	  a	  refutation	  that	  denies	  (the	  opponent’s	  premise	  while)	  the	  subsequent	  three	  sentences	  are	  a	  conditional	  refutation.	  Also,	  it	  is	  possible	  the	  first	  sentence	  presents	  the	  lack	  of	  production	  (while)	  the	  subsequent	  three	  sentences	  explain	  the	  lack	  of	  production.	  
[Explanation]	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Second,	  in	  (the	  section	  that)	  explains	  the	  verses,	  first	  (he)	  explains	  the	  passage	  (and)	  reveals	  the	  proposition.	  Subsequently	  	  (he)	  concludes	  that	  causes	  and	  effects	  are	  both	  empty.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   [Correct	  Meaning]	  In	  the	  explanation	  first	  (he)	  establishes	  the	  correct	  meaning.	  (This	  part)	  also	  is	  to	  explain	  the	  first	  sentence	  of	  the	  verses	  (and,)	  in	  regards	  to	  (the	  main)	  principle,	  is	  a	  refutation	  that	  denies	  (that	  point).	  Second,	  from	  “If	  (one)	  claims…”,	  (he)	  refutes	  the	  reckonings	  of	  externally	  (derived)	  sensations.	  (He)	  also	  explains	  the	  following	  three	  sentences’	  conditional	  refutation.	  Herein,	  (there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  First,	  (he)	  reveals	  the	  certainty	  of	  two	  obstacles.	  Second,	  (he	  provides)	  a	  specific	  refutation	  of	  successive	  (moments).	  Third,	  (taken)	  together	  (he)	  concludes	  both	  are	  not	  (the	  case).	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [Successive	  Moments]	  In	  the	  second	  (of	  the	  three	  parts,	  the	  part	  with	  the)	  specific	  refutation	  (of	  successive	  moments	  there	  are)	  two	  (subparts).	  	  
	  The	  first	  relates	  to	  one	  (moment	  of	  the)	  mind	  and	  refutes	  both	  (causes	  and	  effects	  because	  such	  a	  case)	  conditionally	  allows	  for	  that	  which	  they,	  [i.e.,	  such	  thought	  moments,]	  (subsequently)	  establish.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  correcting	  the	  preceding	  mind	  moment	  of	  ignorance,	  the	  practice,	  etc.	  (that	  follows)	  also	  ought	  to	  be	  simultaneous.	  From	  “Furthermore,	  (if	  this	  were	  so	  then)	  causes	  and	  (their)	  effects…”,	  denies	  their	  causes	  and	  effects.	  In	  the	  passage,	  first	  a	  presentation	  (of	  the	  point)	  is	  brought	  forward,	  then	  the	  explanation	  is	  completed.	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The	  second	  (of	  the	  two	  parts	  in	  this	  section	  with	  the	  specific	  refutation	  of	  successive	  moments)	  relates	  to	  a	  refutation	  of	  many	  moments	  (and)	  has	  three	  (subparts).	  	  First,	  (he	  presents)	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the)	  particular	  differences	  of	  causes	  and	  effects.	  Because	  they	  do	  not	  mutually	  extend	  to	  (one	  another	  they)	  are	  not	  conditionally	  produced	  dharmas.	  	  The	  second	  (is	  a)	  “subsequent	  effects	  lack	  causes”	  refutation.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (when)	  the	  ignorance	  of	  the	  preceding	  section	  (of	  the	  chain	  of	  dharmic	  causation)	  and	  the	  previous	  (moment	  of)	  mind	  are	  both	  extinguished,	  (then,	  regarding)	  the	  subsequent	  part’s	  activities,	  what	  constitutes	  the	  cause?	  	  The	  third	  is	  a	  refutation	  checking	  a	  repeat	  of	  a	  (conceptually	  similar)	  rejoinder.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  a	  heterodox	  teaching	  says,	  	  “My	  previous	  thought	  moment’s	  ignorance,	  although	  extinguished,	  can	  draw	  forth	  a	  subsequent	  branch	  of	  activity	  and	  therefore	  constitutes	  a	  cause.	  	  (There	  is	  then)	  this	  type	  of	  conditioning	  without	  interval.	  (With	  karmic)	  seeds	  in	  the	  fundamental	  consciousness47	  the	  preceding	  are	  extinguished,	  the	  subsequent	  produced,	  etc.”	  	  Now,	  (Nagarjuna)	  refutes	  (this)	  saying,	  (as	  for)	  your	  preceding	  moment	  of	  mind,	  (do	  you	  take	  it)	  as	  already	  extinguished	  or	  as	  not	  yet	  extinguished?	  If	  already	  extinguished,	  the	  extinct	  is	  not	  a	  thing.	  	  What	  (then)	  can	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  cause?	  If	  not	  yet	  extinguished,	  then	  the	  effect	  does	  not	  come	  to	  be	  produced	  because	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  preceding	  moment	  of	  mind	  (is	  as	  yet	  not	  the	  case).	  	  
[Conclusion]	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  Third,	  from	  “The	  twelve	  (types	  of)	  causally	  conditioned…”,	  both	  conclusions	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  
[Karmically	  Functional	  dharmas	  Conclusion]	  Third,	  from	  “For	  these	  reasons…”	  (he)	  concludes	  conditioned	  effects	  are	  all	  empty.	  (This)	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  explanation).	  
[Refutation	  of	  Other	  Types	  of	  dharmas]	  Third	  [sic],	  in	  the	  refutation	  of	  (the	  various	  other)	  categories	  (of	  dharmas)	  there	  are	  four	  (parts).	  	  The	  first,	  (where	  he)	  concludes	  that	  (karmically)	  functional	  dharmas	  are	  empty,	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  	  Second,	  from	  “(If	  even	  karmically)	  functional	  dharmas	  are	  empty…”	  (he	  notes	  that)	  because	  dharmas	  are	  empty,	  it	  reveals	  the	  “I”	  lacks	  an	  (essential)	  dependent	  (basis)	  and	  hence	  is	  also	  empty.	  The	  Treatise	  (quoted)	  states	  dharma	  attachments	  constitute	  the	  causes,	  “I”	  attachments	  constitute	  the	  effects.	  Since	  a	  fundamental	  cause	  is	  lacking,	  future	  results	  are	  accordingly	  lost.	  (That	  is)	  the	  reason	  the	  Treatise	  clarifies	  the	  two	  emptinesses	  of	  the	  person	  and	  dharmas.	  As	  for	  initially	  distinguishing	  the	  emptiness	  of	  dharmas,	  by	  a	  valid	  refutation	  of	  the	  two	  (Buddhist)	  vehicles,	  a	  corresponding	  refutation	  of	  heterodox	  paths	  results.	  Herein	  there	  are	  three	  (parts).	  First	  (he)	  presents	  an	  adjunct	  refutation,	  second,	  (he)	  explains	  the	  refutation	  of	  dharmas,	  (and)	  third	  (he)	  quotes	  an	  evidential	  refutation	  (from	  a	  sutra).	  	  In	  the	  explanation	  (there	  are)	  two	  (parts).	  First,	  (he	  provides)	  an	  explanation	  that	  follows	  (the	  key	  idea).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  due	  to	  the	  aggregation	  of	  the	  three	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categories	  of	  (karmically)	  functional	  dharmas,	  (one	  view)	  suppositionally	  (and	  fallaciously)	  states	  (they)	  constitute	  an	  “I.”	  	  Since	  the	  functional	  (dharmas)	  are	  then	  empty,	  where	  then	  is	  the	  suppositional	  (and	  false)	  “I”?	  The	  hypothetical	  (he	  provides)	  is	  (like)	  [221b]	  fuel,	  (and	  the	  consequence)	  given	  is	  the	  fire.	  The	  explanation	  countering	  (that	  hypothetical	  relationship)	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  	  In	  (the	  section	  that)	  quotes	  evidence	  (from	  a	  text),	  it	  is	  as	  a	  sutra	  states:	  “Due	  to	  I,	  there	  is	  mine.”	  	  Likewise,	  due	  to	  dharmas	  there	  is	  the	  semblance	  of	  “I.”	  Furthermore,	  (he)	  explains	  that	  because	  of	  the	  emptiness	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  
dharmas,	  the	  “I”	  is	  empty.	  This	  clarifies	  that	  because	  of	  the	  emptiness	  of	  “I,”	  “mine”	  is	  (also)	  empty.	  (This	  is	  the	  case)	  because	  “mine”	  is	  a	  (karmic)	  function	  of	  “I.”	  This	  then	  is	  (an	  explanation	  that	  proceeds)	  from	  the	  basis	  towards	  the	  derivative	  in	  order	  to	  expound	  emptiness.	  Third,	  in	  (the	  section	  that)	  categorically	  reveals	  the	  emptiness	  of	  (karmically)	  nonfunctional	  (dharmas),	  first	  (he)	  presents	  the	  classification.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (dharmas	  of)	  “nirvana”	  are	  designated	  as	  “extinct.”	  Second,	  from	  “For	  what	  reason”,	  (he)	  explains	  the	  establishment	  (of	  functional	  and	  nonfunctional	  dharmas).	  In	  explaining	  the	  establishment	  (of	  functional	  and	  nonfunctional	  dharmas	  there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  First,	  (he	  notes	  that)	  because	  there	  are	  no	  dharmas	  that	  might	  be	  extinguished,	  there	  is	  no	  extinction.	  Second,	  (he	  also	  notes	  that)	  lacking	  (an	  “I”	  which)	  can	  attain	  extinction,	  (again)	  therefore	  there	  is	  no	  extinction.	  Third,	  from	  “again…”,	  (he)	  clarifies	  (that)	  the	  production	  of	  (dharmas)	  deficient	  (in	  self-­‐nature)	  awaits	  the	  opposite	  so	  therefore,	  there	  is	  no	  extinction.	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Fourth,	  from	  “For	  these	  reasons…”,	  (he)	  concludes	  the	  three	  emptinesses.	  (This	  part)	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  	  (End	  of)	  the	  first	  (section	  of)	  the	  roll	  (containing)	  A	  Record	  Conveying	  the	  Meanings	  
of	  the	  Tenets	  of	  the	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates.	  	  Second	  (section)	  of	  the	  roll	  (containing)	  A	  Record	  Conveying	  the	  Meanings	  of	  the	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The	  Gate	  of	  Contemplating	  Existent	  Effects	  and	  Nonexistent	  Effects	  	  
The	  Second	  (Gate)	  [The	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  [cont.	  160b]	  	   Again,	  the	  various	  dharmas	  are	  not	  produced.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  	   	  The	  antecedently	  existent	  is	  not	  (subsequently)	  produced.	  	   The	  antecedently	  nonexistent	  is	  also	  not	  (subsequently)	  produced.	  	  The	  antecedently	  existent	  and	  nonexistent	  is	  also	  not	  (subsequently)	  produced.	  	   What	  (then)	  will	  have	  (the	  characteristic	  of)	  production?	  	  	   If	  the	  effect	  (exists)	  within	  the	  cause,	  (then)	  it	  is	  antecedently	  existent.	  (If	  it	  is	  antecedently	  existent,)	  then	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  produce	  it.	  (If	  the	  effect	  is)	  antecedently	  nonexistent,	  it	  is	  also	  not	  necessary	  to	  produce	  it.	  (If	  it	  is	  both	  antecedently)	  existent	  and	  nonexistent,	  it	  is	  also	  not	  necessary	  to	  produce	  it.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  If	  the	  effect	  is	  in	  the	  cause,	  antecedently	  existent	  yet	  still	  produced	  (again	  later),	  this	  then	  (creates	  a	  regress)	  without	  end.	  If	  the	  effect	  which	  is	  antecedently	  not	  yet	  produced	  is	  still	  produced,	  the	  current	  (effect	  which	  is)	  produced	  already	  ought	  to	  yet	  again	  be	  produced.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  Because	  (such	  effects)	  are	  eternally	  existent	  in	  the	  cause.	  From	  this	  existent’s	  side	  (of	  production)	  there	  ought	  to	  be,	  again,	  further	  production	  (already).	  Given	  this,	  (the	  idea	  leads	  to	  a	  regress)	  without	  end.	  	   If	  one	  claims	  the	  (effect	  which	  is)	  produced	  already	  is	  not	  further	  produced,	  (but)	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  is	  still	  produced,	  in	  this	  (idea)	  there	  is	  no	  principle	  of	  production	  of	  the	  existent.	  For	  this	  reason,	  (as	  for	  the	  idea	  of)	  antecedently	  existent	  (effects	  which	  are)	  yet	  produced,	  this	  situation	  is	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  	   Again,	  if	  there	  are	  antecedently	  existent	  effects	  in	  causes	  and	  (we	  also)	  claim	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  is	  still	  produced,	  (while)	  the	  produced	  already	  is	  not	  (again)	  produced,	  (then)	  these	  two	  [i.e.,	  the	  already	  produced	  and	  not	  yet	  produced]	  are	  both	  existent	  even	  as	  one	  is	  produced	  and	  one	  is	  not	  produced.	  (But)	  there	  is	  no	  (such)	  situation.	  	   Again,	  if	  (we)	  claim	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  certainly	  exists	  (already),	  then	  the	  produced	  already	  ought	  to	  be	  nonexistent.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  Because	  (the	  two	  notions	  of)	  the	  produced	  and	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  mutually	  oppose.	  [160c]	  Because	  the	  produced	  and	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  mutually	  oppose	  (one	  another),	  these	  two	  characteristics	  of	  activity	  also	  mutually	  oppose.	  
	   109	  
	   Again,	  existence	  and	  nonexistence	  mutually	  oppose,	  nonexistence	  and	  existence	  mutually	  oppose.	  (So,)	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  the	  produced	  already	  exists	  and	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  also	  exists,	  then	  the	  produced	  and	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  ought	  not	  have	  any	  difference.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  If	  the	  produced	  already	  exists	  and	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  also	  exists,	  (then	  in	  regards	  to)	  a	  produced	  and	  not	  yet	  produced	  (which	  are)	  like	  this,	  what	  difference	  is	  there	  (between	  them?	  But,	  in	  fact	  we	  can	  see	  that	  in	  regards	  to)	  a	  produced	  and	  a	  not	  yet	  produced	  that	  lack	  any	  difference,	  this	  situation	  is	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  For	  this	  reason	  (the	  idea	  that	  antecedent	  effects)	  exist	  (means	  effects)	  are	  not	  produced.	  	   Again,	  (if)	  the	  existent	  is	  already	  antecedently	  complete,	  what	  is	  the	  use	  of	  producing	  it	  again?	  (Just)	  as	  an	  activity	  (which	  is)	  already	  (done)	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  done	  (again,	  obviously	  that	  which	  is)	  complete	  already	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  completed	  (again).	  For	  this	  reason	  (already)	  existent	  dharmas	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	  produced	  (again).	  	   Again,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  there	  is	  the	  (not	  yet)	  produced	  (antecedently)	  in	  the	  cause,	  then	  (even)	  when	  it	  is	  not	  yet	  produced	  the	  effect	  ought	  to	  be	  evident.	  Yet,	  in	  fact,	  it	  is	  not	  evident.	  Similarly	  (we	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  to	  find)	  a	  vase	  in	  (unformed)	  clay,	  (or)	  a	  (finished)	  mat	  in	  (a	  bundle)	  of	  rushes.	  (In	  such	  cases	  the	  effect)	  ought	  to	  be	  evident	  but,	  in	  fact,	  (the	  effects)	  are	  not	  evident.	  For	  this	  reason	  (antecendently)	  existent	  (effects	  means	  effects)	  are	  not	  produced.	  	   The	  interlocutor	  states:	  (But),	  even	  though	  an	  effect	  antecedently	  exists,	  by	  not	  yet	  transforming,	  it	  is	  therefore	  not	  yet	  evident.	  	   Answer:	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  when	  a	  vase	  is	  not	  yet	  produced	  the	  body	  of	  the	  vase	  is	  not	  yet	  transformed,	  and	  is	  therefore	  not	  yet	  evident,	  (then)	  by	  what	  characteristics	  is	  it	  known	  (to	  exist	  such	  that	  we	  could)	  say	  in	  the	  clay	  there	  is	  an	  antecedent	  vase?	  Is	  it	  by	  means	  of	  vase	  characteristics	  (that	  we	  can	  say)	  there	  is	  a	  vase	  (in	  the	  clay)?	  Is	  it	  by	  means	  of	  cow	  characteristics	  or	  horse	  characteristics	  that	  therefore	  (we	  can	  say)	  there	  is	  a	  vase?	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  in	  the	  clay	  there	  are	  no	  vase	  characteristics,	  no	  cow	  characteristics,	  (and)	  no	  horse	  characteristics,	  given	  this	  then	  are	  not	  (such	  “characteristics”	  simply)	  called	  nonexistent?	  For	  these	  reasons	  (when)	  you	  state	  there	  is	  an	  effect	  in	  the	  cause	  antecedently	  even	  as	  (it	  will	  eventually)	  be	  produced,	  this	  situation	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  	   (Now,)	  if	  (one)	  claims	  the	  not	  yet	  transformed	  is	  not	  designated	  as	  an	  effect,	  then,	  in	  the	  end,	  the	  effect	  is	  not	  attainable.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  (If)	  this	  transformation	  is	  antecedently	  nonexistent,	  then	  it	  also	  ought	  to	  be	  subsequently	  nonexistent.	  Therefore	  effects	  such	  as	  vases,	  (which	  all	  require	  a	  process	  of	  transformation	  to	  arise,)	  are	  not	  attainable	  after	  all.	  If	  (one)	  claims	  the	  already	  transformed	  is	  the	  effect,	  then	  it	  is	  antecedently	  nonexistent	  in	  the	  cause.	  Given	  this	  then	  (the	  matter)	  is	  not	  settled.	  Is	  it	  the	  case	  that	  there	  is	  an	  effect	  antecedently	  in	  the	  cause	  or	  is	  it	  the	  case	  there	  is	  no	  effect	  antecedently	  (in	  the	  cause)?	  	   Question:	  Antecedently	  there	  is	  transformation	  yet	  (we)	  do	  not	  come	  to	  perceive	  it.	  All	  things	  individually	  exist.	  As	  for	  (their)	  existing	  even	  as	  they	  do	  not	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come	  to	  be	  perceived,	  it	  is	  like	  a	  thing	  which	  exists	  close	  by	  yet	  is	  not	  knowable,	  or	  a	  thing	  which	  exists	  distantly	  and	  is	  not	  knowable.	  Or	  (it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  the	  required	  sense)	  faculty	  is	  broken	  and	  it	  is	  not	  knowable.	  Or,	  (it	  may	  be	  a	  case	  where)	  the	  mind	  is	  unsettled	  and	  it	  is	  not	  knowable.	  (Or,	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  there	  are)	  obstacles	  (in	  the	  way)	  and	  it	  is	  not	  knowable.	  (Or	  it	  may)	  be	  similar	  (to	  other	  things	  and)	  so	  it	  is	  not	  knowable.	  Or	  (it	  may	  be	  a	  case	  where	  it	  is)	  overcome	  (by	  other	  things)	  and	  so	  is	  not	  knowable.	  Or	  (it	  may	  be)	  minute	  and	  so	  is	  not	  knowable.	  	  As	  for	  it	  being	  close	  but	  yet	  not	  knowable,	  (this	  case)	  is	  like	  having	  medicine	  in	  the	  eye.	  As	  for	  it	  being	  distant	  yet	  not	  knowable,	  this	  is	  like	  a	  bird	  flying	  off	  into	  space,	  soaring	  high	  and	  departing	  in	  the	  distance.	  As	  for	  (the	  sense)	  faculties	  being	  broken	  [161a]	  so	  it	  is	  not	  knowable,	  this	  is	  like	  the	  blind	  (who)	  cannot	  perceive	  color,	  the	  deaf	  who	  cannot	  hear	  sound,	  a	  nose	  that	  is	  stopped	  up	  and	  does	  not	  smell	  scent,	  a	  mouth	  (whose	  taste	  buds)	  miss	  the	  mark	  (and	  so)	  does	  not	  know	  taste,	  a	  body	  (whose	  sense	  of	  touch)	  is	  dulled	  (and	  so)	  does	  not	  know	  feeling,	  (or)	  a	  mind	  that	  is	  insane	  (and)	  does	  not	  know	  the	  real.	  	  As	  for	  a	  mind	  that	  is	  not	  settled	  and	  hence	  cannot	  know	  (the	  object),	  it	  is	  like	  (when)	  the	  mind	  (is	  settled	  upon	  a	  particular)	  form	  it	  does	  not	  perceive	  sound.	  As	  for	  (the	  case	  where	  there	  are)	  obstacles	  and	  one	  does	  not	  perceive	  (an	  object),	  it	  is	  like	  (when)	  an	  earthen	  (dam)	  obstructs	  (one’s	  view	  of)	  a	  large	  (body	  of)	  water	  or	  a	  wall	  blocks	  (one’s	  view	  of)	  things	  outside.	  	  As	  for	  (the	  case	  where	  there	  is)	  similarity	  and	  hence	  one	  cannot	  know	  (the	  object),	  it	  is	  like	  a	  black	  dot	  on	  a	  dark	  (background).	  As	  for	  (the	  case	  where	  the	  object)	  is	  overcome	  (by	  other	  things)	  and	  hence	  one	  cannot	  perceive	  it,	  it	  is	  like	  (a	  situation	  where	  there	  is	  the	  loud)	  noise	  of	  gongs	  and	  drums	  and	  one	  does	  not	  hear	  a	  voice	  dispersed	  (by	  the	  other	  sounds).	  As	  for	  (the	  situation	  where	  a	  thing)	  is	  minute	  and	  so	  is	  not	  knowable,	  it	  is	  like	  small	  particles	  that	  are	  not	  visible.	  	  In	  this	  fashion	  all	  the	  various	  dharmas,	  although	  existent,	  are	  not	  knowable	  due	  to	  (these)	  eight	  causal	  conditions.	  (Now)	  you	  state	  that	  transformation	  in	  the	  cause	  is	  not	  attainable.	  (But)	  as	  for	  (your	  claim	  that)	  vases,	  etc.,	  are	  not	  attainable,	  this	  situation	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  For	  what	  reason?	  These	  phenomena,	  although	  existent,	  do	  not	  come	  to	  be	  (observed)	  because	  of	  the	  (aforementioned)	  eight	  causal	  conditions.	  (Given	  all	  this,	  what	  is	  the	  problem	  here?)	  	   Answer:	  Dharmas	  of	  transformation	  and	  effects	  such	  as	  vases	  are	  not	  the	  same	  as	  (objects	  which)	  are	  not	  knowable	  (due	  to)	  the	  eight	  causal	  conditions.	  	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  dharmas	  of	  transformation	  and	  effects	  (such	  as)	  vases	  are	  extremely	  close	  and	  (therefore)	  not	  attainable,	  (then	  with)	  a	  bit	  of	  distance	  (we)	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  (to	  detect	  them).	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  they	  are	  at	  great	  distance	  and	  (therefore)	  are	  not	  attainable,	  (then	  when)	  a	  bit	  closer	  (we)	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  (to	  detect	  them).	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  (one’s	  sense)	  faculties	  are	  broken,	  (and	  therefore	  the	  objects)	  are	  not	  attainable,	  then	  (when	  those)	  faculties	  (are	  functioning)	  properly,	  (we)	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  (to	  detect	  them).	  If	  it	  is	  a	  case	  that	  the	  mind	  is	  unsettled	  (and	  therefore	  they)	  are	  not	  attainable,	  (then	  when)	  the	  mind	  is	  settled	  (we)	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  (to	  detect	  them).	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  (that	  due	  to)	  obstacles	  (they)	  are	  not	  attainable,	  (then	  we)	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  (to	  detect	  them	  when)	  dharmas	  of	  transformation	  and	  effects	  such	  as	  vases	  are	  not	  obstructed.	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  (that	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in	  being)	  similar	  (they)	  are	  not	  attainable,	  (then	  when)	  there	  is	  difference	  (we)	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  (to	  detect	  them).	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  (when)	  overcome	  (they)	  are	  not	  attainable,	  (then	  when	  that	  state	  of	  being)	  overcome	  ceases	  (we)	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  (to	  detect	  them).	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  (they)	  are	  minute	  and	  (therefore)	  are	  not	  attainable,	  (then	  we	  might	  note	  that)	  even	  so	  effects	  such	  as	  vases	  are	  (rather	  large	  and)	  coarse	  (so	  we)	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  (to	  detect	  them).	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  vases	  are	  (fundamentally)	  minute	  and	  (that	  is	  why	  we)	  are	  not	  able	  (to	  observe	  them	  in	  the	  cause,	  then	  once)	  produced	  they	  also	  should	  not	  be	  attainable.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  Because	  the	  characteristic	  of	  minuteness	  of	  the	  already	  produced	  and	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  is	  one	  (and	  the	  same	  characteristic).	  Therefore	  the	  already	  produced	  and	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  both	  certainly	  have	  (the	  same	  characteristic	  which	  must	  prevent	  their	  detection).	  	   Question:	  (How	  so?)	  When	  (a	  thing)	  is	  not	  yet	  produced	  it	  is	  minute	  (but)	  when	  produced	  it	  becomes	  (large	  and)	  coarse.	  For	  this	  reason	  (when)	  already	  produced	  (we)	  are	  able	  to	  (observe	  it	  but	  when)	  not	  yet	  produced	  we	  are	  not	  able	  (to	  observe	  it).	  	   Answer:	  If	  that	  is	  the	  case	  then	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  the	  effect	  in	  the	  cause.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  Because	  there	  is	  no	  (large	  and)	  coarse	  (characteristic)	  in	  the	  cause.	  Furthermore,	  antecedently	  in	  the	  cause	  there	  is	  no	  (large	  and	  coarse)	  effect	  (such	  as	  arises	  later).	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  there	  is	  a	  coarse	  (effect)	  antecedently	  in	  the	  cause,	  then	  (one)	  ought	  not	  say	  it	  is	  minute	  (and	  therefore	  we)	  are	  not	  able	  (to	  observe	  it).	  Now	  (in	  this	  case)	  the	  effect	  is	  coarse	  (but)	  you	  said	  it	  is	  minute	  and	  therefore	  (we)	  are	  not	  able	  (to	  observe	  it).	  This	  coarse	  (product	  then)	  is	  (apparently)	  not	  designated	  as	  an	  effect.	  Now	  (in	  contrast,	  as	  for	  the	  antecedent	  minute)	  effect,	  in	  the	  end	  (we)	  ought	  not	  be	  able	  (to	  ever	  observe	  it).	  Yet,	  in	  fact,	  effects	  do	  come	  (to	  be	  observed).	  For	  this	  reason,	  (clearly)	  it	  is	  not	  because	  of	  minuteness	  that	  (we)	  are	  not	  able	  (to	  observe)	  existent	  dharmas	  like	  this.	  (So,	  as	  for	  the	  notion	  of)	  antecedently	  existent	  effects	  in	  causes,	  (and	  the	  idea	  that)	  because	  of	  the	  eight	  causal	  conditions	  (we)	  are	  not	  able	  to	  observe	  existent	  effects	  in	  antecedent	  causes,	  this	  situation	  is	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  	   Again,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  antecedently	  there	  is	  the	  production	  of	  the	  effect	  in	  the	  cause,	  [161b]	  then	  the	  causal	  characteristic	  of	  causes	  is	  destroyed	  and	  the	  effect	  characteristic	  of	  effects	  is	  destroyed.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:	  This)	  is	  like	  having	  a	  blanket	  in	  threads	  or	  fruit	  in	  a	  dish.	  (In	  such	  cases	  the	  point	  of	  origination)	  is	  only	  a	  location	  (and	  we)	  do	  not	  designate	  (such	  locations)	  as	  “causes.”	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  Because	  threads	  and	  dishes	  are	  not	  the	  causes	  of	  blankets	  and	  fruit.	  If	  a	  cause	  is	  destroyed	  the	  effect	  is	  also	  destroyed.	  For	  this	  reason	  thread	  is	  not	  the	  cause	  of	  a	  blanket.	  If	  the	  cause	  is	  nonexistent	  the	  effect	  is	  also	  nonexistent.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  cause	  there	  is	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  effect.	  If	  the	  cause	  is	  not	  established	  how	  can	  we	  say	  the	  effect	  is	  established?	  Again,	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if	  there	  is	  no	  activity	  (of	  production	  we)	  do	  not	  designate	  (a	  thing	  as	  an)	  effect.	  Causes	  like	  threads	  cannot	  create	  effects	  like	  blankets.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:	  Well,)	  it	  is	  as	  with	  threads.	  (Threads)	  are	  not	  capable	  of	  creating	  effects	  like	  blankets	  by	  means	  of	  abiding	  in	  blankets.	  (If	  reality)	  is	  like	  this	  then	  there	  are	  no	  causes	  and	  there	  are	  no	  effects.	  If	  causes	  and	  effects	  are	  both	  nonexistent	  then	  (we)	  ought	  not	  seek	  whether	  antecedently	  there	  are	  effects	  or	  there	  are	  no	  effects	  in	  causes.	  	   Again,	  if	  in	  the	  cause	  there	  are	  effects	  even	  as	  (we)	  do	  not	  come	  (to	  observe	  them,	  then	  they)	  ought	  to	  have	  (some)	  characteristics	  that	  are	  evident.	  For	  example,	  (when	  we)	  smell	  a	  fragrance	  (we)	  know	  there	  is	  a	  flower.	  (When	  we)	  hear	  a	  sound	  (we)	  know	  there	  is	  a	  bird.	  (When	  we)	  hear	  laughter	  (we)	  know	  there	  is	  a	  person.	  (When	  we)	  see	  smoke	  (we)	  know	  there	  is	  a	  fire.	  (When	  we)	  see	  a	  crane	  (we)	  know	  there	  is	  a	  pond	  (nearby).	  In	  this	  fashion	  if	  antecedently	  there	  is	  an	  effect	  in	  the	  cause,	  (it)	  should	  have	  characteristics	  that	  are	  evident.	  Now	  (this	  should	  be	  true	  even	  of)	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  effect	  (but	  we)	  also	  do	  not	  come	  (to	  observe	  that.	  As	  for	  the	  various	  possible)	  characteristics	  (of	  effects,	  those)	  too	  we	  do	  not	  come	  (to	  observe).	  Given	  that	  (the	  facts	  are)	  like	  this,	  (we)	  should	  know	  there	  is	  no	  effect	  antecedently	  in	  the	  cause.	  	   Again,	  if	  there	  is	  production	  of	  an	  effect	  antecedently	  in	  the	  cause,	  then	  (we)	  ought	  not	  say	  that	  there	  is	  a	  blanket	  due	  to	  thread,	  or	  mats	  due	  to	  rushes.	  If	  a	  cause	  does	  not	  create	  (the	  effect	  then	  some)	  other	  (thing)	  also	  does	  not	  create	  it.	  This	  is	  like	  a	  (thread)	  blanket	  which	  is	  not	  made	  from	  thread.	  (In	  such	  a	  case)	  could	  (the	  thread	  blanket)	  be	  made	  from	  rushes?	  If	  thread	  does	  not	  create	  it	  and	  (some	  other	  thing	  such	  as)	  rushes	  also	  do	  not	  create	  it,	  do	  we	  not	  come	  to	  say	  there	  is	  nothing	  from	  which	  it	  is	  created?	  If	  there	  is	  nothing	  from	  which	  it	  is	  created,	  we	  do	  not	  designate	  it	  as	  an	  “effect.”	  If	  the	  effect	  does	  not	  exist,	  a	  cause	  also	  does	  not	  exist.	  (This	  is)	  just	  as	  previously	  explained.	  For	  these	  reasons	  production	  from	  effects	  antecedently	  existent	  in	  causes	  is	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  	   Again,	  if	  an	  effect	  lacks	  that	  from	  which	  it	  is	  created	  then	  we	  consider	  it	  permanent,	  like	  the	  nature	  of	  nirvana.	  If	  effects	  are	  permanent	  then	  the	  various	  (karmically)	  functional	  dharmas	  are	  all	  permanent.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:	  This	  would	  be	  the	  case)	  because	  all	  (karmically)	  active	  dharmas	  are	  effects.	  If	  all	  dharmas	  are	  permanent,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  impermanence.	  If	  there	  is	  no	  impermanence	  then	  there	  is	  no	  permanence.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  Due	  to	  permanence	  there	  is	  impermanence.	  Due	  to	  impermanence	  there	  is	  permanence.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  as	  for	  the	  nonexistence	  of	  both	  permanence	  and	  impermanence,	  this	  situation	  is	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  Therefore	  (one)	  does	  not	  get	  to	  claim	  there	  is	  the	  antecedent	  production	  of	  an	  effect	  in	  a	  cause.	  	   Again,	  if	  there	  is	  antecedent	  production	  of	  the	  effect	  in	  the	  cause,	  then	  furthermore	  (this	  would)	  allow	  a	  different	  effect	  to	  make	  a	  cause.	  (This	  would)	  be	  like	  cotton	  (cloth)	  allowing	  (subsequent)	  sitting	  upon	  (the	  cotton	  mat)	  to	  constitute	  an	  (antecedent)	  cause	  (of	  the	  cloth,	  or	  like)	  matting	  allowing	  (the	  subsequent	  effect	  of)	  screening	  to	  constitute	  a	  cause	  (of	  the	  matting,	  or	  like)	  a	  cart	  allowing	  (the	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subsequent	  process	  of)	  conveying	  (a	  load)	  to	  constitute	  a	  cause	  (of	  the	  cart).	  And	  yet,	  in	  fact	  (such	  things)	  do	  not	  allow	  different	  (subsequent)	  effects	  to	  create	  (antecedent)	  causes.	  For	  this	  reason	  we	  do	  not	  get	  to	  say	  there	  is	  the	  production	  of	  the	  effect	  antecedently	  in	  the	  cause.	  	  (Now)	  if	  (we)	  claim	  (this)	  is	  like	  the	  earth	  [161c]	  antecedently	  having	  (as	  yet	  undetected)	  scents,	  (and	  that	  if)	  not	  for	  rain	  showers	  the	  scents	  accordingly	  do	  not	  emerge,	  (and	  that	  all)	  effects	  are	  also	  like	  this	  –	  that	  is	  (to	  say,	  when)	  as	  yet	  there	  are	  not	  the	  (required)	  collected	  conditions,	  then	  the	  (effect)	  is	  not	  able	  to	  make	  a	  cause,	  (well)	  this	  situation	  is	  (also	  simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  (Answer:	  Well)	  it	  is	  as	  you	  have	  stated.	  (Only)	  when	  (the	  result)	  can	  be	  (clearly)	  distinguished	  (is	  it	  then)	  designated	  as	  an	  effect.	  (Accordingly,)	  things	  like	  vases	  and	  such	  are	  not	  effects.	  (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  (Answer:)	  The	  distinguishable	  is	  created.	  Vases	  and	  such	  that	  antecedently	  exist	  are	  not	  created.	  Given	  this	  then	  (we)	  take	  the	  created	  as	  effects.	  For	  this	  reason	  as	  for	  there	  being	  the	  production	  of	  effects	  antecedently	  in	  causes,	  this	  matter	  is	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  Again,	  the	  distinguishing	  cause	  is	  only	  capable	  of	  revealing	  (the	  effect).	  It	  is	  not	  capable	  of	  producing	  things.	  (It	  works)	  like	  (a	  case	  where)	  in	  order	  to	  illuminate	  a	  vase	  in	  the	  dark	  (one	  lights	  a	  lamp	  and,)	  consequently,	  the	  lamp	  can	  also	  reveal	  a	  bed	  and	  other	  such	  things	  (in	  the	  room).	  In	  order	  to	  create	  a	  vase	  (one)	  consequently	  (needs)	  a	  combination	  of	  collected	  conditions	  (and	  those	  conditions)	  are	  not	  capable	  of	  producing	  other	  things	  like	  beds.	  For	  this	  reason	  (one)	  ought	  to	  understand	  it	  is	  not	  (the	  case	  that)	  antecedently	  in	  causes	  there	  is	  the	  production	  of	  effects.	  	  Again,	  if	  there	  is	  the	  production	  of	  effects	  antecedently	  in	  causes,	  then	  there	  ought	  not	  be	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  presently	  created	  and	  (and	  that	  which	  is)	  to	  be	  created.	  And	  yet	  you	  accept	  (the	  distinction	  between)	  the	  presently	  created	  and	  the	  to	  be	  created.	  For	  this	  reason	  it	  is	  not	  (the	  case	  that)	  antecedently	  in	  causes	  there	  is	  the	  production	  of	  effects.	  If	  (one)	  claims	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  there	  is	  no	  effect	  antecedently	  in	  the	  cause	  but	  an	  effect	  is	  (subsequently)	  produced,	  this	  also	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  (Answer:)	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  (that	  the	  effect)	  is	  nonexistent	  yet	  (subsequently)	  produced,	  (we)	  might	  as	  well	  have	  the	  production	  of	  a	  second	  head	  or	  third	  hand.	  (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  (Answer:)	  Because	  the	  nonexistent	  (effect)	  is	  nevertheless	  produced.	  The	  interlocutor	  notes:	  Things	  like	  vases	  and	  such	  have	  (specific)	  causes	  and	  conditions.	  A	  second	  head	  and	  third	  hand	  lack	  (such)	  causes	  and	  conditions.	  Why	  would	  we	  say	  they	  come	  to	  be	  produced?	  For	  this	  reason	  your	  explanation	  is	  not	  the	  case.	   Answer:	  Effects	  like	  second	  heads	  and	  third	  hands	  as	  well	  as	  vases	  and	  such	  are	  all	  nonexistent	  in	  the	  cause.	  Just	  as	  there	  is	  no	  vase	  in	  a	  lump	  of	  clay	  (there	  is)	  also	  no	  vase	  in	  stone.	  So,	  for	  what	  reason	  do	  we	  designate	  a	  lump	  of	  clay	  as	  the	  cause	  of	  a	  vase	  (but)	  do	  not	  designate	  stone	  as	  the	  cause	  of	  a	  vase?	  For	  what	  reason	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do	  we	  designate	  milk	  as	  a	  cause	  of	  cheese	  and	  thread	  as	  a	  cause	  of	  a	  blanket	  but	  do	  not	  designate	  rushes	  as	  a	  cause	  (of	  either)?	  Again,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  the	  cause	  antecedently	  lacks	  an	  effect	  while	  the	  effect	  is	  still	  produced	  (later),	  then	  (any)	  individual	  thing	  might	  produce	  every	  (other	  possible)	  thing.	  As	  (for	  example,)	  a	  fingertip	  ought	  to	  (be	  able)	  to	  produce	  a	  cart,	  a	  horse,	  food,	  drink,	  and	  so	  on.	  In	  this	  fashion	  thread	  ought	  not	  only	  to	  put	  out	  blankets,	  but	  also	  things	  like	  carts,	  horses,	  food,	  drink,	  and	  so	  on.	  (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  (Answer:)	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  (the	  effect	  is	  antecedently)	  nonexistent	  but	  (the	  cause)	  can	  still	  (subsequently)	  produce	  it,	  then	  why	  is	  thread	  only	  capable	  of	  producing	  blankets	  but	  is	  not	  (capable	  of)	  producing	  things	  like	  carts,	  horses,	  food,	  drink,	  and	  so	  on.	  (All	  these	  effects	  are	  equally	  possible)	  because	  they	  are	  all	  (likewise	  antecedently)	  nonexistent	  (in	  the	  cause).	  	  (Furthermore,)	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  there	  is	  no	  antecedent	  effect	  in	  the	  cause	  while	  (subsequent)	  effects	  are	  (nevertheless)	  produced,	  then	  various	  causes	  ought	  not	  to	  individually	  have	  the	  (antecedent	  karmically	  functional)	  power	  (that	  is)	  capable	  of	  producing	  (subsequent)	  effects.	  (Clearly	  this	  is	  incorrect	  because)	  like	  a	  case	  where	  we	  need	  oil,	  we	  must	  extract	  it	  from	  hemp	  (seed).	  We	  do	  not	  crush	  sand	  (to	  obtain	  hempseed	  oil).	  (Now,)	  if	  (we)	  claim	  (we	  have	  had)	  occasion	  to	  observe	  hemp	  (seed)	  give	  off	  oil	  and	  do	  not	  observe	  it	  given	  off	  by	  sand,	  and	  for	  this	  reason	  we	  seek	  (oil)	  in	  hemp	  (seed)	  and	  do	  not	  crush	  sand	  (for	  it,	  then)	  this	  situation	  (also	  cannot)	  be	  the	  case.	  (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  (Answer:)	  If	  it	  were	  the	  case	  that	  the	  characteristic	  of	  production	  was	  (already)	  established	  then	  we	  ought	  to	  say	  at	  other	  times	  that	  having	  observed	  hemp	  produce	  oil	  and	  not	  observed	  [162a]	  sand	  produce	  it,	  for	  these	  reasons,	  in	  regards	  (to	  oil,)	  we	  seek	  it	  in	  hemp	  and	  do	  not	  (attempt	  to)	  extract	  it	  from	  sand.	  However	  the	  characteristic	  of	  production	  of	  all	  dharmas	  is	  not	  established	  and	  therefore	  we	  do	  not	  get	  to	  say	  at	  other	  times	  that	  having	  observed	  hemp	  give	  off	  oil	  we	  therefore	  seek	  it	  in	  hemp	  and	  do	  not	  (attempt	  to)	  extract	  it	  from	  sand.	  Again,	  I	  am	  now	  not	  only	  refuting	  one	  (specific)	  case	  (of	  cause	  and	  effect	  production),	  but	  am	  (also)	  generally	  refuting	  all	  (possible	  cases	  of	  production	  by)	  cause	  and	  effect.	  If	  there	  is	  production	  of	  an	  effect	  antecedently	  in	  a	  cause,	  or	  if	  there	  is	  not	  production	  of	  an	  effect	  antecedently	  (in	  a	  cause),	  or	  if	  there	  is	  both	  production	  antecedently	  and	  there	  is	  not	  production	  antecedently,	  each	  of	  these	  three	  (possible	  explanations	  of)	  production	  are	  not	  established.	  For	  this	  reason	  your	  claim	  at	  other	  times	  (that	  you	  have	  previously)	  seen	  hemp	  (seed)	  emit	  oil	  falls	  to	  (and	  fails	  with	  the)	  same	  doubtful	  (original)	  cause.	  Again,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  there	  is	  no	  effect	  antecedently	  in	  the	  cause,	  even	  as	  an	  effect	  (is	  subsequently)	  produced,	  the	  various	  characteristics	  (necessary	  for	  a)	  cause	  are	  not	  (then)	  established.	  (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  (Answer:)	  If	  the	  various	  (characteristics	  of	  a)	  cause	  are	  nonexistent	  how	  are	  
dharmas	  capable	  of	  creating	  (an	  effect?	  Furthermore,)	  how	  are	  (those	  nonexistent	  characteristics)	  capable	  of	  being	  established?	  If	  we	  lack	  (the	  characteristics	  of)	  creating	  and	  establishing	  (effects),	  what	  then	  is	  designated	  as	  a	  “cause?”	  In	  this	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fashion	  the	  maker	  does	  not	  come	  to	  have	  (an	  effect)	  which	  is	  made.	  (Furthermore,)	  in	  employing	  the	  “maker”	  (for	  that	  purpose	  we)	  also	  do	  not	  come	  to	  have	  (an	  effect)	  which	  is	  made.	  (Alternately,)	  if	  we	  claim	  there	  is	  an	  effect	  antecedently	  (in	  the	  cause),	  then	  we	  ought	  not	  have	  the	  distinctions	  of	  making,	  maker,	  and	  dharmas	  made.	  (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  (Answer:)	  If	  there	  is	  an	  antecedent	  effect,	  what	  need	  is	  there	  to	  make	  it	  again?	  For	  this	  reason	  your	  assertions	  (regarding)	  the	  various	  causes	  of	  making,	  maker,	  and	  dharmas	  made	  are	  not	  obtainable.	  	  (Now)	  as	  for	  (the	  contrary	  assertion	  that)	  there	  are	  no	  effects	  antecedently	  in	  causes,	  this	  is	  also	  not	  the	  case.	  (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  (Answer:)	  If	  one	  accepts	  distinctions	  of	  making	  and	  maker	  (and)	  that	  there	  are	  causes	  and	  effects,	  that	  ought	  to	  produce	  this	  difficulty	  (and	  require	  an	  explanation).	  I	  assert	  that	  making	  and	  maker,	  causes	  and	  effects	  are	  all	  empty.	  If	  you	  refute	  (distinctions	  of)	  making	  and	  maker,	  cause	  and	  effect,	  you	  establish	  my	  point	  and	  (we)	  would	  not	  designate	  that	  as	  a	  difficulty	  (I	  must	  address).	  For	  this	  reason,	  (the	  claim	  that)	  there	  are	  no	  effects	  antecedently	  in	  causes	  even	  as	  effects	  are	  (subsequently)	  produced	  is	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  Again,	  if	  one	  accepts	  that,	  there	  is	  an	  effect	  antecedently	  in	  the	  cause	  that	  should	  produce	  this	  difficulty.	  But	  because	  I	  do	  not	  assert	  that	  there	  is	  an	  effect	  antecedently	  in	  the	  cause	  I	  do	  not	  accept	  (that	  this	  is)	  is	  a	  difficulty	  (I	  must	  explain.	  I)	  also	  do	  not	  accept	  (the	  only	  apparent	  alternative	  that)	  there	  is	  no	  effect	  antecedently	  (in	  the	  cause.	  Hence	  I	  do	  not	  have	  to	  explain	  that	  either).	  If	  (one)	  claims	  that	  in	  the	  cause	  antecedently	  there	  is	  an	  effect	  and	  also	  there	  is	  not	  an	  effect	  even	  as	  an	  effect	  is	  (subsequently)	  produced,	  this	  is	  also	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  (Answer:)	  Because	  the	  nature	  of	  existence	  and	  nonexistence	  mutually	  oppose.	  As	  for	  the	  mutual	  opposition	  of	  those	  natures,	  how	  can	  we	  speak	  (of	  them	  as	  being	  in	  the	  same)	  one	  place?	  Just	  as	  brightness	  and	  darkness,	  suffering	  and	  pleasure,	  going	  and	  staying,	  loosening	  and	  binding,	  do	  not	  come	  to	  be	  (in	  the	  same)	  one	  place,	  (so	  too	  with	  existence	  and	  nonexistence).	  For	  this	  reason	  any	  cause	  that	  antecedently	  both	  has	  an	  effect	  and	  lacks	  an	  effect	  does	  not	  produce	  (anything).	  Again,	  (the	  idea	  that)	  there	  is	  and	  there	  is	  not	  an	  effect	  antecedently	  in	  a	  cause	  has	  already	  been	  refuted	  above	  in	  (the	  sections	  dealing	  with)	  existence	  and	  nonexistence.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  antecedently	  existent	  effects	  in	  causes	  are	  not	  produced,	  (antecedently)	  nonexistent	  effects	  are	  not	  produced,	  (and	  both	  antecedently)	  existent	  and	  nonexistent	  (effects)	  are	  also	  not	  produced.	  The	  limit	  of	  the	  principle	  (is	  reached)	  in	  this.	  All	  (possible)	  situations	  have	  been	  investigated	  and	  (we)	  are	  not	  able	  to	  obtain	  (production	  by	  causes	  and	  effects).	  For	  these	  reasons	  effects	  are,	  in	  the	  end,	  not	  produced.	  Because	  effects	  are,	  finally,	  not	  produced,	  all	  karmically	  active	  dharmas	  are	  empty.	  (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  (Answer:)	  Each	  and	  every	  karmically	  active	  dharma	  is	  a	  cause	  and	  an	  effect.	  (Furthermore,)	  because	  karmically	  active	  (dharmas)	  are	  empty,	  karmically	  inactive	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(dharmas)	  are	  also	  empty.	  Since	  karmically	  active	  and	  karmically	  inactive	  (dharmas)	  are,	  for	  all	  that,	  empty,	  how	  much	  more	  so	  the	  self.	  	  	   [End	  of	  Chapter	  Two	  of	  the	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  
[Commentary	  by	  Fa-­‐tsang]	  To	  explain	  this	  gate	  (I	  will)	  briefly	  (summarize	  by)	  constructing	  four	  parts	  (for	  commentary).	  	  	   [The	  Name	  of	  the	  Gate]	  First,	  as	  for	  explaining	  the	  name,	  the	  names	  of	  all	  of	  the	  gates	  have	  three	  meanings.	  1.	  (They)	  bring	  up	  (the	  idea	  that)	  contemplative	  wisdom	  constitutes	  (the	  wisdom	  that)	  can	  contemplate	  (truth).	  2.	  (They	  also)	  bring	  up	  (the	  idea	  that	  the	  misunderstandings)	  which	  are	  repudiated	  constitute	  the	  gate’s	  (main	  points).	  Accordingly,	  (in	  this	  case	  the)	  existent	  effects	  and	  the	  nonexistent	  effects	  which	  are	  contemplated	  are	  (exactly	  those	  very	  misunderstandings).	  3.	  (Upon)	  entering	  the	  gate	  (one)	  perceives	  the	  ultimate.	  Accordingly,	  the	  true	  emptiness	  of	  the	  text	  that	  follows	  (from	  each	  chapter’s	  analysis)	  is	  (that	  ultimate).	  	  All	  (of	  the	  gates	  primarily)	  title	  the	  (various)	  chapters	  (by	  drawing)	  from	  the	  first	  two	  meanings.	  	   	   [Derivation	  of	  the	  Ideas]	  	   Second,	  as	  for	  deriving	  the	  ideas	  (of	  this	  gate),	  there	  are	  two	  meanings.	  1.	  The	  preceding	  section	  generally	  refutes	  causes	  and	  conditions	  (and)	  extends	  to	  (the	  notion	  that)	  effects	  are	  all	  empty.	  Now,	  this	  (section)	  specifically	  overcomes	  (notions	  of)	  existent	  and	  nonexistent	  (effects)	  within	  causes.	  By	  (previously)	  revealing	  the	  lack	  of	  production	  this	  next	  (point	  logically)	  arrives.	  2.	  (In)	  the	  preceding	  (section)	  the	  appearance	  of	  self	  and	  other(-­‐natures)	  is	  dispelled	  by	  (refuting)	  causes	  and	  conditions	  and	  (by)	  extending	  (that	  refutation	  to)	  effects.	  (It)	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thereby	  reveals	  the	  lack	  of	  production.	  Now,	  accordingly,	  by	  (examining	  notions	  of)	  existent	  and	  nonexistent	  (effects)	  in	  causes,	  (this	  section)	  minutely	  distinguishes	  (aspects	  of	  the	  previously	  demonstrated)	  lack	  of	  production.	  (That)	  is	  the	  reason	  (this	  analysis)	  leads	  to	  the	  aforementioned	  true	  emptiness	  (and)	  comprehension	  of	  the	  limit	  of	  transformation.	  As	  for	  (the	  previous	  analysis)	  leading	  to	  attachments	  to	  existent	  and	  nonexistent	  (effects,	  that)	  is	  because	  the	  transformations	  of	  the	  mind	  lack	  lodging	  (and	  hence	  naturally	  seek	  an	  attachment	  point).	  For	  these	  reasons	  (the	  ideas	  of	  this	  gate	  naturally)	  arrive	  (following	  the	  preceding	  analysis).	  	   	   [The	  Propositions	  Advanced]	  Third,	  as	  for	  advancing	  the	  propositions,	  initially	  (he)	  arranges	  (them	  according	  to)	  that	  which	  is	  refuted.	  (Namely	  and	  in	  order:)	  	  
[The	  Doctrines	  Refuted]	  1.	  Heterodox	  (notions).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  Samkhya	  reckons	  there	  are	  effects	  in	  causes;	  Vaisesika	  reckons	  there	  are	  no	  effects	  in	  causes;	  Nigrantha	  reckoned	  both	  that	  there	  are	  effects	  and	  there	  are	  no	  effects	  in	  causes;	  (finally),	  Jnanaputra	  reckoned	  that	  neither	  are	  there	  effects	  nor	  are	  there	  no	  effects	  in	  causes.48	  2.	  Hinayana	  (notions).	  The	  Sarvastivada	  reckon	  that	  in	  causes	  there	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  effects.	  The	  Sautrantika	  reckon	  that	  in	  causes	  there	  is	  no	  essence	  of	  effects.	  Further,	  the	  Mahasamghika	  reckon	  that	  past	  and	  future	  (dharmas)	  are	  nonexistent.	  Accordingly,	  in	  these	  (schools)	  there	  are	  no	  effects.	  The	  Vatsiputriya	  reckon	  (it	  is	  a	  case	  of)	  both	  existing	  and	  not	  existing.	  (This	  is)	  because	  (they	  figure)	  there	  are	  no	  phenomena	  [221c]	  even	  as	  there	  is	  a	  nature.	  (This)	  meaning	  is	  adjusted	  (by)	  the	  Fa-­‐
hsiang	  Mahayana	  (who)	  expound	  neither	  existence	  nor	  nonexistence.	  Because	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(effects)	  await	  conditions,	  (they)	  do	  not	  exist.	  (But)	  in	  constituting	  causes,	  therefore	  (they)	  do	  not	  lack	  existence.	  Passages	  (expounding)	  these	  types	  (of	  ideas)	  are	  those	  which	  are	  refuted	  (in	  this	  chapter).49	  
[The	  Propositions	  Revealed]	  	  Second,	  (we	  find	  him	  presenting)	  the	  propositions	  which	  are	  revealed.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  due	  to	  the	  four	  propositions	  (exhaustively)	  constituting	  that	  by	  which	  (effects	  might	  possibly	  exist	  in	  causes,	  the	  analysis	  shows	  they)	  do	  not	  come	  to	  be	  produced	  and	  do	  not	  await	  a	  place	  of	  production.	  These	  are	  the	  propositions	  which	  (one)	  enters	  (through	  this	  gate).	  	   [Explanation]	  Fourth,	  in	  the	  explanatory	  section	  (of	  the	  chapter	  there	  are)	  four	  (parts):	  1.	  (The	  first	  is)	  a	  general	  presentation	  (of	  the	  points).	  2.	  (The	  second	  is	  a)	  specific	  explanation	  (of	  those	  points).	  3.	  (After	  that	  we	  find	  a)	  concluding	  proposition.	  4.	  (He	  finishes	  by)	  categorically	  dispelling	  (the	  errors).	  In	  the	  first	  (part,	  the	  general	  presentation,	  there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  Initially	  (he)	  presents	  a	  proposition	  (about)	  productive	  arising,	  then	  (he)	  brings	  up	  verses	  to	  establish	  that	  proposition.	  This	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  Second,	  in	  the	  specific	  explanation	  (there	  are	  also)	  two	  (main	  points).	  First	  (he)	  brings	  up	  verses	  to	  establish	  a	  three	  section	  gate.	  Second,	  from	  “For	  what	  reason…”,	  (he)	  explains.	  	  In	  the	  explanation	  (there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  First	  (he)	  explains	  that	  existent	  effects	  in	  causes	  are	  not	  produced.	  Next	  (he)	  explains	  nonexistent	  (effects	  in	  causes	  also	  are	  not	  produced).	  Finally,	  (he)	  explains	  both	  (options	  together	  also	  do	  not	  produce	  effects).	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[Refutation	  of	  Antecedently	  Existent	  Effects]	  	  In	  (the	  section	  that)	  explains	  (antecedently)	  existent	  (effects	  in	  causes)	  do	  not	  complete	  production,	  there	  are	  15	  iterations	  (of	  the	  point).	  
[The	  15	  Iterations]	  
[1]	  The	  first	  is	  a	  refutation	  (demonstrating	  that)	  eternally	  produced	  (effects)	  are	  not	  (further)	  produced.	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  four	  (parts):	  The	  first	  (part)	  reveals	  the	  error.	  Second	  is	  a	  refutation	  (based	  upon)	  genealogical	  reckonings	  (about	  the	  effect).	  Third	  is	  a	  refutation	  of	  an	  obscuring	  (attempt	  to)	  save	  (the	  view).	  Fourth	  (he)	  concludes,	  completing	  the	  (first	  form	  of	  the)	  refutation.	  The	  preceding	  two	  (are)	  refutations	  allowing	  (for	  a	  hypothetical).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (if	  one)	  considers	  the	  already	  produced	  as	  (being)	  the	  same	  as	  the	  not	  yet	  produced,	  then	  (such	  effects)	  ought	  to	  be	  eternally	  (and	  already)	  produced.	  The	  last	  two	  are	  refutations	  that	  take	  away	  (the	  posited	  hypothetical.	  If	  one)	  takes	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  as	  (being)	  the	  same	  as	  the	  already	  produced,	  then	  (such	  effects)	  ought	  not	  be	  produced	  ever.	  Among	  the	  preceding,	  in	  the	  second	  one	  –	  the	  refutation	  (based	  upon)	  genealogical	  reckoning	  (about	  the	  effect,	  he)	  syllogistically	  states	  causes	  ought	  to	  produce	  effects	  that	  have	  already	  been	  (but)	  are	  yet	  again	  produced	  because	  within	  the	  cause	  there	  is,	  eternally,	  the	  (very	  same)	  effect.	  (In	  such	  a	  case)	  it	  is	  a	  cause	  of	  a	  not	  yet	  produced	  effect	  (which	  also	  already	  and	  eternally	  exists.	  This	  occurs)	  because	  the	  (relative,	  karmic)	  position	  of	  a	  cause	  of	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  and	  the	  (already)	  produced	  does	  not	  change.	  Furthermore,	  (it	  is)	  because	  an	  already	  produced	  effect	  does	  not	  differ	  from	  the	  time	  when	  (the	  effect	  is)	  not	  yet	  produced.	  For	  this	  reason,	  in	  the	  cause	  there	  (would)	  always	  be	  eternal	  production.	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As	  for	  (the	  notion	  that)	  following	  this	  (time	  of	  the	  antecedent	  cause)	  there	  is	  a	  (temporal)	  boundary	  that	  (means	  the	  effect)	  ought	  to	  be	  produced	  again,	  (this)	  claims	  the	  effect	  dharma	  (is	  found	  both)	  in	  the	  cause	  and	  apart	  from	  the	  cause.	  (This	  means)	  both	  (such	  effects)	  are	  (simultaneously)	  existent.	  (Now,)	  	  as	  for	  (the	  effect	  that	  is	  already)	  in	  the	  cause,	  since	  it	  is	  (already)	  produced,	  (in	  regards	  to	  the	  very	  same	  effect	  which)	  departs	  from	  the	  cause,	  how	  does	  it	  (ever)	  come	  to	  be	  not	  produced?	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  produced	  is	  already	  and	  still	  again	  produced.	  (Given)	  this,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  exhausting	  (this	  particular	  unnecessary	  sequence).	  This	  is	  repeated	  production	  (of	  the	  same	  effect)	  without	  end.	  Third,	  the	  refutation	  of	  an	  obscuring	  (attempt	  to)	  save	  (the	  view)	  is	  also	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  idea	  that)	  eternally	  (existent	  effects)	  do	  not	  produce.	  Therein	  he	  first	  records	  a	  heterodox	  teaching	  (which)	  states:	  The	  already	  produced	  is	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  phenomena	  (and)	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  phenomena	  does	  not	  require	  (further)	  production.	  The	  not	  yet	  produced	  is	  (a	  reference	  to)	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  (antecedent	  and	  unmanifest)	  nature	  (and)	  the	  existence	  of	  that	  nature	  therefore	  must	  be	  (subsequently)	  produced.	  	   The	  subsequent	  valid	  refutation	  states	  that	  as	  for	  lacking	  the	  principle	  of	  production,	  since	  the	  already	  produced	  is	  existent	  and	  not	  further	  produced,	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  (nature)	  is	  also	  (antecedently)	  existent	  (and	  so)	  ought	  to	  also	  not	  be	  (subsequently)	  produced.	  Therefore	  (he)	  says	  (that)	  in	  the	  end	  there	  is	  no	  principle	  of	  production.	  Also	  there	  is	  an	  inference	  stating	  that	  a	  cause	  (containing	  a	  nature	  that)	  is	  not	  yet	  produced	  should	  not	  produce	  a	  (subsequent)	  effect	  because	  in	  the	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cause	  there	  is	  the	  effect	  (already.	  Given	  this,)	  there	  is	  no	  principle	  of	  production.	  (This	  is)	  like	  (the	  illogical	  case	  of)	  causes	  with	  an	  already	  produced	  effect.	  This	  (notion	  is)	  the	  error	  of	  eternal	  nonproduction.	  If	  (we)	  take	  the	  already	  (produced	  as	  being)	  the	  same	  as	  the	  not	  yet	  (produced),	  then	  (the	  not	  yet	  produced)	  should	  be	  forever	  (already)	  produced.	  If	  (we)	  take	  the	  not	  yet	  as	  (being)	  the	  same	  as	  the	  already,	  then	  (the	  not	  yet	  produced)	  ought	  to	  be	  forever	  not	  produced.	  	   From	  all	  these	  errors	  the	  fourth	  (part)	  generally	  concludes	  (by	  pointing	  out	  the)	  lack	  of	  production.	  	  
[2]	  The	  second	  (refutation	  concerning	  the	  notion	  that)	  both	  exist	  is	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on)	  nonequivalence.	  The	  idea	  of	  the	  refutation	  states	  that	  if	  the	  already	  and	  not	  yet	  both	  exist	  it	  follows	  then	  (we)	  come	  (to	  have	  in	  existence)	  one	  produced	  and	  one	  not	  produced.	  Also	  it	  is	  possible	  (with	  a	  case	  of)	  the	  already	  produced	  along	  with	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  (that)	  one	  exists	  and	  one	  does	  not	  exist.	  If	  (one)	  claims	  the	  not	  yet	  (produced)	  is	  the	  existence	  of	  (an	  essential)	  nature	  (and)	  therefore	  there	  is	  (its	  subsequent)	  production,	  (while)	  the	  already	  (produced)	  is	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  (fully	  manifest)	  phenomena	  (and)	  therefore	  (it)	  is	  not	  (antecedently)	  produced,	  (then	  it	  is)	  also	  possible	  (everything)	  produced	  has	  two	  
[222a]	  productions	  –	  one	  is	  because	  of	  the	  production	  of	  the	  (essential)	  nature	  (and)	  the	  second	  is	  because	  of	  the	  production	  of	  the	  phenomena	  (itself).	  	   In	  the	  passage	  (on)	  nonproduction,	  first	  (he)	  records	  the	  attachments,	  then	  (presents	  a)	  valid	  refutation.	  (These	  points)	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	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   [3]	  The	  third	  (is)	  a	  refutation	  of	  the	  mutual	  opposition	  of	  the	  already	  and	  the	  not	  yet.	  Herein	  (he)	  initially	  (presents	  a)	  valid	  refutation	  and	  subsequently	  (he)	  explains	  completion.	  As	  for	  the	  first,	  the	  (already)	  produced	  and	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  actually	  are	  mutually	  opposed.	  (If)	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  exists,	  the	  produced	  already	  ought	  to	  be	  nonexistent	  because	  they	  are	  mutually	  opposed	  –	  like	  brightness	  and	  darkness.	  	   In	  the	  explanation,	  concerning	  the	  two	  actions	  as	  also	  mutually	  opposed,	  (if)	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  is	  taken	  as	  having	  the	  characteristic	  of	  active	  (functioning),	  the	  produced	  already	  also	  (can	  be)	  taken	  as	  having	  the	  characteristic	  of	  active	  (functioning.	  But	  as	  shown,	  the)	  already	  (and)	  not	  yet	  actually	  mutually	  conflict	  (so	  as	  for)	  the	  (two)	  characteristics	  of	  active	  (functioning),	  how	  are	  they	  not	  mutually	  opposed?	  Therefore	  (this)	  leads	  to	  (the	  conclusion	  that	  they)	  are	  not	  equivalent.	  	   It	  is	  also	  possible	  this	  is	  a	  refutation	  of	  (arisings)	  changing	  position	  (and)	  losing	  (an)	  essence	  (in	  the	  process).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (if)	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  actually	  has	  subsequent	  creative	  (function),	  the	  produced	  already	  ought	  to	  lose	  its	  particular	  essence	  (of	  producing	  the	  not	  yet.	  This	  must	  be	  the	  case)	  because	  (the	  already	  produced)	  loses	  the	  position	  of	  (being)	  not	  yet	  produced.	  	   [4]	  The	  fourth	  is	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on)	  the	  already	  (produced)	  and	  not	  yet	  (produced)	  lacking	  difference.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  you	  do	  not	  accept	  the	  troublesome	  (consequences	  of	  their)	  mutual	  opposition,	  then	  (you)	  fall	  into	  the	  fault	  of	  (their)	  lacking	  distinction.	  (In	  that	  case	  we	  can)	  inferentially	  say	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  ought	  to	  actually	  be	  the	  already	  produced	  because	  the	  essences	  of	  both	  have	  no	  distinction	  even	  as	  the	  already	  produced	  is	  antecedent.	  (If,)	  by	  (means	  of	  the	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distinctions	  between)	  the	  already	  and	  not	  yet	  (we)	  investigate	  (their)	  particular	  essence,	  (their)	  particular	  essences	  do	  not	  come	  to	  be	  one.	  Now	  (in	  contrast,	  if)	  by	  (means	  of	  the	  singular	  nature	  of	  their)	  particular	  essence	  (we)	  investigate	  the	  already	  and	  not	  yet,	  the	  already	  and	  not	  yet	  do	  not	  come	  (to	  be)	  differentiated.	  	   In	  the	  passage	  (there	  are)	  three	  (parts):	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  (there	  is	  a)	  presentation,	  explanation,	  and	  conclusion.	  (These	  are	  all)	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  	   [5]	  The	  fifth	  is	  a	  refutation	  of	  the	  antecedently	  complete	  lacking	  function.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (if)	  effects	  are	  already	  antecedently	  existent,	  (then)	  causes	  lack	  a	  productive	  function.	  Like	  (for	  example,	  if)	  the	  effect	  is	  (already	  located)	  at	  the	  tool,	  tools	  lack	  the	  function	  of	  producing	  effects.	  Therefore	  (he)	  says	  (if	  a	  phenomena	  is)	  created	  already,	  (then	  such	  a	  thing)	  is	  not	  created	  (as	  a	  future	  effect).	  	   In	  the	  passage	  (there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  First	  (he	  provides	  a)	  valid	  refutation.	  Second	  (he)	  brings	  up	  the	  rule.	  Third,	  (he	  provides)	  a	  concluding	  negation.	  (These	  are	  all)	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  	   [6]	  The	  sixth	  is	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  the)	  already	  existent	  ought	  to	  be	  evident.	  Initially	  (he	  presents	  a)	  valid	  refutation.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  an	  effect	  is	  existent	  yet	  still	  not	  perceived,	  then	  again,	  by	  what	  dharma	  can	  one	  know	  it	  exists?	  (One	  can	  then)	  inferentially	  say	  the	  existent	  is	  not	  existent	  because	  it	  is	  not	  perceived.	  It	  is	  (simply	  the	  same)	  as	  a	  non-­‐thing.	  	   The	  second	  (part	  of	  the	  sixth	  refutation)	  refutes	  the	  (attempted)	  saving	  (rejoinder).	  The	  save	  considers	  the	  future	  change	  as	  lacking	  characteristics	  and	  for	  this	  reason	  (claims	  it	  is)	  not	  perceived.	  (Nagarjuna)	  refutes	  (this)	  idea	  (noting	  that	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in)	  this	  case	  since	  (there	  is)	  future	  change	  (to	  a	  vase)	  in	  clay	  even	  as	  it	  (presently)	  lacks	  the	  characteristics	  of	  a	  vase,	  (one	  might	  further)	  allow	  that	  clay	  also	  (presently)	  lacks	  the	  characteristics	  of	  a	  horse.	  (In	  that	  case	  we	  might	  ask	  of)	  these	  two,	  what	  difference	  is	  there?	  In	  clay	  there	  are	  no	  characteristics	  of	  a	  horse	  and	  also	  then	  there	  is	  no	  essence	  of	  a	  horse.	  In	  clay	  there	  are	  no	  characteristics	  of	  a	  vase,	  (so)	  how	  does	  it	  come	  to	  have	  the	  essence	  of	  a	  vase?	  The	  inference	  is	  understandable.	  The	  conclusion	  is	  (also)	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  	  Furthermore,	  (since)	  in	  clay	  there	  are	  no	  characteristics	  of	  horses,	  (naturally)	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  know	  there	  is	  a	  horse	  (there.	  Similarly,)	  in	  clay	  there	  are	  also	  no	  characteristics	  of	  vases	  (so)	  by	  what	  (means	  might	  one)	  know	  there	  is	  a	  vase	  (in	  there)?	  Again,	  (here)	  there	  is	  an	  inference	  that	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  Following	  this	  (there)	  is	  also	  a	  refutation	  of	  investigating	  effects	  by	  means	  of	  characteristics.	  	   [7]	  The	  seventh	  is	  a	  refutation	  that	  exhausts	  (the	  possibilities	  of)	  transformation	  and	  (thereby)	  loses	  effects.	  Therein	  (there	  are)	  two	  (parts):	  first	  (he	  presents	  a)	  valid	  refutation,	  then	  (he)	  refutes	  the	  save.	  	  
[First	  Part	  of	  the	  Seventh	  Refutation]	  In	  the	  preceding	  (part	  there	  are)	  three	  (subsections).	  The	  first	  is	  a	  refutation	  of	  taking	  transformation	  as	  being	  the	  same	  as	  (future)	  effects.	  As	  for	  effects	  (antecedently)	  existing,	  transformation	  (to	  the	  effect	  then)	  also	  exists.	  Now	  (granting	  this,	  then	  it)	  ought	  to	  be	  evident.	  This	  is	  a	  refutation	  that	  allows	  for	  (the	  hypothetical.	  From)	  “yet,	  in	  fact…”	  [sic]50	  	  regards	  (the	  key)	  proposition	  (and)	  concludes	  (it)	  is	  not	  (the	  case.)	  This	  is	  a	  refutation	  that	  takes	  away	  (the	  premise).	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Second,	  from	  “if	  (one)	  claims	  the	  (already)	  transformed…”51	  is	  a	  refutation	  that	  takes	  (future)	  effects	  as	  being	  the	  same	  as	  transformation.	  (If)	  transformation	  is	  nonexistent,	  effects	  also	  are	  nonexistent	  (and)	  accordingly	  (one)	  has	  erred	  in	  regards	  to	  effect	  dharmas.	  Taking	  transformation	  as	  initially	  nonexistent	  (must	  mean)	  the	  subsequent	  end	  (product	  also)	  does	  not	  exist.	  (This	  is)	  because	  in	  that	  proposition,	  if	  effects	  are	  initially	  nonexistent,	  (then	  that	  must	  mean)	  subsequently	  the	  end	  (product)	  is	  not	  produced.	  For	  this	  reason	  transformation’s	  [222b]	  end	  (product)	  does	  not	  come	  to	  exist.	  Because	  transformation’s	  end	  (product)	  does	  not	  come	  to	  exist,	  effects	  are	  then	  eternally	  nonexistent.	  Third	  is	  a	  refutation	  of	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  existence	  and	  nonexistence.	  (This	  is)	  a	  result	  of	  perverse	  basic	  reckoning	  and	  of	  contradicting	  their	  own	  words.	  The	  passage’s	  (meaning)	  is	  evident	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  
[Second	  Part	  of	  the	  Seventh	  Refutation]	  In	  the	  second	  (part	  of	  this	  section	  with	  the	  seventh	  refutation,	  the	  part	  where	  he)	  refutes	  the	  saving	  (rejoinder,	  there	  are)	  four	  (subsections).	  First,	  (he	  presents	  the)	  heterodox	  (attempt	  at	  a)	  save.	  Second,	  (he	  presents)	  a	  valid	  refutation.	  Third,	  (he	  presents)	  a	  reiterated	  save.	  Fourth,	  (he	  provides)	  a	  reiterated	  refutation.	  
	   	   [The	  Rejoinder]	  First,	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  heterodox	  save	  draws	  upon	  eight	  conditions	  of	  the	  world	  to	  prove	  transformation	  is	  existent	  while	  lacking	  manifestation.	  (And)	  for	  this	  reason	  (the	  opponent	  claims	  that	  regarding)	  the	  above	  (mentioned)	  various	  difficulties,	  they	  are	  all	  cleared	  up.	  In	  (this)	  passage	  (there	  are)	  three	  (points).	  First,	  a	  single	  sentence	  presents	  the	  particular	  proposition.	  Second,	  from	  “All	  things…”	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(he)	  draws	  on	  the	  particular	  categories.	  Third,	  from	  “You	  state	  that	  	  (transformation)	  in	  the	  cause…”	  concludes	  (with)	  refuting	  (and)	  negating	  (these	  notions).	  In	  (the	  part	  that)	  draws	  on	  (the	  particular)	  categories	  (there	  are)	  four	  (subsections).	  First	  (he)	  presents;	  second	  (he)	  classifies;	  third	  (he)	  explains;	  (and)	  fourth	  (he)	  concludes.	  (These	  four)	  together	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  The	  heterodox	  idea	  holds	  the	  eight	  as	  a	  (valid)	  inference.	  
	   	   [Refutation	  of	  the	  Rejoinder]	  Second,	  in	  the	  (section	  with	  the)	  valid	  refutation,	  (there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  Initially	  (he	  shows)	  the	  general	  selection	  (of	  the	  eight	  conditions)	  is	  not	  the	  same	  (as	  the	  dharmas	  of	  transformation	  and	  effects).	  Second	  (he	  deals	  with)	  the	  sequential,	  specific	  selection	  (of	  the	  eight	  conditions).	  Third	  (he	  provides	  a)	  specific	  refutation	  of	  the	  eighth.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  because	  beginning	  and	  end	  are	  one,	  (and)	  because	  both	  certainly	  exist,	  they	  do	  not	  come	  to	  change.	  The	  inference	  is	  understandable.	  
	   	   [The	  Rejoinder	  Reiterated]	  Third,	  the	  reiterated	  save	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  
	   	   [The	  Reiterated	  Refutation]	  Fourth,	  in	  the	  reiterated	  refutation	  (there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  	  The	  first	  is	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  notion	  that)	  taking	  effects	  to	  be	  the	  same	  as	  (the	  sensed)	  qualities	  (of	  objects	  accordingly)	  loses	  the	  effect.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (he	  notes	  that	  if)	  you	  speak	  of	  details	  concerning	  a	  time	  when	  (effects	  are)	  not	  yet	  produced,	  (then)	  accordingly	  the	  effects	  of	  (such)	  qualities	  are	  antecedently	  nonexistent.	  (In	  so	  doing	  you	  thereby)	  contradict	  your	  own	  proposition.	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Second,	  from	  “Furthermore,	  (antecedently	  in	  the	  cause)…”	  is	  a	  refutation	  that	  by	  details	  takes	  away	  the	  (key)	  qualities	  and	  loses	  the	  effects.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  you	  speak	  of	  producing	  already	  transformed	  qualities,	  then	  the	  details	  (of	  such	  qualities)	  are	  not	  effects.	  Because	  (in	  such	  a	  case	  one)	  does	  not	  come	  to	  speak	  of	  the	  effect’s	  details	  (as	  they)	  are	  unobtainable.	  (So,	  when)	  qualities	  and	  (their)	  details	  are	  both	  checked,	  the	  essence	  of	  effects	  is	  fundamentally	  nonexistent.	  Third,	  from	  “For	  this	  reason…”	  (he)	  concludes,	  rebuking	  reckoning	  (based	  on)	  sense	  (perceptions).	  
[8]	  In	  the	  eighth	  (he	  presents	  a)	  refutation	  (based	  on)	  causes	  and	  effects	  (which	  have	  had	  their)	  self	  (-­‐essence)	  destroyed.	  Initially	  he	  records	  the	  reckoning	  (and)	  presents	  the	  destruction.	  Second,	  from	  “For	  what	  reason?”	  (he)	  explains	  and	  reveals	  the	  destruction	  of	  (their	  key)	  characteristics.	  	  Herein	  (he)	  first	  explains	  the	  destruction	  of	  causes.	  	  (In	  the	  case	  cited,)	  causes	  lack	  causation	  because	  (they)	  are	  only	  the	  location	  (where	  an)	  effect	  dharma	  lodges.	  (This	  situation	  is)	  as	  with	  fruit	  in	  a	  dish.	  As	  a	  result	  the	  dish	  is	  not	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  fruit.	  (In	  his	  argument	  “blanket	  in)	  threads”	  is	  the	  (main)	  proposition,	  “(fruit	  in	  a)	  dish”	  is	  an	  example,	  (and)	  the	  (concluding)	  inference	  is	  understandable.	  Second,	  from	  “If	  a	  cause	  is	  destroyed…”	  (he)	  explains	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  effect.	  (Herein	  he)	  first	  (provides	  a)	  refutation	  of	  (nonexistent	  causal)	  characteristics	  awaiting	  (manifestation).	  The	  next	  (part	  that)	  explains	  the	  refutation	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  
[9]	  The	  ninth	  is	  a	  refutation	  (which	  shows)	  losing	  the	  (essential	  characteristics	  of	  effect)	  dharmas	  (leads	  to	  an)	  empty	  search	  (for	  such	  effects).	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Therein	  (there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  Initially	  (he)	  presents	  (the	  idea	  that)	  because	  (effects	  are)	  not	  created	  (there	  is)	  destruction	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  (key	  characteristic	  of	  an)	  “effect.”	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  (effects)	  antecedently	  exist,	  because	  (they)	  antecedently	  exist,	  accordingly	  (they)	  are	  not	  that	  which	  is	  created.	  Because	  (they)	  are	  not	  that	  which	  is	  created,	  (they)	  do	  not	  come	  to	  be	  designated	  as	  “effects.”	  Accordingly	  (this)	  is	  a	  case	  of	  losing	  the	  effect.	  Second,	  from	  “For	  what	  reason…”	  (he)	  explains	  that	  because	  (causes)	  do	  not	  create	  (effects)	  there	  is	  destruction	  in	  regards	  to	  (the	  key	  characteristic	  of	  a)	  cause.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  because	  in	  the	  end	  (if	  one)	  does	  not	  take	  effects	  as	  abiding	  therein,	  [i.e.,	  in	  the	  cause]	  (then	  when)	  expounding	  causes	  (as)	  having	  that	  (characteristic)	  which	  can	  create,	  for	  this	  reason	  (one)	  lacks	  (the	  key	  characteristic)	  which	  can	  create	  	  (and)	  accordingly	  there	  is	  no	  cause.	  Third,	  from	  “In	  this	  fashion…”	  (he)	  concludes	  (with)	  empty	  searching.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  causes	  and	  effects	  –	  since	  both	  are	  nonexistent,	  why	  must	  (one)	  deludedly	  seek	  (them)	  in	  an	  existent	  nonexistence?	  Furthermore,	  (given	  the	  points	  of	  the)	  preceding	  gate,	  because	  causes	  perish,	  effects	  perish.	  (In)	  this	  gate	  the	  perishing	  of	  effects	  (means)	  furthermore	  (one)	  loses	  the	  cause.	  (With)	  causes	  (we)	  consider	  “producing	  effects”	  as	  (the	  key	  characteristic	  of	  that	  which)	  can	  create.	  (With)	  effects	  (we)	  consider	  “consequentially	  produced”	  as	  (the	  key	  characteristic	  of)	  that	  which	  is	  created.	  (In	  the	  erroneous	  view	  explained	  here)	  effects	  are	  exactly	  antecedently	  existent	  (and)	  accordingly	  causes	  lose	  the	  quality	  of	  (being	  that	  which)	  can	  produce.	  (As	  a	  result)	  effects	  perish	  (with	  respect	  to)	  the	  meaning	  of	  	  “consequentially	  produced.”	  For	  this	  reason	  both	  (meanings)	  are	  lost.	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[10]	  The	  tenth	  is	  a	  refutation	  (pointing	  out	  the)	  nonexistence	  of	  characteristics	  (means)	  the	  essence	  is	  lost.	  	  (Question:	  If	  we	  compare)	  this	  (one)	  with	  the	  preceding	  rebuke	  (of	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  are	  the)	  characteristics	  of	  a	  vase	  in	  clay,	  what	  differences	  are	  there?	  
[222c]	  (Answer:)	  The	  preceding	  examined	  the	  characteristics	  of	  an	  essence.	  This	  (one)	  rebukes	  (the	  idea	  that	  there	  are)	  characteristics	  of	  signification.	  Consequently,	  (the	  two)	  are	  different.	  In	  this	  section	  (there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  First,	  hypothetically	  granting	  existence,	  (he)	  examines	  characteristics.	  Second,	  (he)	  raises	  precedents	  (that	  might)	  indicate	  phenomena.	  Third,	  from	  “In	  this	  fashion…”	  (he)	  validly	  deprives	  (the	  opponent	  of)	  attachments	  to	  (notions	  produced	  by)	  sensation.	  (These	  points	  are	  all)	  also	  understandable	  (without	  further	  explanation).	  
[11]	  The	  eleventh	  is	  a	  refutation	  rebuking	  (the	  notion	  that)	  effects	  lack	  consequentiality.	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  three	  (parts).	  Initially	  he	  records	  (the	  idea	  that)	  effects	  do	  not	  consequentially	  follow	  causes.	  Second,	  from	  “If	  a	  cause	  does	  not…”	  (he)	  searches	  for	  effects	  that	  validly	  lack	  (the	  quality	  of)	  consequentially	  deriving	  from	  (a	  cause).	  Third,	  from	  “If	  the	  effect	  does	  not	  exist	  …”	  he	  concludes	  both	  (options	  are)	  nonexistent.	  (This	  is)	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  
[12]	  The	  twelfth	  is	  a	  refutation	  (pointing	  out)	  individual	  destruction	  (means	  the)	  two	  unite.	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  four	  (parts).	  First	  (he)	  presents	  the	  attachment	  (and)	  displays	  the	  error.	  The	  inferential	  (analysis)	  states	  that	  effects	  ought	  to	  be	  eternal	  because	  (they)	  lack	  (the	  status	  of	  being)	  consequentially	  created.	  Like,	  (for	  example,)	  the	  nature	  of	  nirvana.	  Second,	  from	  “If	  effects…”	  (shows	  how	  this)	  destroys	  and	  loses	  (	  the	  key	  characteristic	  of	  karmically)	  active	  (dharmas).	  Third,	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from	  “If	  all…”	  (shows	  how	  this)	  destroys	  and	  loses	  (the	  key	  characteristic	  of	  
karmically)	  inactive	  (dharmas).	  Fourth	  (is	  a)	  concluding	  negation	  that	  rebukes	  and	  ends	  (the	  error.	  These	  parts	  are)	  also	  understandable	  (without	  further	  explanation).	  
[13]	  The	  thirteenth	  is	  a	  refutation	  (pointing	  out	  the)	  endless	  (regress)	  of	  a	  cause	  (to)	  cause	  (sequence).	  Therein	  (are)	  two	  (parts).	  	  
[First	  Part	  of	  the	  Thirteenth	  Refutation]	  Initially	  (he	  provides)	  a	  valid	  refutation	  (while)	  subsequently	  (he)	  refutes	  the	  rejoinder.	  In	  the	  first	  (part	  there	  are)	  three	  (subparts).	  First	  (he)	  records	  the	  attachment	  (and)	  displays	  the	  error.	  	  Second,	  from	  “(This	  would	  be)	  like	  cotton	  (cloth)…”	  he	  cites	  a	  category	  (of	  the	  error	  which)	  also	  is	  a	  hypothetical	  existence	  corresponding	  to	  (an	  associated)	  sensation.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (if)	  within	  (a)	  cause	  there	  is	  an	  effect,	  (and)	  this	  effect	  again	  constitutes	  an	  additional	  cause,	  (then)	  therein	  and	  again	  there	  is	  an	  additional	  effect.	  In	  this	  fashion	  then	  there	  is	  no	  exhausting	  (the	  regress).	  Relying	  on	  the	  
Nirvana	  sutra	  (we	  find	  the	  following	  point:)	  	  (This)	  is	  like	  in	  the	  cow,	  first	  there	  is	  milk	  and	  (yet)	  this	  milk	  has	  (within	  it)	  cheese	  curds	  (and	  so	  on)	  even	  up	  to	  refined	  butter.52	  For	  this	  reason,	  (on	  this	  view)	  the	  five	  flavors	  (of	  dairy	  products)	  are	  already	  complete	  (in	  the	  unprocessed	  milk).	  Furthermore	  (it	  also)	  says:	  (If	  on)	  the	  morrow	  (milk)	  will	  submit	  (to	  producing)	  cheese,	  presently	  (one	  ought	  to)	  already	  suffer	  the	  smell.	  (And	  this	  is	  true)	  even	  to	  (the	  idea	  that)	  in	  rice	  there	  ought	  to	  be	  (the	  smell	  of	  as	  yet	  unproduced	  meals).	  Furthermore,	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selling	  a	  mare	  (one)	  ought	  to	  obtain	  (compensation	  for)	  a	  foal	  wherein,	  again,	  there	  is	  (another)	  foal.	  In	  this	  fashion	  one	  horse	  accordingly	  ought	  to	  be	  a	  herd.	  This	  is	  the	  meaning	  (of	  this	  section	  of	  the	  text).	  	   Third,	  from	  “And	  yet,	  in	  fact…”	  concerns	  the	  (main)	  proposition.	  (This	  part)	  takes	  away	  (the	  main	  point	  while	  ending	  with)	  nonexistence.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  since	  different	  effects	  internal	  to	  (other)	  effects	  (which	  are	  found)	  within	  causes	  are	  not	  existent,	  (this)	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  creating	  causes.	  Effects	  within	  causes	  are,	  accordingly,	  not	  present.	  	   	   [Second	  Part	  of	  the	  Thirteenth	  Refutation]	  	   Second,	  in	  (the	  next	  section	  where	  he)	  refutes	  the	  rejoinder	  (there	  are)	  four	  (parts).	  Initially	  he	  records	  the	  attachments	  and	  generally	  negates	  (them).	  Second,	  from	  “For	  what	  reason…”	  (he)	  explains	  the	  negations	  and	  reveals	  the	  refutation.	  (He)	  refutes	  the	  idea	  saying,	  if	  (for	  example,)	  it	  is	  like	  the	  scent	  of	  earth	  (which)	  must	  await	  conditions	  to	  emerge,	  (then)	  when	  it	  has	  yet	  to	  emerge	  (one)	  does	  not	  designate	  it	  as	  an	  effect.	  You	  take	  what	  may	  be	  completed	  as	  an	  effect	  and	  consequently,	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  scent	  of	  earth,)	  water	  is	  what	  can	  complete	  (it	  and)	  the	  scent	  is	  what	  may	  be	  completed.	  The	  completed	  is	  created	  and	  so	  may	  be	  designated	  as	  an	  effect.	  (Similarly,)	  vases,	  and	  so	  on,	  since	  (they)	  are	  antecedently	  existent	  are	  not	  created.	  As	  a	  result,	  (they)	  do	  not	  (count	  as)	  an	  effect.	  The	  third	  (part)	  is	  a	  reiterated	  explanation	  (while)	  the	  fourth	  is	  a	  concluding	  negation.	  Both	  (parts)	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	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   [14]	  The	  fourteenth	  is	  a	  refutation	  (that	  points	  out)	  identical	  completion	  (leads	  to)	  losing	  production.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (if)	  you	  consider	  water	  giving	  rise	  to	  the	  scent	  of	  earth	  as	  a	  revealing	  cause	  (and	  if)	  vases,	  etc,	  are	  	  (similarly)	  thus,	  (then	  they)	  ought	  to	  mutually	  complete	  one	  another.	  (This	  would	  be)	  like	  a	  lamp	  illuminating	  a	  vase	  and	  also	  illuminating	  other	  (things)	  as	  a	  result.	  Furthermore,	  (he	  notes)	  “your	  (erroneous	  view)	  considers	  being	  (already)	  created	  as	  (the	  key	  characteristic	  of	  an)	  effect	  (and	  also)	  considers	  (subsequently	  being)	  completed	  as	  (the	  key	  characteristic	  of	  an)	  effect.”	  If	  effects	  are	  (already)	  created	  (then)	  vases,	  etc.	  are	  antecedently	  existent.	  (In	  such	  a	  case	  they)	  are	  not	  (actually)	  created	  (by	  the	  cause	  and	  one)	  does	  not	  designate	  (them)	  effects.	  (Also)	  if	  effects	  are	  (to	  be)	  completed	  (then)	  clay	  (for	  example,	  counts	  as	  a	  cause	  which)	  completes	  vases.	  (If	  such	  things	  subsequently	  follow	  from	  clay,)	  why	  does	  it	  not	  also	  equally	  produce	  other	  things	  as	  well?	  	   In	  (this)	  passage	  (there	  are)	  four	  (parts).	  First	  is	  the	  proposition,	  second	  is	  an	  example,	  third	  is	  a	  combination	  (of	  the	  key	  points,	  and)	  fourth	  is	  the	  conclusion.	  Together	  (these	  four)	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  	   [15]	  The	  fifteenth	  is	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  notion	  that)	  dual	  creation	  does	  not	  complete	  (production	  of	  the	  effect).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  because	  the	  effect	  is	  antecedently	  existent,	  what	  is	  presently	  created?	  What	  will	  be	  created	  (in	  the	  future)?	  That	  school	  reckons	  there	  are	  differences	  of	  the	  two	  created	  	  (effects).	  
[223a]	  (But	  this)	  is	  to	  lose	  a	  grasp	  of	  the	  particular	  (nature	  of	  an	  effect).	  In	  the	  passage	  (he)	  first	  (makes	  a)	  demand,	  (then)	  afterward	  concludes	  (the	  point).	  (Both	  parts)	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  elaboration).	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   The	  above	  section	  explaining	  (that)	  antecedently	  existent	  (effects)	  do	  not	  produce	  (subsequent	  effects)	  is	  finished.	  
	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  Antecedently	  Nonexistent	  Effects]	  	   The	  second	  portion	  (of	  the	  specific	  explanation)	  explains	  (that)	  antecedently	  nonexistent	  (effects)	  also	  are	  not	  produced.	  Therein	  there	  are	  five	  iterations	  (of	  the	  argument).	  	   	   	   	   [Five	  Iterations	  of	  the	  Argument]	  	   [1]	  The	  first	  (iteration)	  is	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  in	  case	  of	  antecedently	  nonexistent	  effects),	  causes	  are	  not	  causes.	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  two	  (parts).	  Initially	  (he	  presents)	  a	  valid	  refutation	  and	  subsequently	  (he)	  refutes	  a	  saving	  (rejoinder).	  In	  refuting	  the	  save	  initially	  (he	  presents)	  the	  save	  and	  then	  the	  refutation.	  In	  the	  refutation	  (of	  the	  rejoinder	  there	  are)	  two	  (subparts).	  Initially	  (he	  notes	  causes)	  categorically	  do	  not	  produce	  different	  (types	  of)	  effects.	  	  Then	  (he	  notes)	  identical	  (causes)	  do	  not	  constitute	  different	  causes.	  The	  inferences	  are	  both	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  	   [2]	  The	  second	  is	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  idea	  that)	  one	  cause	  (produces)	  many	  effects.	  Therein	  initially	  (he	  provides	  a)	  valid	  refutation	  and	  then	  refutes	  the	  saving	  (rejoinder).	  In	  the	  preceding,	  (his	  argument)	  corresponds	  to	  the	  refutation	  of	  a	  hypothetical.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  one	  cause	  ought	  to	  produce	  all	  things	  categorically;	  (since	  they	  do	  not,	  one)	  can	  consider	  this	  nonexistent	  as	  a	  result.	  	  	   Then,	  from	  “If	  	  (it	  is	  the	  case	  that)	  the	  cause…”	  (he	  provides	  a)	  refutation	  (that)	  denies	  (the	  rejoinder).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  the	  (effect	  is	  antecedently)	  nonexistent	  it	  ought	  not	  (be	  true	  that)	  various	  causes,	  in	  regards	  to	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various	  effects,	  each	  individually	  have	  the	  (karmic)	  power	  to	  be	  able	  to	  produce	  (only	  particular)	  effects.	  Now,	  since	  various	  causes	  each	  individually	  in	  regards	  to	  particular	  effects	  do	  have	  (karmic)	  power,	  as	  a	  result	  (we)	  know	  they	  are	  not	  (antecedently)	  nonexistent.	  From	  “Like	  a	  case	  where	  we	  need	  oil…”	  brings	  up	  a	  (specific)	  matter	  (to)	  illuminate	  (the	  point).	  	   Second,	  in	  refuting	  the	  save,	  initially	  (he)	  records	  the	  general	  negation	  of	  	  (the	  rejoinder’s)	  reckoning.	  Second,	  (he)	  explains	  and	  reveals	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  negation.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  extracting	  oil	  from	  hemp	  (seed)	  is	  production.	  But	  this	  is	  an	  empty	  delusion	  of	  worldly	  individuals	  referred	  to	  as	  “production.”	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  not	  production.	  (As	  he	  points	  out	  in	  this	  section,)	  with	  sand	  there	  is	  no	  difference.	  For	  this	  reason	  investigating	  the	  rebuke	  accordingly	  (shows	  why	  the	  heterodox	  idea)	  does	  not	  establish	  production.	  And	  even	  further,	  by	  what	  principle	  (might	  one)	  know	  there	  is	  production?	  	   Third,	  from	  “for	  this	  reason…”	  (he	  provides	  a)	  concluding	  negation	  and	  rebukes	  the	  attachment.	  	   [3]	  The	  third	  is	  a	  refutation	  (of	  the	  idea	  that)	  even	  if	  previously	  (the	  cause	  is	  observed	  to	  produce	  a	  certain	  effect,	  this	  case	  is)	  likewise	  doubtful.	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  three	  parts.	  First	  (he)	  presents	  (the)	  particular	  idea.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (he)	  fears	  that	  heterodox	  individuals,	  even	  though	  they	  (may)	  lack	  attachment	  to	  no	  effects	  in	  causes,	  perceive	  the	  Author	  taking	  sand	  to	  illustrate	  (the	  nature	  of)	  hemp	  (seed	  and	  conclude)	  the	  meaning	  of	  nonexistent	  (oil)	  in	  hemp	  (seed)	  is	  not	  complete.	  Accordingly	  (this	  may)	  mean	  (they	  think)	  the	  Author	  permits	  (the	  notion	  that)	  they	  [i.e.,	  effects]	  are	  existent.	  	  The	  idea	  (he)	  wants	  to	  convey	  (is	  one	  ought	  to	  simply)	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lack	  attachment	  to	  existents.	  For	  this	  reason	  the	  Author,	  in	  turn,	  checks	  (this	  possible	  tendency)	  saying,	  “I	  do	  not	  simply	  refute	  your	  reckoned	  nonexistent	  (effects),	  existent	  (effects)	  equally	  are	  also	  refuted.”	  Therefore	  (he)	  says	  (he)	  refutes	  all	  (types	  of)	  causes	  and	  effects.	  	   Second	  from	  “If…	  in	  a	  cause…”	  explains	  that	  all	  (the	  possible	  variations)	  do	  not	  complete	  (actual	  production).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  three	  (types	  of)	  causation	  together	  do	  not	  complete	  production.	  	   Third,	  from	  “For	  this	  reason…”	  concludes	  	  (all	  the	  possibilities)	  are	  likewise	  doubtful.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (he	  is	  asserting),	  “You	  only	  speak	  of	  seeing	  oil	  extracted	  from	  hemp	  (seed),	  yet	  do	  not	  know	  (whether)	  in	  hemp	  (seed)	  it	  is	  on	  account	  of	  (antecedently)	  existent	  (oil),	  on	  account	  of	  (antecedently)	  nonexistent	  (oil),	  or	  on	  account	  of	  both	  (antecedently)	  existent	  and	  nonexistent	  (oil).	  (Given)	  this,	  then	  your	  (views)	  in	  regards	  to	  particular	  causes	  are	  (all)	  likewise	  doubtful	  and	  not	  complete.”	  (So	  the	  question	  remains,)	  “How	  do	  they	  come	  to	  complete	  production?”	  	   [4]	  The	  fourth	  is	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  idea	  that)	  the	  characteristics	  of	  causes	  do	  not	  complete	  (production).	  Therein	  are	  two	  (points).	  Initially	  he	  records	  attachments	  to	  causes	  that	  do	  not	  complete	  (production).	  Second,	  (he)	  explains	  and	  reveals	  characteristics	  that	  do	  not	  complete	  (production).	  Therein	  initially	  (he)	  explains	  that	  causes	  do	  not	  complete	  (production).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  proximate	  and	  remote	  (causes)	  are	  not	  one	  (type)	  so	  (he)	  mentions	  various	  causes.	  Among	  (them)	  there	  are	  no	  effect	  dharmas	  so	  (he	  also)	  says	  there	  are	  no	  (cause)	  dharmas.	  If	  (they	  are)	  a	  single	  type	  (and)	  both	  lack	  effect	  dharmas,	  (one)	  does	  not	  know	  which	  is	  the	  proximate	  cause	  (that)	  therefore	  can	  create	  (the	  initial	  conditions	  for	  the	  effect,	  nor)	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which	  is	  the	  remote	  cause	  (that)	  therefore	  can	  complete	  (the	  effect).	  Furthermore,	  if	  there	  is	  no	  effect	  dharma,	  what	  is	  created?	  What	  is	  completed?	  Because	  there	  is	  no	  created	  and	  completed,	  accordingly	  it	  is	  (the	  case	  that	  so-­‐called	  causes)	  are	  not	  causes.	  This	  passage	  (actually)	  inverts	  (the	  point).	  It	  should	  say,	  “If	  there	  is	  no	  effect	  
dharma,	  (then)	  what	  sort	  (of	  thing)	  can	  this	  cause	  create?”	  Because	  there	  is	  no	  completion	  or	  creation,	  there	  are	  also	  no	  causes.	  	   Second,	  (he)	  explains	  (the	  idea	  that)	  effects	  do	  not	  complete	  (production	  either).	  In	  this	  fashion	  causes	  do	  not	  complete	  (effects)	  and	  therefore	  the	  proximate	  
[223b]	  cause	  designated	  as	  “maker”	  does	  not	  come	  to	  have	  effects	  which	  are	  created.	  (That	  which)	  stirs	  the	  maker	  is	  the	  remote	  cause	  (and	  it)	  also	  does	  not	  come	  to	  have	  an	  effect.	  Furthermore	  there	  are	  treatises	  (wherein)	  originally	  the	  word	  “stirs”	  creates	  the	  word	  “which	  is	  (made).”	  Accordingly,	  (on	  this	  view)	  the	  maker	  is	  an	  artisan	  (who)	  lacks	  an	  effect	  dharma	  (which)	  may	  be	  created.	  Therefore	  (the	  artisan)	  does	  not	  come	  to	  have	  (a	  product)	  which	  is	  created.	  (Alternately,	  if)	  that	  which	  is	  made	  (e.g.,	  a	  clay	  vase)	  is	  caused	  by	  clay,	  (then	  the	  clay)	  also	  does	  not	  come	  to	  have	  (a	  product)	  which	  is	  created	  because	  clay	  is	  that	  which	  is	  utilized	  by	  the	  artisan	  to	  create	  (the	  vase).	  	   [5]	  The	  fifth	  is	  a	  refutation	  (that	  addresses	  various)	  counter	  difficulties	  and	  contrary	  propositions.	  Therein	  are	  three	  (parts).	  First,	  heterodox	  individuals’	  counter	  difficulties	  (are	  addressed	  by)	  the	  Author.	  Second,	  the	  Author	  reveals	  the	  errors	  of	  those	  contrary	  propositions.	  Third,	  (he)	  concludes	  with	  a	  negation,	  rebuking	  (and)	  putting	  an	  end	  to	  (the	  difficulties).	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   In	  the	  first,	  within	  the	  heterodox	  individuals’	  counter	  difficulties	  there	  are	  two	  (specific)	  difficulties	  (mentioned).	  First	  is	  the	  counter	  substance	  difficulty.	  (The	  opponent)	  says,	  “You	  refute	  me	  (stating)	  because	  there	  are	  no	  effects	  in	  the	  cause,	  accordingly,	  there	  is	  no	  maker.	  Because	  there	  is	  no	  maker	  accordingly	  this	  is	  to	  lack	  a	  cause.	  If	  it	  is	  so,	  (then)	  your	  (view)	  accordingly	  (must	  be	  that)	  in	  causes	  there	  are	  effects	  and	  therefore,	  there	  is	  creating	  and	  a	  maker.	  Aren’t	  (those	  then)	  the	  cause	  of	  various	  dharmas?”	  	   The	  second	  is	  an	  equally	  erroneous	  difficulty.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  “If,	  because	  in	  my	  (view	  of)	  causes	  there	  are	  no	  effects,	  then	  without	  (the	  act	  of)	  creating,	  (causes)	  are	  not	  causers.	  (But)	  in	  your	  (view	  of)	  causes	  there	  are	  antecedent	  effects	  (and	  given	  this,	  then)	  also	  there	  is	  no	  creating	  (or)	  maker.”	  (This	  is)	  because	  the	  antecedently	  existent	  does	  not	  need	  (to	  be)	  created.	  Among	  these	  (two	  views	  we	  find)	  the	  “difficult	  to	  create”	  and	  the	  “difficult	  to	  exist.”	  	  	   (In	  this	  part	  of	  the	  text	  the	  word)	  “maker”	  is	  the	  agent;	  “creating”	  is	  the	  
karmic	  functioning.	  “Created	  dharmas”	  are	  the	  effects	  which	  are	  created.	  The	  presentation	  (part)	  in	  (this	  section	  of)	  text	  is	  the	  initial	  difficulty.	  The	  explanation	  (part)	  is	  the	  subsequent	  difficulty.	  (These)	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  	   In	  the	  second	  (part	  here,	  the)	  Author’s	  refutation	  (providing)	  counter	  answers,	  (there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  First	  (he)	  records	  the	  attachment	  and	  generally	  negates	  (it).	  Second	  he	  specifically	  explains	  two	  difficulties.	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  two	  (parts).	  First	  (he)	  answers	  the	  “equally	  erroneous”	  difficulty	  saying,	  “Now,	  refuting	  the	  (notions	  of	  a)	  maker	  (and)	  created	  dharmas	  is	  not	  my	  position	  (because	  I	  simply	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point	  out	  their	  emptiness).	  Therefore	  it	  does	  not	  form	  a	  difficulty	  (I	  must	  address.	  However,)	  if	  you	  can	  refute	  that,	  (you)	  still	  accord	  with	  my	  emptiness	  proposition.	  (So,	  that)	  also	  does	  not	  form	  a	  difficulty	  (for	  me).”	  The	  passage’s	  two	  (points)	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  From	  “For	  this	  reason…”	  (he	  provides	  the)	  conclusion	  (and	  it	  is)	  understandable	  (as	  is).	  	   In	  the	  second	  answer	  (where	  he)	  counters	  the	  substance	  difficulty	  (there	  are)	  two	  (parts).	  First	  is	  a	  valid	  answer.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (he	  notes)	  that	  (the	  view	  of	  an	  essential)	  basis	  of	  an	  existent	  effect	  is	  “not	  my	  proposition.”	  (Pointing	  out	  as	  much	  simply	  means,)	  “You	  yourself	  hastily	  labor	  to	  complete	  my	  meaning.”	  	   Second	  (he)	  blocks	  the	  difficulty.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  fearing	  that	  difficulty	  (may	  arise	  he)	  says	  “Since	  you	  do	  not	  accept	  existent	  effects,	  accordingly	  and	  like	  me,	  (you	  are	  left)	  without	  reckoning.”	  Therefore	  (he	  notes	  that	  his	  view)	  also	  does	  not	  accept	  that	  there	  is	  no	  effect.	  	  	  	   The	  above	  (section	  with	  the	  five	  iterations	  of	  the)	  refutation	  of	  (antecedently)	  nonexistent	  (effects)	  is	  complete.	   	  
	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  Both]	  	   The	  third	  large	  section	  refutes	  attachments	  to	  both	  existent	  and	  nonexistent	  (effects)	  together	  (and	  addresses	  the	  question	  of)	  how	  they	  arise.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (when)	  heterodox	  individuals’	  initially	  reckoned	  existent	  (effects)	  do	  not	  form	  (a	  satisfactory	  answer,	  they)	  accordingly	  shift	  attachments	  to	  nonexistent	  (effects).	  Further,	  (they)	  perceive	  the	  Author’s	  refutation	  as	  already	  incomplete	  and	  	  accordingly	  claim	  his	  “biased”	  reckoning	  of	  existent	  and	  nonexistent	  therefore	  is	  not	  complete.	  (This	  is)	  due	  to	  both	  (possibilities	  reflecting	  their)	  grasping	  at	  two	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(misunderstood)	  meanings	  (when	  they)	  ought	  to	  accord	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  way.	  Therefore,	  (a	  need	  for)	  a	  (third)	  gate	  of	  refutation	  comes	  to	  (logically	  follow	  the	  above	  two).	  	   Furthermore,	  the	  faculties	  (of	  individuals)	  are	  of	  three	  classes.	  (Those	  of)	  superior	  faculties	  at	  the	  first	  gate	  are	  even	  then	  awakened	  (to	  the	  final	  point.	  Those	  of)	  middling	  faculties	  reach	  the	  second	  (gate	  before	  understanding	  the	  final	  point).	  (Those	  of)	  inferior	  faculties	  reach	  this	  (level	  before	  understanding	  the	  idea).	  Therefore	  there	  is	  the	  (logical)	  arrrival	  of	  this	  (third	  explanation).	  	  	   In	  the	  passage	  (there	  are)	  two	  iterations	  (of	  the	  argument).	  The	  first	  is	  a	  refutation	  (that	  illustrates	  the)	  mutual	  opposition	  of	  the	  particularity	  of	  the	  (two)	  natures).	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  four	  (parts).	  First	  (he)	  brings	  up	  the	  attachment	  and	  generally	  negates	  (it).	  Second,	  (he)	  explains	  and	  reveals	  the	  mutual	  opposition.	  Third,	  he	  draws	  upon	  an	  example	  and	  indicates	  phenomena	  (that	  are	  mutually	  opposed).	  Fourth,	  (he)	  generally	  concludes	  (with	  the	  idea	  that	  such	  phenomena)	  do	  not	  produce	  (arising).	  Also	  (it	  is)	  possible	  (to	  read	  these	  parts	  as:)	  1.	  the	  proposition,	  2.	  the	  reason,	  3.	  an	  illustration,	  and	  4.	  the	  conclusion.	  	   The	  second	  (turn	  of	  the	  argument)	  is	  a	  refutation	  that	  indicates	  the	  same	  (points)	  as	  the	  preceding	  two.	  The	  (meaning	  of	  the)	  passage	  is	  evident.	  	   [223c]	  The	  third	  (part	  of	  this)	  large	  section	  (with	  the	  explanation)	  concludes	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  proposition.	  (Herein	  there	  are)	  two	  (parts).	  Initially	  (he)	  concludes	  that	  the	  above	  three	  gates	  (show	  these	  ideas)	  do	  not	  produce	  (arising).	  Second,	  from	  “All	  (possible	  situations)…”	  (he)	  concludes	  (by)	  returning	  to	  nonproduction.	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The	  Gate	  of	  Contemplating	  Conditions	  
The	  Third	  (Gate)	  [The	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  [cont.	  162b]	  	   	  	   Again,	  the	  various	  dharmic	  conditions	  are	  not	  established.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  (Answer:)	  	  	  Generally	  and	  briefly	  (speaking,	  as	  for	  the)	  collected	  conditioned	  dharmas,	  	   among	  them	  there	  is	  no	  effect.	  (Now,)	  among	  conditions,	  if	  there	  is	  no	  effect,	  	  	   how	  can	  we	  speak	  of	  production	  from	  conditions?	  	  	   Effects	  like	  vases	  are	  not	  existent	  in	  individual	  conditions	  and	  are	  also	  not	  existent	  in	  aggregations.	  If	  (effects)	  are	  nonexistent	  in	  (these)	  two	  aspects,	  how	  can	  we	  speak	  of	  production	  from	  conditions?	  	   Question:	  What	  are	  designated	  as	  “conditions”?	  Answer:	  	  	  Four	  conditions	  produce	  the	  various	  dharmas	  	  	   and	  there	  is	  no	  fifth	  condition.	  	   (The	  four	  conditions	  are)	  the	  causal-­‐condition,	  the	  sequential-­‐condition,	  	   	   the	  conditioning-­‐condition,	  and	  the	  augmenting-­‐condition.	  	  	   As	  for	  the	  causal-­‐condition,	  in	  regards	  to	  dharmas	  produced	  from	  (its	  influence,)	  if	  they	  are	  already	  produced	  from	  it,	  presently	  being	  produced	  from	  it,	  or	  will	  be	  produced	  from	  it,	  (then)	  this	  (particular)	  dharma	  is	  designated	  as	  the	  “cause-­‐condition.”	  	   As	  for	  sequential-­‐conditions,	  (any	  set	  of)	  sequential	  production	  	  (-­‐conditions	  requiring	  the)	  extinction	  of	  earlier	  dharmas	  is	  designated	  as	  “sequential-­‐conditions.”	  	   As	  for	  conditioning-­‐conditions,	  in	  regards	  to	  dharmas	  of	  conceptualization,	  if	  they	  give	  rise	  to	  karma	  of	  the	  body,	  if	  they	  give	  rise	  to	  karma	  of	  speech,	  (and/or)	  if	  they	  give	  rise	  to	  dharmas	  of	  the	  mind	  and	  (associated)	  mental	  attributes,	  (then)	  they	  are	  designated	  as	  “conditioning-­‐conditions.”	  	   As	  for	  augmenting-­‐conditions,	  (when	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that)	  due	  to	  (the	  presence	  of)	  this	  dharma,	  that	  dharma	  comes	  to	  be	  (directly)	  produced,	  (then)	  this	  dharma	  constitutes	  the	  augmenting-­‐condition	  (in	  respect)	  to	  that	  dharma.	  	   In	  this	  fashion	  the	  four	  conditions	  like	  these	  each	  (illustrate	  that)	  in	  the	  cause	  there	  is	  no	  effect.	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  there	  are	  effects	  in	  the	  cause	  (then	  it)	  ought	  to	  be	  (the	  case)	  that	  there	  are	  still	  effects	  even	  separate	  from	  the	  various	  conditions.	  Yet,	  in	  fact,	  separate	  from	  conditions	  there	  are	  no	  effects.	  (On	  the	  other	  hand)	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  there	  are	  effects	  in	  conditions,	  (then	  it)	  ought	  to	  be	  (the	  case)	  that	  there	  are	  still	  effects	  even	  separate	  from	  causes.	  Yet,	  in	  fact,	  separate	  from	  causes	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there	  are	  no	  effects.	  (Finally,)	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  there	  are	  effects	  in	  (both)	  conditions	  and	  causes,	  (we)	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  to	  attain	  them.	  (But,	  when)	  by	  means	  of	  logical	  analysis	  (we)	  investigate	  (this	  possibility,	  we)	  are	  still	  not	  able	  to	  attain	  them.	  For	  these	  reasons	  the	  two	  positions	  are	  both	  nonexistent.	  (Accordingly,)	  in	  this	  fashion	  (the	  effect)	  is	  nonexistent	  in	  each	  individual	  (condition	  and)	  is	  also	  nonexistent	  in	  their	  aggregations.	  (Since	  that	  is	  the	  case,)	  how	  do	  (we)	  come	  to	  say	  the	  effect	  is	  produced	  from	  conditions?	  Again,	  	  	   If	  effects	  are	  nonexistent	  in	  conditions,even	  while	  emerging	  from	  conditions,	  (then	  as	  for)	  these	  effects,	  why	  do	  they	  not	  emerge	  from	  nonconditions?	  	   If	  one	  claims	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  effects	  are	  lacking	  in	  conditions	  (but	  are)	  nevertheless	  produced	  from	  conditions,	  why	  are	  they	  not	  (then)	  produced	  from	  nonconditions?	  (This	  ought	  to	  be	  possible)	  because	  (in)	  each	  of	  the	  two	  (options,	  effects)	  are	  (likewise)	  nonexistent.	  For	  this	  reason	  there	  is	  no	  case	  of	  existent	  causes	  and	  conditions	  that	  can	  produce	  effects.	  Since	  effects	  are	  not	  produced,	  conditions	  are	  also	  not	  produced.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  Because	  (we	  have	  a	  situation	  requiring)	  antecedent	  conditions	  (in	  order	  to	  produce)	  subsequent	  effects.	  Since	  conditions	  and	  effects	  are	  nonexistent,	  all	  karmically	  active	  dharmas	  are	  empty.	  As	  karmically	  active	  dharmas	  are	  empty,	  
karmically	  inactive	  dharmas	  are	  also	  empty.	  Because	  karmically	  active	  and	  
karmically	  inactive	  (dharmas)	  are	  (all)	  empty,	  how	  can	  we	  speak	  of	  an	  existent	  self	  ?	  	   [End	  of	  Chapter	  Three	  of	  the	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  	   [Commentary	  by	  Fa-­‐tsang]	  	  	   	   [The	  Name	  of	  the	  Gate]	  	   Explaining	  this	  gate	  (we	  first	  note	  it	  contains)	  four	  ideas	  (which)	  are	  the	  same	  as	  the	  preceding.	  First,	  as	  for	  distinguishing	  (among)	  the	  designations	  (found	  in	  the	  chapter	  heading,	  that	  which)	  arouses	  effects	  is	  (designated	  as	  a)	  “condition.”	  (This	  gate)	  contemplates	  the	  lack	  of	  (self)	  nature	  of	  (those)	  conditions	  and	  hence	  (can	  be)	  considered	  a	  “gate.”	  	   	   [Derivation	  of	  the	  Ideas]	  	   Second,	  as	  for	  deriving	  the	  ideas	  (of	  this	  gate),	  the	  previous	  (gate)	  regarded	  seeking	  (effects)	  within	  causes	  (and	  found	  their)	  production	  is	  not	  attained.	  Now	  (this	  gate)	  regards	  seeking	  (effects)	  within	  conditions	  and	  also	  (finds	  they)	  lack	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production.	  Therefore	  (these	  notions)	  sequentially	  (and	  logically)	  arrive	  (as	  a	  matter	  of	  systematic	  deliberation).	  Furthermore,	  by	  the	  many	  gates	  (one)	  drives	  off	  attachments	  (and)	  exhausts	  (them)	  as	  a	  result.	  Furthermore,	  (this	  process	  also)	  reveals	  that	  the	  (various)	  paths	  of	  (delusion	  inducing)	  sensation	  all	  lack	  production.	  	   	   [The	  Propositions	  Clarified]	  	   Third,	  as	  for	  elucidating	  (the	  propositions)	  clarified	  in	  the	  three	  categories	  (of	  existent	  effects	  in	  conditions),	  this	  means	  (by)	  investigating	  and	  seeking	  the	  four	  conditions	  (the	  analysis	  shows)	  each	  lacks	  the	  principle	  of	  production.	  (This	  point)	  is	  that	  which	  is	  the	  (main)	  proposition	  (of	  the	  chapter).	  	   	   [Explanation]	  	   Fourth,	  in	  the	  explanation	  section	  (there	  are)	  five	  (parts).	  First	  (he)	  presents	  the	  proposition.	  Second,	  (he)	  refutes	  the	  existence	  (of	  effects	  in	  conditions).	  Third,	  (he)	  refutes	  (their)	  nonexistence.	  Fourth,	  (he)	  refutes	  conditions	  (and	  effects).	  Fifth,	  (he)	  categorically	  dispels	  (the	  error).	  	   	   	   [The	  Proposition]	  	   In	  the	  first	  (part	  he	  shows	  that)	  various	  dharmas	  are	  effects	  and	  consequential	  conditions	  each	  do	  not	  complete	  (the	  production	  of	  such	  effects).	  	  	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  Existent	  Effects	  in	  Conditions]	   	  	   Second,	  in	  refuting	  the	  existence	  (of	  effects	  in	  conditions	  there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  First,	  (he)	  brings	  up	  a	  verse	  (and)	  briefly	  presents	  (the	  types	  of	  conditions).	  Second,	  (he	  lays)	  out	  the	  characteristics	  of	  those	  conditions.	  Third,	  (he)	  evidentially	  refutes	  (the	  key	  ideas	  and)	  clarifies	  (their)	  emptiness.	  	   	   	   	   [The	  Verse]	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   In	  the	  first	  (he)	  initially	  establishes	  the	  verse	  then	  briefly	  explains.	  In	  the	  verse	  the	  top	  half	  is	  a	  refutation	  denying	  (the	  ideas	  at	  issue).	  The	  bottom	  half	  is	  a	  concluding	  rebuke.	  Furthermore,	  the	  top	  half	  reveals	  the	  principle	  (while)	  the	  bottom	  half	  inquires	  into	  sensations.	  In	  the	  brief	  explanation	  each	  individual	  condition	  is	  broadly	  (discussed	  and	  their)	  combination	  is	  briefly	  (discussed).	  In	  these	  two	  gates	  (he)	  seeks	  existent	  (effects	  in	  conditions	  and	  finds)	  production	  is	  not	  attainable.	  	   	   	   	   [The	  Characteristics	  of	  Conditions]	   	  	   In	  the	  second	  (part,	  the	  part	  that)	  distinguishes	  the	  characteristics	  of	  conditions,	  (there	  are)	  two	  (parts).	  Initially	  (he	  raises)	  a	  question,	  then	  (he	  provides)	  an	  answer.	  In	  the	  answer,	  initially	  (he	  quotes)	  a	  verse,	  then	  he	  explains	  it.	  In	  the	  verse,	  the	  top	  half	  settles	  (the	  question	  of	  the	  number	  of	  conditions,	  while)	  the	  bottom	  half	  lists	  (their)	  names.	  (He)	  considers	  the	  heterodox	  (view	  that)	  establishes	  a	  soul	  as	  the	  fifth	  (possible)	  condition	  and	  this	  (view)	  is	  accordingly	  lacking	  (here	  -­‐	  having	  been	  refuted	  already).	  	  	   	   	   	   	   [The	  Explanation	  of	  the	  Verse]	  	   In	  the	  explanation	  (there	  are)	  two	  (parts).	  Initially	  he	  lists	  the	  names,	  then	  explains	  (their)	  characteristics.	  In	  explaining	  the	  characteristics	  (he)	  explains	  four	  conditions	  (and)	  accordingly	  (the	  explanation)	  takes	  four	  (parts).	  Herein	  each	  (explanation)	  has	  three	  points.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (each	  has	  a)	  presentation,	  an	  explanation,	  and	  a	  conclusion.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   [Explaining	  Causal-­‐Conditions]	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   In	  the	  first	  (part	  of	  the	  explanation),	  as	  for	  causal-­‐conditions,	  (he)	  considers	  causes	  as	  conditions	  and	  hence	  refers	  to	  (them	  generally	  as)	  “causes.”	  (Given)	  this,	  accordingly	  (then)	  causes	  are	  conditions	  (and)	  consequently	  are	  designated	  “causal	  -­‐conditions.”	  It	  is	  not	  (the	  case	  here	  that)	  proximate	  and	  distant	  (conditions)	  are	  both	  brought	  up	  (together	  and)	  designated	  as	  “causes	  (and)	  conditions.”	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  “that	  which	  derivatively	  produces”	  reveals	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  “proximate	  producer.”	  Furthermore,	  this	  derivative	  producer	  is	  (an)	  effect	  dharma	  (whose)	  substance	  is	  karmically	  active	  as	  a	  result.	  The	  three	  time	  (periods)	  are	  simply	  encompassed	  (by	  that	  karmic	  functioning).	  	   	   	   	   	   	   [Explaining	  Sequential-­‐Conditions]	   	  	   In	  the	  second	  (part),	  as	  for	  dharmas	  that	  are	  already	  extinct,	  (it	  means)	  the	  preceding	  mental	  dharmas	  are	  extinquished.	  As	  for	  the	  sequentially	  produced	  (dharmas,	  they	  are)	  due	  to	  mental	  dharmas	  of	  the	  previous	  mental	  (moment).	  Although	  (those	  dharmas	  are)	  extinquished,	  (they)	  thus	  have	  the	  (karmic)	  power	  of	  bringing	  forth,	  hiding	  away,	  drawing	  out,	  and	  taking	  away	  (subsequent	  dharmas).	  Now,	  subsequent	  mental	  dharmas	  are	  produced	  without	  interval.	  Therefore	  (he)	  refers	  to	  “sequential	  production.”	  Allowing	  that	  sequentially	  (produced)	  dharmas	  constitute	  conditions,	  therefore	  (we	  get	  the)	  designation.	  Newer	  translations	  designate	  (these	  as)	  “conditions	  arrayed	  without	  interval.”	  (With)	  this	  (view)	  only	  mental	  dharmas	  exist;	  all	  others	  are	  nonexistent.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   [Explaining	  Conditioning-­‐Conditions]	   	  	   In	  the	  third,	  as	  for	  conditions,	  (they	  are)	  “that	  which	  is	  conditioned.”	  	  (But)	  because	  dharmas	  that	  are	  conditioned	  (in	  turn)	  conditionally	  arouse	  the	  mind	  that	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can	  condition,	  (and	  all	  the	  associated)	  mental	  dharmas	  and	  so	  on,	  (they	  are	  all)	  designated	  as	  “conditions.”	  Accordingly,	  (dharmas)	  which	  are	  conditioned	  constitute	  (active)	  conditions	  and	  are	  therefore	  referred	  to	  as	  “conditions	  that	  condition.”	  (More)	  recently	  (these	  are)	  designated	  as	  “conditioning-­‐conditions.”	  In	  the	  explanation	  [224a]	  “that	  which	  is	  thought”	  accordingly	  is	  “that	  which	  is	  conditioned.”	  Reasoning	  in	  fact	  only	  arouses	  the	  mind	  and	  (associated)	  mental	  
dharmas	  (and	  they	  in	  turn)	  constitute	  the	  dependent	  resting	  (point)	  of	  the	  two	  (types	  of)	  karma	  of	  body	  and	  speech.	  The	  dharmas	  of	  conceptualization	  are	  established	  upon	  (these	  conditions)	  as	  a	  consequence.	  (They)	  also	  universally	  bring	  up	  the	  three	  (types	  of)	  karmic	  (activities).	  	   	   	   	   	   	   [Explaining	  Augmenting-­‐Conditions]	   	  	   In	  the	  fourth,	  because	  this	  dharma,	  in	  regards	  to	  that	  dharma,	  has	  augmentative	  power,	  (he)	  refers	  to	  “augmentation.”	  Augmenting	  (dharmas)	  are	  conditions	  and	  so	  (he)	  refers	  to	  “augmenting-­‐conditions.”	  These	  (conditions)	  have	  two	  types.	  1.	  Augmenting(-­‐conditions)	  that	  do	  not	  mutually	  obstruct.	  2.	  Augmenting	  (-­‐conditions)	  of	  superior	  power	  (that)	  assist	  in	  forming	  (other	  dharmas).	  This	  section	  broadly	  covers	  the	  two	  (but)	  explains	  based	  (only)	  upon	  the	  latter.	  	   	   	   	   [Evidential	  Refutation]	   	   	  	   The	  third	  (part	  here	  is	  the)	  investigative	  refutation	  (that)	  clarifies	  emptiness.	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  five	  (parts).	  First,	  (he)	  generally	  presents	  (the	  point).	  Second,	  (he)	  specifically	  proves	  (it).	  Third,	  (he	  addresses)	  both	  (and)	  demands	  (an	  answer).	  Fourth,	  (he)	  concludes	  (they)	  are	  lacking.	  Fifth,	  (he)	  concludes	  the	  proposition.	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   In	  the	  specific	  (proof),	  first	  by	  (using)	  conditions	  to	  take	  away	  causes	  (he)	  clarifies	  (the	  point)	  that	  in	  causes	  there	  are	  no	  (effects).	  Second,	  by	  (using)	  causes	  to	  take	  away	  conditions	  (he)	  clarifies	  that	  in	  conditions	  there	  are	  no	  (effects).	  Third,	  from	  “If	  it	  is	  the	  case…”	  (he	  takes	  both)	  together,	  inquires	  (about	  them),	  and	  demands	  (an	  answer).	  Fourth,	  from	  “For	  these	  reasons…”	  he	  concludes	  there	  are	  no	  (existent	  causes	  or	  conditions).	  Fifth,	  from	  “In	  this	  fashion,…	  in	  each	  individual…”	  (he)	  concludes	  the	  valid	  investigation	  of	  (conditions	  alledgedly	  established	  by	  the)	  sensations.	  “Each	  individual”	  is	  a	  specific	  demand	  and	  so	  is	  a	  broad	  (point.	  Their)	  “combination”	  is	  a	  general	  inquiry	  (into	  the	  totality	  and)	  so	  is	  a	  brief	  (point).	  	  	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  Nonexistent	  Effects	  in	  Conditions]	  	   Third,	  in	  (the	  next	  section	  that	  focuses	  on)	  refuting	  nonexistent	  (effects	  in	  conditions,	  there	  are)	  three	  (points).	  Initially	  (he)	  establishes	  (the	  key	  ideas	  by	  quoting	  a)	  verse.	  In	  the	  verse,	  the	  upper	  half	  displays	  the	  heterodox	  reckoning.	  (In)	  the	  lower	  half	  both	  (possibilities)	  are	  refuted	  by	  (means	  of)	  nonconditions.	  	   Subsequently	  he	  explains	  and	  reveals	  (the	  main	  idea	  in	  the	  verse).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  (opponent’s)	  heterodox	  idea	  claims	  that	  (whether	  we)	  briefly	  or	  broadly	  seek	  (effects)	  in	  conditions	  (and)	  do	  not	  attain	  (them),	  how	  does	  that	  interfere	  with	  this	  effect	  being	  produced	  from	  (the)	  four	  conditions?	  (Nagarjuna)	  refutes	  this	  idea	  saying	  since	  conditions	  and	  nonconditions	  are	  likewise	  without	  effects,	  even	  as	  (effects	  allegedly)	  come	  to	  emerge	  from	  conditions,	  how	  is	  it	  (effects)	  do	  not	  come	  to	  emerge	  from	  nonconditions?	  (The	  components	  of	  the)	  established	  (syllogistic)	  reasoning	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  	   Third,	  from	  “For	  this	  reason…”	  (he)	  concludes	  (with	  the)	  lack	  of	  production.	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The	  Gate	  of	  Contemplating	  Characteristics	  
The	  Fourth	  (Gate)	  [The	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  [cont.	  162c]	  	  	   Again,	  all	  dharmas	  are	  empty	  (of	  self-­‐nature).	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  	  	  	   Karmically	  active	  and	  karmically	  inactive,	  	   	   the	  two	  (types	  of)	  dharmas	  both	  lack	  characteristics.	  	   Because	  (they)	  lack	  existent	  characteristics,	  	   	   the	  two	  (types	  of)	  dharmas	  accordingly	  are	  each	  empty.	  
	  
Karmically	  active	  (dharmas)	  are	  not	  made	  manifest	  by	  means	  of	  characteristics.	  	   Question:	  What	  sorts	  of	  (things)	  are	  karmically	  active	  characteristics?	  	   Answer:	  The	  myriad	  things	  all	  have	  karmically	  active	  characteristics.	  Like,	  (for	  example,	  with	  an)	  ox.	  (We	  can)	  take	  the	  peak	  of	  the	  horns,	  their	  droop,	  rise	  (or	  even	  whether)	  the	  tip	  of	  the	  tail	  has	  hair	  as	  constituting	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  ox.	  	  Like	  (for	  example,	  with	  a)	  vase.	  (We	  can)	  take	  the	  flat	  bottom,	  the	  large	  belly,	  the	  slender	  neck,	  and	  the	  rough	  lip	  as	  constituting	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  vase.	  Like	  (for	  example,	  with	  a)	  cart.	  (We	  can)	  consider	  the	  wheels,	  axle,	  shaft,	  and	  yoke	  as	  constituting	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  cart.	  Like	  (for	  example,	  with	  a)	  person.	  (We	  can)	  consider	  the	  head,	  eyes,	  torso,	  spine,	  shoulders,	  arms,	  hands,	  and	  feet	  as	  constituting	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  person.	  (Now,	  given	  that	  things	  are)	  like	  this,	  (as	  for	  the	  three	  characteristics	  of	  dharmas,	  i.e.,	  their)	  production,	  abiding,	  and	  extinction,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  these	  (three)	  are	  characteristics	  of	  karmically	  active	  
dharmas,	  are	  they	  then	  (also)	  karmically	  active	  or	  are	  they	  karmically	  inactive?	  	   Question:	  If	  (we	  say)	  they	  are	  karmically	  active,	  what	  error	  is	  there?	  	   Answer:	  	  	   If	  (the	  characteristic	  of)	  production	  is	  karmically	  active,	  	   	   it	  should	  again	  have	  the	  three	  characteristics.	  	   If	  (the	  characteristic	  of)	  production	  is	  karmically	  inactive,	  	   	   why	  is	  it	  designated	  a	  characteristic	  of	  the	  karmically	  active?	  	  	   If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  (the	  characteristic	  of)	  production	  is	  karmically	  active,	  then	  it	  should	  (itself)	  have	  the	  three	  characteristics	  (of	  karmically	  active	  phenomena).	  Those	  three	  characteristics	  should	  then	  also	  have	  the	  three	  characteristics.	  In	  this	  fashion	  (the	  requirement)	  keeps	  turning	  over	  and	  accordingly	  forms	  (a	  regress)	  without	  end.	  (The	  characteristics	  of)	  abiding	  and	  extinction	  are	  also	  thus.	  	   (On	  the	  other	  hand,)	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  (that	  the	  characteristic	  of)	  production	  is	  
karmically	  inactive,	  how	  (can	  one)	  claim	  the	  karmically	  inactive	  participates	  with	  the	  karmically	  active	  to	  create	  characateristics?	  Separate	  from	  (the	  characteristics	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of)	  production,	  abiding,	  and	  extinction,	  who	  could	  (possibly)	  understand	  (what	  actually)	  is	  production?	  	   Again,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  differentiating	  between	  production,	  abiding,	  and	  extinction,	  there	  is	  (an	  identifiable	  characteristic	  of)	  production.	  The	  karmically	  inactive	  is	  not	  so	  differentiable.	  For	  this	  reason	  then	  there	  is	  no	  (identifiable	  characteristic	  of)	  production.	  (The	  characteristics	  of)	  abiding	  and	  extinction	  are	  also	  thus.	  	   (The	  characteristics	  of)	  production,	  abiding,	  and	  extinction	  are	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature).	  Therefore	  karmically	  active	  dharmas	  are	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature).	  Because	  karmically	  active	  dharmas	  are	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature),	  therefore	  karmically	  inactive	  dharmas	  are	  also	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature).	  Because	  of	  the	  karmically	  active,	  therefore,	  there	  is	  the	  karmically	  inactive.	  Because	  karmically	  active	  and	  karmically	  inactive	  dharmas	  are	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature),	  hence	  all	  dharmas,	  each	  and	  every	  one,	  are	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature).	  	   Question:	  You	  say	  the	  three	  characteristics	  each,	  in	  turn,	  (must	  also)	  have	  the	  three	  characteristics	  and	  therefore	  (the	  regress)	  is	  without	  end.	  (As	  a	  result,	  you	  claim,)	  production	  ought	  not	  (be	  considered)	  as	  karmically	  active.	  Now	  (in	  response	  I)	  must	  assert:	  	  	   The	  producing	  (part	  of)	  of	  production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing	  	   	   is	  produced	  at	  (the	  point	  of)	  fundamental	  production.	  	   The	  producing	  (part	  of)	  fundamental	  production	  is,	  in	  turn,	  produced	  at	  (the	  point	  when)	  production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing	  (arises).	  	  	   When	  a	  dharma	  is	  produced,	  through	  the	  particular	  form	  (of	  that	  dharma’s	  arising,)	  seven	  dharmas	  are	  produced	  together	  (as	  part	  of	  that	  arising.	  The	  seven	  are:)	  1.	  the	  dharma,	  2.	  production,	  3.	  abiding,	  4.	  extinction,	  5.	  production’s	  producing,	  6.	  abiding’s	  abiding,	  and	  7.	  extinction’s	  extinction.	  Among	  these	  seven	  
dharmas,	  besides	  its	  particular	  form,	  production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing	  can	  (also)	  produce	  (the	  other)	  six	  dharmas.	  (So,)	  production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing	  can	  produce	  fundamental	  production	  and	  fundamental	  production,	  in	  turn,	  produces	  production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  although	  the	  three	  characteristics	  are	  karmically	  active,	  even	  so	  there	  is	  not	  (a	  regress)	  without	  end.	  Abiding	  and	  extinction	  are	  also	  like	  this.	  	   Answer:	  [163a]	  	  	   If	  (one)	  claims	  that	  production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing	  	   	   can,	  in	  turn,	  produce	  fundamental	  production,	  (and	  if)	  production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing	  is	  (initially	  derived)	  from	  fundamental	  production,	  how	  can	  (production’s	  characteristic	  of	  production)	  produce	  fundamental	  production	  (in	  the	  first	  place)?	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If	  (one)	  claims	  production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing	  can	  produce	  fundamental	  production,	  (then	  that	  subsequent)	  fundamental	  production	  does	  not	  produce	  production’s	  (antecedently	  existent	  characteristic	  of)	  producing.	  	  	   (Even	  further	  though,)	  how	  can	  production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing	  produce	  (an	  antecedently	  necessary)	  fundamental	  production?	  	  If	  (one)	  claims	  it	  is	  fundamental	  production	  	   that	  can	  produce	  production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing,	  	   (and	  if)	  fundamental	  production	  is	  (derived)	  from	  that	  producing,	  how	  can	  (fundamental	  production)	  produce	  production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing	  (in	  the	  first	  place)?	  	  If	  (one)	  claims	  fundamental	  production	  can	  produce	  production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing,	  (and	  that)	  production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing	  (once)	  produced	  already	  in	  turn	  produces	  fundamental	  production,	  (then)	  this	  situation	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  The	  dharma	  of	  production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing	  ought	  to	  produce	  fundamental	  production.	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  it	  is	  designated	  as	  “production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing.”	  Yet,	  (given	  that	  scenario,	  at	  that	  time)	  fundamental	  production	  in	  fact	  is	  itself	  not	  yet	  produced.	  (So)	  how	  can	  one	  say	  (that	  even	  before	  it	  exists,	  fundamental	  production)	  can	  produce	  production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing?	  	   (Alternately,)	  if	  (one)	  claims	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  when	  (fundamental	  production)	  produces	  production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing,	  (then	  at	  that	  moment	  production’s	  characteristic	  of	  producing)	  can	  produce	  fundamental	  production,	  (then)	  this	  situation	  is	  also	  not	  the	  case.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  	  	   (If)	  it	  is	  (the	  case	  that)	  when	  (fundamental	  production)	  produces	  	   	   production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing,	  	   (production’s	  characteristic	  of	  producing)	  will	  be	  able	  to	  produce	  	   fundamental	  production,	  (then	  at	  the	  time	  when)	  production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing	  is	  still	  yet	  to	  be	  produced,	  	  	   how	  can	  it	  produce	  fundamental	  production?	  	  	   (If)	  it	  is	  (the	  case	  that)	  when	  (fundamental	  production)	  produces	  production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing	  (then	  it)	  will	  be	  able	  to	  produce	  fundamental	  production,	  (we	  must	  note	  that)	  while	  the	  form	  itself	  of	  this	  production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing	  is	  not	  yet	  produced	  it	  cannot	  produce	  the	  fundamental	  production	  (required	  as	  an	  antecedent	  cause	  for	  its	  own	  existence).	  	   (Alternately,)	  if	  (one)	  claims	  it	  is	  (the	  case	  that)	  when	  (fundamental	  production)	  produces	  production’s	  (characteristic	  of)	  producing	  (then	  it)	  can	  (simultaneously)	  self-­‐produce	  and	  also	  produce	  (production’s	  characteristic	  of	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producing),	  just	  like	  a	  burning	  lamp	  that	  can	  (simultaneously)	  self-­‐illuminate	  and	  illuminate	  other	  (things,	  then)	  this	  situation	  is	  (also)	  not	  the	  case.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  	  	   In	  the	  (burning)	  lamp	  itself	  there	  is	  no	  darkness.	  	   Nor	  is	  there	  darkness	  in	  that	  place	  where	  (it	  burns).	  	   Destroying	  darkness	  is	  designated	  “illuminating.”	  	   (But	  as	  for	  the	  burning)	  lamp,	  what	  exactly	  is	  illuminated?	  	  	   The	  form	  of	  the	  (burning)	  lamp	  itself	  lacks	  darkness.	  The	  place	  which	  is	  illuminated	  also	  lacks	  darkness.	  If	  in	  the	  (burning)	  lamp	  there	  is	  no	  darkness	  and	  there	  is	  also	  no	  darkness	  in	  the	  place	  where	  (it	  is	  burning),	  how	  can	  (one)	  speak	  of	  the	  lamp	  self-­‐illuminating	  and	  also	  being	  able	  to	  illuminate	  that	  (place	  where	  it	  burns?	  Illumination)	  is	  designated	  “illumination”	  because	  it	  eliminates	  darkness.	  	  (However)	  the	  (burning)	  lamp	  does	  not	  eliminate	  (any)	  darkness	  of	  its	  own	  and	  also	  does	  not	  eliminate	  	  (any)	  darkness	  of	  that	  (place	  where	  it	  burns).	  For	  this	  reason	  the	  lamp	  does	  not	  self-­‐illuminate	  and	  also	  does	  not	  illuminate	  that	  (place	  where	  it	  burns).	  For	  this	  reason,	  (as	  for)	  your	  previous	  assertion	  that	  the	  lamp	  self-­‐illuminates	  and	  also	  illuminates	  that	  (place	  where	  it	  burns,	  and	  analogously)	  production,	  in	  this	  fashion	  self-­‐produces	  and	  also	  produces	  that	  (other	  production),	  this	  situation	  is	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  	   Question:	  If	  (it	  is	  the	  case	  that)	  when	  a	  lamp	  is	  burning	  it	  can	  eliminate	  darkness,	  (that	  is)	  the	  reason	  why	  there	  is	  no	  darkness	  in	  the	  lamp	  and	  also	  that	  there	  is	  no	  darkness	  in	  the	  place	  where	  the	  lamp	  is	  located.	  (Given	  this,	  what	  is	  the	  difficulty?)	  	   Answer:	  	  	   	  	   How	  can	  (one)	  claim	  that	  when	  burning,	  	   	   it	  is	  still	  able	  to	  eliminate	  darkness?	  	   (Also,)	  when	  this	  lamp	  is	  initially	  lit,	  	   	   it	  cannot	  extend	  to	  darkness.	  	  	   If	  the	  lamp	  is	  not	  able	  to	  extend	  to	  darkness	  when	  it	  is	  burning,	  (then)	  if	  it	  is	  not	  able	  to	  extend	  to	  darkness	  (when	  burning,	  one)	  ought	  not	  claim	  it	  eliminates	  darkness	  (when	  initially	  lit).	  	   Again:	  	  	   If	  (one	  claims)	  it	  is	  the	  case	  the	  (burning)	  lamp	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  darkness,	  	   	   but	  can	  still	  eliminate	  darkness,	  	   	   (then)	  the	  lamp	  at	  this	  location,	  	   	   ought	  to	  eliminate	  darkness	  everywhere.	  	  	   If	  (one)	  claims	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  even	  though	  the	  (burning)	  lamp	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  darkness,	  it	  still	  has	  the	  power	  to	  eliminate	  darkness,	  (then)	  the	  burning	  lamp	  at	  this	  location	  should	  eliminate	  darkness	  over	  the	  entire	  world.	  (This	  follows	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logically)	  because	  all	  (the	  world’s	  darkness)	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  (the	  lamp	  in	  this	  location).	  Yet,	  in	  fact	  (we	  see	  that)	  the	  burning	  lamp	  in	  this	  location	  is	  not	  able	  to	  eliminate	  darkness	  throughout	  the	  entire	  world.	  For	  this	  reason	  (as	  for)	  your	  assertion	  that	  even	  though	  the	  (burning)	  lamp	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  darkness	  it	  still	  has	  the	  power	  to	  eliminate	  darkness,	  this	  situation	  is	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  	   Again:	  	  	   If	  the	  lamp	  can	  self-­‐illuminate,	  	   	   and	  can	  illuminate	  other	  (places),	  	   	   darkness	  also	  ought	  to	  be	  like	  this,	  	   	   (such	  that	  it	  both)	  self-­‐conceals	  and	  conceals	  other	  (places).	  	  If	  (one)	  claims	  the	  lamp	  can	  self-­‐illuminate	  and	  also	  illuminate	  other	  (places,	  since)	  darkness	  and	  (the	  burning)	  lamp	  are	  mutually	  opposed,	  (darkness)	  also	  ought	  to	  self-­‐conceal	  and	  conceal	  other	  (places.	  Alternately,)	  if	  darkness	  and	  the	  (burning)	  lamp	  are	  mutually	  opposed	  (but	  one	  claims	  darkness)	  cannot	  self-­‐conceal	  and	  cannot	  conceal	  other	  (places,)	  while	  still	  claiming	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  the	  (burning)	  lamp	  can	  self-­‐illuminate	  and	  illuminate	  other	  (places,	  then)	  this	  situation	  is	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  (If	  you	  make	  this	  claim)	  then	  your	  example	  is	  not	  (logically	  sound.	  This	  issue)	  is	  just	  like	  the	  case	  where	  (you	  claim)	  production	  can	  self-­‐produce	  and	  also	  produce	  (that)	  other	  (production).	  	  	   (We)	  should	  further	  note:	  	  	   If	  this	  (characteristic	  of)	  production	  is	  not	  yet	  produced,	  	   	   how	  can	  we	  say	  it	  self-­‐produces?	  	   If	  this	  (characteristic	  of)	  production	  has	  already	  self-­‐produced,	  	   (then	  in)	  being	  produced	  already,	  what	  is	  the	  use	  of	  producing	  (itself	  	   again)?	  	  When	  this	  (characteristic	  of)	  production	  is	  not	  yet	  produced	  then	  (its	  subsequent	  production)	  must	  be	  either	  the	  production	  of	  (that	  which	  is)	  already	  produced	  or	  the	  production	  of	  (that	  which	  is)	  not	  yet	  produced.	  If	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  is	  still	  (subsequently)	  produced,	  (since)	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  is	  designated	  as	  not	  yet	  existent,	  how	  (can	  one)	  claim	  the	  (not	  yet	  existent)	  can	  self-­‐produce?	  	   (Alternately,)	  if	  (one)	  claims	  even	  though	  (it	  is)	  produced	  already	  it	  is	  still	  (subsequently)	  produced,	  the	  produced	  already	  is	  exactly	  the	  produced	  (so)	  what	  necessity	  is	  there	  (for	  its)	  further	  production?	  The	  produced	  already	  lacks	  further	  (need	  for	  production	  so)	  the	  already	  created	  production	  lacks	  further	  (need	  for)	  creation.	  	  	   For	  these	  reasons	  the	  (already	  and	  not	  yet)	  produced	  do	  not	  self-­‐produce.	  If	  (the	  already	  and	  not	  yet)	  produced	  do	  not	  self-­‐produce,	  why	  claim	  they	  produce	  another?	  You	  assert	  it	  self-­‐produces	  and	  produces	  another	  (but)	  this	  situation	  is	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  Abiding	  and	  extinction	  are	  also	  like	  this.	  	   For	  these	  reasons,	  (as	  for	  the	  claim	  that)	  production,	  abiding,	  and	  extinction	  are	  karmically	  active	  characteristics,	  (this)	  situation	  is	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  (The	  idea	  of)	  production,	  abiding,	  and	  extinction	  as	  karmically	  active	  characteristics	  is	  
	   154	  
not	  (logically)	  established.	  Accordingly,	  karmically	  active	  dharmas	  are	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature).	  	  Because	  karmically	  active	  dharmas	  are	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature),	  therefore	  karmically	  inactive	  dharmas	  are	  also	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature).	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  (The	  state	  that	  results	  from)	  extinguishing	  the	  karmically	  active	  is	  designated	  as	  karmically	  inactive	  nirvana.	  For	  this	  reason	  nirvana	  is	  also	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature).	  	   Again,	  nonproduction,	  nonabiding,	  nonextinction	  are	  designated	  as	  
karmically	  inactive	  chcracteristics.	  In	  lacking	  (the	  characteristics)	  of	  production,	  abiding,	  and	  extinction	  (we)	  accordingly	  then	  lack	  dharmas.	  Non-­‐dharmas	  should	  not	  (be	  able	  to)	  create	  characteristics.	  	   (Now)	  if	  (one)	  claims	  lacking	  characteristics	  is	  the	  characteristic	  of	  nirvana,	  (then)	  this	  situation	  is	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  If	  lacking	  characteristics	  is	  the	  characteristic	  of	  nirvana,	  (then)	  by	  reason	  of	  what	  characteristic	  (might	  we)	  know	  it	  is	  no	  characteristic?	  If	  [163c]	  it	  is	  by	  means	  of	  having	  characteristics	  (that	  we)	  know	  it	  is	  lacking	  characteristics,	  why	  designate	  it	  it	  as	  lacking	  characteristics?	  If	  it	  is	  by	  means	  of	  lacking	  characteristics	  (that	  we)	  know	  there	  is	  no	  characteristic,	  (then	  that)	  lack	  of	  characteristics	  is	  (a	  way	  of	  indicating)	  nonexistence.	  (If	  it	  is)	  nonexistent,	  then	  it	  cannot	  be	  known	  (characteristically).	  	   If	  (one)	  claims	  it	  is	  a	  case	  like	  a	  collection	  of	  clothes	  that	  all	  have	  characteristics	  (while)	  only	  one	  garment	  (in	  the	  group)	  lacks	  characteristics,	  (we	  can	  then)	  properly	  consider	  lacking	  characteristics	  as	  a	  characteristic.	  (Furthermore,	  assuming)	  so,	  (in	  that	  case	  if)	  someone	  says	  “Grab	  the	  garment	  without	  characteristics,”	  (then)	  in	  this	  fashion	  they	  can	  know	  the	  garment	  without	  characteristics	  and	  grab	  it.	  Similarly,	  (one	  might	  claim)	  production,	  abiding,	  and	  extinction	  are	  karmically	  active	  characteristics.	  The	  state	  of	  lacking	  production,	  abiding,	  and	  extinction	  accordingly	  should	  be	  known	  as	  the	  karmically	  inactive	  characteristic.	  Therefore,	  lacking	  characteristics	  is	  the	  (characteristic	  of)	  nirvana.	  (But,	  if	  one	  claims	  as	  much,)	  this	  situation	  is	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:	  As	  for)	  production,	  abiding,	  and	  exinction,	  the	  assorted	  causes	  and	  conditions	  are	  all	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature.	  Consequently)	  we	  do	  not	  come	  to	  have	  
karmically	  active	  characteristics.	  (Since	  we	  do	  not	  find	  any	  karmically	  active	  characteristics,)	  how	  can	  we	  say	  that	  due	  to	  these	  (karmically	  active	  characteristics	  we)	  know	  the	  karmically	  inactive?	  (By	  means	  of)	  what	  karmically	  active	  determinate	  characteristic	  (can)	  you	  come	  to	  know	  that	  state	  of	  lacking	  characteristics	  is	  the	  
karmically	  inactive?	  For	  these	  reasons,	  as	  for	  your	  assertion	  that	  among	  the	  collection	  of	  clothes	  with	  characteristics	  (there	  is	  one)	  garment	  lacking	  characteristics,	  (and	  that	  this	  example)	  illustrates	  nirvana’s	  lack	  of	  characteristics,	  (well)	  this	  situation	  is	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  Furthermore,	  the	  clothing	  example	  will	  be	  (more)	  broadly	  explained	  in	  a	  subsequent	  (section	  in)	  chapter	  five.	  	   For	  these	  reasons	  karmically	  active	  dharmas	  are	  all	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature).	  Because	  karmically	  active	  dharmas	  are	  empty,	  karmically	  inactive	  dharmas	  are	  also	  empty.	  Because	  karmically	  active	  and	  karmically	  inactive	  dharmas	  are	  empty,	  the	  self	  is	  also	  empty.	  (These)	  three	  things	  are	  empty	  so	  all	  dharmas	  are	  empty.	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[End	  of	  Chapter	  Four	  of	  the	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  	   [Commentary	  by	  Fa-­‐tsang]	  	  	   (In)	  explaining	  this	  gate	  (I	  will	  divide	  it	  into)	  four	  sections	  just	  as	  (I	  have	  done	  with	  the)	  previous	  (gates).	  	   	   [The	  Name	  of	  the	  Gate]	  	   First,	  as	  for	  explaining	  the	  (gate’s)	  name,	  (this	  section)	  contemplates	  (and)	  refutes	  that	  which	  can	  characterize	  and	  that	  which	  is	  characterized	  (so	  that)	  
dharmas	  are	  exhausted.	  Because	  (one)	  thereby	  reaches	  true	  emptiness,	  (it	  is)	  referred	  to	  (by	  the	  given	  title).	  	   	   [Derivation	  of	  the	  Ideas]	  	   Second,	  as	  for	  deriving	  the	  ideas	  (of	  this	  gate),	  previously	  (Nagarjuna)	  refuted	  that	  which	  is	  characterized	  (so)	  next	  (he)	  refutes	  that	  which	  can	  characterize.	  The	  meanings	  are	  sequential	  and	  so	  consequentially	  arrive.	  Furthermore,	  for	  those	  who	  are	  attached	  to	  views,	  hearing	  the	  preceding	  gate’s	  (conclusion	  that)	  conditions	  do	  not	  produce	  effects,	  some	  (then)	  claim	  characteristics	  can	  produce	  dharmas.	  In	  order	  to	  refute	  that	  (notion	  he)	  therefore	  brings	  up	  this	  gate.	  Furthermore,	  using	  numerous	  gates	  (he)	  reveals	  the	  principled	  (reasoning	  of	  the	  matter	  and)	  causes	  clarity	  as	  a	  result.	  	   	   [The	  Propositions	  Clarifed]	  	   Third,	  as	  for	  that	  which	  the	  three	  categories	  clarify,	  (they)	  refute	  entirely	  the	  three	  characteristics,	  leading	  (one)	  to	  see	  that	  the	  mind	  lacks	  lodging,	  thereby	  completing	  valid	  contemplation	  as	  a	  result.	  	   	   [Explanation]	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   Fourth,	  in	  the	  explanatory	  section	  (there	  are)	  four	  (parts).	  Initially	  he	  presents	  the	  proposition.	  Second,	  (he)	  establishes	  (the	  key	  ideas	  by	  quoting)	  a	  verse.	  Third,	  (he)	  explains	  and	  refutes	  (the	  errors).	  Fourth,	  (he)	  categorically	  dispels	  (the	  incorrect	  views).	  	   In	  the	  verse,	  the	  first	  sentence	  brings	  up	  the	  (notion	  of	  an)	  essence	  of	  
dharmas.	  The	  next	  sentence	  distinguishes	  the	  emptiness	  of	  dharmas.	  The	  lower	  half	  (of	  the	  verse)	  relies	  [224b]	  upon	  the	  emptiness	  of	  characteristics	  to	  dispel	  the	  (notion	  of	  an)	  essence	  of	  dharmas.	   	  	   In	  the	  third	  (part,	  the)	  explanation	  (of	  the	  verse,	  there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  In	  the	  initial	  (part	  of	  the)	  explanation	  (he)	  presents	  (the	  point	  that)	  karmically	  active	  characteristics	  are	  empty.	  In	  the	  subsequent	  (part	  of	  the)	  explanation	  (he)	  presents	  (the	  point	  that)	  karmically	  inactive	  characteristics	  are	  empty.	  	  	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  Karmically	  Active	  Characteristics]	   	  	   In	  the	  initial	  (part	  on	  karmically	  active	  characteristics	  there	  are)	  also	  two	  (subparts).	  Initially	  there	  are	  five	  stanzas	  refuting	  Sarvastivada	  masters’	  (notions	  of)	  major	  and	  minor	  characteristics	  that	  mutually	  produce	  and	  complete	  (the	  effect,	  so	  that)	  together	  (they)	  have	  the	  meaning	  of	  “cause.”	  Subsequently	  (he	  adds)	  five	  (parts)	  refuting	  Mahasamghika	  masters’	  ideas	  which	  consider	  karmically	  active	  characteristics	  as	  producing	  (both)	  self	  and	  others.	  	   	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  Sarvastivada	  Masters]	  	   In	  the	  preceding	  (of	  the	  above	  two	  there	  are)	  also	  two	  (parts).	  First	  is	  a	  valid	  refutation.	  Subsequently	  (he)	  refutes	  the	  (attempt	  at	  a)	  saving	  (rejoinder).	  In	  the	  first,	  the	  initial	  sentence	  establishes	  the	  proposition.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (as	  for)	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karmically	  active	  dharmas,	  because	  (it	  is)	  not	  due	  to,	  nor	  in	  regards	  to	  characteristics	  that	  (arising)	  forms	  those	  dharmas,	  (he)	  says	  (they	  are	  empty).	  Second,	  in	  (the	  part	  that)	  correctly	  reveals	  (the	  error,)	  initially	  (there	  is)	  a	  question	  and	  answer	  that	  brings	  up	  a	  determination	  of	  characteristics.	  Subsequently	  (there	  is)	  a	  question	  and	  answer	  that	  uses	  principled	  (reasoning)	  to	  validly	  refute	  (the	  error).	  	   In	  the	  first	  (question	  and	  answer	  section	  he)	  initially	  (raises	  the)	  question,	  then	  (he	  presents)	  the	  answer.	  In	  the	  answer	  (he)	  initially	  distinguishes	  various	  
dharmas	  that	  each	  individually	  have	  (characteristic)	  forms.	  (For	  example,	  he	  lists	  
dharmas)	  such	  as	  an	  ox,	  a	  vase,	  etc.,	  that	  (presumably)	  do	  not	  require	  (additional)	  
dharmas	  (which	  are)	  external	  (to),	  and	  other	  (than	  themselves),	  that	  can	  	  (functionally)	  characterize	  (them.)	  He	  (then)	  asks	  of	  the	  opponent’s	  view,	  “As	  for	  your	  three	  characteristics,	  if	  they	  are	  karmically	  active	  characteristics	  we	  do	  not	  know	  (whether	  or	  not	  in	  regards	  to)	  these	  three	  (we)	  ought	  to	  treat	  their	  essence	  as	  constituting	  kamically	  active	  (dharmas),	  or	  as	  constituting	  karmically	  inactive	  (dharmas).”	  If	  it	  is	  as	  the	  Abhidharmins	  and	  Satyasiddi’s	  similarly	  say,	  the	  three	  characteristics	  are	  existent	  dharmas.	  The	  Vibhajavadins	  say	  the	  essence	  of	  
karmically	  active	  (dharmas)	  is	  incapable	  of	  self-­‐determination.	  (If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  they	  cannot	  even	  self-­‐characterize,)	  how	  is	  it	  (they	  are)	  capable	  of	  characterizing	  another?	  	   (Also,	  one)	  should	  know	  the	  third	  characteristic	  is	  a	  karmically	  inactive	  
dharma.	  An	  eminent	  Dharmagupta	  (master)	  says	  the	  two	  characteristics	  of	  production	  and	  abiding	  are	  karmically	  active	  dharmas	  (while)	  the	  characteristic	  of	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extinction	  is	  a	  karmically	  inactive	  dharma.	  For	  this	  reason	  the	  three	  characteristics	  are	  (then)	  both	  karmically	  active	  and	  karmically	  inactive.	  	   In	  the	  second	  (part,	  the	  part	  that)	  uses	  principled	  (reasoning)	  to	  validly	  refute	  (the	  point,	  there	  are)	  two	  (parts).	  First,	  (he	  notes	  a)	  heterodox	  question	  that	  is	  (about)	  accepting	  the	  karmically	  active	  (viewpoint).	  Subsequently	  (he	  provides	  an)	  orthodox	  answer	  validly	  refuting	  (that	  view).	  	  Because	  the	  karmically	  inactive	  (view)	  and	  both	  (views	  combined	  together)	  await	  (later)	  refutation,	  (he)	  is	  using	  (the	  material)	  in	  this	  section	  only	  to	  refute	  the	  karmically	  active	  (possibility).	  	   In	  (this)	  section	  (there	  are)	  two	  (parts).	  First	  he	  establishes	  (the	  point	  by	  quoting)	  a	  verse.	  The	  upper	  half	  refutes	  (the	  idea	  that)	  the	  three	  characteristics	  are	  
karmically	  active	  (by)	  granting	  (it	  and	  noting	  it)	  gives	  off	  the	  error	  of	  (a	  regress)	  without	  exhaustion.	  The	  lower	  half	  refutes	  (the	  idea	  that)	  the	  three	  characteristics	  are	  karmically	  inactive	  (by)	  granting	  (that	  idea	  and	  noting	  it	  then)	  gives	  off	  the	  error	  of	  losing	  (the	  quality	  of	  being	  a)	  characteristic.	  	  	   (Now	  to)	  further	  explain,	  the	  lower	  half	  refutes	  (a	  possible	  attempt	  at	  a)	  saving	  (rejoinder.	  He)	  says	  the	  substance	  of	  karmically	  active	  dharmas	  is	  necessarily	  characterized	  (as	  active).	  As	  for	  the	  necessary	  characteristic	  again	  not	  necessarily	  (characterized	  as	  active,	  allowing)	  this	  then	  the	  substance	  of	  dharmas	  is	  necessarily	  characterized,	  (such	  that)	  the	  characteristic	  (and	  the)	  essence	  of	  dharmas	  are	  (both)	  
karmically	  active.	  (But	  with	  this	  hypothetical)	  the	  characteristic	  is	  then	  not	  necessarily	  characterized	  (as	  active.	  Accordingly)	  the	  characteristic	  ought	  to	  be	  (considered)	  karmically	  inactive.	  (Now)	  if	  the	  characteristic	  (of	  production)	  is	  
karmically	  inactive	  (one	  must)	  explain	  how	  it	  establishes	  karmically	  active	  dharmas	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that	  create	  the	  characteristic	  (of	  production).	  Therefore	  (he)	  says	  “What	  is	  called	  a	  
karmically	  active	  characteristic	  (of	  production)?’	  In	  the	  explanation	  (he)	  accords	  with	  this	  (basic	  line	  of	  thinking).	  	   Second,	  in	  the	  explanation	  (there	  are)	  two	  (parts).	  Initially	  he	  explains	  the	  verse	  then	  he	  categorically	  dispels	  (additional	  errors).	  In	  the	  preceding	  (he)	  first	  explains	  the	  upper	  half	  of	  the	  verse,	  then	  explains	  the	  lower	  half	  of	  the	  verse.	  In	  the	  preceding	  (of	  these	  two	  parts,	  the	  part	  where	  he	  explains	  the	  upper	  half,	  he)	  initially	  explains	  production.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  first	  (he	  explains)	  the	  error	  of	  (a	  regress)	  without	  exhaustion.	  (This)	  is	  as	  the	  passage	  reveals.	  Second,	  (he	  explains	  that)	  if	  in	  production	  there	  is	  extinction,	  then	  (there	  is)	  mutual	  opposition.	  (But	  whatever)	  lacks	  extinction	  is	  not	  karmically	  active.	  Therefore,	  having	  extinction	  does	  not	  complete	  (production)	  and	  lacking	  extinction	  also	  does	  not	  complete	  (production).	  Therefore,	  production	  is	  empty	  (of	  either	  characteristic.	  In	  the)	  second	  (part	  of	  the	  explanation	  he)	  categorizes	  abiding	  and	  extinction	  as	  also	  thus.	  	   Second,	  from	  “If	  production	  is	  karmically	  inactive,”	  (he)	  explains	  the	  lower	  half	  of	  the	  verse.	  Also	  (he)	  initially	  explains	  that	  production	  has	  three	  meanings.	  	   1.	  (He	  explains	  a)	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  notion	  that)	  the	  two	  collections	  (of	  
dharmas	  are)	  intractably	  opposed.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (if	  one)	  extinguishes	  the	  karmically	  active	  (collection,	  that	  means)	  then	  (that	  all	  dharmas)	  are	  karmically	  inactive.	  	  Ultimately,	  (they)	  mutually	  counter	  (one	  another)	  as	  a	  result.	  (It	  is)	  as	  (with)	  light	  and	  dark.	  How	  can	  light	  and	  dark	  [224c]	  constitute	  mutually	  (self-­‐existent	  and	  independent	  characteristics)?	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   2.	  (Next	  he	  provides	  a)	  refutation	  that	  rebukes	  (this	  notion	  of)	  characteristics	  (by	  pointing	  out	  the)	  loss	  (of	  their)	  essence.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  they	  are	  karmically	  inactive	  then	  (they)	  lack	  (the	  characteristics	  of)	  production,	  abiding,	  and	  extinction.	  Apart	  from	  these	  three	  characteristics,	  who	  (can)	  understand	  the	  production	  of	  these	  karmically	  active	  dharmas?	  	   3.	  From	  “Again…”	  (he	  provides	  a)	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  idea	  of)	  lacking	  differentiation.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  this	  karmically	  inactive	  (state	  is)	  a	  single	  state	  (and)	  lacks	  dual	  (qualities.	  So)	  what	  circumstances	  (allow	  it)	  to	  have	  production	  that	  comes	  to	  differ	  from	  abiding	  and	  extinction?	  (Likewise,)	  from	  “For	  this	  reason	  there	  is	  no	  production…”	  (he	  applies	  this)	  rule	  to	  	  abiding	  and	  extinction	  and	  therefore	  says	  (they)	  are	  also	  thus.	  	   In	  the	  second	  (part	  of	  the	  explanation,	  the	  part	  where	  he)	  categorically	  dispels	  (additional	  errors,	  there	  are)	  three	  (subparts).	  1.	  Utilizing	  the	  nonexistence	  of	  characteristics	  (he)	  dispels	  (the	  notion	  of)	  dharmic	  essences.	  2.	  (Next	  he)	  dispels	  (the	  notion	  of)	  karmically	  inactive	  (dharmic	  essences).	  3.	  (Finally	  he)	  universally	  concludes	  (applying	  the	  point	  to)	  all	  (dharmas).	  	   In	  the	  second	  (part	  of	  this	  broader	  section	  dealing	  with	  the	  verse,	  the	  part	  concerning	  the	  lower	  half	  of	  the	  verse	  that)	  refutes	  the	  saving	  (rejoinder),	  initially	  (he	  presents	  the)	  heterodox	  (view),	  then	  (he	  provides	  a)	  valid	  refutation.	  In	  the	  first	  (of	  these	  two	  sections	  there	  are)	  two	  (subparts).	  Initially	  he	  records	  the	  preceding	  errors.	  Second,	  (he)	  establishes	  the	  teaching	  of	  the	  principle	  (of	  emptiness).	  Therein	  initially	  (he	  provides	  a)	  verse,	  then	  (he)	  explains.	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   In	  the	  verse	  (he	  presents	  the)	  saving	  (rejoinder	  to)	  the	  preceding	  two	  difficulties.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  upper	  half	  	  (is	  the)	  saving	  (rejoinder	  to)	  the	  “karmically	  inactive”	  difficulty.	  (It	  claims	  that)	  because	  of	  the	  fundamental	  production	  of	  production’s	  producing,	  fundamental	  production	  (is	  derived)	  from	  the	  production	  of	  production’s	  producing.	  Therefore	  (these)	  are	  not	  karmically	  inactive	  
dharmas.	  The	  lower	  half	  (presents	  the)	  saving	  (rejoinder	  to)	  the	  error	  of	  (a	  regress)	  without	  exhaustion.	  (It	  claims	  that)	  because	  of	  production’s	  producing	  of	  fundamental	  production,	  production’s	  producing	  is	  in	  turn	  (derived)	  from	  the	  production	  of	  fundamental	  production.	  For	  this	  reason	  there	  is	  no	  error	  of	  (a	  regress)	  without	  exhaustion.	  Therein	  the	  first	  phrase	  brings	  up	  the	  essence	  of	  production’s	  producing.	  Because	  it	  is	  that	  which	  is	  produced	  by	  fundamental	  production’s	  genus,	  (he)	  calls	  it	  “that	  which	  is	  produced.”	  The	  next	  phrase	  distinguishes	  the	  function	  of	  production’s	  producing.	  The	  lower	  two	  phrases	  counter	  and	  adjust	  this	  understanding.	  	   Second,	  in	  the	  explanation	  (there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  Initially	  (he)	  reveals	  the	  principle.	  Second	  (he	  covers	  the)	  error	  of	  the	  saving	  (rejoinder).	  Third	  (he	  ends	  with	  a)	  concluding	  distinction.	  	   In	  (the	  part)	  concerning	  the	  error	  of	  the	  saving	  (rejoinder),	  as	  for	  (the	  opponent’s	  idea	  that)	  fundamental	  production	  eliminates	  a	  self-­‐essence	  (because	  it	  is	  the	  collective	  process	  of)	  producing	  the	  six	  dharmas,	  considering	  the	  fundamental	  existence	  of	  proximate	  production	  as	  the	  essence	  of	  dharmas,	  (the	  opponent)	  therefore	  designates	  it	  as	  “fundamental	  production”	  (and)	  accordingly	  (claims	  there	  is)	  the	  production	  of	  a	  basis	  as	  a	  result.	  Furthermore,	  (the	  opponent)	  takes	  the	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production	  of	  this	  basis	  (and)	  designates	  it	  as	  “production’s	  producing.”	  Accordingly	  (he	  claims	  there	  is)	  the	  producing	  of	  production.	  (These	  two	  are)	  also	  designated	  as	  “great	  production”	  (and)	  “small	  production.”	  	  	   Together	  with	  the	  six	  dharmas	  this	  “great	  production”	  (alledgedly)	  constitutes	  the	  characteristic	  of	  production.	  (According	  to	  the	  opponent,	  dharmas)	  only	  (work	  together	  and)	  do	  not	  (come)	  with	  the	  characteristic	  of	  individual	  creation.	  (This	  is	  the	  case)	  because	  (he)	  takes	  individual	  great	  production’s	  functioning	  (together	  with)	  small	  production’s	  (functioning)	  as	  (necessary	  to)	  constitute	  characteristics.	  Great	  abiding,	  and	  extinction	  are	  also	  (considered)	  thus.	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  great	  characteristic	  (of	  collective	  production)	  can	  universally	  characterize	  (both)	  the	  great	  and	  small.	  It	  being	  so,	  (the	  opponent	  claims	  it	  is)	  only	  (the	  case	  that	  great	  production)	  does	  not	  individually	  characterize	  (while)	  small	  production	  does	  not	  universally	  characterize	  (both)	  the	  great	  and	  small.	  That	  being	  so	  (great	  production)	  only	  characterizes	  the	  one	  great	  (characteristic	  of	  collective	  production	  due	  to	  proximity).	  Because	  small	  (production)	  lacks	  (collective)	  power,	  producing	  dharmas	  sparingly,	  accordingly	  it	  is	  designated	  as	  “small.”	  (Because	  the)	  great	  characteristic	  (of	  collective	  production)	  has	  power	  (and)	  produces	  dharmas	  in	  abundance,	  accordingly	  it	  is	  designated	  as	  “great.”	  For	  example,	  within	  great	  production	  (the	  opponent)	  considers	  small	  production	  as	  the	  (individual,	  specific)	  characteristic	  of	  (a	  dharma’s)	  production.	  Great	  abiding	  and	  extinction	  constitute	  the	  characteristics	  of	  (collective)	  abiding	  and	  extinction.	  Great	  abiding	  takes	  small	  abiding	  as	  the	  (specific)	  characteristic	  of	  abiding.	  (Likewise)	  great	  production	  (takes)	  extinction	  as	  the	  characteristic	  of	  the	  extinction	  of	  production.	  Great	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extinction	  takes	  small	  extinction	  as	  the	  characteristic	  of	  extinction.	  Great	  production	  (takes)	  abiding	  as	  the	  characteristic	  of	  the	  abiding	  of	  production.	  If,	  in	  small	  production,	  (it)	  completely	  has	  the	  three	  great	  characteristics,	  small	  abiding	  and	  extinction	  are	  also	  thus.	  For	  these	  reasons	  (the	  opponent	  claims)	  there	  is	  no	  error	  of	  that	  (regress)	  without	  exhaustion.	  (Given)	  this,	  then	  among	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  six	  collectively,	  there	  is	  causation.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  when	  together,	  (they	  then)	  arise	  and	  therefore	  collectively	  exist.	  They	  furthermore	  mutually	  commission	  (one	  another	  and)	  therefore	  are	  designated	  as	  “causes.”	  Herein	  having	  collective	  existence	  is	  (understood	  as)	  collectively	  having	  causal	  (power.	  They)	  have	  collective	  existence	  even	  as	  they	  are	  not	  (individually	  powerful)	  causes.	  	  	   If	  (one)	  takes	  up	  (the	  perspective	  of	  the)	  essences	  of	  (individual)	  dharmas	  and	  look	  at	  the	  six	  characteristics,	  (they)	  come	  to	  create	  (their)	  collective	  existence	  (and	  so)	  collectively	  have	  causal	  (power).	  If	  (one)	  takes	  up	  (the	  perspective	  of)	  great	  production	  (and)	  look	  at	  the	  six	  dharmas,	  (they)	  are	  also	  collectively	  existent	  (and)	  collectively	  have	  causal	  (power).	  Great	  [225a]	  abiding	  and	  great	  extinction	  are	  also	  (considered)	  thus.	  	   (In	  contrast)	  if	  one	  takes	  up	  (the	  perspective	  of)	  small	  production	  and	  looks	  at	  great	  production,	  (again,	  it)	  collectively	  exists	  (and)	  collectively	  there	  is	  causal	  (power.	  If	  one	  takes	  up)	  small	  abiding	  and	  looks	  at	  great	  abiding,	  (or	  if	  we	  take	  up)	  small	  extinction	  and	  look	  at	  great	  extinction,	  (again	  they)	  also	  have	  collective	  existence	  (and)	  collectively	  have	  causal	  (power.	  Taking)	  small	  production	  to	  look	  at	  the	  (other)	  five	  dharmas,	  (they)	  collectively	  exist	  even	  as	  (they)	  are	  not	  (individual,	  independent)	  causes.	  (Taking)	  small	  abiding	  and	  small	  extinction	  to	  look	  at	  the	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(other)	  five	  dharmas	  (it	  is)	  also	  thus.	  (This)	  being	  so,	  (considering)	  the	  two	  productions	  of	  great	  and	  small,	  that	  proposition	  (of	  the	  opponent)	  takes	  instantaneous,	  collective	  and	  mutual	  reliance	  (as)	  arising.	  Abiding	  and	  extinction	  are	  also	  (considered)	  thus.	  Therefore,	  (the	  opponent	  claims)	  there	  is	  no	  mistake	  of	  (necessary)	  antecedence.	  	   Third,	  from	  “for	  this	  reason...”	  (is	  the)	  conclusion	  (that)	  departs	  from	  the	  error.	  Below	  (that,	  Nagarjuna)	  lists	  the	  two	  (further	  characteristics)	  of	  abiding	  and	  extinction.	  	   From	  “Answer:…”	  (Nagarjuna	  presents	  a)	  refutation	  (that)	  validly	  dismisses	  (the	  points	  covered	  in	  the	  rejoinder	  above).	  Therein	  are	  two	  (parts).	  Initially	  there	  are	  two	  verses.	  (The	  points)	  clarified	  are,	  (firstly,)	  a	  refutation	  (which	  notes	  this	  idea	  means)	  that	  which	  (is	  produced	  is)	  lacking	  that	  which	  can	  (produce	  it).	  The	  subsequent	  verse	  (provides	  a)	  refutation	  (which	  notes)	  that	  which	  is	  not	  yet	  capable	  (of	  producing	  must)	  lack	  that	  which	  is	  produced.	  (Now,)	  further	  explaining,	  the	  first	  two	  are	  a	  refutation	  (showing)	  the	  preceeding	  and	  subsequent	  do	  not	  produce	  (these	  results).	  The	  subsequent	  one	  is	  a	  refutation	  (showing)	  simultaneity	  (also)	  does	  not	  produce	  (these	  results).	  	  	   	   	   	   	   [Problems	  of	  Antecedence]	  	   In	  the	  preceding	  (there	  are)	  two	  verses.	  (The)	  first	  (notes)	  small	  (production)	  does	  not	  produce	  great	  (production).	  The	  second	  (notes)	  great	  (production)	  does	  not	  produce	  small	  (production.	  With)	  the	  initial	  (verse)	  then,	  small	  production	  is	  located	  antecedent	  (to	  great	  production,	  while)	  great	  production	  is	  located	  subsequent	  (to	  small.	  In	  this	  case)	  small	  production	  does	  not	  produce	  
	   165	  
great	  production.	  (With)	  the	  subsequent	  (verse)	  then,	  great	  production	  is	  located	  antecedent	  (to	  small,	  while)	  small	  production	  is	  located	  subsequent	  (to	  great.	  In	  this	  case)	  great	  production	  does	  not	  produce	  small	  production.	  	   In	  the	  subsequent	  explanatory	  verse	  (there	  are)	  two	  (parts).	  First,	  (he)	  records	  (the	  opponent’s)	  reckoning	  (and)	  generally	  negates	  (it).	  Second,	  (he)	  explains	  the	  wherefores	  of	  the	  negation.	  	   	   	   	   	   [Problems	  of	  Simultaneity]	   	  	   In	  the	  second	  (refutation,	  the)	  refutation	  (based	  on	  problems	  of)	  simultaneity,	  (there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  Initially	  (he)	  records	  (the	  opponent’s)	  reckoning	  and	  generally	  negates	  (it).	  Second,	  (he)	  establishes	  a	  verse	  (with	  a)	  valid	  refutation.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  upper	  half	  corresponds	  to	  hypothetically	  (allowing	  the	  stated)	  circumstances.	  The	  lower	  half	  then	  concerns	  depriving	  (the	  opponent)	  of	  the	  principle.	  Third,	  (he)	  explains	  the	  refutation.	  The	  point	  of	  the	  refutation	  states,	  “Certainly	  the	  logic	  of	  mutual	  production	  must	  (admit)	  there	  are	  substances	  that	  can	  produce	  (even	  when)	  there	  are	  no	  substances	  from	  production.	  Now,	  speaking	  of	  simultaneous	  (production,)	  it	  is	  (either	  the	  case	  that)	  both	  are	  existent	  (or)	  it	  is	  (the	  case	  that)	  both	  are	  nonexistent.	  If	  it	  is	  both	  exist,	  what	  necessity	  (is	  there	  for)	  mutual	  production?	  If	  it	  is	  both	  do	  not	  exist,	  who	  (or	  what	  is)	  mutually	  produced?	  If	  it	  is	  one	  exists	  and	  one	  does	  not	  exist,	  how	  do	  (they)	  come	  to	  be	  simultaneous?	  Furthermore,	  how	  (could	  they)	  come	  to	  reciprocally	  produce	  (one	  another)?”.	  	   	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  Mahasamghika	  Masters]	  	  	   The	  second	  (part	  of	  explanation)	  refutes	  Mahasamghika	  masters	  (who)	  reckon	  karmically	  active	  characteristics	  self-­‐produce	  (and)	  produce	  others.	  Therein	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(we	  find)	  two	  (parts).	  Initially	  (Nagarjuna)	  records	  (their)	  reckoning	  and	  generally	  negates	  (it).	  Second,	  (he	  provides	  a)	  refutation	  using	  the	  principle	  to	  dismiss	  (the	  point).	  Herein	  (there	  are)	  two	  (parts).	  Initially	  there	  are	  four	  verses	  refuting	  the	  example.	  Subsequently	  (there	  is)	  one	  verse	  refuting	  the	  principle.	  	  	   In	  the	  preceding	  (of	  the	  above	  two	  parts	  there	  are)	  four	  (subparts).	  First	  (there	  is)	  a	  verse	  clarifying	  a	  refutation	  (that	  shows	  when	  something	  has)	  already	  been	  the	  case	  (it)	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  (another).	  The	  second	  verse	  clarifies	  a	  refutation	  (showing)	  when	  (something)	  is	  (presently)	  the	  case	  (it	  also)	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  (another).	  The	  third	  verse	  clarifies	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  notion	  of)	  mutual	  derivation	  of	  proximate	  and	  distant	  (causes).	  The	  fourth	  (is	  a)	  refutation	  (based	  on)	  the	  contradictory	  combination	  of	  lamp	  (light)	  and	  darkness.	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   [Refuting	  the	  Example]	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   [First	  Form	  of	  the	  Refutation]	   	   	  	   In	  the	  first	  (of	  the	  above	  four	  there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  In	  the	  first,	  a	  verse,	  the	  upper	  half	  clarifies	  the	  reason	  there	  is	  no	  darkness	  illuminated	  by	  self	  and	  other.	  The	  lower	  half	  (shows	  it)	  consequentially	  follows	  there	  is	  no	  lamp	  that	  can	  illuminate.	  Second,	  (he)	  explains.	  Third,	  from	  “For	  this	  reason…”	  (he	  provides	  a)	  concluding	  negation,	  rebuking	  (the	  opponent	  and)	  ending	  (the	  matter).	  Both	  (the	  second	  and	  third	  parts)	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  	   	   	   	   	   	   [Second	  Form	  of	  the	  Refutation]	   	  	   As	  for	  the	  second	  (of	  the	  four	  above),	  the	  refutation	  (showing)	  when	  (something)	  is	  the	  case	  (it)	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  (another),	  first	  (he	  raises	  a)	  question.	  The	  point	  of	  the	  question	  notes	  that	  when	  lamp	  (light)	  is	  initially	  produced	  the	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substance	  (of	  light)	  is	  not	  yet	  formed	  (and)	  therefore	  within	  the	  flame	  there	  is	  darkness.	  (This)	  clarifies	  the	  reason	  (the	  light)	  is	  not	  yet	  (fully)	  ripened.	  (For	  example,	  when	  that	  is	  the	  case,)	  	  within	  a	  house	  (the	  lighting)	  is	  still	  dim.	  (As)	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  lamp	  (light)	  gradually	  (becomes	  more)	  perfectly	  (developed,)	  the	  darkness	  is	  then	  exhausted.	  One	  should	  understand	  the	  destruction	  of	  darkness	  is	  the	  (moment	  of)	  initially	  producing	  the	  lamp	  (light).	  Therefore,	  it	  says	  “when	  it	  is	  the	  case,”	  (then	  the	  process)	  can	  destroy	  darkness.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  self-­‐illumination	  is	  (simultaneously)	  illuminating	  the	  other.	  	   Second,	  in	  the	  answer	  (to	  the	  above	  idea)	  first	  (Nagarjuna	  provides)	  a	  verse.	  The	  upper	  half	  investigates	  (the	  opponent’s)	  reckoning	  (while)	  the	  lower	  half	  validly	  refutes	  (it).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  since	  this	  (view	  holds)	  when	  initially	  producing	  the	  lamp	  (light),	  darkness	  is	  already	  faded	  and	  extinct,	  for	  this	  reason	  in	  the	  end	  there	  is	  no	  (time	  when	  the)	  [225b]	  initially	  produced	  lamp	  (light)	  and	  as	  yet	  faded	  darkness	  (overlap)	  together.	  Because	  they	  do	  not	  (overlap)	  together,	  (light)	  also	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  darkness.	  (As	  it)	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  darkness	  (we)	  therefore	  do	  not	  designate	  it	  as	  “destroying”	  (darkness.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  though,	  even)	  if	  it	  extends	  to	  darkness	  (it)	  also	  does	  destroy	  (it).	  The	  (text’s)	  explanation	  of	  extended	  action	  (that	  follows)	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  	   	   	   	   	   	   [Third	  Form	  of	  the	  Refutation]	   	  	   In	  the	  third	  (of	  the	  four	  parts),	  the	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  idea	  of)	  the	  mutual	  derivation	  of	  proximate	  and	  distant	  (causes	  and	  effects),	  first	  (he	  provides)	  a	  verse.	  The	  upper	  half	  records	  the	  reckoning.	  The	  lower	  half	  validly	  refutes	  (it).	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   In	  the	  subsequent	  explanation,	  (if	  one)	  considers	  both	  (types	  of	  “causes”)	  that	  do	  not	  extend	  to	  (effects)	  as	  causes,	  there	  are	  four	  difficulties.	  1.	  (We	  might)	  take	  a	  proximate	  (cause	  to	  be)	  the	  same	  as	  a	  distant	  (cause.	  Given	  this,	  it)	  ought	  to	  be(the	  case)	  both	  do	  not	  destroy	  (the	  darkness).	  2.	  (We	  might)	  take	  a	  distant	  (cause	  to	  be)	  the	  same	  as	  a	  proximate	  (cause.	  Given	  this,)	  then	  (it)	  ought	  to	  (be	  the	  case	  that)	  both	  destroy	  (the	  darkness).	  3.	  If	  both	  do	  not	  extend	  to	  (the	  effect,	  i.e.,	  the)	  darkness,	  therefore	  (this	  option)	  destroys	  the	  proximate	  (and)	  does	  not	  destroy	  the	  distant.	  Alternately,	  it	  might	  (be	  the	  case	  that)	  because	  both	  do	  not	  extend	  to	  (the	  darkness,	  this)	  destroys	  the	  distant	  (but)	  does	  not	  destroy	  the	  proximate.	  4.	  Since	  there	  is	  destruction	  (of	  darkness)	  and	  no	  destruction	  (of	  darkness),	  it	  ought	  (to	  be	  the	  case	  that)	  there	  is	  extension	  to	  (the	  effect)	  and	  no	  extension	  to	  (the	  effect).	  	   In	  (this)	  section	  (there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  First	  he	  records	  the	  reckoning.	  Second	  (he	  provides	  a)	  valid	  refutation.	  (In	  the	  refutation)	  initially	  (he)	  allows	  (the	  point	  hypothetically,	  then)	  subsequently	  takes	  it	  away.	  Third	  is	  a	  concluding	  dismissal.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   [Fourth	  Form	  of	  the	  Refutation]	   	  	   The	  fourth	  (of	  the	  four	  parts	  refuting	  the	  views	  of	  Mahsamghika	  masters	  is)	  the	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  a)	  mutually	  opposed	  contradictory	  combination.	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  two	  (parts).	  First	  is	  a	  verse,	  then	  an	  explanation.	  In	  the	  verse	  the	  upper	  half	  records	  the	  reckoning	  (while)	  the	  lower	  half	  is	  a	  refutation	  by	  the	  (customary)	  usage	  of	  “darkness.”	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  brightness	  and	  darkness	  truly	  oppose	  (one	  another).	  Since	  brightness	  has	  the	  function	  of	  illuminating	  darkness,	  darkness	  also	  ought	  to	  have	  the	  power	  of	  blocking	  brightness.	  Because	  of	  having	  this	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power	  (it)	  is	  (the	  case	  that)	  the	  lamp	  cannot	  destroy	  the	  darkness.	  Furthermore,	  if	  (you	  claim)	  since	  the	  lamp	  self-­‐illuminates	  (it)	  also	  illuminates	  the	  darkness,	  (you	  must	  accept	  that	  since)	  darkness	  also	  ought	  to	  self-­‐darken,	  (it	  will)	  also	  darken	  the	  lamp.	  (Now	  as	  for	  the)	  the	  lamp,	  if	  it	  is	  darkened,	  how	  might	  it	  be	  able	  to	  destroy	  darkness?	  Supposing	  that,	  (the	  attempted)	  saving	  (rejoinder)	  says,	  “	  Because	  brightness	  is	  superior,	  (it)	  illuminates	  others	  while	  in	  turn	  self-­‐illuminating.	  Because	  darkness	  is	  inferior,	  it	  darkens	  itself	  (but)	  does	  not	  darken	  the	  other.”	  (But,	  given	  this)	  then,	  again,	  (Nagarjuna	  notes)	  a	  difficulty	  saying,	  “Brightness	  is	  superior	  so	  it	  can	  oppose	  darkness.	  Darkness	  is	  inferior	  so	  it	  does	  not	  oppose	  brightness.	  If	  (we	  are)	  using	  (the	  idea	  that)	  both	  mutually	  oppose,	  why	  is	  it	  not	  necessary	  (that	  they)	  mutually	  destroy	  (one	  another)?”.	  	  	   (If	  we)	  thoroughly	  discuss	  (the	  issue	  of)	  considering	  both	  mutually	  opposing	  (factors)	  as	  causes,	  (then)	  there	  are	  also	  four	  difficulties	  (to	  note).	  	   1.	  (The	  first	  is	  a)	  refutation	  (based	  on)	  considering	  the	  lamp	  (light)	  from	  (the	  perspective	  of)	  darkness.	  (In	  that	  case)	  the	  lamp	  (light)	  ought	  not	  destroy	  the	  darkness	  because	  both	  mutually	  oppose.	  (This	  is)	  just	  as	  (in	  the	  case	  of)	  darkness	  not	  darkening	  the	  lamp	  (light).	  	   2.	  (The	  second	  is	  a)	  refutation	  (that)	  considers	  darkness	  from	  (the	  perspective	  of)	  lamp	  (light).	  Darkness	  certainly	  can	  also	  obstruct	  lamp	  (light)	  because	  they	  mutually	  oppose.	  (This	  is)	  just	  as	  (in	  the	  case	  of)	  lamp	  (light)	  being	  able	  to	  destroy	  darkness.	  	   3.	  (If)	  lamp	  (light)	  is	  exactly	  opposed	  to	  darkness,	  then	  while	  the	  lamp	  (is	  lit),	  it	  accordingly	  can	  destroy	  darkness.	  (In	  this	  case)	  darkness	  cannot	  darken	  lamp	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(light.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  it)	  is	  also	  possible	  darkness	  is	  opposed	  to	  lamp	  (light),	  then	  while	  darkening,	  it	  accordingly	  can	  darken	  the	  lamp	  (light.	  In	  this	  case	  then)	  lamp	  (light)	  cannot	  destroy	  darkness.	  	   4.	  If	  one	  destroys	  and	  one	  does	  not	  destroy,	  it	  ought	  (to	  be	  the	  case	  that)	  one	  opposes	  and	  one	  does	  not	  oppose.	  If	  darkness	  does	  not	  oppose	  lamp	  (light,	  then)	  in	  the	  lamp	  (light	  it)	  ought	  (to	  be	  the	  case	  that)	  there	  is	  darkness,	  and	  in	  darkness	  (it)	  ought	  (to	  be	  the	  case	  that)	  there	  is	  lamp	  (light).	  	  	   Together	  (these	  four	  points)	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment.	  Also)	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  explanation	  in	  this	  section	  is	  understandable	  (without	  additional	  comment.	  The	  section	  with	  various)	  examples	  of	  refutation	  is	  (now)	  finished.	  	   	   	   	   	   [Refuting	  the	  Principle]	  	   In	  the	  second	  (part	  that)	  refutes	  the	  principle	  (there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  Initially	  (he)	  presents	  the	  reckoning,	  then	  (he)	  dismissingly	  refutes	  (it).	  In	  the	  refutation	  initially	  (he	  provides	  a)	  verse,	  then	  (he)	  explains.	  In	  the	  verse	  (he)	  briefly	  brings	  up	  (the	  point	  that)	  individuals	  do	  not	  complete	  production.	  The	  upper	  half	  corresponds	  to	  bringing	  up	  a	  refutation	  of	  future	  production.	  The	  lower	  half	  brings	  up	  a	  refutation	  of	  past	  production.	  	  	   In	  the	  explanation	  (there	  are)	  two	  (parts).	  Initially	  (he	  provides)	  a	  single	  verse,	  then	  (he)	  generally	  concludes	  the	  gate.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   [Explanation	  Part	  1]	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   In	  the	  preceding	  (of	  the	  above	  two	  there	  are)	  two	  (subparts).	  First	  (he)	  explains	  production.	  Then,	  (he	  likewise	  applies	  this)	  precedent	  to	  abiding	  and	  extinction.	  	  	   In	  the	  preceding	  (of	  these	  two	  there	  are)	  three	  (additional	  parts).	  First,	  (he)	  explains,	  refuting	  self-­‐production.	  Second,	  (he)	  explains,	  refuting	  (the	  notion	  of)	  producing	  another.	  Third,	  (he)	  combines	  (the	  two),	  concluding	  (with	  a)	  dismissal	  and	  negation.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [First	  Part	  of	  Part	  1]	  	   In	  the	  first	  (of	  the	  three	  above	  there	  are)	  three	  (points).	  First	  (he	  renders	  a)	  judgement	  (based	  on	  precedent).	  Second,	  from	  “If	  the	  not	  yet	  produced…”	  [225c]	  (he)	  validly	  refutes	  (the	  idea).	  The	  initial	  (part)	  corresponds	  to	  a	  refutation	  of	  future	  production.	  	  Since	  (before	  future	  production	  we	  do)	  not	  as	  yet	  have	  an	  individual,	  what	  can	  self-­‐produce?	  (The	  section)	  from	  “If	  (one)	  claims…	  (it)	  is	  produced	  already…”	  brings	  up	  a	  refutation	  of	  past	  production.	  (He	  notes	  that	  in	  this	  case)	  since	  (it	  is)	  already	  produced,	  what	  necessity	  (is	  there	  to)	  self-­‐produce	  again?	  Third,	  from	  “For	  these	  reasons…”	  (he	  provides	  the)	  conclusion.	  	   Second,	  (in	  the	  section	  following	  the	  refutation	  of	  self-­‐production),	  from	  “If	  (the	  already	  and	  not	  yet	  produced)	  do	  not	  self-­‐produce…”	  (he)	  refutes	  producing	  another.	  	   Third,	  (from)	  	  “You	  assert…”	  (the	  two	  are)	  combined	  (and	  he)	  concludes	  (with	  a)	  dismissal	  and	  negation.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [Second	  Part	  of	  Part	  1]	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   Second,	  (the	  next	  part	  where	  he	  applies	  this)	  precedent	  to	  abiding	  and	  extinction	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  	   	   	   	   	   	   [Explanation	  Part	  2]	  	   Second,	  from	  “For	  these	  reasons…”	  he	  generally	  concludes	  (this	  particular)	  single	  gate.	  	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  Karmically	  Inactive	  Characteristics]	   	  	   In	  the	  second	  (part	  that)	  refutes	  (the	  notion	  of)	  karmically	  inactive	  (characteristics,	  there	  are)	  two	  (subsections).	  Initially	  (he)	  notes	  (the	  idea	  that)	  the	  preceding	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  subsequent.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  utilizing	  the	  precedent	  of	  the	  emptiness	  of	  characteristics	  (means)	  that	  which	  is	  characterized	  is	  also	  empty.	  These	  karmically	  (active	  dharmas	  are	  also)	  empty	  as	  a	  result	  (and	  the)	  karmically	  inactive	  (dharmas)	  aroused	  subsequently	  (are	  then)	  also	  empty.	  	   Second,	  in	  the	  (part	  with	  the)	  valid	  refutation,	  first	  (he	  provides)	  a	  valid	  refutation,	  then	  (he)	  refutes	  the	  saving	  (rejoinder).	  In	  the	  preceding	  (of	  these	  two),	  first	  (he)	  presents	  (the	  refutation),	  then	  (he)	  explains.	  	  	   	   	   	   [Explanation	  of	  the	  Refutation]	  	   In	  the	  explanation	  (there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  	  	   First	  (he)	  refutes	  the	  (notion	  of	  an)	  essence	  of	  the	  karmically	  inactive.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (he)	  clarifies	  (the	  point	  that)	  extinction	  retires	  the	  karmically	  active.	  (Given)	  this	  then	  there	  is	  no	  (remaining)	  thing.	  (So)	  what	  further	  dharma	  is	  there	  (to	  be)	  designated	  as	  creating	  the	  karmically	  inactive?	  As	  a	  result	  (of	  that,	  one	  then)	  lacks	  an	  essence	  of	  these	  karmically	  inactive	  dharmas.	  Furthermore,	  since	  the	  karmically	  active	  are	  (already)	  empty	  (and)	  lack	  extinguish-­‐ability,	  as	  a	  result	  there	  are	  no	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karmically	  inactive	  (dharmas).	  Second,	  from	  “Again…”,	  (he)	  refutes	  karmically	  inactive	  characteristics.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  because	  there	  are	  no	  characteristics	  displayed,	  there	  is	  no	  essence	  (so	  characterized).	  Since	  the	  three	  characteristics	  are	  (the	  marks	  of	  the)	  karmically	  active,	  lacking	  the	  three	  is	  exactly	  (equivalent	  to)	  lacking	  dharmas.	  (Consequently,)	  how	  can	  (one)	  consider	  the	  lack	  of	  dharmas	  as	  a	  characteristic?	  Therefore,	  the	  lack	  (of	  such	  karmically	  inactive	  dharmas)	  is	  (certainly	  the	  case).	  	   	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  the	  Rejoinder]	  	   Second,	  from	  “If	  (one)	  claims…”	  (he)	  refutes	  the	  saving	  (rejoinder).	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  two	  (parts).	  	  	   	   	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  Essences]	  	   First	  (he)	  refutes	  (the	  idea	  that)	  treats	  the	  essence	  as	  displaying	  characteristics.	  Second,	  (he)	  refutes	  the	  contrary	  (condition	  as)	  revealing	  characteristics.	  In	  the	  preceding	  (there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  First	  he	  records	  (their)	  reckoning	  and	  generally	  negates	  (it).	  Second,	  (he)	  validly	  refutes	  (it).	  In	  the	  valid	  refutation	  (there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  First,	  (he)	  generally	  investigates	  known	  characteristics.	  Second,	  (he	  is)	  specifically	  concerned	  (with)	  an	  investigation	  of	  existent	  characteristics.	  Third,	  (he	  is)	  specifically	  concerned	  with	  an	  investigation	  of	  nonexistent	  characteristics.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  (they)	  exist	  then	  (that)	  deviates	  from	  the	  proposition.	  If	  nonexistent,	  then	  (they)	  are	  erroneously	  displayed	  as	  a	  result.	  All	  (these	  points)	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  	   	   	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  Opposites]	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   Second,	  from	  “If	  (one)	  claims…”	  (he)	  refutes	  (the	  idea	  of)	  the	  opposite	  (as)	  revealing	  	  characteristics.	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  four	  (parts).	  	  	   First,	  (he)	  records	  the	  reckoning	  and	  generally	  negates	  (it).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  initially	  (he	  provides)	  an	  example,	  then	  (he	  mentions	  the)	  dharma	  (in	  question).	  The	  heterodox	  idea	  (is	  that	  characteristics)	  are	  like	  clothes	  that	  all	  have	  specific,	  descriptively	  verifiable	  characteristics.	  (As)	  only	  one	  (article	  of)	  clothing	  lacks	  (such)	  descriptively	  verifiable	  characteristics	  (they)	  accordingly	  designate	  this	  (article	  of)	  clothing	  (by)	  naming	  (it)	  the	  “clothing	  without	  characteristics.”	  (They)	  do	  not	  claim	  there	  is	  no	  dharma	  of	  this	  clothing	  but	  (only)	  consider	  the	  contrasting	  clothing	  as	  having	  characteristics.	  (They)	  speak	  of	  this	  (type	  of	  clothing)	  as	  “nonexistent”	  (and	  consider)	  karmically	  inactive	  (dharmas)	  as	  also	  thus.	  Therefore,	  (they	  say	  this)	  is	  not	  (a	  case	  of	  a)	  nonexistent	  dharma.	  	  	   The	  second	  (of	  the	  four	  parts)	  explains	  the	  refutation.	  	  	   The	  third,	  from	  “For	  these	  reasons…”,	  (provides	  the)	  concluding	  negation.	  	   Fourth,	  (he)	  points	  to	  the	  subsequent	  refutation.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  in	  the	  gate	  after	  this	  (one	  he)	  refutes	  (the	  notion)	  that	  (dharmas)	  have	  characteristics	  and	  (that)	  lacking	  characteristics	  is	  (the	  case).	  The	  (following)	  four	  categorical	  (statements)	  dispelling	  (the	  notion	  that)	  all	  (types	  of	  dharmas)	  lack	  (essential	  characteristics	  and)	  do	  not	  return	  to	  emptiness	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	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The	  Gate	  of	  Contemplating	  Existent	  Characteristics	  and	  Nonexistent	  
Characteristics	  
The	  Fifth	  (Gate)	  [The	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  [cont.	  163c]	  	   Again,	  all	  dharmas	  are	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature).	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  	  	  	   The	  characteristics	  of	  existent	  characteristics	  do	  not	  characterize.	  	   Nonexistent	  characteristics	  also	  do	  not	  characterize.	  	   Apart	  from	  the	  characterized	  and	  not	  characterized,	  	   	   Characteristics	  are	  what	  (sort	  of	  thing)	  which	  characterize?	  	  Among	  phenomena	  with	  characteristics,	  characteristics	  do	  not	  characterize	  (anything).	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  If	  dharmas	  antecedently	  have	  characteristics,	  of	  what	  further	  use	  are	  (additional)	  characteristics?	  	   Again,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  among	  phenomena	  with	  characteristics,	  characteristics	  (still)	  come	  to	  characterize	  (them),	  then	  there	  are	  two	  errors	  of	  characterization.	  The	  first	  is	  (the	  error	  of)	  antecedently	  existent	  characteristics	  (and)	  the	  second	  (is	  the	  error	  of)	  characteristics	  that	  come	  to	  characterize.	  Therefore,	  among	  phenomena	  that	  (already)	  have	  characteristics,	  characteristics	  lack	  that	  which	  (needs	  to	  be)	  characterized.	  Among	  phenomena	  without	  characteristics,	  characteristics	  also	  lack	  that	  which	  (can	  be)	  characterized.	  (This	  being	  the	  case,)	  what	  dharma	  (can	  be)	  designated	  as	  lacking	  characteristics	  even	  while	  still	  considering	  it	  as	  characterized	  by	  having	  characteristics?	  This	  is	  like	  an	  elephant	  that	  has	  two	  tusks,	  a	  hanging	  trunk,	  a	  head	  with	  three	  protuberances,	  ears	  like	  winnowing	  baskets,	  a	  spine	  like	  a	  curved	  bow,	  a	  belly	  that	  is	  large	  and	  droops,	  a	  tail	  with	  hair	  at	  the	  end,	  and	  four	  legs	  that	  are	  chunky	  and	  round.	  These	  constitute	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  elephant.	  If	  we	  depart	  from	  these	  characteristics	  then	  there	  is	  no	  other	  existent	  elephant	  that	  may	  be	  characterized	  by	  characteristics.	  In	  this	  fashion,	  amidst	  existent	  characteristics,	  characteristics	  lack	  that	  which	  (they)	  characterize.	  (Furthermore,)	  amidst	  a	  lack	  of	  characteristics,	  characteristics	  also	  lack	  that	  which	  (they)	  characterize.	  Apart	  from	  having	  characteristics	  and	  lacking	  characteristics	  there	  is	  no	  third	  (type	  of)	  dharma	  that	  may	  be	  characterized	  by	  characteristics.	  For	  these	  reasons	  characteristics	  lack	  that	  which	  (they)	  characterize.	  Because	  characteristics	  lack	  that	  which	  [164a]	  (they)	  characterize,	  dharmas	  that	  are	  characterizable	  are	  also	  not	  established.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  It	  is	  by	  means	  of	  characteristics	  that	  we	  therefore	  (come	  to)	  know	  these	  phenomena	  designated	  as	  characterizable.	  (But)	  for	  these	  causes	  and	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conditions	  therefore	  the	  characteristics	  (which	  designate)	  and	  the	  characterizable	  (which	  is	  so	  designated)	  are	  both	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature).	  Because	  characteristics	  and	  the	  characterizable	  are	  (both)	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature),	  the	  myriad	  things	  are	  also	  (all)	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature).	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  Apart	  from	  characteristics	  and	  the	  characterizable	  there	  is	  no	  further	  existent	  thing.	  Because	  (all	  such)	  things	  are	  nonexistent,	  nonthings	  are	  also	  nonexistent.	  It	  is	  by	  the	  extinction	  of	  a	  thing	  that	  (such	  a	  state	  is)	  therefore	  designated	  as	  lacking	  the	  thing.	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  there	  is	  no	  thing,	  then	  what	  is	  that	  which	  is	  extinguished?	  For	  this	  reason,	  (such	  an	  absence	  of	  a	  thing)	  is	  designated	  as	  “lacking	  the	  thing.”	  Since	  things	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  things	  are	  both	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature),	  therefore	  all	  karmically	  active	  dharmas	  are	  empty.	  Since	  
karmically	  active	  dharmas	  are	  empty,	  therefore	  karmically	  inactive	  dharmas	  are	  also	  empty.	  Since	  karmically	  active	  and	  karmically	  inactive	  (dharmas)	  are	  empty,	  therefore	  the	  self	  is	  also	  empty.	  	   [End	  of	  Chapter	  Five	  of	  the	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  	   [Commentary	  by	  Fa-­‐tsang]	  	  	   (There	  are)	  four	  sections	  (in	  this	  chapter,	  just)	  like	  the	  preceding	  (one).	  	   	   [The	  Name	  of	  the	  Gate]	  	   1.	  As	  for	  explaining	  the	  name,	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  two	  aspects	  of	  existence	  and	  nonexistence,	  (this	  gate)	  investigates	  and	  dispels	  their	  characteristics.	  (The	  chapter)	  consequently	  takes	  (its)	  name	  from	  the	  (errors)	  dispelled.	  	   	   [Derivation	  of	  the	  Ideas]	  	   2.	  As	  for	  deriving	  the	  ideas,	  while	  the	  preceding	  gate	  refuted	  characteristics,	  fearing	  (the	  reader)	  is	  still	  not	  yet	  awakened	  (to	  the	  key	  point,	  he)	  demands	  further	  (explanation.	  Namely,)	  among	  dharmas	  that	  may	  be	  characterized,	  existent	  characteristics	  therefore	  characterize;	  nonexistent	  characteristics	  	  (also)	  therefore	  characterize.	  As	  both	  (together)	  therefore	  characterize,	  for	  this	  reason	  (a	  need	  for	  further	  elaboration)	  arrives.	  	   	   [The	  Propositions	  Clarified]	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   3.	  As	  for	  that	  which	  is	  clarified,	  existent	  and	  nonexistent	  (notions)	  are	  all	  
[226a]	  exhausted.	  Without	  lodging,	  (a	  mindset)	  near	  to	  emptiness	  is	  (then	  possible).	  	   	   [Explanation]	  	   4.	  The	  explanatory	  section	  has	  four	  (parts).	  First,	  (he)	  presents	  (the	  point).	  Second,	  (he)	  explains	  (it).	  Third,	  (he)	  concludes	  (and)	  fourth,	  (he)	  categorically	  (negates	  the	  errors).	  	   	   	   [Presentation	  of	  the	  Point]	  	   Within	  the	  first	  (of	  the	  four	  parts	  above),	  as	  for	  (the	  reference	  to)	  “all	  
dharmas,”	  (these)	  are	  the	  karmically	  active	  and	  the	  karmically	  inactive	  (dharmas	  which)	  are	  all	  empty.	  	   	   	   [Explanation	  of	  the	  Point]	  	   2.	  In	  the	  explanation	  (there	  are)	  two	  (parts).	  First,	  (he)	  investigates	  and	  presents	  (the	  key	  points	  and)	  briefly	  refutes	  (them).	  Subsequently	  he	  explains	  the	  verse	  and	  broadly	  refutes	  (the	  errors).	  	  	   In	  the	  former	  (of	  the	  above	  two	  he)	  initially	  (considers	  the)	  rationale,	  investigating	  and	  presenting	  (the	  idea).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (he	  investigates	  the	  question	  of)	  how	  (one)	  comes	  to	  know	  that	  all	  dharmas	  are	  empty.	  Subsequently	  he	  establishes	  a	  verse	  and	  briefly	  explains.	  Therein	  the	  first	  section	  refutes	  existent	  characteristics.	  The	  second	  refutes	  nonexistent	  characteristics.	  The	  third	  refutes	  both	  and	  the	  fourth	  concludes	  (with)	  emptiness.	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   In	  the	  second	  (of	  the	  above	  two	  parts	  of	  the	  explanation,	  the	  part	  that)	  broadly	  explains,	  (there	  are)	  three	  (points).	  Initially	  he	  explains,	  refuting	  existent	  (characteristics).	  Second,	  (he)	  refutes	  (their)	  nonexistence.	  Third,	  (he)	  refutes	  both.	  	   	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  Existent	  Characteristics]	  	   In	  the	  first	  (of	  these	  three	  parts	  there	  are)	  three	  (subparts).	  Initially	  (he	  notes	  that)	  taking	  away	  (defining	  characteristics)	  leads	  to	  losing	  the	  (the	  essential)	  characteristic	  and	  refutes	  (its)	  existence.	  The	  presentation	  and	  explanation	  (in	  this	  section)	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  Second,	  (he)	  grants	  (the	  hypothethetical)	  then	  (shows	  that)	  the	  two	  characteristics	  are	  refuted.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (he	  addresses)	  the	  rationale	  for	  the	  two	  characteristics	  of	  “new”	  and	  “old.”	  Third,	  from	  “For	  these	  reasons…”	  (he	  provides	  a)	  concluding	  negation.	  	   	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  Nonexistent	  Characteristics]	   	  	   In	  the	  second	  (part	  that)	  refutes	  nonexistent	  (characteristics),	  first	  (he)	  presents	  (the	  key	  point).	  Subsequently	  he	  brings	  up	  phenomena,	  explaining	  and	  revealing	  (the	  point).	  Previously,	  in	  (the	  section	  that)	  refutes	  existent	  (characteristics),	  by	  considering	  attachment	  to	  existence,	  (he	  shows)	  there	  is	  no	  (arising)	  that	  can	  characterize.	  Because	  of	  lacking	  that	  which	  can	  characterize,	  (one)	  also	  lacks	  that	  which	  is	  characterized.	  (Now)	  in	  this	  (part),	  by	  considering	  attachment	  to	  nonexistence,	  (he	  shows)	  there	  is	  no	  (arising)	  which	  is	  characterized.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  lacking	  that	  which	  is	  characterized,	  (one)	  also	  lacks	  (that	  which)	  can	  characterize.	  This	  is	  the	  point	  of	  the	  passage.	  	   	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  Both]	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   Third,	  from	  “In	  this	  fashion…”	  (there	  are)	  sentences	  explaining	  and	  refuting	  both	  (possibilities	  combined).	  Considering	  (the	  point	  that)	  apart	  from	  (the)	  two	  (possibilities	  already	  covered)	  there	  is	  no	  third	  (option),	  therefore	  emptiness	  is	  (finally	  the	  case).	  	   	   	   [Concluding	  Negation]	  	   Third,	  from	  “For	  these	  reasons…”	  (is)	  the	  third	  (point	  where	  he)	  generally	  (summarizes	  with	  a)	  concluding	  negation.	  	   	   	   [Categorically	  Dispelling	  the	  Errors]	  	   In	  the	  fourth	  (section	  where	  he)	  categorically	  dispels	  (the	  errors	  there	  are)	  six	  (points):	  	   1.	  The	  presentation	  and	  explanation	  categorically	  dispelling	  the	  existence	  of	  
dharmas	  by	  (means	  of)	  characteristics	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  	   2.	  (Here	  he	  provides)	  a	  presentation	  and	  explanation	  that	  uses	  one	  to	  categorically	  dispel	  the	  (notion	  that	  the)	  many	  are	  also	  existent.	  	   3.	  By	  existence	  (he)	  categorically	  dispels	  nonexistence.	  	   4.	  By	  (the	  notion	  of	  a)	  “thing”	  (he)	  categorically	  dispels	  (the	  notion	  of)	  
karmically	  active	  (dharmas).	  	   5.	  (He)	  categorically	  dispels	  (the	  notion	  of)	  karmically	  inactive	  (dharmas).	  	   6.	  (He)	  categorically	  dispels	  (the	  notion	  of	  a)	  self.	  	   Therefore	  (at	  this	  point	  he)	  completes	  the	  above	  (refutation	  of	  the	  errors	  and)	  presents	  the	  principle	  that	  all	  dharmas	  are	  empty.	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The	  Sixth	  (Gate)	  [The	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  [cont.	  164a]	  	   Again,	  all	  dharmas	  are	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature).	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  	  	   (As	  for)	  characteristics	  and	  the	  characterizable,	  	   	   neither	  their	  identity	  nor	  their	  difference	  is	  attainable.	  	   If	  there	  is	  neither	  identity	  nor	  difference,	  	   	   how	  can	  these	  two	  be	  established?	  	  	   (As	  for)	  this	  (pair	  of)	  characteristics	  and	  the	  characterizable,	  if	  (their)	  identity	  is	  not	  attainable,	  (their)	  difference	  too	  is	  not	  attainable.	  If	  neither	  (their)	  identity	  nor	  (their)	  difference	  is	  attainable,	  then	  these	  two	  are	  not	  established.	  For	  these	  reasons	  both	  characteristics	  and	  the	  characterizable	  are	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature).	  Because	  characteristics	  and	  the	  characterizable	  are	  empty,	  all	  dharmas	  are	  empty.	  	   Question:	  Characteristics	  and	  the	  characterizable	  are	  always	  established.	  Why	  (do	  you	  assert)	  they	  are	  not	  established?	  You	  assert	  that	  the	  identity	  or	  difference	  of	  characteristics	  and	  the	  characterizable	  is	  not	  attainable.	  Now	  (instead)	  you	  should	  assert	  that	  (in	  regards	  to)	  every	  thing	  either	  characteristics	  are	  exactly	  the	  characterizable,	  or	  characteristics	  are	  different	  from	  the	  characterizable,	  or	  (things	  are)	  partially	  characteristics	  and	  the	  remainder	  the	  characterizable.	  	  	   (The	  first	  possibility	  is)	  like,	  (for	  example,	  where)	  the	  characteristic	  of	  consciousness	  is	  awareness	  and	  apart	  from	  the	  awareness	  which	  is	  functional	  there	  is	  no	  further	  consciousness.	  (Similarly,)	  the	  characteristic	  of	  sensation	  is	  sensing	  and	  apart	  from	  the	  sensing	  which	  is	  functional	  there	  is	  no	  further	  sensation.	  Just	  like	  this	  the	  various	  characteristics	  are	  exactly	  the	  characterizable.	  	   (The	  second	  possibility	  is)	  like	  the	  Buddha	  said,	  extinguishing	  desire	  is	  designated	  nirvana.	  Desire	  is	  a	  karmically	  active	  dharma	  with	  karmic	  outflows.53	  Extinction	  is	  a	  karmically	  inactive	  dharma	  lacking	  karmic	  outflows.	  It	  is	  like	  a	  believer	  who	  has	  three	  characteristics:	  (he)	  enjoys	  approaching	  good	  people,	  joyfully	  wants	  to	  hear	  the	  Dharma,	  and	  enjoys	  practicing	  charity.	  Because	  these	  three	  phenomena	  are	  karmas	  of	  body	  and	  speech,	  (they)	  are	  that	  which	  the	  form	  
skandha	  includes.54	  Because	  faith	  is	  a	  dharma	  of	  mental	  conditions,	  it	  is	  that	  which	  the	  samskara	  skandha	  includes.	  These	  designated	  characteristics	  and	  (their	  associated)	  characterizable	  are	  different.	  	   	  (Furthermore,	  the	  third	  possibility	  is)	  like	  the	  right	  views	  which	  are	  a	  characteristic	  of	  the	  (Eightfold	  Noble)	  Path.	  In	  regards	  to	  that	  Path	  (right	  views)	  are	  (one)	  small	  part.	  Furthermore,	  production,	  abiding,	  and	  extinction	  are	  karmically	  active	  characteristics.	  In	  regards	  to	  karmically	  active	  dharmas,	  (these	  three)	  are	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(one)	  small	  part	  (of	  the	  larger	  group).	  In	  this	  fashion,	  among	  the	  characterizable	  a	  part	  is	  designated	  as	  the	  characteristics.	  	  	   For	  these	  reasons	  either	  characteristics	  are	  exactly	  the	  characterizable,	  or	  characteristics	  are	  different	  from	  the	  characterizable,	  or	  part	  of	  the	  characterizable	  constitutes	  characteristics.	  (Now,	  as	  for)	  your	  assertion	  that	  because	  the	  identity	  and/or	  difference	  of	  characteristics	  and	  the	  characterizable	  is	  not	  established,	  (and	  therefore)	  characteristics	  and	  the	  characterizable	  are	  not	  established,	  this	  matter	  is	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  (So,	  what	  then	  is	  the	  problem	  here?)	  	   Answer:	  You	  state,	  “either	  characteristics	  are	  the	  characterizable,”	  (and	  illustrate	  claiming	  this	  is)	  like	  consciousness,	  and	  so	  on.	  But	  this	  matter	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:	  It	  must	  be	  so)	  because	  that	  which	  is	  knowable	  by	  characteristics	  is	  designated	  as	  the	  “characterizable”	  (while)	  that	  which	  functionally	  (indicates	  the	  knowable)	  is	  designated	  as	  the	  “characteristic.”	  [164b]	  All	  things	  are	  not	  capable	  of	  self	  (-­‐indicating)	  knowledge,	  just	  like	  a	  finger	  is	  not	  capable	  of	  touching	  itself	  (and)	  an	  eye	  is	  not	  capable	  of	  seeing	  itself.	  Therefore	  (as	  for)	  your	  assertion	  that	  consciousness	  is	  exactly	  a	  characteristic	  and	  the	  characterizable,	  this	  matter	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  	   Again,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  the	  characteristic	  is	  the	  characterizable,	  we	  ought	  not	  be	  able	  to	  differentiate	  (between)	  this	  characteristic	  and	  (that)	  characterizable.	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  (we	  can)	  differentiate	  between	  this	  characteristic	  and	  (that)	  characterizable,	  (then	  we)	  ought	  not	  claim	  the	  characteristic	  is	  exactly	  the	  characterizable.	  	   Again,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  characteristics	  are	  exactly	  the	  characterizable,	  then	  cause	  and	  effect	  are	  one	  (and	  the	  same).	  How	  then	  (could	  we	  know	  the)	  characteristic	  is	  a	  cause	  and	  the	  characterizable	  is	  an	  effect?	  (In	  such	  a	  case)	  these	  two	  are	  one	  (and	  the	  same)	  when	  in	  fact	  they	  are	  not	  one	  (and	  the	  same).	  Therefore	  (as	  for	  the	  notion	  that)	  characteristics	  are	  exactly	  the	  characterizable,	  (well,)	  this	  matter	  is	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  	   (Alternately,	  if)	  you	  assert	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  characteristics	  differ	  from	  the	  characterizable,	  (then)	  this	  too	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  	  You	  assert	  that	  extinguished	  desire	  is	  a	  characteristic	  of	  nirvana	  (while)	  not	  asserting	  that	  desire	  is	  a	  characteristic	  of	  
nirvana.	  If	  you	  assert	  that	  desire	  is	  a	  characteristic	  of	  nirvana,	  you	  should	  speak	  of	  a	  difference	  between	  the	  characteristic	  and	  the	  characterizable.	  (On	  the	  other	  hand,)	  if	  you	  say	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  extinguished	  desire	  is	  a	  characteristic	  of	  nirvana,	  then	  (you)	  do	  not	  get	  to	  speak	  of	  a	  difference	  between	  the	  characteristic	  and	  the	  characterizable.	  	   Furthermore,	  you	  assert	  believers	  have	  three	  characteristics	  (but	  in	  fact)	  both	  (the	  believer	  and	  the	  characteristics)	  do	  not	  differ.	  If	  believers	  lack	  (the	  characteristics	  of)	  belief,	  	  (they)	  therefore	  lack	  these	  three	  phenomenal	  (characteristics	  that	  mark	  them	  as	  “believers”).	  As	  a	  result	  (we)	  do	  not	  attain	  a	  difference	  between	  characteristics	  and	  the	  characterizable.	  	   Furthermore,	  as	  for	  (the	  notion	  of)	  a	  difference	  between	  characteristics	  and	  the	  characterizable,	  characteristics	  (themselves)	  also	  ought	  to	  have	  characteristics.	  (In	  that	  case	  this)	  then	  constitutes	  (a	  regress)	  without	  end.	  (In	  fact)	  though,	  this	  
	   182	  
matter	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  Therefore	  characteristics	  and	  the	  characterizable	  do	  not	  come	  to	  differ.	  	   Question:	  Just	  like	  a	  lamp	  that	  can	  illuminate	  itself	  and	  also	  illuminate	  other	  (things),	  similarly	  a	  characteristic	  can	  characterize	  itself	  and	  also	  characterize	  other	  (things.	  So,	  what	  is	  the	  problem	  here?)	  	   Answer:	  Your	  claim	  regarding	  the	  lamp	  example	  has	  been	  refuted	  already	  in	  (the	  earlier	  section	  dealing	  with	  the)	  three	  (types	  of)	  karmically	  active	  characteristics.	  Furthermore,	  you	  contradict	  yourself	  (with	  an)	  earlier	  assertion.	  Above	  you	  said	  characteristics	  and	  the	  characterizable	  differ.	  	  Now	  however	  you	  say	  characteristics	  can	  self-­‐characterize	  and	  also	  characterize	  others.	  This	  matter	  (simply	  cannot)	  be	  so.	  	   Furthermore	  you	  asserted	  that	  the	  parts	  amidst	  the	  characterizable	  are	  characteristics.	  (But)	  this	  matter	  (too	  simply	  cannot)	  be	  so.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  The	  meaning	  of	  this	  (point	  lies)	  either	  in	  their	  identity	  or	  in	  (their)	  difference.	  Because	  the	  notion	  of	  identity	  and/or	  difference	  has	  been	  previously	  refuted	  already,	  we	  should	  understand	  (that	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  characterizable,	  as)	  in	  part	  characteristics,	  is	  also	  refuted.	  	   In	  this	  fashion	  (as	  for	  the)	  characteristics	  and/or	  characterizable	  (associated	  with)	  various	  causes	  and	  conditions,	  their	  identity	  may	  not	  be	  attained	  nor	  may	  their	  difference	  be	  attained.	  There	  is	  no	  further	  third	  dharma	  that	  forms	  characteristics	  or	  the	  characterizable.	  Therefore	  characteristics	  and	  the	  chararcterizable	  are	  both	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature).	  	   [End	  of	  Chapter	  Six	  of	  the	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  	   [Commentary	  by	  Fa-­‐tsang]	  	  	   	   [The	  Name	  of	  the	  Gate]	  	  	   First,	  as	  for	  explaining	  the	  name,	  (he	  uses	  this	  chapter	  title)	  because	  (notions	  of)	  identity	  and	  difference	  are	  that	  which	  are	  dispelled.	  (We	  can)	  further	  state	  (he)	  dispels	  identity	  and	  difference	  by	  advancing	  to	  true	  emptiness	  and	  therefore	  (this	  is)	  taken	  as	  a	  “gate.”	  	   	   [Derivation	  of	  the	  Ideas]	  	   Second,	  as	  for	  deriving	  the	  ideas,	  the	  preceding	  (gate)	  uses	  existence	  and	  nonexistence	  to	  refute	  characteristics	  (such	  that	  notions	  of)	  the	  characterizable	  are	  already	  exhausted.	  But,	  by	  yet	  again	  having	  a	  gate	  of	  identity	  and	  difference	  to	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repeatedly	  refute	  (the	  error,	  he)	  causes	  the	  attached	  mind	  (to	  be)	  forever	  exhausted	  (while	  an	  understanding	  of)	  the	  true	  principle	  is	  stabilized.	  For	  this	  reason	  (he)	  concludes	  (by	  addressing)	  the	  identity	  and	  difference	  of	  characteristics	  and	  the	  characterizable,	  and	  (also)	  both	  (together)	  while	  yet	  again	  refuting	  (the	  error).	  	   	   [The	  Propositions	  Clarified]	  	   Third,	  as	  for	  that	  which	  is	  clarified,	  (it)	  is	  (the	  point	  that)	  by	  refuting	  the	  identity	  and	  difference	  of	  characteristics	  and	  the	  characterizable	  (so	  that)	  both	  are	  exhausted	  (he)	  leads	  the	  contemplative	  mind	  to	  illuminate	  the	  principle	  (of	  emptiness).	  	   	   [Explanation]	  	   Fourth,	  in	  explaining	  the	  passage	  (there	  are)	  two	  (parts).	  The	  first	  part	  presents	  the	  proposition.	  Subsequently	  he	  explains	  and	  refutes	  (the	  error).	  In	  the	  refutation	  (there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  Initially	  (he	  provides	  a)	  valid	  refutation.	  Subsequently	  (he)	  refutes	  the	  saving	  (rejoinder).	  	  	   	   	   [Initial	  Refutation]	  	   In	  the	  first	  (of	  the	  above	  two	  there	  are)	  three	  (subparts).	  Initially	  (he	  quotes	  a)	  verse.	  The	  upper	  half	  refutes	  (the	  notions	  of)	  identity	  and	  difference.	  The	  lower	  half	  refutes	  (the	  notions	  of)	  characteristics	  and	  the	  characterizable.	  (This	  part)	  also	  concludes	  (with	  their)	  nonexistence.	  	  	   Second,	  (he)	  explains	  (the	  verse).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (the	  idea	  is)	  if	  they	  are	  identical,	  then	  characteristics	  lack	  the	  ability	  to	  display	  (the	  characterizable.	  This	  is)	  because	  (the	  characteristic)	  is	  the	  same	  as	  that	  which	  is	  characterized.	  (But)	  if	  they	  are	  different,	  (then	  that	  too)	  does	  not	  constitute	  displaying	  (the	  characterizable.	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This	  is)	  because	  (characteristics	  then)	  do	  not	  mutually	  cause	  (the	  characterizable	  to	  be	  evident.	  This	  is)	  because	  (each)	  is	  the	  same	  as	  (the)	  other	  dharma.	  Consequently	  it	  says	  “(their)	  identity	  and/or	  difference	  is	  not	  attainable.”	  From	  “(their)	  identity	  and/or	  difference	  is	  not	  attainable…”	  explains	  the	  lower	  half	  (of	  the	  verse	  and)	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  	   Third,	  from	  “For	  this	  reason…”	  (he)	  categorically	  dispels	  (the	  error,)	  [226b]	  concluding	  the	  proposition.	   	  	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  the	  Rejoinder]	  	   Second,	  in	  (the	  part	  where	  he)	  refutes	  the	  saving	  (rejoinder,	  there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  Initially	  (he	  presents	  the)	  heterodox	  (response).	  Then	  (he)	  explains	  the	  refutation.	  	  	   	   	   	   [The	  Rejoinder]	  	   In	  the	  saving	  (rejoinder	  we	  see	  that)	  by	  hearing	  characteristics	  and	  dharmas	  are	  both	  empty	  and	  attachments	  to	  sensations	  lack	  support,	  (the	  opponent)	  consequently	  takes	  hold	  of	  forms	  like	  phenomena,	  (trying	  to)	  categorically	  save	  the	  two	  relations.	  Furthermore,	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  explanation,	  the	  verse	  dispelling	  phenomena	  is	  complete	  yet	  human	  sensations	  (create)	  many	  delusions.	  Consequently	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  provisionally	  establish	  the	  heterodox	  saving	  (rejoinder	  to)	  broadly	  refute	  that	  which	  is	  misleading.	  	  	   Therein	  (there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  First	  	  (Nagarjuna)	  records	  the	  (opponent’s)	  frightened	  rebuke	  of	  (his	  initial)	  refutation.	  Second,	  (he	  shows	  how	  the	  opponent)	  establishes	  characteristics	  to	  save	  dharmas.	  Third	  (he)	  concludes,	  (showing	  that)	  the	  (opponent’s)	  refutation,	  (allegedly	  disproving	  Nagarjuna’s	  view,)	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  
	   185	  
	   In	  the	  second	  (of	  the	  above	  three,	  the)	  saving	  (rejoinder	  that)	  establishes	  characteristics,	  (there	  are)	  two	  (parts).	  First,	  (Nagarjuna)	  reveals	  three	  sections	  (that	  are)	  accordingly	  (intended	  to)	  overturn	  the	  above	  three	  parts	  (of	  his	  argument).	  Subsequently	  he	  explains	  three	  matters	  (in	  a	  discussion	  that)	  forms	  three	  sections.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   [Identical]	   	  	   In	  the	  first	  (part,	  the	  one	  which)	  explains	  identity,	  (there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  First,	  (the	  opponent)	  brings	  up	  the	  two	  examples	  of	  consciousness	  and	  sensation.	  Just	  as	  consciousness	  takes	  comprehension	  specifically	  as	  (its)	  characteristic,	  and	  also	  takes	  comprehension	  specifically	  as	  (its)	  essence,	  sensations	  are	  also	  like	  this.	  Second,	  from	  “In	  this	  fashion…”	  he	  concludes	  the	  proposition.	  	   	   	   	   	   [Different]	  	   In	  the	  second	  (of	  the	  three	  parts,	  the	  one	  which)	  explains	  difference,	  (there	  are)	  also	  two	  (points).	  First	  (the	  opponent)	  brings	  up	  the	  two	  examples	  of	  extinction	  and	  belief.	  Subsequently,	  from	  “These	  designated…”	  he	  concludes.	  In	  the	  preceding	  (of	  these	  two	  he	  first	  deals	  with)	  external	  (dharmas).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (he	  addresses)	  the	  (notion	  that	  the)	  extinction	  of	  desire	  differs	  from	  nirvana.	  Subsequently	  (he	  notes	  that)	  considering	  these	  three	  phenomena	  (as	  located)	  with	  the	  body	  and	  speech,	  (means	  they)	  belong	  to	  the	  form	  skandha.	  (But)	  belief	  is	  an	  (internal)	  mental	  
dharma	  (and)	  belongs	  to	  the	  consciousness	  skandha.	  (Even	  so,	  he	  claims	  that)	  externally	  seeing	  there	  are	  these	  three	  (external)	  phenomena	  (of	  faith	  means	  one	  then)	  knows	  internally	  there	  is	  a	  faithful	  mind.	  For	  this	  reason,	  (dharmas	  of)	  form	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and	  the	  mind	  create	  characteristics	  and	  consequently,	  (he	  claims,	  we)	  know	  (they)	  are	  different.	  	   	   	   	   	   [Both	  Identical	  and	  Different]	   	  	   In	  the	  third	  (of	  the	  three	  parts,	  the	  one	  which	  explains	  the	  idea	  that	  characteristics	  and	  the	  characterizable	  are)	  both	  the	  same	  and	  different,	  (there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  First	  (the	  opponent)	  brings	  up	  two	  examples.	  Subsequently	  (he)	  concludes	  (the	  point).	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   [First	  Example]	  	   In	  the	  first	  (the	  opponent)	  initially	  brings	  up	  the	  example	  of	  Right	  Views.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  Right	  Views	  are	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  (Eightfold	  Noble)	  Path	  and	  therefore	  (a)	  small	  part	  (of	  the	  whole)	  is	  characterizable	  (by	  that	  whole.	  Yet,)	  again	  it	  is	  a	  branch	  of	  the	  Eightfold	  Noble	  Middle	  Path	  and	  therefore	  a	  small	  part	  is,	  (in	  turn,	  that	  which)	  can	  characterize	  (the	  whole).	  Furthermore,	  Right	  Views	  are	  wisdom.	  Right	  (Views)	  are	  a	  universal	  essence	  of	  the	  Truth	  of	  the	  Path.	  (This	  being)	  the	  case,	  (it)	  is	  one	  number	  among	  the	  Eight	  (Noble	  Truths	  and)	  consequently	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  “small	  part.”	  (But,	  it	  is)	  universal	  (to	  all	  eight	  and)	  consequently	  is	  (that	  which)	  can	  characterize	  (the	  whole.	  Even	  so,	  it	  is	  a)	  specific	  (part	  and)	  consequently	  constitutes	  a	  characterizable	  (element	  of	  the	  whole).	  	   	   	   	   	   	   [Second	  Example]	  	   (In	  the)	  second	  (of	  the	  above	  section’s	  two	  parts)	  he	  brings	  up	  examples	  of	  the	  three	  characteristics.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  corresponding	  to	  the	  75	  dharmas	  of	  the	  
Hinayana	  (schools)	  the	  division	  constitutes	  (the)	  two	  groups	  (of	  dharmic	  types).	  The	  preceding	  72	  are	  karmically	  active	  (dharmas).	  The	  subsequent	  three	  are	  karmically	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inactive	  (dharmas.	  Now)	  in	  regards	  to	  (those	  dharmas)	  in	  the	  karmically	  active	  group,	  the	  three	  universal	  (aspects	  of)	  production,	  abiding,	  and	  extinction,	  along	  with	  all	  karmically	  active	  dharmas,	  create	  characteristics.	  (Their)	  particular	  substance	  is	  again,	  a	  small	  part	  within	  the	  count	  (of	  members)	  among	  the	  karmically	  active	  dharmas.	  For	  this	  reason,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  (these	  three),	  along	  with	  the	  
karmically	  active	  (dharmas)	  which	  are	  characterized	  (by	  them),	  are	  not	  different,	  (then	  one)	  ought	  not,	  in	  regards	  to	  (the	  members)	  in	  the	  (group	  of)	  karmically	  active	  
dharmas,	  expound	  these	  three	  (characteristics	  of	  production,	  abiding,	  and	  extinction.	  On	  the	  other	  hand)	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  (these	  three),	  along	  with	  the	  
karmically	  active	  (dharmas),	  are	  not	  identical,	  (then	  their)	  particular	  (substance	  then)	  ought	  not	  be	  encompassed	  by	  (the	  group	  of)	  karmically	  active	  (dharmas).	  For	  these	  reasons	  (one)	  ought	  to	  understand	  (they	  apparently	  must)	  be	  both	  identical	  and	  different.	  Subsequently,	  from	  “In	  this	  fashion…”	  (he)	  concludes.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   [Conclusion	  of	  Both]	  	   Third,	  from	  “For	  this	  reason	  either	  characteristics…”	  (he)	  generally	  concludes,	  (attempting	  to)	  negate	  and	  refute	  (Nagarjuna’s	  claims.	  This	  part)	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  	   	   	   	   [Explanation	  of	  the	  Refutation	  of	  the	  Rejoinder]	   	  	   In	  the	  second	  (part	  where	  Nagarjuna)	  explains	  the	  refutation,	  (he)	  refutes	  the	  above	  three	  reckonings.	  The	  section	  accordingly	  forms	  three	  (parts).	  	  	   	   	   	   	   [Identical]	  	   In	  the	  first	  (of	  those	  three,	  the	  part	  where	  he)	  refutes	  (their)	  identity,	  (there	  are)	  also	  three	  (subparts).	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   First	  is	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  idea	  that)	  dharmas	  lack	  (the	  capability	  to)	  self-­‐indicate.	  Therein	  (he	  makes)	  three	  (points).	  Initially	  (he)	  records	  the	  attachment	  and	  generally	  negates	  (it).	  Second,	  (he)	  explains	  the	  wherefores	  of	  the	  negation.	  Third,	  from	  “For	  these	  reasons…”	  (he)	  concludes	  the	  negation,	  rebuking	  (and)	  ending	  (the	  error).	  In	  (the	  part)	  concerning	  the	  explanation,	  (he)	  claims	  that	  which	  is	  characterized	  is	  certainly	  known	  by	  characteristics	  and	  hence	  is	  designated	  as	  the	  “characterizable.”	  The	  indicator	  which	  is	  functional	  is	  designated	  as	  the	  “characteristic.”	  For	  this	  reason	  the	  characteristic	  and	  that	  which	  is	  characterized	  are	  not	  identical.	  If	  it	  were	  the	  case	  (they	  were)	  identical	  (then)	  the	  individual	  could	  indicate	  (itself	  and	  that	  to	  which	  it)	  points	  ought	  [226c]	  to	  be	  the	  individual	  alone.	  (This)	  counters	  the	  counterproof.	  	   Second,	  from	  “Again,	  …”	  (he	  presents	  a)	  refutation	  (based	  on)	  characteristics	  losing	  the	  capability	  to	  (characterize)	  or	  (to	  be)	  that	  which	  is	  (characterized).	  As	  for	  “If	  they	  are	  identical…”	  (this)	  means	  (one)	  ought	  not	  differentiate	  (between)	  “this	  is	  the	  characteristic”	  (and)	  “this	  is	  the	  characterizable.”	  (On	  the	  other	  hand	  though,	  he	  notes)	  if	  (you)	  neglect	  to	  differentiate,	  your	  (position)	  ought	  to	  be	  (considered)	  contradictory	  (and	  it)	  consequently	  has	  words	  without	  significance.	  	   Third,	  from	  “Again,…”	  (he	  presents	  a)	  refutation	  (based	  on)	  a	  confusion	  of	  causes	  and	  effects.	  Initially	  he	  presents	  (the	  point).	  Next,	  (he)	  explains	  (it).	  Subsequently	  (he)	  concludes.	  (All	  these	  three)	  together	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  	   	   	   	   	   [Different]	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   Second,	  in	  (the	  following	  part	  where	  he)	  refutes	  (their)	  difference	  (there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  Initially	  (he	  provides	  a)	  valid	  refutation.	  Subsequently	  (he)	  refutes	  the	  saving	  (rejoinder).	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   [Valid	  Refutation]	  	   Within	  the	  first	  (there	  are)	  two	  (subpoints).	  Initially	  he	  records	  (their)	  reckoning	  and	  generally	  negates	  (it).	  Subsequently	  (he)	  specifically	  refutes	  (it	  and)	  explains	  the	  negation.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [Examples]	  	   Therein	  initially	  (he)	  specifically	  refutes	  two	  examples.	  Subsequently	  (he)	  generally	  indicates	  (the	  associated	  problem	  of	  a	  regress)	  without	  exhaustion.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [First	  Example]	  	   In	  the	  preceding	  (of	  the	  two	  parts	  just	  mentioned)	  initially	  he	  refutes	  the	  first	  example.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (if)	  desire	  is	  extinguished	  then	  (nirvana)	  lacks	  characteristics.	  (But	  if)	  desire	  exists	  (then)	  again	  (it)	  is	  not	  a	  characteristic	  of	  	  
nirvana.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [Second	  Example]	  	   Second,	  (in	  the	  section)	  refuting	  characteristics	  of	  the	  believer	  there	  are	  two	  (points).	  First	  is	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on	  their)	  lack	  of	  difference.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (suppose)	  there	  is	  a	  hypocrite	  (who)	  actually	  lacks	  a	  faithful	  mind	  and	  yet	  falsely	  presents	  (himself	  as)	  having	  these	  three	  characteristics,	  how	  is	  it	  (that	  he)	  has	  a	  faith	  whereby	  (in	  comparison)	  with	  the	  (truly)	  faithful,	  (his	  faith)	  is	  not	  distinguished?	  Consequently	  (Nagarjuna)	  says	  both	  (cases)	  are	  not	  different	  faiths.	  Furthermore	  the	  idea	  of	  this	  Treatise	  seemingly	  takes	  the	  three	  phenomenal	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(characteristics)	  and	  faith	  as	  (if	  they	  are)	  not	  distinguished	  and	  consequently	  says	  (they)	  do	  not	  differ.	  (By	  doing	  so,	  the	  Author)	  thereby	  (skillfully)	  refutes	  their	  difference.	  	   Second,	  (he	  presents	  a)	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  key	  criteria)	  are	  not	  determined.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (he	  notes)	  you	  know	  there	  is	  faith	  by	  means	  of	  the	  three	  phenomenal	  (characteristics.	  Given	  this,)	  then	  faith	  is	  the	  characterizable	  (and)	  the	  three	  are	  (that	  which)	  can	  characterize.	  Now,	  furthermore,	  by	  means	  of	  the	  principle	  (we	  can)	  deduce	  then	  that	  due	  to	  having	  faith,	  therefore	  (at	  that	  point	  in	  time	  one)	  begins	  to	  be	  able	  to	  produce	  these	  three	  phenomenal	  (characteristics).	  For	  this	  reason	  the	  three	  phenomenal	  (characteristics)	  contrarily	  are	  the	  characterizable.	  Therefore	  (he)	  states	  that	  lacking	  faith,	  (one)	  lacks	  the	  three	  phenomenal	  (characteristics.	  He)	  further	  demands	  (an	  answer	  of	  the	  opponent)	  saying,	  “(According	  to)	  your	  (view,	  when	  one)	  does	  not	  yet	  (have)	  charity,	  and	  so	  on,	  before	  (that	  time)	  is	  there	  this	  faithful	  mind	  or	  not?	  If	  there	  is,	  by	  what	  characteristics	  is	  it	  known?	  If	  not,	  (then)	  based	  upon	  what	  (does	  one)	  subsequently	  arouse	  charity?”	  Therefore	  (it)	  is	  said	  (that	  the	  opponent’s	  view	  is	  incorrect).	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [Regress]	  	   Second,	  in	  (the	  part	  with)	  the	  refutation	  (based	  on)	  indicating	  (a	  regress)	  without	  end,	  (he	  notes)	  the	  characterizable	  certainly	  is	  karmically	  active	  (and)	  specifically	  there	  are	  dharmas	  that	  can	  characterize	  (it.	  That	  which)	  can	  characterize	  is	  karmically	  active	  (and	  in	  turn)	  ought	  to	  also	  specifically	  have	  dharmas	  that	  can	  characterize	  (it).	  In	  this	  fashion	  then,	  (we	  encounter	  another	  regress)	  without	  end.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  the	  Rejoinder]	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The	  Gate	  of	  Contemplating	  Existence	  and	  Nonexistence	  
The	  Seventh	  (Gate)	  [The	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  [cont.	  164b]	  	   Again,	  all	  dharmas	  are	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature).	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   Simultaneous	  existence	  and	  nonexistence	  is	  not	  attainable.	  Nonsimultaneous	  (existence	  and	  nonexistence)	  are	  also	  not	  attainable.	  As	  the	  (text)	  states:	  	  Existence	  and	  nonexistence	  do	  not	  simultaneously	  exist.	  	   Separate	  from	  nonexistence,	  existence	  is	  also	  nonexistent.	  	   (If)	  there	  is	  existence	  (which)	  is	  not	  separate	  from	  nonexistence,	  	   	   existence	  then	  ought	  to	  be	  eternally	  nonexistent.	  	  	  The	  nature	  of	  existence	  and	  nonexistence	  is	  mutually	  opposed.	  (So)	  both	  should	  not	  exist	  within	  one	  dharma.	  (This	  is)	  just	  like	  at	  the	  time	  of	  production	  there	  is	  no	  
[164c]	  extinction	  and	  at	  the	  time	  of	  extinction	  there	  is	  no	  production.	  This	  issue	  has	  already	  been	  discussed	  in	  (my)	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Middle	  Way.55	  	  	   (Now,)	  if	  (one)	  claims	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  there	  is	  no	  error	  (with	  the	  idea	  that)	  apart	  from	  nonexistence	  there	  is	  existence,	  (then)	  this	  matter	  is	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  Apart	  from	  nonexistence	  how	  (could	  one)	  claim	  there	  is	  existence?	  Just	  as	  previously	  stated,	  when	  dharmas	  are	  produced	  through	  (the	  arising	  of	  a)	  form	  itself	  the	  seven	  (types	  of)	  dharmas	  are	  (all)	  produced	  together.	  (This	  is	  just)	  like	  it	  states	  in	  the	  (various)	  Abhidharma	  texts.	  (So)	  existence	  and	  nonexistence	  are	  always	  produced	  together.	  The	  absence	  of	  permanence	  [i.e.,	  abiding]	  is	  the	  characteristic	  of	  extinction.	  Therefore	  (extinction)	  is	  designated	  as	  lacking	  (abiding-­‐	  the	  characteristic	  of	  existence).	  For	  this	  reason	  existence	  is	  not	  produced	  separate	  from	  nonexistence.	  	  	   (Alternately,)	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  there	  is	  a	  production	  of	  existence	  that	  is	  not	  separate	  from	  the	  absence	  of	  permanence	  [i.e.,	  abiding],	  then	  existence	  is	  always	  (characterized	  by)	  the	  absence	  of	  (abiding).	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  existence	  is	  always	  (characterized	  by)	  the	  absence	  (of	  abiding,	  then	  from	  the)	  beginning	  there	  is	  no	  abiding.	  (If	  this	  is	  the	  case,)	  then	  (the	  characteristic	  of)	  permanence	  [i.e.,	  abiding]	  is	  destroyed.	  Yet,	  in	  fact,	  there	  is	  abiding.	  For	  this	  reason	  existence	  is	  not	  always	  (and	  simply)	  nonexistent.	  	   (Now,)	  if	  (one	  claims)	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  there	  always	  is	  the	  production	  of	  existence	  separate	  from	  nonexistence,	  this	  matter	  (too	  is	  simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  Separate	  from	  nonexistence	  it	  is	  always	  (the	  case	  that)	  existence	  is,	  in	  fact,	  not	  produced.	  	   Question:	  When	  existence	  is	  produced,	  (then	  at	  that	  time)	  there	  is	  already	  and	  always	  nonexistence	  even	  as	  it	  is	  not	  yet	  initiated.	  When	  extinction	  (arises),	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then	  it	  initiates	  the	  destruction	  of	  this	  existent.	  In	  this	  fashion	  production,	  abiding,	  and	  extinction	  decline.	  (In	  order	  to)	  obtain,	  each	  awaits	  the	  (appropriate)	  time	  and	  (is	  then)	  initiated.	  When	  an	  existent	  arises,	  production	  is	  considered	  functional	  and	  this	  leads	  to	  the	  production	  of	  the	  existent.	  In	  the	  interval	  between	  production	  and	  extinction	  abiding	  is	  considered	  functional	  and	  (it)	  supports	  this	  existent.	  When	  extinction	  (begins,	  then)	  the	  absence	  of	  permanence	  is	  functional	  and	  so	  it	  extinguishes	  this	  existent.	  Decline	  changes	  production	  to	  abiding	  and	  changes	  abiding	  to	  extinction.	  (In	  this	  fashion,)	  the	  absence	  of	  permanence	  then	  comes	  to	  destroy	  permanence	  and	  leads	  to	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  four	  phenomena.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  although	  dharmas	  are	  produced	  together	  with	  the	  absence	  of	  permanence,	  existence	  is	  not	  always	  (produced	  with)	  nonexistence.	  (So,	  what	  is	  the	  problem	  here?)	  	   Answer:	  You	  assert	  that	  the	  absence	  of	  permanence	  is	  the	  characteristic	  of	  extinction	  and	  (that	  it)	  is	  produced	  together	  with	  the	  existent.	  (If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then)	  when	  produced,	  the	  existent	  ought	  to	  decay	  and	  when	  decaying	  the	  existent	  ought	  to	  be	  produced.	  	   Again,	  production	  and	  extinction	  are	  both	  nonexistent.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  When	  extinction	  (is	  the	  case	  we)	  ought	  not	  have	  production.	  When	  production	  (is	  the	  case	  we)	  ought	  not	  have	  extinction.	  (This	  must	  be	  the	  case)	  because	  of	  the	  mutual	  opposition	  of	  production	  and	  extinction.	  	   Again,	  (according	  to)	  you	  the	  absence	  of	  permanence,	  (which	  is	  the	  characteristic	  of	  extinction,)	  and	  the	  abiding	  of	  dharmas	  are	  produced	  together.	  When	  the	  existent	  decays,	  it	  should	  (then)	  lack	  abiding.	  (On	  the	  other	  hand,)	  if	  it	  abides,	  then	  (it	  ought	  to)	  lack	  decay.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:	  This	  is	  the	  case)	  because	  of	  the	  mutual	  opposition	  of	  abiding	  and	  decay.	  When	  the	  (dharma	  is)	  aging	  it	  lacks	  abiding.	  When	  (it	  is)	  abiding	  it	  lacks	  decay.	  Therefore	  (as	  for)	  your	  assertion	  that	  production,	  abiding,	  extinction,	  aging,	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  permanence	  originally	  come	  to	  be	  produced	  together,	  this	  (idea)	  is	  confused.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  If	  this	  existent	  is	  produced	  together	  with	  the	  absence	  of	  permanence,	  (and)	  the	  absence	  of	  permanence	  is	  the	  characteristic	  of	  decay,	  (then)	  when	  (actually)	  produced	  all	  things	  also	  (and	  contradictorily)	  lack	  the	  characteristic	  of	  decay.	  (Furthermore,)	  when	  abiding	  (they)	  also	  (and	  contradictorily)	  lack	  the	  characteristic	  of	  decay.	  At	  such	  times	  is	  it	  not	  (the	  case	  that)	  there	  is	  no	  characteristic	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  permanence?	  (This	  is)	  like	  (that)	  which	  can	  be	  aware	  and	  is	  therefore	  designated	  as	  consciousness,	  (while	  that	  which	  is)	  not	  capable	  of	  awareness	  lacks	  the	  characteristic	  of	  consciousness.	  (Also,	  that	  which	  is)	  capable	  of	  sensing	  is	  designated	  as	  sensation,	  (while	  that	  which	  is)	  not	  capable	  of	  sensing	  lacks	  the	  characteristic	  of	  sensation.	  (Similarly,	  that	  which	  is)	  capable	  of	  reflection	  is	  therefore	  designated	  as	  thought,	  (while	  that	  which	  is)	  not	  capable	  of	  reflection	  then	  lacks	  the	  characteristic	  of	  thought.	  Arising	  is	  the	  characteristic	  of	  production.	  Not	  arising	  is	  then	  not	  the	  characteristic	  of	  production.	  Maintaining	  is	  the	  characteristic	  of	  abiding	  (and)	  not	  maintaining	  is	  then	  not	  the	  characteristic	  of	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abiding.	  Transformation	  is	  the	  characteristic	  of	  aging.	  Not	  transforming	  is	  then	  not	  the	  characteristic	  of	  aging.	  The	  extinction	  of	  life	  is	  the	  characteristic	  of	  death.	  Life	  not	  ending	  is	  then	  not	  the	  characteristic	  of	  death.	  In	  this	  fashion	  decay	  is	  [165a]	  the	  characteristic	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  permanence	  (while	  any	  characteristic)	  separate	  from	  decay	  is	  not	  the	  characteristic	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  permanence.	  If	  (it	  is	  the	  case	  that)	  during	  the	  time	  of	  production	  and	  abiding,	  although	  there	  is	  the	  absence	  of	  permanence,	  it	  is	  not	  capable	  of	  decaying	  the	  existent,	  (while)	  subsequently	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  it	  can	  decay	  the	  existent,	  (then)	  what	  is	  the	  use	  of	  having	  (the	  absence	  of	  permanence)	  produced	  together	  with	  (production	  and	  abiding)?	  In	  this	  fashion	  it	  should	  (be	  the	  case	  that),	  in	  accord	  with	  when	  existence	  decays,	  then	  there	  is	  the	  absence	  of	  permanence.	  Therefore,	  as	  for	  (the	  idea	  that)	  the	  absence	  of	  permanence,	  although	  it	  is	  produced	  together	  with	  (production	  and	  abiding,	  only)	  subsequently	  decays	  the	  existent,	  this	  matter	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  	  	   In	  this	  fashion	  existence	  and	  nonexistence	  are	  not	  established	  together	  and	  are	  also	  not	  established	  separately.	  Therefore	  existence	  and	  nonexistence	  are	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature).	  Existence	  and	  nonexistence	  are	  empty	  so	  all	  karmically	  active	  (dharmas)	  are	  empty.	  All	  karmically	  active	  (dharmas)	  are	  empty	  so	  karmically	  inactive	  (dharmas)	  are	  also	  empty.	  Karmically	  active	  and	  karmically	  inactive	  (dharmas)	  are	  empty	  so	  (all)	  collective	  productions	  [i.e.,	  sentient	  beings]	  are	  also	  empty.	  	   [End	  of	  Chapter	  Seven	  of	  the	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  	   [Commentary	  by	  Fa-­‐tsang]	  	   	   [The	  Name	  of	  the	  Gate]	  	   First,	  as	  for	  explaining	  the	  name	  (of	  this	  gate,	  the	  characteristics	  of)	  production	  and	  abiding	  are	  existent,	  (while)	  the	  characteristic	  of	  extinction	  is	  nonexistent.	  (If	  one)	  seeks	  these,	  (one	  finds)	  the	  principles	  of	  existence	  and	  nonexistence	  are	  not	  established,	  and	  therefore	  (this	  type	  of	  investigation)	  is	  considered	  a	  “gate.”	  	   	   [Derivation	  of	  the	  Ideas]	  	   Second,	  as	  for	  the	  derivation	  of	  the	  ideas,	  because	  the	  (previous)	  gate	  of	  identity	  and	  difference	  repeatedly	  revealed	  and	  lead	  to	  a	  firm	  (understanding)	  of	  the	  (correct)	  principle,	  it	  eliminated	  grasping	  views	  (and)	  as	  a	  consequence	  this	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(next	  point)	  is	  broadly	  derived	  (from	  that).	  As	  for	  the	  specifics,	  the	  preceding	  (gate)	  corresponds	  to	  a	  refutation	  of	  the	  characteristic	  and	  the	  characterizable.	  This	  (gate)	  concerns	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on	  a)	  mutual	  opposition	  within	  that	  which	  is	  characterized.	  Consequently	  (the	  point	  here)	  is	  derived	  (from	  the	  earlier	  gate).	  	   	   [The	  Propositions	  Clarified]	  	   Third,	  as	  for	  that	  which	  is	  clarified,	  (we	  can)	  say	  (it)	  concerns	  the	  individual,	  mutual	  opposition	  of	  existence	  and	  nonexistence	  within	  the	  four	  characteristics.	  (They)	  do	  not	  obtain	  (in)	  the	  same,	  single	  [227a]	  moment.	  Accordingly,	  (one)	  loses	  (the)	  karmically	  active	  dharmas.	  By	  distinguishing	  true	  emptiness	  (the	  text)	  leads	  to	  establishing	  Right	  Contemplation	  as	  a	  result.	  	   	   [Explanation]	  	   Fourth,	  in	  explaining	  the	  text	  (there	  are)	  four	  (parts).	  First,	  (Nagarjuna)	  presents	  (the	  main	  point).	  Second,	  (he)	  explains	  (it).	  Third,	  (he)	  concludes	  (the	  refutation)	  and,	  fourth,	  (he)	  categorically	  (dismisses	  the	  error).	  	   	   	   [Presentation	  of	  the	  Main	  Point]	  	   In	  the	  first	  (of	  the	  above	  four	  parts	  there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  Initially	  he	  presents	  and	  explains	  (the	  notion	  of)	  ongoing	  (strings	  of	  dharmic)	  activity	  producing	  existents.	  Subsequently	  (he)	  establishes	  a	  verse	  briefly	  distinguishing	  (key	  points).	  Taking	  the	  Sarvastivada	  (view	  that)	  establishes	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  four	  characteristics	  as	  simultaneously	  complete,	  because	  (those	  characteristics)	  form	  karmically	  active	  (dharmas,	  they	  claim	  that	  by)	  utilizing	  the	  preceding,	  subsequent	  (dharmas)	  are	  brought	  forth.	  (They	  claim	  this	  is	  possible)	  because	  (such	  a	  process)	  departs	  from	  the	  (problems	  of)	  mutual	  opposition	  (among	  the	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characteristics	  of	  dharmas.	  Nagarjuna)	  refutes	  this	  idea	  saying	  the	  preceding	  and	  subsequent	  are	  not	  karmically	  active.	  (This	  is	  an)	  error	  of	  the	  mutual	  opposition	  of	  (characteristics	  with)	  the	  same	  essence.	  Furthermore,	  in	  the	  (Treatise	  on)	  
Establishing	  Mind	  Only,	  the	  preceding	  three	  (characteristics	  occur	  in)	  the	  same	  one	  moment	  (while	  only)	  the	  subsequent	  moment	  then	  extends	  to	  extinction.	  (They	  claim)	  those	  (subsequent	  moments)	  thusly	  destroy	  the	  karmically	  active	  (preceding	  
dharmic	  moment).	  As	  a	  result	  at	  each	  and	  every	  moment	  (in	  such	  a	  string	  one	  can)	  consider	  that	  the	  characteristics	  are	  not	  complete.	  	   In	  the	  verse,	  the	  first	  part	  refutes	  simultaneity.	  The	  next	  part	  refutes	  (the	  temporal	  sequence	  of)	  preceding	  and	  subsequent.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  separating	  (the	  (first	  three	  characteristics)	  from	  the	  nonexistence	  of	  the	  characteristic	  of	  extinction	  leads	  to	  (a	  situation	  where)	  the	  existence	  of	  production	  and	  abiding	  also	  does	  not	  attain	  existence.	  Therefore	  (Nagarjuna)	  says,	  “apart	  from	  nonexistence,	  existence	  also	  is	  nonexistent.”	  	  	   From	  “Because	  (they)	  are	  not	  karmically	  active…”	  (the)	  second	  part	  (of	  Nagarjuna’s	  refutation)	  explains	  the	  verses	  of	  the	  first	  part.	  Because	  the	  existence	  of	  production	  and	  abiding	  is	  not	  separate	  from	  the	  nonexistence	  of	  the	  characteristic	  of	  extinction,	  accordingly	  then	  existence	  must	  constitute	  that	  which	  is	  harmed	  by	  nonexistence.	  Consequently	  (existence)	  is	  eternally	  nonexistent.	  Furthermore,	  (he)	  also	  ought	  to	  say	  (if)	  there	  is	  nonexistence	  that	  is	  not	  separate	  from	  existence,	  nonexistence	  then	  ought	  to	  constantly	  exist.	  (Even)	  further,	  (he)	  ought	  to	  have	  an	  explanation	  (concerning)	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  above	  (verse.	  This	  should	  include)	  an	  analysis	  of	  preceding	  and	  subsequent	  (temporal	  sequencing	  that)	  says,	  “If	  there	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is	  existence	  apart	  from	  nonexistence,	  existence	  then	  is	  not	  karmically	  active.”	  But	  (as	  covered	  in	  the	  text,	  this	  point	  is)	  false	  (only)	  on	  account	  of	  the	  verse	  (itself).	  	   	   	   [Explanation	  of	  the	  Main	  Point]	  	   Second,	  in	  the	  explanation	  (there	  are)	  two	  (subparts).	  First	  (he	  provides	  a)	  valid	  refutation.	  Subsequently	  (he)	  refutes	  the	  (attempt	  at	  a)	  saving	  (rejoinder).	  	  	   	   	   	   [Valid	  Refutation]	  	   In	  the	  preceding	  (of	  these	  two	  there	  are)	  four	  (points).	  First	  (he)	  explains	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  verse.	  It	  is	  like	  the	  Middle	  Treatise’s	  chapter	  on	  “Formation	  and	  Destruction”	  states:	  	  Apart	  from	  formation	  and	  even	  together	  with	  formation,	  	  	   herein	  there	  is	  no	  destruction.	  	  Apart	  from	  destruction	  and	  even	  together	  with	  destruction,	  	  	   herein	  also	  there	  is	  no	  formation.	  	  	   (In)	  the	  second	  (of	  the	  four	  parts,	  the	  part)	  from	  “If	  (one)	  claims…”	  (he)	  explains	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  verse.	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  two	  (points).	  Initially	  (he)	  records	  the	  attachment	  (and)	  generally	  negates	  (it).	  Second,	  in	  explaining	  the	  negation	  (he	  notes	  that)	  the	  characteristic	  of	  extinction	  within	  the	  seven	  dharmas	  is	  nonexistent,	  (while)	  the	  others	  are	  all	  existent.	  Furthermore,	  existence	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  dharmas	  (and)	  is	  produced	  along	  with	  the	  characteristic	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  permanence.	  With	  the	  absence	  of	  permanence,	  since	  (it)	  completes	  extinction,	  (we)	  clearly	  know	  that	  apart	  from	  nonexistence,	  existence	  does	  not	  come	  to	  be	  produced.	  	   Third,	  from	  “If	  (it)	  is	  not	  separate	  from…”	  (he)	  explains	  the	  verses	  of	  the	  following	  two	  parts.	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  three	  (points).	  First	  (he)	  brings	  up	  the	  error.	  Subsequently	  (he	  provides)	  an	  explanation	  that	  inverts	  (the	  point).	  	  In	  the	  inverting	  explanation	  (he	  shows	  that)	  because	  (it)	  is	  not	  separate	  from	  the	  nonexistence	  of	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extinction,	  this	  existence	  is	  eternally	  nonexistent.	  Because	  initial	  production	  is	  (immediately)	  destroyed	  (and)	  extinquished,	  (it)	  cannot	  come	  to	  reach	  (a	  point	  of)	  abiding.	  Therefore	  (he)	  says	  “From	  the	  beginning…”	  etc.	  Furthermore,	  is	  it	  not	  (the	  case	  that	  an	  existent	  dharma	  already	  and)	  for	  a	  while	  yet	  has	  (the	  characteristic	  of)	  abiding?	  Therefore	  (he)	  says,	  (“Yet,	  in	  fact,	  there	  is	  abiding”).	  Third,	  the	  concluding	  negation	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  	   Fourth,	  from	  “If	  (it)	  is	  separate	  from…”	  (he)	  explains	  the	  passage	  on	  existents	  that	  should	  (be	  the	  case	  as	  described)	  in	  the	  verse.	  Considering	  (the	  notion	  that)	  apart	  from	  the	  characteristics	  of	  impermanence,	  extinction,	  etc,	  there	  is	  as	  yet	  still	  the	  production	  of	  karmically	  active	  dharmas,	  etc.,	  (then	  in	  that	  case	  they	  are)	  all	  not	  possible.	  	   	   	   	   [The	  Rejoinder]	  	   In	  the	  second	  (part,	  the	  part	  where	  he)	  refutes	  the	  (attempted)	  saving	  (rejoinder,	  there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  Initially	  (he	  presents	  the)	  heterodox	  save.	  Then	  (he)	  explains	  the	  refutation.	  In	  the	  (presentation	  of	  the	  attempted)	  save	  (there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  	  	   First	  (the	  rejoinder)	  establishes	  the	  simultaneity	  of	  essences	  and	  consequently	  (claims	  this	  view)	  lacks	  the	  above	  error	  of	  nonproduction.	  	  	   Second,	  from	  “In	  this	  fashion…”	  explains	  five	  matters,	  clarifying	  functional	  antecedence	  and	  subsequence	  as	  a	  result.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (the	  opponent	  claims	  the	  existence	  of	  dharmas	  occurs)	  when	  the	  functionality	  of	  circumstances	  exists.	  (That	  being	  so,	  he	  asks,)	  how	  (does	  this)	  allow	  for	  the	  rebuke	  that	  there	  is	  eternal	  nonexistence?	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   Furthermore,	  (the	  opponent	  claims)	  production	  restrains	  extinction	  and	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  a	  severing	  (of	  the	  two.	  Likewise)	  abiding	  can	  restrain	  production	  and	  not	  lead	  to	  [227b]	  an	  increase.	  (Finally,)	  extinction	  restrains	  abiding	  (but)	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  an	  (absolute)	  division.	  Difference	  pervades	  the	  (relationship	  between	  the)	  preceding	  and	  subsequent.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  changing	  production	  leads	  to	  abiding,	  and	  so	  forth.	  Furthermore,	  that	  (view)	  reckons	  that	  in	  one	  moment	  the	  initiation	  of	  the	  moment	  is	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  characteristic	  of	  production.	  The	  moment’s	  next	  (instant)	  is	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  characteristic	  of	  abiding.	  The	  moment’s	  subsequent	  (and	  final	  instant)	  is	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  characteristic	  of	  extinction.	  Consequently	  (dharmic)	  functions	  have	  an	  antecedent	  and	  subsequent	  (temporal	  progression).	  As	  for	  “(In	  order	  to)	  obtain…”,	  (it	  claims)	  these	  four	  univeral	  (characteristics)	  are	  designated	  as	  not	  correspondingly	  active.	  A	  dharmas’	  previous	  	  (characteristics	  such	  as)	  “obtaining”	  [i.e.,	  initiation],	  and	  the	  like,	  (are	  all)	  like	  stringing	  things	  (together	  in	  a	  single	  sequence).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  major	  and	  minor	  characteristics	  obtain	  (and)	  lead	  to	  the	  constant	  completion	  of	  the	  four	  characteristics	  (in	  sequence).	  	   Third,	  from	  “Therefore…”	  (the	  opponent	  provides	  the)	  concluding	  negation.	  (No	  further	  comment	  is	  required	  here).	  	   	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  the	  Rejoinder]	  	   In	  the	  second	  (part	  here,	  the	  part	  with	  the)	  valid	  refutation	  (of	  the	  rejoinder),	  initially	  (Nagarjuna)	  refutes	  the	  simultaneous	  completion	  of	  essences.	  Subsequently	  (he)	  refutes	  the	  antecedent	  and	  subsequent	  issuance	  of	  functions.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  Simultaneous	  Completion]	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   In	  the	  first	  (of	  the	  above	  two	  parts)	  initially	  (he)	  refutes	  the	  extinction	  of	  production.	  Subsequently	  (he)	  refutes	  the	  aging	  of	  abiding.	  In	  the	  preceding	  (of	  these	  two	  points	  there	  are	  also)	  two	  (subpoints).	  Initially	  (he	  provides	  a)	  refutation	  (showing	  that)	  the	  dismissal	  of	  change	  (means)	  reciprocity	  is	  lost.	  	  Second,	  from	  “Again,…”	  (he	  provides	  a)	  refutation	  clarifying	  (that)	  mutual	  opposition	  (means)	  both	  are	  lost.	  There	  is	  a	  presentation	  and	  explanation	  (of	  these	  points)	  that	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  	  	   In	  the	  second	  (part	  where	  he)	  refutes	  abiding	  and	  aging,	  initially	  (he)	  presents	  the	  point	  and	  subsequently	  (he)	  explains	  it.	  Also	  there	  is	  a	  refutation	  (illustrating	  the)	  mutual	  opposition	  (arising	  from)	  dismissal	  of	  change.	  	   Third,	  from	  “Therefore…”	  (he)	  generally	  concludes	  (the	  opponent’s	  view	  is)	  confused.	  (Here	  there	  is	  a)	  presentation	  and	  an	  explanation	  (that)	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  elaboration).	  	   	   	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  Sequential	  Functions]	  	   Second,	  from	  “(This	  is)	  like	  (that	  which)	  can	  be	  aware…”	  (Nagarjuna)	  refutes	  the	  antecedent	  and	  subsequent	  issuance	  of	  functions.	  Therein	  (he	  makes)	  three	  (points).	  	  	   The	  first	  (point)	  is	  a	  refutation	  that	  brings	  up	  phenomenal	  examples.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  that	  heterodox	  reckoning	  claims	  at	  the	  time	  of	  production,	  although	  there	  is	  already	  the	  essence	  of	  destruction,	  (it)	  has	  not	  yet	  issued	  forth.	  (It	  also	  holds	  that)	  when	  (an	  arising	  is)	  extinct,	  then	  it	  is	  the	  case	  (destruction	  has)	  issued	  forth.	  (Nagarjuna)	  refutes	  (this)	  saying	  (it)	  is	  like	  (that	  which)	  cannot	  be	  aware	  is	  accordingly	  not	  designated	  “consciousness.”	  The	  remaining	  six	  (examples)	  are	  also	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The	  Gate	  of	  Contemplating	  the	  Nature	  (of	  Dharmas)	  
The	  Eighth	  (Gate)	  [The	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  [cont.	  165a]	  	   Again,	  all	  dharmas	  are	  empty	  (of	  a	  self-­‐nature).	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (This	  is	  the	  case)	  because	  the	  various	  dharmas	  (all)	  have	  no	  (essential)	  nature.	  As	  (the	  text)	  states:	  	  	   Seeing	  that	  (they)	  have	  changing	  characteristics,	  	   	   (we	  know)	  the	  various	  dharmas	  lack	  (an	  essential)	  nature.	  	   Dharmas	  without	  (an	  essential)	  nature	  also	  lack	  (essential)	  existence.	  	   All	  the	  various	  dharmas	  are	  empty	  as	  a	  result.	  	  	   The	  various	  dharmas	  should	  not	  change	  if	  they	  have	  an	  (essential)	  nature.	  Yet,	  (we)	  see	  that	  all	  dharmas	  change.	  For	  this	  reason	  we	  certainly	  know	  the	  various	  
dharmas	  lack	  an	  (essential)	  nature.	  	   Again,	  if	  the	  various	  dharmas	  have	  a	  fixed	  nature	  then	  (they)	  should	  not	  be	  produced	  from	  collected	  conditions.	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  (their)	  nature	  is	  produced	  from	  collected	  conditions,	  (then	  that)	  nature	  is	  exactly	  the	  dharma	  constructed.	  (However,	  it	  is	  precisely	  that	  which	  is)	  not	  a	  (dependently)	  constructed	  dharma,	  (that)	  does	  not	  causally	  await	  (the	  karmic	  activities	  of	  others,)	  which	  is	  designated	  as	  (a	  dharma’s	  essential)	  nature.	  Therefore,	  (since	  all	  dharmas	  actually	  are	  produced	  from	  conditions,)	  all	  dharmas	  are	  empty	  (of	  an	  essential	  nature).	  	   Question:	  If	  all	  dharmas	  are	  empty	  then	  there	  is	  no	  production	  and	  there	  is	  no	  extinction.	  If	  there	  is	  no	  production	  and	  no	  extinction	  then	  there	  is	  no	  Truth	  of	  Suffering.	  If	  there	  is	  no	  Truth	  of	  Suffering,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  Truth	  of	  the	  Origin	  (of	  Suffering).	  If	  there	  is	  no	  Truth	  of	  Suffering	  (and	  no	  Truth	  of	  the)	  Origin	  (of	  Suffering),	  then	  there	  is	  no	  Truth	  of	  the	  Cessation	  (of	  Suffering).	  If	  there	  is	  no	  (Truth	  of	  the)	  Cessation	  of	  Suffering,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  Path	  which	  reaches	  the	  end	  of	  suffering.	  If	  the	  various	  dharmas	  are	  empty	  and	  lack	  (an	  essential)	  nature,	  then	  there	  are	  no	  Four	  Noble	  Truths.	  Because	  there	  are	  no	  Four	  Noble	  Truths,	  there	  are	  also	  no	  Four	  Sramana	  Fruits.56	  Because	  there	  are	  no	  Four	  Sramana	  Fruits,	  there	  are	  no	  virtuous	  sages.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  nonexistence	  of	  (all)	  these	  matters,	  the	  Buddha,	  Dharma,	  and	  Sangha	  are	  also	  nonexistent.	  	  (But,	  we	  clearly	  see)	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  Therefore	  the	  various	  dharmas	  should	  not	  be	  (considered)	  completely	  empty	  (of	  an	  essential	  nature.	  This	  being	  the	  case,	  what	  is	  the	  error	  here?)	  	   Answer:	  There	  are	  Two	  Truths:	  (namely,)	  1.	  conventional	  truth,	  and	  2.	  ultimate	  truth.	  Due	  to	  conventional	  truth	  (we)	  come	  to	  speak	  of	  ultimate	  truth.	  If	  (we)	  do	  not	  base	  (our	  discussion	  on)	  conventional	  truth,	  then	  (we)	  do	  not	  come	  to	  speak	  of	  ultimate	  truth.	  (However,)	  if	  (we)	  do	  not	  attain	  ultimate	  truth,	  then	  (we)	  do	  not	  attain	  nirvana.	  If	  one	  does	  not	  know	  the	  Two	  Truths,	  then	  (one)	  does	  not	  know	  (their)	  individual	  benefits,	  benefits	  for	  others,	  or	  collective	  benefits.	  In	  this	  fashion	  if	  (one)	  understands	  conventional	  truth,	  then	  (one)	  understands	  ultimate	  truth.	  (Also,	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if	  one)	  understands	  ultimate	  truth,	  then	  (one)	  understands	  conventional	  truth.	  You	  now	  hear	  (me)	  speaking	  about	  conventional	  truths,	  (but	  you	  mistakenly)	  refer	  to	  it	  as	  ultimate	  truth.	  As	  a	  result	  (you)	  fall	  into	  an	  erroneous	  judgement.	  The	  various	  Buddhas’	  Dharma	  of	  causes	  and	  conditions	  is	  designated	  as	  the	  exceedingly	  profound	  ultimate	  truth.	  These	  [165b]	  causally	  conditioned	  dharmas	  lack	  a	  self-­‐nature	  and	  so	  I	  assert	  that	  they	  are	  empty.	  (If)	  the	  various	  dharmas	  are	  not	  produced	  from	  collected	  conditions,	  then	  they	  should	  each	  have	  a	  fixed	  nature.	  (In	  that	  case,	  dharmas	  of)	  the	  five	  skandhas	  should	  not	  have	  the	  characteristics	  of	  production	  and	  extinction.	  (Dharmas	  of)	  the	  five	  skandhas	  that	  are	  not	  produced	  and	  not	  extinguished	  are	  then	  lacking	  the	  absence	  of	  permanence.	  If	  (they)	  lack	  the	  absence	  of	  permanence	  then	  there	  is	  no	  Noble	  Truth	  of	  Suffering.	  If	  there	  is	  no	  Noble	  Truth	  of	  Suffering,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  Noble	  Truth	  of	  the	  Origin	  (of)	  dharmas	  produced	  by	  causes	  and	  conditions.	  If	  the	  various	  dharmas	  have	  a	  fixed	  nature,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  Noble	  Truth	  of	  the	  Cessation	  of	  Suffering.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:	  If	  they	  have	  a	  fixed	  nature,	  then)	  their	  nature	  lacks	  change	  as	  a	  result.	  If	  there	  is	  no	  Noble	  Truth	  of	  the	  Cessation	  of	  Suffering,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  Path	  that	  reaches	  the	  cessation	  of	  suffering.	  Therefore,	  if	  an	  individual	  does	  not	  accept	  emptiness,	  then	  there	  are	  no	  Four	  Noble	  Truths.	  If	  there	  are	  no	  Four	  Noble	  Truths,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  attaining	  the	  Four	  Noble	  Truths.	  If	  there	  is	  no	  attaining	  the	  Four	  Noble	  Truths,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  understanding	  suffering,	  (no)	  severing	  its	  origins,	  (no)	  realizing	  its	  extinction,	  (and	  no)	  cultivating	  the	  Path.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  nonexistence	  of	  these	  phenomena	  there	  are	  no	  Four	  Sramana	  Fruits.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  there	  being	  no	  (set	  of)	  Four	  Sramana	  Fruits,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  one	  attaining	  progress	  towards	  (them).	  If	  there	  is	  no	  one	  attaining	  (progress)	  towards	  (them),	  then	  there	  are	  no	  Buddhas.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  refuting	  causally	  conditioned	  dharmas,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  Dharma.	  Because	  there	  is	  no	  Dharma,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  Sangha.	  If	  we	  lack	  Buddha,	  
Dharma,	  and	  Sangha,	  then	  we	  lack	  the	  Three	  Jewels.	  If	  we	  lack	  the	  Three	  Jewels,	  then	  (that)	  destroys	  the	  Dharma	  of	  conventional	  worldly	  (truth.	  But	  since	  there	  obviously	  is	  a	  conventional	  world,)	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  Therefore	  all	  dharmas	  are	  empty.	  	   Again,	  if	  the	  various	  dharmas	  have	  a	  fixed	  nature,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  production,	  no	  extinction,	  and	  no	  good	  or	  evil.	  Without	  the	  (karmic)	  fruit	  and	  retribution	  of	  good	  and	  evil,	  the	  world	  will	  be	  always	  (marked	  by)	  one	  characteristic.	  For	  this	  reason	  (we)	  should	  know	  the	  various	  dharmas	  lack	  (an	  essential)	  nature.	  	  	   (Alternately,)	  if	  (one)	  claims	  the	  various	  dharmas	  lack	  a	  self-­‐nature	  and	  (are	  a	  type	  of)	  existent	  derived	  from	  other-­‐natures,	  this	  (view)	  also	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  If	  (they	  all)	  lack	  a	  self-­‐nature	  how	  (can	  their)	  existence	  be	  derived	  from	  (some)	  other-­‐nature?	  This	  is	  because	  due	  to	  self-­‐nature	  there	  is	  other-­‐nature.	  Furthermore,	  (the	  so-­‐called)	  “other-­‐nature”	  is	  also	  exactly	  (a	  kind	  of)	  self-­‐nature.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  Because	  an	  other-­‐nature	  is	  exactly	  a	  self-­‐nature	  of	  “other.”	  If	  self-­‐nature	  is	  not	  established,	  other-­‐nature	  is	  also	  not	  established.	  If	  self-­‐nature	  and	  other-­‐nature	  are	  not	  established,	  separate	  from	  self-­‐nature	  and	  other-­‐nature,	  with	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what	  further	  circumstance	  (could)	  there	  be	  dharmas?	  If	  existence	  is	  not	  established,	  nonexistence	  is	  also	  not	  established.	  	  	   Therefore,	  (having)	  now	  examined	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  self-­‐nature	  and	  lack	  of	  an	  other-­‐nature,	  (and	  finding)	  there	  is	  no	  existence	  and	  no	  nonexistence,	  accordingly	  (we	  know)	  all	  karmically	  active	  dharmas	  are	  empty.	  Because	  (all)	  karmically	  active	  
dharmas	  are	  empty,	  (all)	  karmically	  inactive	  dharmas	  are	  also	  empty.	  (As	  all)	  
karmically	  active	  and	  inactive	  (dharmas)	  are,	  as	  before,	  empty,	  how	  much	  more	  so	  the	  self?	  	   [End	  of	  Chapter	  Eight	  of	  the	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  	   [Commentary	  by	  Fa-­‐tsang]	  	  	   	   [The	  Name	  of	  the	  Gate]	  	   First,	  as	  for	  explaining	  the	  name	  (of	  this	  chapter),	  “nature”	  is	  (a	  reference	  to)	  “essential	  nature.”	  (The	  chapter)	  inquires	  (after	  it,	  finds	  it)	  is	  not	  existent,	  (and)	  connects	  it	  to	  true	  emptiness.	  Therefore	  it	  constitutes	  a	  “gate.”	  	  That	  which	  is	  dismissed	  [i.e.,“nature”]	  and	  that	  which	  is	  trusted	  [i.e.	  “contemplation”]	  constitute	  (the	  key	  elements	  of)	  the	  name.	  	   	   [Derivation	  of	  the	  Ideas]	  	   Second,	  as	  for	  deriving	  the	  ideas,	  the	  general	  idea	  is	  as	  (with	  the)	  preceeding	  (chapter).	  Specifically	  (though),	  the	  first	  three	  parts	  refute	  dharmic	  (essences).	  The	  next	  four	  gates	  refute	  (the	  idea	  of)	  that	  which	  can	  characterize.	  Now	  (this	  chapter)	  further	  refutes	  (the	  notion	  of	  an)	  essential	  nature	  and	  therefore	  (naturally)	  is	  derived	  (from	  the	  preceding).	  	  	   Furthermore,	  heterodox	  individuals’	  (tendencies	  toward)	  grasping	  at	  meaning	  has	  two	  types.	  The	  first	  is	  phenomena,	  then,	  the	  second	  is	  (an	  essential)	  nature.	  (The	  meaning	  of	  an	  essential)	  nature	  relies	  upon	  future	  completion	  (while	  that	  of)	  phenomena	  relies	  upon	  present	  (manifestation).	  The	  preceding	  gate	  on	  existence	  and	  nonexistence	  refutes	  present	  phenomena	  (showing	  they)	  are	  not	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established.	  But,	  grasping	  at	  sensations	  is	  difficult	  to	  disperse.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (this	  means	  grasping	  at	  the	  idea	  that)	  various	  dharmas,	  not	  yet	  complete,	  antecedently	  have	  an	  essential	  nature.	  (This	  error)	  relies	  on	  present	  causes	  and	  conditions	  to	  arouse	  an	  (essential,	  antecedently	  existent)	  nature	  and	  complete	  phenomena.	  If	  it	  is	  thus,	  the	  (opponent	  considers)	  various	  dharmas	  are	  still	  established	  and	  (wonders)	  why	  (Nagarjuna)	  comes	  to	  say	  all	  dharmas	  are	  empty.	  This	  gate	  refutes	  that	  (notion	  and)	  therefore	  successively	  derives	  from	  (the	  preceding).	  Furthermore,	  (the	  material	  that)	  came	  above	  refuted	  characteristics.	  Heterodox	  individuals	  say,	  (what	  we	  mean)	  to	  say	  is,	  although	  external	  characteristics	  have	  perished,	  the	  internal	  nature	  is	  still	  real.	  As	  a	  result,	  this	  gate	  arrives	  in	  order	  to	  refute	  that	  reckoning.	  	   	   [The	  Propositions	  Clarified]	  	   Third,	  as	  for	  that	  which	  is	  clarified,	  (by)	  refuting	  a	  nature	  (Nagarjuna)	  clarifies	  emptiness.	  The	  contemplative	  mind	  lacks	  lodging	  because	  (his	  argument)	  completes	  valid	  (understanding.)	  	   	   [Explanation]	  	   Fourth,	  (in	  the	  part)	  explaining	  the	  chapter’s	  (point	  there	  are)	  four	  (subparts:	  i.e.,)	  1.	  a	  presentation,	  2.	  an	  explanation,	  3.	  a	  conclusion,	  (and)	  4.	  a	  categorical	  (dismissal	  of	  the	  erroneous	  view).	  [227a]	  	  	   In	  the	  (section)	  concerning	  the	  explanation	  (there	  are)	  three	  (points).	  First	  (he	  opens	  with	  dharmic)	  arising.	  Second,	  (he)	  establishes	  a	  verse.	  Third,	  (he)	  explains	  the	  verse.	  In	  the	  verse	  the	  upper	  half	  refutes	  (the	  notion	  that	  dharmas)	  have	  a	  nature.	  The	  lower	  half	  refutes	  (the	  notion	  that	  dharmas)	  lack	  a	  nature.	  	  	   	   	   [Explaining	  the	  Verse]	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   In	  the	  third	  (part	  that)	  explains	  (the	  verse,	  there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  First	  he	  explains	  (and)	  refutes	  (the	  notion	  that)	  there	  is	  a	  nature	  (in	  dharmas).	  Then	  he	  refutes	  (the	  notion	  that	  they)	  lack	  a	  nature.	  	  	   In	  the	  preceding	  (of	  these	  two	  there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  Initially	  (he)	  refutes	  a	  self(-­‐nature).	  Second,	  (he)	  refutes	  other(-­‐nature).	  Third,	  both	  are	  (refuted	  and	  he)	  concludes.	  	  	   	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  Self-­‐nature]	   	  	   In	  the	  first	  (of	  the	  above	  three	  there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  Initially	  (he	  provides	  a)	  valid	  refutation.	  Subsequently	  (he)	  refutes	  (the	  attempt	  at	  a)	  saving	  (rejoinder).	  	   	   	   	   	   [Valid	  Refutation]	   	  	   In	  the	  first	  (of	  the	  above	  two	  points	  there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  Initially	  (Nagarjuna	  provides	  a)	  refutation	  of	  (a)	  varying,	  deviating	  nature.	  (He)	  refutes	  (that	  notion	  saying),	  “As	  for	  your	  idea,	  if	  the	  not	  yet	  formed	  already	  has	  a	  nature,	  that	  future	  nature’s	  (aspect	  of)	  ‘does	  not	  alter’	  constitutes	  its	  significance.	  (However,	  if)	  you	  allow	  variation,	  the	  significance	  of	  (that)	  nature	  rests	  upon	  (this	  notion).”	  Therefore	  (this	  point)	  is	  stated	  (as	  we	  find	  in	  the	  text).	  	  	   Second,	  (Nagarjuna	  presents	  a)	  refutation	  (showing)	  conditional	  creation	  (means	  one)	  loses	  (any	  essential)	  nature.	  Initially	  (he	  presents	  an)	  explanation	  according	  with	  (the	  idea	  in	  question).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (if	  a	  dharma’s)	  nature	  has	  a	  true,	  (essential	  quality)	  how,	  supposedly,	  is	  it	  conditionally	  formed?	  Now,	  since	  (you	  claim)	  conditional	  creation	  (is	  also	  the	  case),	  clarify	  (why)	  it	  is	  not	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  (essential)	  nature.	  Second,	  from	  “is	  not	  created…”	  (he	  provides	  a)	  counter	  explanation.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (that	  which)	  is	  not	  created	  is	  designated	  as	  (the	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“essential)	  nature.”	  Therefore	  (we)	  know	  (if	  something	  is)	  created	  then	  it	  is	  not	  (such	  a	  nature).	  	   Third,	  from	  “For	  this	  reason…”	  (he)	  concludes	  the	  proposition.	  	   	   	   	   	   [Refuting	  the	  Rejoinder]	  	   Second,	  in	  (the	  part	  that)	  refutes	  (the	  attempt	  at	  a)	  saving	  (rejoinder,	  there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  Initially	  the	  heterodox	  (opponent)	  records	  a	  refutation	  indicating	  errors	  and	  diffculties	  (in	  Nagajuna’s	  view).	  Subsequently	  the	  Author	  reveals	  the	  answer	  (to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  preceding)	  section	  still	  has	  errors.	  	   In	  the	  first	  (of	  the	  above	  two),	  the	  heterodox	  (proponent,)	  hearing	  that	  (the	  existence	  of)	  present	  phenomenal	  dharmas	  is	  already	  a	  refutation	  of	  the	  (Author’s)	  rebuke,	  (holds	  that)	  completing	  the	  essential	  nature	  (of	  dharmas)	  in	  the	  future,	  further	  refutes	  the	  extinction	  (of	  presently	  existent	  dharmic	  natures).	  Accordingly,	  (the	  opponent)	  raises	  an	  understanding	  that	  considers	  the	  (text’s	  allegedly)	  error	  (prone)	  Author	  as	  (holding	  a)	  perspective	  of	  great	  heterodoxy.	  	  	   In	  (this)	  section	  (there	  are)	  two	  (parts).	  First	  (Nagarjuna)	  records	  the	  (opponent’s)	  refutation	  indicating	  (his	  alleged)	  error.	  The	  heterodox	  (view)	  is	  due	  to	  considering	  the	  impermanence	  of	  production	  and	  extinction	  as	  the	  Truth	  of	  Suffering.	  The	  remaining	  (part	  of	  this)	  section	  is	  comprehensible	  (without	  further	  elaboration	  here).	  Secondly,	  from	  “(if)	  these	  phenomena…”	  is	  the	  (opponent’s)	  concluding	  negation	  rebuking	  (Nagarjuna)	  to	  stop	  (spreading	  erroneous	  views).	  	   In	  (Nagarjuna’s)	  answer	  (there	  are)	  five	  (parts).	  First	  (he)	  brings	  up	  the	  
Dharma	  of	  the	  Two	  Truths.	  Initially	  (he)	  lists	  the	  names.	  Subsequently,	  (he	  notes	  that)	  based	  upon	  conventional	  (truth	  one)	  comes	  to	  (understand)	  ultimate	  (truth).	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That	  is	  to	  say,	  Noble	  (Ones)	  expound	  the	  Dharma	  of	  the	  causes	  and	  conditions	  of	  conventional	  truths.	  (When)	  compared	  with	  this	  Dharma,	  the	  above	  leads	  to	  (seeing	  the)	  collective	  lack	  of	  essential	  nature.	  In	  order	  that	  (one	  might)	  come	  to	  the	  ultimate	  emptiness	  (of	  arisings	  they)	  therefore	  expound	  conventional	  truth.	  (They)	  do	  not	  mean	  (one	  ought	  to)	  preserve	  this	  conventional	  truth	  while	  not	  entering	  the	  ultimate.	  Therefore	  it	  states	  (as	  much	  in	  Nagarjuna’s	  reply).	  	   Second,	  (the	  part)	  from	  “If	  an	  individual…”	  clarifies	  the	  benefit	  of	  knowing	  the	  Dharma.	  Therein,	  first	  (he	  notes	  that)	  knowing	  the	  Dharma	  completes	  two	  benefits.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  to	  expound	  the	  ultimate	  based	  upon	  the	  conventional	  constitutes	  benefiting	  others.	  Acquiring	  the	  effects	  of	  illuminating	  the	  ultimate	  constitutes	  personal	  benefits.	  Furthermore,	  as	  for	  the	  completion	  of	  a	  single	  activity	  with	  the	  two	  benefits,	  it	  is	  a	  combination	  (of	  both	  benefits	  resulting	  from	  knowledge).	  Secondly,	  (he)	  clarifies	  the	  mutual	  assistance	  of	  the	  Two	  Truths.	  (They	  mutually	  assist)	  because	  (they)	  are	  not	  a	  duality	  even	  while	  (they	  are)	  still	  two	  (distinct	  truths).	  This	  clarifies	  the	  benefit	  of	  correctly	  understanding	  the	  Dharma.	  	   Third,	  from	  “You	  now…”	  (Nagarjuna)	  clarifies	  an	  error	  of	  delusion	  about	  
dharmas.	  That	  is	  to	  say	  (he	  notes,)	  “You	  hear	  (me)	  speak	  of	  the	  dharmas	  of	  the	  
skandhas,	  dhatu’s,	  etc.	  and	  do	  not	  understand	  (they)	  are	  only	  the	  vacant	  falsities	  of	  conventional	  truth.	  (Instead	  you)	  mistakenly	  grasp	  at	  the	  meaning	  (as	  if	  they)	  constitute	  the	  truth	  of	  foremost	  significance.	  For	  this	  reason,	  hearing	  the	  refutation	  (and	  misunderstanding	  it),	  means	  the	  self	  (which)	  desires	  (such	  falsities)	  has	  fallen	  into	  lost	  circumstances.	  Countering	  this	  accordingly	  (indicates	  my	  response)	  certainly	  lacks	  defect.”	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   Fourth,	  (Nagarjuna)	  explains	  and	  reveals	  the	  meaning	  of	  Dharma.	  Therein,	  initially	  (he)	  presents	  the	  exceeding	  profundity	  of	  the	  Dharma.	  In	  regards	  to	  the	  causes	  and	  conditions	  expounded	  by	  the	  Buddha,	  (he	  notes	  that)	  the	  Dharma	  that	  is	  profound	  is	  not	  that	  expounded	  by	  your	  Two	  Vehicles.	  Furthermore,	  matched	  with	  the	  treatises	  on	  the	  Buddhas’	  Wisdom,	  “causally	  conditioned	  dharmas”	  then	  comes	  to	  be	  called	  the	  “Dharma	  of	  causes	  and	  conditions.”	  Therefore	  it	  says	  the	  Buddhas’	  
Dharma	  of	  causes	  and	  conditions	  is	  designated	  “exceedingly	  profound.”	  Secondly,	  from	  “these	  causes	  and	  conditions…”	  (he)	  explains	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  exceeding	  profoundity	  of	  completion.	  Further,	  this	  Dharma	  of	  causes	  and	  conditions	  moreover	  and	  rightly	  ought	  to	  be	  (understood	  as)	  conventional	  truth.	  (If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  one	  might	  reasonably	  ask)	  for	  what	  reason	  then	  (does	  he)	  refer	  to	  (it)	  as	  (the	  truth	  of)	  foremost	  significance?	  (He)	  explains	  (this	  by)	  saying	  because	  (they)	  lack	  a	  self-­‐nature,	  there	  is	  no	  nature	  (there)	  even	  as	  (one	  conventionally)	  [228a]	  speaks	  of	  causes	  and	  conditions.	  For	  this	  reason	  it	  is	  “profound.”	  	   Question:	  Previously,	  (when)	  speaking	  to	  the	  heterodox	  individual	  (Nagarjuna	  said)	  “You,	  hearing	  of	  worldly	  truth,	  (take	  it)	  to	  mean	  it	  is	  (the	  truth	  of)	  foremost	  significance.”	  Now	  (however)	  the	  text’s	  Author	  also	  says	  (the	  Dharma	  of)	  causes	  and	  conditions	  is	  the	  (truth	  of)	  foremost	  significance.	  Well,	  what	  is	  the	  difference	  (of	  this	  claim)	  with	  that	  (earlier	  assertion)?	  	   Answer:	  The	  heterodox	  individual	  (takes	  it)	  to	  mean	  the	  phenomena	  of	  causes	  and	  conditions	  are	  (the	  truth)	  of	  foremost	  significance.	  The	  text’s	  Author	  takes	  the	  principle	  of	  causes	  and	  conditions	  as	  ultimate	  truth.	  Furthermore,	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  text’s	  Author	  (is	  that)	  every	  Buddha	  expounds	  dharmas	  of	  the	  worldly	  truth	  of	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causes	  and	  conditions.	  (The)	  desire	  (behind	  this)	  idea	  is	  to	  lead	  (others)	  to	  know	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  nature	  and	  thereby	  realize	  ultimate	  truth.	  It	  does	  not	  mean	  (they	  seek)	  to	  preserve	  these	  dharmas	  of	  causes	  and	  conditions.	  Further,	  above	  (he)	  said,	  due	  to	  worldly	  truth	  (one	  comes	  to)	  know	  (the	  truth	  of)	  foremost	  significance.	  Therefore,	  in	  the	  Treatise	  on	  (the	  Sutra	  Concerning	  the	  Ten)	  Stages,	  (it	  notes	  that)	  if	  one	  accords	  with	  and	  contemplates	  wordly	  truth	  then	  (one	  can)	  enter	  the	  truth	  of	  foremost	  significance.	  This	  is	  (the	  Author’s)	  meaning	  (here).	  	   Fifth,	  from	  “If	  the	  various	  dharmas…”	  (he)	  correctly	  returns	  to	  an	  error	  in	  regards	  to	  that	  (heterodox	  idea).	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  (dharmas)	  have	  a	  nature	  then	  (they)	  do	  not	  derive	  from	  conditions.	  (But)	  because	  (they)	  do	  not	  derive	  from	  conditions,	  then	  there	  are	  no	  (such)	  various	  dharmas.	  For	  this	  reason	  the	  Treatise	  on	  
the	  Middle	  Way	  says,	  “Because	  there	  is	  the	  significance	  of	  emptiness,	  therefore	  all	  
dharmas	  come	  to	  be	  formed.	  If	  there	  is	  no	  significance	  of	  emptiness,	  all	  dharmas	  do	  not	  (come	  to	  be)	  formed.”	  Furthermore,	  (the	  text	  notes,	  “You)	  ought	  to	  know	  there	  are	  a	  multitude	  of	  errors	  and	  afflictions	  (that)	  you	  personally	  do	  not	  understand	  (even	  as	  you)	  contrarily	  come	  to	  answer	  me	  (with	  your	  mistakes).	  Therefore	  the	  
Treatise	  on	  the	  Middle	  Way	  says,	  “You	  now	  personally	  have	  (committed)	  errors	  even	  while	  (you)	  thereby	  turn	  back	  towards	  me.	  This	  is	  like	  a	  man	  riding	  a	  horse	  (even)	  while	  (he	  is)	  personally	  mistaken	  in	  regards	  to	  that	  which	  he	  is	  riding.	  Now	  (it	  is	  clear	  that)	  this	  (notion	  of)	  destroying	  the	  six	  phenomena	  is	  still,	  (in	  fact,)	  your	  error.”	  	   Regarding	  the	  middle	  (portion	  of	  this	  section,	  there	  are)	  six	  (points).	  First	  (he	  notes	  how	  the	  error)	  destroys	  the	  Four	  (Noble)	  Truths.	  Second,	  from	  “If	  the	  Four	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Noble	  Truths…”	  clarifies	  the	  action	  of	  destroying	  the	  four.	  Third,	  (he	  notes	  how	  it)	  destroys	  the	  eight	  (fruits	  of)	  the	  virtuous	  and	  the	  Arhats.	  Fourth,	  (he	  notes	  it)	  destroys	  the	  Three	  Jewels.	  Fifth,	  (he	  notes	  it)	  destroys	  worldy	  conventions.	  Sixth,	  (he	  notes	  it)	  destroys	  cause	  and	  effect.	  (These	  six)	  together	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  	   	   	   	   [Refuting	  Other-­‐nature]	   	  	   Second,	  in	  (the	  next	  part	  that)	  refutes	  other-­‐nature,	  (there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  Initially	  (he)	  records	  the	  reckoning	  (in	  question	  and)	  generally	  investigates.	  Subsequently	  (he	  provides	  a)	  valid	  refutation.	  In	  the	  refutation	  first	  (he	  provides	  a)	  refutation	  (which	  points	  out	  that)	  a	  self	  of	  forms	  deprives	  (one	  of	  an)	  other-­‐(nature).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (that	  which	  stands)	  in	  contrast	  to	  “self”	  is	  designated	  “other.”	  Since	  a	  self(-­‐nature)	  is	  indeed	  lacking,	  (then)	  in	  contrast	  to	  what	  (might	  one)	  designate	  an	  “other”	  (-­‐nature)?	  Secondly,	  (he	  provides	  a)	  refutation	  (that	  points	  out	  if	  other-­‐nature)	  is	  the	  same	  as	  self(-­‐nature,	  then)	  there	  is	  no	  other(-­‐nature).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (when)	  looking	  toward	  an	  individual	  [i.e.,	  “self”]	  it	  still	  is	  an	  (individual)	  “self”	  (nature).	  For	  this	  reason	  a	  self(-­‐nature)	  without	  an	  other(-­‐nature)	  is	  also	  nonexistent.	  There	  is	  a	  presentation	  (and)	  explanation	  (of	  these	  points	  that	  is)	  understandable	  (without	  further	  explanation	  here).	  	  	   	   	   	   [Both	  Combined]	  Third,	  from	  “If	  self-­‐nature	  and	  other-­‐nature…”	  (he)	  combines	  (them)	  to	  conclude	  (and)	  both	  are	  negated.	  	   	   	   [Conclusion	  and	  Categorical	  Dismissal]	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The	  Gate	  of	  Contemplating	  Causes	  and	  Effects	  
The	  Ninth	  (Gate)	  [The	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  [cont.	  165b]	  	   Again,	  all	  dharmas	  are	  empty.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:	  Because)	  the	  various	  dharmas	  individually	  lack	  a	  nature	  (and)	  also	  do	  not	  come	  from	  some	  other	  (set	  of)	  circumstances.	  (This	  is)	  as	  stated:	  	  	  	   An	  effect	  among	  collected	  conditions,	  	   	   in	  the	  end,	  may	  not	  be	  obtained.	  	   It	  also	  does	  not	  come	  from	  some	  other	  (set	  of)	  circumstances.	  	   How	  then	  (can)	  there	  still	  be	  effects?	  	  	   [165c]	  As	  for	  collected	  conditions,	  whether	  among	  them	  individually	  or	  whether	  among	  them	  combined,	  both	  (alternatives)	  lack	  effects.	  (This	  is	  just)	  as	  previously	  stated.	  	  Furthermore,	  these	  effects	  do	  not	  come	  from	  other	  (sets	  of)	  circumstances.	  If	  it	  was	  the	  case	  that	  they	  came	  from	  other	  circumstances	  then	  they	  would	  not	  be	  produced	  from	  causes	  and	  conditions.	  Also	  (then),	  there	  is	  no	  power	  (found	  in)	  the	  combination	  of	  collected	  conditions.	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  effects	  are	  lacking	  among	  collected	  conditions	  and	  also	  do	  not	  come	  from	  other	  circumstances,	  (then)	  this	  is	  exactly	  (the	  state	  of	  being)	  empty	  (of	  a	  nature.)	  Because	  effects	  are	  empty,	  all	  karmically	  active	  dharmas	  are	  empty.	  Because	  karmically	  active	  dharmas	  are	  empty,	  karmically	  inactive	  dharmas	  are	  also	  empty.	  As	  even	  karmically	  active	  and	  karmically	  inactive	  (dharmas)	  are	  empty,	  how	  much	  more	  so	  the	  self?	  	   [End	  of	  Chapter	  Nine	  of	  the	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  	   [Commentary	  by	  Fa-­‐tsang]	  	  	   	   [The	  Name	  of	  the	  Gate]	  	   First,	  as	  for	  explaining	  the	  name,	  there	  are	  two	  meanings.	  First,	  supposing	  causes	  produce	  effects	  (Nagarjuna)	  refutes	  (the	  notion	  that)	  effects,	  deriving	  from	  other	  circumstances,	  individually	  (and	  particularly)	  [i.e.,	  essentially,]	  even	  so	  still	  arrive.	  Secondly,	  again,	  contemplating	  (what	  is	  found)	  among	  causes	  and	  conditions,	  (he)	  also	  (finds)	  there	  are	  no	  effects.	  Because	  of	  lacking	  effects,	  there	  are	  no	  causes.	  For	  this	  reason	  causes	  and	  effects	  are	  both	  refuted.	  Corresponding	  to	  the	  first	  
	   214	  
meaning	  and	  derived	  from	  “that	  which	  can	  refute”	  (we	  get	  the	  first	  possibility	  that	  can	  be	  considered)	  as	  the	  name	  (of	  this	  chapter).	  Corresponding	  to	  the	  latter	  meaning	  and	  derived	  from	  “that	  which	  is	  refuted”	  (we	  get	  the	  second	  possibility	  that	  can	  be	  considered)	  as	  the	  name	  (of	  this	  chapter).	  	   	   [Derivation	  of	  the	  Ideas]	  	   Second,	  as	  for	  deriving	  the	  ideas,	  (they	  are)	  derived	  from	  the	  preceding	  (chapter).	  Although	  (before	  he)	  also	  broadly	  revealed	  that	  causes	  and	  effects	  derived	  from	  conditions	  lack	  a	  nature,	  even	  so	  madly	  deluded	  followers	  again	  claim	  (they)	  individually	  (and	  particularly)	  [i.e.,	  essentially]	  yet	  exist.	  In	  order	  to	  refute	  this	  attachment	  therefore	  (we)	  have	  the	  arrival	  of	  this	  gate.	  	   	   [The	  Propositions	  Clarified]	  	   Third,	  as	  for	  that	  which	  the	  categories	  clarify,	  this	  	  (chapter)	  clarifies	  that	  internal	  and	  external	  effect	  dharmas	  are	  both	  empty.	  Causes,	  and	  so	  forth,	  are	  all	  also	  thus.	  Thereby	  (he)	  establishes	  the	  contemplation	  of	  emptiness.	  	   	   [Explanation]	  	   Fourth,	  in	  the	  explanation	  section	  [228b]	  (there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  First	  (he	  presents	  the	  proposition.	  Second,	  (he)	  explains	  and	  reveals	  (the	  error).	  Third,	  (he)	  categorically	  dismisses	  (the	  erroneous	  viewpoint).	  	   In	  the	  explanation	  (there	  are)	  three	  (points).	  Initially	  (he	  deals	  with	  the)	  arising	  (of	  effects).	  Second,	  (he)	  establishes	  a	  verse.	  The	  upper	  half	  refutes	  internal	  production.	  The	  lower	  half	  refutes	  external	  derivation.	  Furthermore,	  the	  upper	  half	  records	  the	  preceding	  gate’s	  meaning	  that	  conditions	  do	  not	  produce	  effects.	  The	  lower	  half	  correctly	  clarifies	  the	  essence	  of	  this	  gate.	  Based	  only	  upon	  the	  preceding	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The	  Gate	  of	  Contemplating	  Agency	  
The	  Tenth	  (Gate)	  [The	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  [cont.	  165c]	  	   Again,	  all	  dharmas	  are	  empty.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   Because	  made	  by	  self,	  made	  by	  other,	  made	  by	  combination,	  made	  without	  cause,	  none	  (of	  these	  options)	  is	  obtainable.	  As	  (the	  text)	  says:	  	  	   Made	  by	  self,	  made	  by	  other,	  	   	   made	  by	  combination,	  and	  made	  without	  cause,	  	   	   (a	  thing)	  like	  this	  is	  not	  obtainable.	  	   Given	  this	  then	  there	  is	  no	  suffering.	  	  	   Suffering	  that	  is	  made	  by	  itself	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  If	  it	  is	  made	  by	  self,	  that	  is,	  (if	  it)	  makes	  its	  (own	  essential)	  essence,	  (then)	  by	  means	  of	  this	  (self	  made)	  phenomena	  (we)	  do	  not	  obtain	  (a	  situation	  where)	  that	  (self	  made	  phenomena)	  then	  creates	  the	  (very	  same)	  phenomena.	  (This	  is)	  just	  like	  a	  consciousness	  cannot	  self-­‐cognize	  and	  a	  finger	  cannot	  touch	  itself.	  For	  this	  reason	  we	  do	  not	  get	  to	  speak	  of	  (things	  as)	  made	  by	  self.	  	   (Alternatively,)	  made	  by	  other	  is	  also	  not	  the	  case.	  (As	  for	  any	  hypothetical)	  other,	  how	  can	  it	  create	  suffering	  (for	  an	  entirely	  different	  thing)?	  	   Question:	  Collected	  conditions	  are	  designated	  as	  “other.”	  Because	  collected	  conditions	  create	  suffering,	  (this	  form	  of	  causation)	  is	  designated	  as	  “made	  by	  other.”	  Why	  (do	  you)	  say	  (that	  suffering)	  is	  not	  made	  from	  others?	  	  	   Answer:	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  collected	  conditions	  are	  designated	  as	  “other,”	  then	  suffering	  is	  made	  from	  collected	  conditions.	  This	  suffering	  (that	  is)	  produced	  from	  collected	  conditions	  is	  then	  (of	  the	  very	  same)	  nature	  as	  collected	  conditions.	  If	  it	  is	  then	  exactly	  the	  (same)	  nature	  as	  collected	  conditions,	  why	  designate	  them	  as	  “other”?	  (This	  is)	  like	  a	  clay	  jar	  –	  the	  clay	  is	  not	  designated	  as	  “other”	  (than	  the	  jar).	  Furthermore,	  (this	  is)	  like	  a	  gold	  bracelet	  –	  the	  gold	  is	  not	  designated	  as	  “other”	  (than	  the	  bracelet).	  Suffering	  is	  also	  like	  this.	  Because	  it	  is	  produced	  from	  collected	  conditions,	  collected	  conditions	  do	  not	  get	  to	  be	  designated	  as	  “other.”	  	   Continuing,	  these	  collected	  conditions,	  because	  they	  also	  are	  not	  an	  existent	  that	  has	  a	  self-­‐nature,	  they	  do	  not	  come	  to	  attain	  sovereign	  independence.57	  For	  these	  reasons	  we	  do	  not	  get	  to	  speak	  of	  effects	  produced	  from	  collected	  conditions.	  (This	  is)	  like	  it	  states	  in	  the	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Middle	  Way:	  	  	   Effects	  are	  produced	  from	  collected	  conditions.	  	   (But)	  these	  conditions	  are	  not	  self-­‐(existent).	  	   (If)	  conditions	  are	  not	  self-­‐existent,	  	   	   how	  do	  conditions	  produce	  effects?	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In	  this	  fashion	  suffering	  does	  not	  come	  to	  be	  made	  from	  another.	  	  	   (Alternatively,)	  made	  by	  both	  self	  and	  other	  is	  also	  not	  the	  case.	  (It	  cannot	  be	  so)	  because	  there	  are	  two	  errors	  (combined	  in	  this	  alternative).	  If	  (one)	  asserts	  suffering	  is	  both	  made	  by	  self	  and	  made	  by	  other	  then	  there	  are	  the	  (previously	  indicated)	  errors	  of	  made	  by	  self	  and	  made	  by	  other	  (combined).	  Therefore	  suffering	  made	  by	  combination	  is	  also	  not	  the	  case.	  	   (Alternatively,)	  if	  (one)	  claims	  suffering	  is	  produced	  without	  cause,	  that	  is	  also	  not	  the	  case.	  (It	  cannot	  be	  so)	  because	  (in	  that	  case)	  there	  is	  the	  error	  of	  limitless	  (possibilities.	  This	  is)	  as	  the	  sutra	  states:	  	   A	  naked	  ascetic	  [166a]	  asked	  the	  Buddha,	  “Is	  suffering	  made	  by	  self?”	  The	  Buddha	  was	  silent	  and	  did	  not	  answer.	  	  (The	  naked	  ascetic	  then	  continued,)	  “World	  Honored	  One,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  suffering	  is	  not	  made	  by	  self,	  is	  it	  not	  made	  by	  other?”	  Again	  the	  Buddha	  did	  not	  answer.	  (So	  the	  naked	  ascetic	  continued,)	  “World	  Honored	  One,	  if	  such	  is	  the	  case	  then	  is	  it	  not	  so	  that	  suffering	  is	  made	  by	  self	  and	  made	  by	  other?”	  Again	  the	  Buddha	  did	  not	  answer.	  (So	  the	  naked	  ascetic	  continued,)	  “World	  Honored	  one,	  if	  such	  is	  the	  case	  then	  is	  it	  not	  so	  that	  suffering	  is	  made	  without	  causes	  and	  without	  conditions?”	  Again	  the	  Buddha	  did	  not	  answer.	  	  	   Just	  as	  with	  these	  four	  questions	  and	  the	  Buddha	  not	  answering	  each,	  we	  should	  (also)	  know	  suffering	  is	  empty.	  	   Question:	  	  The	  Buddha	  expounded	  this	  sutra	  (but	  notably)	  did	  not	  state	  that	  suffering	  is	  empty.	  He	  created	  this	  exposition	  in	  accord	  with	  (the	  needs	  of)	  the	  sentient	  beings	  who	  can	  be	  saved.	  (So,	  why	  do	  you	  claim	  this	  text	  expounds	  the	  emptiness	  of	  suffering?)	  	   (Answer:)	  This	  naked	  ascetic	  claims	  that	  people	  are	  the	  cause	  of	  suffering.	  Those	  (who	  claim)	  there	  is	  a	  self,	  assert	  that	  the	  beautiful	  and	  the	  ugly	  are	  that	  which	  is	  created	  by	  an	  eternal	  soul.58	  (They	  say)	  the	  soul	  is	  eternally	  pure	  and	  does	  not	  have	  suffering	  or	  vexations.	  (They	  claim)	  that	  which	  knows	  and	  that	  which	  is	  known	  are	  all	  the	  soul.	  (They	  claim)	  the	  soul	  creates	  the	  beautiful	  and	  the	  ugly,	  suffering	  and	  joy,	  and	  in	  turn	  (karmically)	  receives	  assorted	  (karmically	  associated)	  bodies.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  heterodox	  view	  (the	  naked	  ascetic)	  questioned	  the	  Buddha,	  (asking	  whether)	  suffering	  is	  not	  made	  by	  self.	  For	  this	  reason	  the	  Buddha	  did	  not	  answer.	  In	  fact	  suffering	  is	  not	  made	  by	  self.	  If	  the	  self	  were	  the	  cause	  of	  suffering,	  the	  self	  then	  would	  lack	  permanence	  because	  of	  the	  self	  producing	  suffering.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  If	  dharmas	  are	  causes	  and	  (also)	  produced	  from	  causes,	  (then)	  all	  
dharmas	  also	  lack	  permanence.	  If	  the	  self	  lacks	  permanence,	  then	  the	  karmic	  recompenses	  of	  (being)	  blameworthy	  and/or	  blessed	  are	  all	  (eventually)	  extinguished.	  (This	  means)	  the	  positive	  recompenses	  (that	  come	  with)	  cultivating	  the	  Brahmanic	  practices	  also	  should	  be	  empty.	  (So)	  if	  the	  self	  is	  the	  cause	  of	  suffering	  then	  there	  is	  no	  liberation.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	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   (Answer:)	  If	  the	  self	  creates	  suffering	  (then)	  apart	  from	  suffering	  there	  is	  no	  self.	  (This	  is	  because	  the	  self,)	  which	  is	  that	  which	  can	  create	  suffering,	  (would)	  therefore	  lack	  a	  form	  (apart	  from	  suffering).	  If	  is	  is	  the	  case	  that	  even	  without	  form	  (the	  self)	  can	  still	  create	  suffering,	  then	  as	  for	  attaining	  liberation,	  (since	  it	  lacks	  form	  as	  well,)	  it	  also	  ought	  to	  be	  (a	  state	  with)	  suffering.	  (A	  state)	  like	  this	  is	  then	  not	  liberation.	  	  And	  yet,	  in	  fact,	  there	  is	  liberation.	  Therefore	  suffering	  that	  is	  made	  by	  self	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  	  	   (Alternatively,)	  suffering	  made	  by	  other	  is	  also	  not	  the	  case.	  (If	  we	  consider)	  suffering	  apart	  (from	  the	  self),	  how	  is	  it	  (possible)	  that	  there	  is	  a	  (separate)	  individual	  who	  then	  creates	  suffering	  to	  give	  to	  another?	  	   Again,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  suffering	  is	  created	  by	  other,	  then	  (such)	  is	  (apparently	  a	  case	  of)	  God	  created	  (suffering).59	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  questions	  like	  these	  heterodox	  views	  the	  Buddha	  did	  not	  answer.	  Yet,	  in	  fact,	  (suffering)	  is	  not	  created	  from	  God	  (either).	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:	  This	  must	  be	  the	  case)	  because	  their	  respective	  natures	  mutually	  contradict	  (one	  another.	  The	  combination	  would	  be)	  like	  a	  calf	  that	  is	  yet	  a	  cow.	  If	  the	  ten	  thousand	  things	  are	  produced	  from	  God,	  they	  should	  all	  resemble	  God	  because	  they	  (are	  all)	  its	  offspring.	  	   Again,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  God	  created	  sentient	  beings,	  (then	  God)	  should	  not	  take	  suffering	  and	  impart	  it	  to	  the	  children.	  For	  these	  reasons	  (one)	  ought	  not	  claim	  God	  creates	  suffering.	  	   Question:	  Sentient	  beings	  are	  produced	  from	  God.	  Suffering	  and/or	  joy	  are	  also	  that	  which	  is	  produced	  from	  God.	  Because	  (sentient	  beings)	  are	  not	  aware	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  joy	  (God)	  gives	  them	  suffering.	  (This	  being	  the	  case,	  why	  do	  you	  say	  we	  ought	  not	  claim	  suffering	  comes	  from	  God?)	  	   Answer:	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  sentient	  beings	  are	  God’s	  children,	  (God)	  should	  only	  use	  joy	  to	  check	  (their)	  suffering.	  (God	  certainly)	  should	  not	  give	  them	  suffering.	  Also	  it	  should	  (be	  the	  case	  that)	  whenever	  (one)	  worships	  God	  then	  (one	  definitely)	  extinguishes	  suffering	  and	  attains	  joy.	  Yet,	  in	  fact	  it	  is	  not	  so.	  (It	  is)	  only	  when	  (one)	  individually	  engages	  the	  causes	  and	  conditions	  of	  suffering	  and/or	  joy	  that	  (one)	  individually	  receives	  (the	  associated	  and	  appropriate)	  karmic	  recompense.	  Those	  (results	  then)	  are	  not	  created	  by	  God.	  	   Again,	  as	  for	  that	  (idea	  of	  God),	  if	  he	  is	  [166b]	  self-­‐existent	  there	  should	  not	  be	  (anything)	  he	  requires.	  (If)	  there	  is	  (anything)	  made	  by	  itself	  which	  requires	  (anything	  additional	  to	  be	  itself,	  then	  that	  thing)	  is	  not	  designated	  as	  self-­‐existent.	  (Now)	  if	  (a	  self-­‐existent	  thing)	  lacks	  (anything	  additional)	  which	  is	  required,	  what	  is	  the	  use	  of	  transforming	  and	  creating	  the	  ten	  thousand	  things?	  (Any	  being	  who	  does	  so	  would)	  be	  like	  a	  small	  boy	  (simply)	  playing	  around	  (to	  no	  real	  purpose).	  	   Again,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  God	  creates	  sentient	  beings,	  who,	  in	  turn,	  created	  God?	  If	  (one	  claims)	  God	  is	  self-­‐created,	  then	  that	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  (This	  must	  be	  so	  because	  God)	  is	  like	  (all	  other	  things	  that)	  are	  not	  able	  to	  self-­‐create.	  If	  there	  is	  a	  further	  creator,	  then	  (one	  would)	  not	  designate	  (this	  God	  as)	  self-­‐existent.	  	  	   Again,	  if	  God	  is	  the	  creator	  then	  in	  regards	  to	  creating	  (things)	  there	  is	  no	  obstacle	  and	  (even)	  a	  thought	  can	  create	  (everything).	  But	  as	  the	  Isvara	  sutra	  states:	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God	  wanted	  to	  create	  the	  ten	  thousand	  things	  (so	  he)	  engaged	  in	  ascetic	  practices	  and	  produced	  the	  insects	  that	  move	  on	  their	  belly.	  (God)	  again	  enagaged	  in	  ascetic	  practices	  and	  produced	  the	  various	  flying	  birds.	  (God)	  again	  engaged	  in	  ascetic	  practices	  and	  produced	  humans	  and	  the	  demi-­‐gods.	  	  If	  (the	  karma	  of)	  engaging	  in	  ascetic	  practices	  initially	  produced	  poisonous	  insects,	  next	  produced	  flying	  birds,	  and	  finally	  produced	  humans	  and	  demi-­‐gods,	  we	  should	  (clearly)	  understand	  that	  sentient	  beings	  were	  produced	  from	  karmic	  causes	  and	  conditions	  and	  not	  from	  (God)	  having	  an	  ascetic	  practice.	  	   Again,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  God	  created	  the	  ten	  thousand	  things,	  what	  place	  did	  he	  abide	  in	  to	  then	  create	  those	  ten	  thousand	  things?	  This	  place	  where	  he	  abided,	  was	  it	  for	  God’s	  creation	  or	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  other	  (things)?	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  it	  was	  for	  God’s	  creation,	  where	  did	  he	  abide	  to	  create	  (it)?	  If	  he	  abided	  in	  another	  place	  (to	  create	  the	  place	  where	  he	  created	  the	  ten	  thousand	  things),	  then	  again,	  who	  created	  that	  other	  place?	  In	  this	  fashion	  (the	  regress)	  is	  without	  end.	  	   (Alternatively,)	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  (God)	  is	  made	  by	  other,	  then	  there	  are	  (at	  least)	  two	  Gods.	  (Even	  by	  your	  own	  views	  though)	  this	  situation	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  For	  (all)	  these	  reasons	  the	  world’s	  ten	  thousand	  things	  are	  not	  that	  which	  God	  made.	  	   Again,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  God	  made	  (all	  things),	  why	  did	  (he	  need)	  ascetic	  practices	  (that	  require)	  worshipping	  another?	  (Could	  it	  be	  due	  to)	  a	  desire	  to	  cause	  pleasure	  and	  accordingly	  (he)	  beseeched	  (another	  for)	  that	  which	  he	  wanted?	  If	  ascetic	  practices	  (were	  used	  to)	  beseech	  another,	  we	  should	  know	  he	  is	  not	  God.	  	   Again,	  if	  God	  made	  the	  ten	  thousand	  things,	  in	  that	  case	  (that	  which	  is)	  initially	  created	  is	  fixed	  and	  should	  not	  change.	  Horses	  then	  are	  always	  horses	  and	  men	  are	  always	  men.	  Yet,	  now	  (we	  certainly	  know)	  that	  in	  accord	  with	  karma	  there	  is	  change	  (in	  all	  these	  things.	  Therefore	  we)	  should	  know	  they	  are	  not	  that	  which	  is	  made	  by	  God.	  	   Again,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  (the	  ten	  thousand	  things)	  are	  that	  which	  is	  made	  by	  God,	  then	  (they	  should)	  lack	  (variations	  over	  time	  in	  the	  qualities	  of)	  bad	  and	  good.	  (This	  would	  have	  to	  be	  the	  case)	  because	  good	  and	  evil,	  beauty	  and	  ugliness	  are	  all	  created	  by	  God	  (and	  hence	  should	  not	  vary	  over	  time	  within	  a	  thing).	  Yet,	  in	  fact	  there	  are	  (variations	  in)	  bad	  and	  good	  so	  they	  are	  not	  that	  which	  God	  created.	  	   Again,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  sentient	  beings	  are	  produced	  from	  God	  they	  should	  all	  revere	  and	  love	  (God)	  like	  children	  love	  their	  father.	  Yet,	  in	  fact	  it	  is	  not	  so.	  (We	  can	  clearly	  see	  that)	  there	  is	  dislike	  and	  there	  is	  love	  (of	  God	  by	  different	  people)	  so	  we	  must	  know	  they	  are	  not	  that	  which	  God	  made.	  	   Again,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  God	  made	  (sentient	  beings),	  why	  not	  make	  entirely	  happy	  or	  entirely	  unhappy	  people?	  Yet	  (in	  fact)	  there	  are	  (those	  who	  are)	  happy	  and	  unhappy.	  (Given	  this	  fact	  we)	  must	  know	  (those	  mindsets)	  are	  (karmically)	  produced	  from	  dislike	  and	  affection	  and	  therefore	  are	  not	  (from)	  God.	  (As	  they)	  are	  not	  (from)	  God,	  (they)	  are	  not	  that	  which	  God	  made.	  	   Again,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  God	  makes	  (everything,	  then)	  sentient	  beings	  each	  ought	  not	  have	  that	  which	  (they	  individually)	  made.	  Yet,	  (in	  fact,)	  sentient	  beings	  (have)	  skills	  and	  each	  has	  that	  which	  (they)	  made	  (using	  those	  skills).	  Therefore	  we	  should	  know	  (all	  those	  things)	  are	  not	  that	  made	  by	  God.	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   Again,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  God	  [166c]	  makes	  (everything),	  matters	  of	  good,	  evil,	  suffering,	  and	  joy	  are	  not	  (karmically)	  made	  but	  are	  derived	  from	  God.	  If	  (things	  are)	  like	  this	  (then	  that)	  destroys	  the	  worldly	  Dharma	  (and	  as	  a	  consequence),	  maintaining	  discipline	  and	  cultivating	  the	  Brahmana	  practices	  all	  lack	  that	  which	  benefits	  (one’s	  development).	  Yet,	  in	  fact	  (we	  clearly	  see)	  that	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  Therefore	  (we)	  should	  know	  they	  are	  not	  that	  made	  by	  God.	  	   Again,	  if	  (God)	  is	  great	  among	  sentient	  beings	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  causes	  and	  conditions	  of	  karmically	  (produced)	  happiness,	  (then)	  other	  sentient	  beings	  (likewise)	  practicing	  the	  karma	  of	  happiness	  also	  ought	  to	  be	  great.	  	  (So)	  why	  (especially)	  honor	  God	  (on	  this	  count)?	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  even	  without	  causes	  and	  conditions	  God	  is	  (great),	  all	  sentient	  beings	  also	  ought	  to	  be	  (like)	  God.	  Yet,	  in	  fact,	  (we	  clearly	  see)	  it	  is	  not	  thus.	  (Therefore	  we)	  should	  know	  (these	  things)	  are	  not	  that	  made	  by	  God.	  	   (Furthermore,)	  if	  God	  is	  obtained	  from	  another,	  then	  in	  turn	  that	  other	  (must	  be	  obtained)	  from	  another.	  In	  this	  fashion	  then	  there	  is	  no	  end	  (to	  the	  regress).	  If	  there	  is	  no	  end	  (to	  the	  regresss),	  then	  there	  is	  no	  (original)	  cause.	  Similarly,	  (this	  point	  is)	  equally	  (valid	  regarding)	  the	  various	  and	  assorted	  causes	  and	  conditions.	  (So,	  we)	  should	  know	  the	  ten	  thousand	  things	  are	  not	  products	  of	  God.	  Furthermore,	  there	  is	  no	  God.	  Because	  of	  this	  (when	  the)	  heterodox	  (believer)	  questioned	  (the	  Buddha	  about	  the	  possibility	  of)	  made	  by	  other,	  the	  Buddha	  also	  did	  not	  answer.	  	   (Furthermore,	  the	  possibility	  of)	  made	  by	  combination	  is	  also	  not	  the	  case.	  (This	  must	  be	  so)	  because	  (this	  option)	  has	  both	  errors	  (combined).	  	   (Furthermore,)	  because	  (things)	  are	  produced	  from	  causes	  and	  conditions	  combined,	  they	  are	  not	  produced	  from	  an	  absence	  of	  causes.	  (Consequently)	  the	  Buddha	  also	  did	  not	  answer	  (the	  heterodox	  believer	  when	  he	  asked	  about	  production	  without	  causes).	  	   (Question:)	  That	  is	  why	  this	  sutra	  only	  refutes	  the	  heterodox	  views	  of	  the	  four	  types	  (of	  causation).	  	  It	  does	  not	  expound	  (the	  idea	  that)	  suffering	  is	  empty.	  (So	  why	  do	  you	  claim	  as	  much?)	  	   Answer:	  Although,	  in	  this	  fashion,	  the	  Buddha	  did	  assert	  that	  suffering	  is	  produced	  from	  collected	  causes	  and	  conditions,	  refuting	  heterodox	  views	  of	  the	  four	  types	  (of	  causation)	  is	  exactly	  (a	  form	  of)	  expounding	  emptiness.	  (This	  is	  true	  because)	  expounding	  (the	  idea	  that)	  suffering	  is	  produced	  from	  collected	  causes	  and	  conditions	  is	  exactly	  (a	  form	  of)	  expounding	  the	  meaning	  of	  emptiness.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)If	  (something)	  is	  produced	  from	  collected	  causes	  and	  conditions	  then	  it	  lacks	  a	  self-­‐nature.	  Lacking	  a	  self-­‐nature	  is	  exactly	  (the	  same	  as	  being)	  empty.	  Since	  suffering	  is	  empty,	  (we)	  should	  know	  that	  karmically	  active	  (dharmas,	  
karmically)	  inactive	  (dharmas),	  and	  collective	  productions	  [i.e.,	  sentient	  beings]	  are	  all	  empty.	  	   [End	  of	  Chapter	  Ten	  of	  the	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  	   [Commentary	  by	  Fa-­‐tsang]	  	  	   	   [The	  Name	  of	  the	  Gate]	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   First,	  as	  for	  explaining	  the	  name,	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  four	  (possible)	  circumstances	  of	  (agency	  by)	  self	  and	  other,	  because	  (when)	  seeking	  the	  agent	  (one)	  does	  not	  obtain	  (one,	  Nagarjuna)	  takes	  (this	  idea)	  as	  the	  name	  (for	  the	  chapter).	  	   	   [Derivation	  of	  the	  Ideas]	  	   Second,	  as	  for	  deriving	  the	  ideas,	  by	  means	  of	  internal	  and	  external	  (causes	  and	  conditions)	  the	  preceding	  (chapter)	  briefly	  sought	  (a	  source	  of	  production).	  Now,	  broadly,	  (and)	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  four	  (possible)	  circumstances	  (of	  agency	  by	  self,	  other,	  both	  self	  and	  other,	  and	  neither	  self	  nor	  other,	  he	  continues)	  to	  search	  for	  (an	  agent).	  Therefore,	  (the	  chapter’s	  topic)	  is	  derived	  (naturally	  from	  that	  which	  precedes).	  Furthermore,	  one	  (explanation)	  states	  the	  above	  nine	  chapters	  already	  and	  for	  once	  refuted	  causes	  and	  effects.	  Individually	  the	  following	  three	  chapters	  are	  (then)	  the	  second	  time	  (Nagarjuna)	  refutes	  causes	  and	  effects.	  As	  for	  what	  difference	  there	  is	  with	  the	  preceding	  (refutations),	  the	  preceding	  was	  broad	  and	  this	  is	  therefore	  brief.	  The	  first	  two	  chapters	  (of	  the	  final	  three)	  refute	  (the	  notion	  of	  an	  agent)	  that	  can	  produce.	  The	  following	  (and	  final	  chapter	  of	  the	  Treatise)	  refutes	  (the	  notion	  of)	  that	  which	  is	  produced.	  Therefore	  (these	  ideas	  naturally)	  are	  derived	  (from	  the	  preceding).	  	   	   [The	  Propositions	  Clarified]	  	   Third,	  as	  for	  that	  which	  is	  clarified	  by	  the	  chapter,	  (it)	  refutes	  these	  four	  (notions	  of)	  agency	  (and)	  has	  two	  gates.	  	  	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  That	  Which	  is	  a	  Cause]	   	  	   First,	  (it)	  reveals	  refutations	  of	  that	  which	  is	  (a	  cause.	  This	  part)	  also	  (has)	  two	  (points).	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   The	  first	  corresponds	  to	  heterodox	  path	  (views)	  concerning	  an	  individual	  (as	  agent.	  There	  are	  four	  forms	  of	  this	  idea.)	  1.	  Made	  by	  self.	  2.	  Made	  by	  God.	  3.	  (Made	  by	  combination.)	  For	  example,	  (the	  idea	  that)	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  an	  eon	  one	  man	  and	  one	  woman	  together	  produce	  sentient	  beings	  is	  (a	  form	  of	  the)	  made	  by	  combination	  (idea).	  4.	  (Causeless	  creation.)	  For	  example,	  the	  causeless	  heterodox	  path	  (that)	  grasps	  at	  spontaneous	  production	  is	  (an	  example	  of	  a	  tradition	  advocating)	  causeless	  creation.	  (Their	  idea	  is)	  like	  (claiming)	  disgusting	  things	  are	  not	  infectious.	  	   The	  second	  (type	  of	  notions	  refuted)	  correspond	  to	  Hinayana	  (views)	  concerning	  dharmas.	  (There	  are	  also	  four	  forms	  of	  these	  ideas.)	  1.	  Causal	  production	  of	  the	  individual	  unit.	  2.	  Recompensive	  causation.	  (That	  is	  to	  say,	  according	  to	  this	  idea)	  the	  cause	  is	  (karmically)	  good	  or	  bad	  (while)	  the	  effect	  lacks	  (karmic)	  mark.	  Therefore	  this	  is	  a	  (form	  of)	  “other”	  (causation).	  3.	  (The	  third	  is	  a	  notion)	  like	  collectively	  existent	  causation.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  seven	  dharmas	  together	  produce	  (an	  effect).	  4.	  Causeless	  production.	  Some	  say	  (that	  according	  to)	  Sautrantika	  masters	  the	  branching	  of	  ignorance	  (reflects	  the	  fact	  that)	  preceding	  supports	  (are)	  empty	  even	  as	  arising	  (still	  occurs).	  Consequently	  (this	  is)	  also	  (a	  view	  of)	  causeless	  (production).	  	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  That	  Which	  Can	  Produce	  Causation]	   	  	   Secondly,	  in	  (the	  part	  revealing)	  refutations	  of	  (that	  which)	  can	  (produce	  causation,	  there	  are)	  also	  two	  (parts).	  The	  first	  is	  a	  refutation	  of	  (the	  idea	  that	  the	  causal	  connection)	  is	  only	  concealed.	  (This	  point	  is	  the	  same)	  as	  the	  (quote	  from	  the)	  Middle	  Way	  Treatise	  and	  this	  text’s	  (explanation	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	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chapter).	  The	  second	  (is	  a	  refutation	  of	  the	  causal	  connection	  as)	  both	  concealed	  and	  manifest.	  (This	  point	  is)	  like	  the	  Treatise	  on	  the	  (Ten)	  Grounds	  says:	  (The	  claim	  is)	  the	  cause	  does	  not	  produce	  because	  conditions	  produce.	  	  (But	  also)	  conditions	  do	  not	  produce	  because	  individual	  causes	  produce.	  (Either	  way	  arisings	  are)	  not	  collectively	  produced.	  There	  is	  no	  knower	  as	  a	  result	  (and)	  the	  time	  of	  creation	  does	  not	  abide	  as	  a	  result.	  (If	  this)	  is	  not	  causeless	  production	  (then	  it	  must)	  accordingly	  conform	  to	  (notions	  of)	  existent	  (causes).	  Furthermore,	  the	  Treatise	  on	  Comparing	  Dharmas	  says:	  (If	  the)	  self	  (-­‐created)	  type	  (of	  arisings)	  exist,	  (they)	  therefore	  do	  not	  derive	  from	  others.	  (If	  they)	  await	  collected	  conditions	  (to	  arise	  then	  they)	  therefore	  are	  not	  self-­‐created.	  Lacking	  creative	  functioning	  (they)	  therefore	  are	  not	  collectively	  produced.	  (But,	  if)	  there	  is	  the	  capacity	  to	  achieve	  (production,	  then)	  therefore	  (arising)	  is	  not	  causeless.	  (If)	  it	  is	  the	  case	  (that)	  all	  conditioned	  arisings	  lack	  both	  (possible	  basic)	  clauses,	  (it)	  already	  is	  then	  exceedingly	  profound.	  How	  much	  more	  so	  (if	  it)	  generally	  lacks	  [228c]	  the	  four	  (possible)	  clauses	  (of	  a	  complete	  tetralemma)?	  For	  this	  reason	  conditioned	  arising	  is	  the	  most	  exceedingly	  profound	  (principle).	  	   (We	  can)	  explain	  (this)	  saying	  the	  idea	  these	  two	  Treatises	  (focus	  upon)	  considers	  the	  cause	  as	  the	  particular	  (existent	  which)	  utilizes	  conditions	  as	  the	  other	  (requirements	  for	  successful	  production).	  These	  causes	  and	  conditions	  mutually	  await	  (one	  another)	  and	  therefore	  each	  has	  two	  meanings.	  1.	  (They	  take	  the)	  meaning	  of	  having	  power	  (to	  effect	  causation).	  2.	  	  (They	  have	  the)	  the	  meaning	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of	  lacking	  the	  power	  (to	  effect	  causation).	  Considering	  the	  causes’	  lack	  (of	  power)	  as	  the	  conditions’	  having	  (power),	  consequently	  (means	  that	  causes)	  do	  not	  self-­‐produce.	  Considering	  conditions’	  lack	  (of	  power)	  as	  causes’	  having	  (power),	  consequently	  (means	  arisings	  are)	  not	  produced	  from	  others.	  The	  lack	  of	  duality	  of	  one	  having	  (or)	  one	  lacking	  consequently	  (means	  arisings)	  do	  not	  collectively	  produce	  (one	  another).	  The	  “not	  both”	  (possibilities)	  of	  both	  having	  (power	  or)	  both	  lacking	  (power)	  consequently	  also	  (means	  they)	  do	  not	  collectively	  produce	  (one	  another).	  Accordingly,	  due	  to	  this	  lack	  of	  a	  nature,	  then	  (we)	  attain	  the	  arising	  of	  these	  effects	  that	  do	  not	  arise.	  Consequently	  (arisings)	  do	  not	  lack	  causes	  and	  are	  not	  nonexistent.	  In	  this	  fashion,	  this	  is	  the	  reason	  (they	  are)	  not	  self	  (causes),	  not	  other	  (causes,	  and)	  not	  collective	  causes.	  If	  (we)	  concisely	  (summarize	  this	  with)	  the	  exposition	  of	  the	  gate	  that	  reveals	  the	  nonobstruction	  of	  the	  interfusion	  and	  interpenetration	  of	  the	  dependent	  arising	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  dharmas,	  the	  four	  gates	  together	  have	  creative	  (power).	  	   (Question:)	  How	  so?	  	   (Answer:)	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  causes	  and	  conditions	  each	  have	  three	  meanings.	  (Namely,	  they	  are)	  1.	  Existent,	  2.	  Nonexistent,	  (and)	  3.	  Both	  existent	  and	  nonexistent.	  Because	  each,	  [i.e.,	  causes	  and	  conditions]	  specifically	  reveals	  the	  first	  meaning,	  (they)	  self-­‐create	  and	  (are)	  other-­‐created.	  Because	  (they)	  combine	  the	  third	  meaning	  (they	  are)	  collectively	  created.	  (Because	  they)	  combine	  the	  second	  meaning	  (they	  are)	  causelessly	  created.	  (These	  latter	  two	  options	  are)	  because	  each	  (individually)	  lacks	  (causal)	  power.	  This	  likewise	  (follows)	  from	  (issues	  with)	  a	  non-­‐abiding	  basis	  establishing	  all	  dharmas.	  Consider	  it	  and	  (it	  will	  be)	  evident.	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   After	  this	  (part,	  that	  which)	  the	  Text	  expounds	  is	  not	  a	  Three	  Treatise	  (school)	  idea.	  Because	  it	  is	  simply	  a	  type	  of	  (commonly)	  circulating	  (idea,	  he)	  just	  quotes	  (it	  and	  briefly)	  expounds	  (on	  it).	  
	   	   [The	  Explanation]	   	  	   Fourth,	  in	  the	  explanation	  section	  (of	  the	  chapter	  there	  are)	  three	  (main	  parts).	  First	  (he)	  presents	  (the	  point).	  Second,	  (he)	  explains	  it.	  Third,	  (he)	  categorically	  (refutes	  it).	   	   	  	   In	  the	  explanation	  (there	  are)	  three	  (points).	  	  First,	  (there	  is)	  an	  opening	  section	  inquiring	  (about	  and)	  presenting	  (the	  key	  points).	  Second,	  (he)	  establishes	  a	  verse	  briefly	  refuting	  (the	  errors).	  The	  upper	  half	  records	  the	  four	  gates.	  The	  lower	  half	  reveals	  that	  all	  (the	  options)	  are	  not	  (the	  case).	  Third,	  based	  on	  (the	  above)	  section	  (he)	  broadly	  explains.	  (Therein	  we	  find)	  two	  (parts).	  Initially	  (he)	  explains	  the	  valid	  refutation	  of	  the	  verse.	  Subsequently	  (he)	  quotes	  the	  Teachings	  (and	  the)	  proof	  is	  completed.	  	  	   In	  the	  first	  (of	  the	  above	  two	  parts,	  he)	  explains	  the	  gates	  of	  the	  four	  sections	  (and)	  accordingly,	  (the	  explanation)	  constitutes	  four	  (parts).	  	  	   	   	   [Made	  by	  Self]	  	   Regarding	  the	  first	  (part	  of	  the)	  explanation,	  in	  refuting	  (the	  notion	  of)	  made	  by	  self	  (there	  are	  four	  points).	  First	  he	  records	  a	  negation.	  Second,	  (he	  provides	  an)	  explanatory	  refutation.	  Third,	  (he	  provides	  an)	  illustrative	  refutation.	  Fourth,	  (he)	  summarily	  negates	  (the	  error).	  Also	  (these	  four)	  are	  (parts	  that)	  establish	  the	  proposition,	  elicit	  a	  reason,	  raise	  an	  example,	  (and)	  summarily	  (conclude)	  the	  proposition.	  (These	  are)	  also	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	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   [Made	  by	  Other]	   	  	   In	  the	  second	  (part,	  the	  part	  that)	  explains	  and	  refutes	  (the	  idea	  of)	  made	  by	  other,	  (there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  	  Initially	  (he	  provides	  a)	  valid	  refutation,	  subsequently	  (he)	  refutes	  (the	  attempt	  at	  a)	  saving	  (rejoinder).	  	  	   In	  the	  first	  (of	  these	  two	  parts)	  initially	  (he)	  presents	  (the	  point	  and)	  negates	  (it).	  Secondly	  (he)	  explains	  and	  refutes.	  Speaking	  of	  (made	  by)	  other,	  as	  for	  (the	  question)	  “What	  can	  create?”,	  (the	  point)	  is	  to	  say	  (that	  if	  the)	  individual	  cannot	  even	  (self-­‐create),	  how	  is	  it	  that	  another	  can	  create?	  Furthermore,	  since	  the	  individual	  is	  not	  yet	  existent,	  (please)	  explain	  what	  constitutes	  the	  other?	  Furthermore,	  apart	  from	  the	  individual	  there	  is	  no	  particular	  other.	  Therefore	  an	  individual	  without	  an	  other	  is	  also	  nonexistent.	  Therefore	  (the	  text)	  asks,	  “What	  can	  create?”.	  	   In	  the	  second	  (part,	  the	  part	  that)	  refutes	  the	  (attempt	  at	  a)	  saving	  (rejoinder),	  initially	  (he	  presents	  the	  attempted)	  save,	  subsequently	  (he)	  refutes	  (it).	  The	  idea	  of	  the	  (opponent’s	  attempted)	  save	  is,	  “I	  consider	  the	  cause	  oriented	  towards	  the	  effect	  as	  the	  other.	  (It)	  is	  not	  an	  other	  of	  remaining	  (associated)	  
dharmas.”	  	  	   In	  the	  refutation	  (there	  are)	  two	  (parts).	  Initially	  (he	  provides)	  a	  valid	  refutation,	  subsequently,	  from	  “In	  this	  fashion	  suffering…,”	  (he)	  summarily	  negates	  (the	  error).	  	   In	  the	  refutation	  (there	  are)	  two	  (further	  points).	  First	  is	  a	  refutation	  (pointing	  out	  that	  a	  cause	  which)	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  effect	  is	  not	  an	  other.	  Therein	  (he)	  initially	  (presents	  the)	  principle,	  next	  (he	  provides)	  an	  example,	  then	  he	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combines	  (the	  points	  to	  conclude).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  combining	  collective	  conditions	  thereby	  completes	  effects,	  how	  does	  it	  come	  (to	  be	  the	  case	  that)	  conditioned	  effects	  constitute	  an	  other?	  Second,	  in	  the	  refutation	  of	  the	  other	  as	  lacking	  individual	  independence,	  first	  (he	  provides	  a)	  valid	  refutation,	  then	  (he)	  quotes	  a	  verse	  of	  the	  
Middle	  Way	  Treatise.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (as	  for)	  these	  collected	  conditions,	  since	  (they	  are)	  still	  formed	  dependent	  upon	  conditions,	  this	  accordingly	  (means)	  they	  lack	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  self-­‐nature.	  Therefore,	  (given	  that,	  they)	  do	  not	  come	  to	  be	  individually	  independent.	  Because	  they	  are	  not	  individually	  independent,	  they	  cannot	  produce	  effects.	  	   Second,	  the	  concluding	  section	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  	   	   	   [Made	  by	  Combination]	   	  	   Third,	  in	  (the	  next	  section	  that)	  refutes	  collective	  creation	  [229a]	  (there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  1.	  (He)	  records	  a	  negation.	  2.	  (He)	  validly	  refutes	  (the	  idea).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  together	  (they	  combine)	  the	  preceding	  two	  errors.	  For	  this	  reason	  (he)	  indicates	  (this	  error)	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  preceding.	  3.	  From	  “For	  this	  reason…”	  (he)	  concludes.	  	   	   	   [Causeless	  Creation]	  	   Fourth,	  (he)	  refutes	  causeless	  creation.	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  two	  (parts).	  	   Initially	  he	  records	  the	  attachment	  and	  generally	  negates	  (it).	  As	  for	  having	  immeasurable	  errors,	  it	  is	  because	  those	  Hinayana	  propositions	  are	  also	  the	  same	  and	  (therefore)	  not	  permissible.	  Furthermore,	  because	  of	  (their	  notion	  of	  the)	  haphazard	  production	  of	  various	  dharmas	  there	  are	  many	  errors.	  	  
	   228	  
	   Second,	  in	  (the	  next	  part	  that)	  draws	  upon	  evidence	  (there	  are)	  four	  (points).	  First,	  he	  brings	  up	  the	  (heterodox)	  teaching.	  Second,	  (he)	  assembles	  the	  (key)	  ideas.	  Third,	  (he	  presents	  the)	  heterodox	  (attempt	  at	  a)	  saving	  (rejoinder).	  Fourth,	  (he)	  assembles	  (all	  the	  elements	  of)	  the	  refutation	  (of	  the	  rejoinder).	  	   	   	   	   [The	  Heterodox	  View]	  	   In	  the	  first	  (of	  the	  above	  four),	  the	  heterodox	  (questioner	  suggests)	  because	  the	  four	  propositions	  preserving	  production	  do	  not	  penetrate	  the	  real	  nature	  of	  suffering,	  the	  Buddha	  set	  (them)	  aside	  and	  did	  not	  answer.	  	   	   	   	   [Nagarjuna’s	  Response]	  	   Second,	  from	  “Like	  these	  (four)…”	  (he)	  assembles	  (the	  key)	  ideas,	  clarifying	  emptiness.	  There	  are	  two	  types	  of	  reasons	  (for	  their	  emptiness).	  1.	  (They)	  are	  produced	  from	  conditions	  therefore	  (they)	  are	  empty.	  2.	  The	  Buddha	  did	  not	  answer	  therefore	  (they)	  are	  empty.	  In	  this	  (part),	  considering	  the	  substance	  of	  suffering	  is	  fundamentally	  empty,	  from	  what	  circumstances	  (then	  does	  one)	  get	  the	  production	  of	  suffering	  from	  self,	  other,	  etc.?	  Isn’t	  it	  rather	  like	  asking	  whether	  a	  hare’s	  horns	  are	  produced	  from	  self,	  other,	  etc.?	  If	  (the	  Buddha)	  had	  answered	  then	  (he	  would)	  have	  fallen	  into	  a	  defeat.	  	   (Question:)	  How	  so?	  	   (Answer:	  Well,)	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  it	  was	  the	  case	  (he)	  answered	  saying	  (for	  example,	  they)	  are	  not	  self-­‐produced,	  etc.,	  that	  then	  would	  mean	  the	  hare’s	  horns	  are	  existent.	  (In	  that	  case	  they)	  are	  not	  produced	  from	  self,	  other,	  etc.	  (But)	  if	  it	  were	  the	  case	  he	  answered	  by	  saying	  (we)	  lack	  these	  hare’s	  horns,	  (he	  would	  have	  missed	  the	  point	  because	  the)	  other	  (individual)	  originally	  asked	  about	  production	  from	  (a	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particular	  source.	  He)	  did	  not	  ask	  about	  (their)	  existence	  or	  nonexistence.	  (In	  that	  situtation)	  the	  question	  (would	  have)	  differed	  from	  the	  answer	  (and)	  consequently	  (that	  answer)	  also	  is	  not	  then	  (appropriate).	  Therefore,	  in	  the	  Sutra	  (the	  opponent)	  questions	  the	  Buddha,	  (claiming)	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  the	  Tathagata	  [i.e.,	  Buddha]	  is	  not	  able	  to	  answer	  the	  fourteen	  difficult	  (questions),	  why	  call	  (that)	  the	  “wisdom	  of	  everything?”	  (In	  reply)	  the	  Buddha	  says	  “If	  the	  Tathagata	  did	  answer	  the	  fourteen	  difficult	  (questions),	  then	  (that)	  is	  not	  the	  wisdom	  of	  everything.”	  For	  this	  reason	  one	  should	  know	  that	  as	  for	  the	  point	  of	  not	  answering,	  it	  was	  to	  clarify	  the	  emptiness	  of	  those	  dharmas.	  (One	  can	  then	  see	  they)	  are,	  as	  a	  result,	  lacking	  (essential	  existence).	  	   	   	   	   [The	  Rejoinder]	  	   Third,	  in	  (the	  part	  that	  covers	  the)	  heterodox	  (questioner’s	  attempt	  at	  a)	  saving	  (rejoinder	  there	  are)	  three	  (points).	  First,	  (The	  questioner	  notes	  the	  above	  point)	  is	  not	  in	  (their)	  understanding	  of	  the	  (text’s)	  ideas.	  Second,	  (he)	  explains	  the	  
Sutra	  to	  reveal	  their	  idea.	  Third,	  (he)	  summarily	  (concludes	  that	  Nagarjuna’s	  point)	  is	  not	  proof.	  	   In	  the	  first	  (of	  the	  above	  three	  points)	  the	  heterodox	  (opponent)	  claims	  the	  Treatise’s	  Author	  completely	  failed	  to	  get	  the	  Buddha’s	  idea.	  (He	  rhetorically	  asks,)	  has	  it	  ever	  been	  the	  case	  that	  the	  Buddha,	  (while)	  speaking	  of	  reasons,	  did	  not	  answer	  and	  therefore	  expounded	  (the	  notion	  that)	  suffering	  is	  empty?	  It	  is	  just	  that	  the	  Buddha	  did	  not	  answer	  (questions	  about	  the)	  specific	  idea	  of	  self-­‐existence.	  (That)	  specific	  idea	  has	  two	  (key	  parts).	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   1.	  It	  is	  just	  that	  (for)	  those	  sentient	  beings	  (on	  the	  Path	  he)	  rightly	  ought	  not	  answer	  while	  (they	  are	  just)	  acquiring	  entry	  to	  the	  Dharma.	  Therefore	  (he)	  must	  not	  answer	  (at	  that	  critical	  time.	  That	  being	  the	  case,)	  why	  must	  (Nagarjuna	  claim	  he)	  thereby	  clarifies	  emptiness?	  	  	   2.	  In	  order	  to	  refute	  the	  heterodoxy’s	  four	  perverse	  expositions,	  therefore	  (the	  Buddha’s	  approach)	  must	  be	  so.	  	  	   	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  the	  Rejoinder]	  	   The	  passage	  refuting	  the	  four	  attachments	  (found	  in	  the	  rejoinder)	  accordingly	  constitutes	  four	  (subsections).	  	  	   First,	  (he)	  brings	  up	  the	  attachments	  to	  understand	  the	  Sutra’s	  (point).	  	  	   Second,	  from	  “suffering,	  in	  fact	  is	  not…,”	  (he)	  uses	  the	  principle	  to	  validly	  refute	  (the	  idea).	  In	  the	  valid	  refutation	  (there	  are)	  two	  (parts).	  	  	  	   First	  is	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  the)	  self	  likewise	  lacks	  permanence.	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  two	  (points).	  Initially	  (he)	  presents	  (the	  refutation,)	  then	  (he)	  explains	  it.	  In	  the	  explanation	  (there	  are)	  two	  (further	  subpoints).	  Initially	  (there)	  is	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  notion	  of)	  losing	  that	  which	  can	  create.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  (the	  self)	  is	  impermanent,	  then	  (that	  entails)	  losing	  the	  essence	  of	  a	  self	  and	  there	  is	  nothing	  that	  can	  create.	  Second,	  from	  “if	  the	  self	  is	  impermament…”	  is	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  notion	  of)	  losing	  that	  which	  is	  created.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (this	  is	  a	  problem)	  because	  of	  lacking	  that	  upon	  which	  (karmic	  recompense)	  depends.	  	   Second	  is	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  in	  such	  a	  case)	  suffering	  lacks	  (a	  final)	  release.	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  two	  (subparts).	  First	  (he)	  presents	  (the	  point).	  Second,	  from	  “How	  so?…,”	  (he)	  explains.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  one	  speaks	  of	  the	  self	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creating	  suffering,	  the	  capability	  must	  be	  located	  in	  the	  antecedent	  (self).	  And	  yet,	  in	  fact,	  apart	  from	  the	  suffering	  which	  has	  been	  created,	  previously	  there	  is	  no	  self	  that	  can	  create	  (that)	  suffering.	  	   (Question:)	  Why?	  	   (Answer:)	  Because,	  (at	  that	  time)	  there	  is	  not	  yet	  the	  body	  of	  skandhas	  upon	  which	  the	  (result)	  depends.	  (That	  being	  the	  case,	  at	  the	  earlier	  time,	  in)	  what	  place	  does	  the	  self	  reside?	  If	  (one	  claims)	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  (even)	  without	  this	  body	  of	  
skandhas	  the	  self	  alone	  still	  can	  create	  suffering,	  (then)	  as	  for	  obtaining	  release	  (from	  suffering),	  [229b]	  it	  also	  lacks	  a	  body.	  An	  existent	  self	  also	  ought	  to	  constantly	  be	  suffering.	  This	  (is	  a	  situation	  where	  the)	  preceding	  time	  [i.e.,	  before	  release]	  lacks	  a	  body	  (of	  skandhas)	  and	  yet	  creates	  suffering.	  The	  subsequent	  time	  [i.e.,	  release	  from	  suffering]	  also	  lacks	  a	  body	  (of	  skandhas)	  and	  also	  ought	  to	  then	  eternally	  be	  suffering.	  (This	  occurs)	  because	  (the	  two	  situations)	  	  [i.e.,	  before	  and	  after	  release	  from	  suffering]	  lack	  different	  causes.	  	   (The	  meaning	  of)	  the	  concluding	  section	  is	  evident	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  	   	   	   [Made	  by	  God]	   	   	  	   Second,	  [sic]	  in	  (the	  following	  section	  that)	  refutes	  (the	  idea	  of	  a	  divine)	  made	  by	  other,	  (there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  First	  (he)	  refutes	  (the	  error,	  then)	  subsequently	  (he)	  concludes.	  In	  the	  refutation	  there	  are	  fifteen	  iterations	  (of	  the	  argument).	  	   (1.)	  First	  is	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  an	  arising	  with)	  one	  and	  the	  same	  substance	  is	  not	  an	  “other.”	  (So,	  for	  example,)	  how	  are	  there	  other	  individuals	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who	  create	  suffering	  that	  is	  received	  by	  this	  (essentially	  different)	  person?	  Therefore	  it	  is	  stated	  (as	  in	  the	  text).	  	   2.	  (Second	  is	  a)	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  idea	  that)	  causes	  and	  effects	  do	  not	  mutually	  resemble	  	  (one	  another).	  This	  is	  the	  heterodox	  (notion	  that)	  causes	  are	  not	  (all)	  equivalent	  causes.	  Therein	  (he)	  initially	  brings	  up	  the	  attachment	  to	  understand	  the	  Sutra’s	  (point).	  Subsequently,	  from	  “Yet,	  in	  fact…”	  (he)	  utilizes	  the	  (key)	  principle	  to	  validly	  refute	  (the	  opponent’s	  point).	  The	  presentation	  and	  explanation	  (that	  follow)	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  	   3.	  (Third	  is	  a)	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  notion	  that)	  pleasure	  and	  pain	  mutually	  oppose	  (one	  another).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  father	  (referred	  to	  by	  the	  opponent)	  ought	  to	  grant	  (his	  children)	  pleasure,	  (so)	  how	  then	  (does	  he)	  come	  to	  allow	  (their)	  suffering?	  Also,	  (this)	  is	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  this	  view)	  perversely	  loses	  the	  (nature	  of	  the)	  father-­‐child	  (relationship).	  Therein	  (he)	  initially	  (provides	  a)	  valid	  refutation.	  Subsequently	  (he)	  reveals	  (the	  attempt	  at	  a)	  saving	  (rejoinder).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  (the	  father)	  cannot	  produce	  children	  who	  understand	  (the	  causes	  of	  the)	  merciful	  mind,	  how	  (can	  one)	  designate	  God	  (as	  that	  which)	  can	  produce	  the	  myriad	  things?	  Furthermore,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  (he)	  can	  in	  fact	  produce	  (those	  pleasurable	  results)	  while	  therefore	  (he)	  does	  not	  (produce	  them,	  that)	  is	  then	  a	  lack	  of	  mercy.	  (If	  there	  is	  no	  mercy,)	  what	  is	  it	  which	  is	  (then)	  discerned	  (as	  such)?	  Furthermore,	  the	  ignorant	  type	  (of	  person)	  makes	  offerings	  to	  heaven	  and	  accordingly	  (are	  said	  to)	  discern	  (God’s)	  mercy.	  Why	  (do	  they)	  not	  avoid	  suffering?	  (As	  they)	  still	  have	  the	  sufferings	  of	  poverty,	  and	  so	  on,	  (we)	  therefore	  know	  (this)	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  In	  this	  section	  the	  first	  (part)	  corresponds	  to	  a	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hypothetical	  refutation	  (focused	  on)	  feelings.	  The	  second	  (part),	  from	  “Yet,	  in	  fact…”	  is	  a	  dispelling	  refutation	  concerned	  with	  the	  (key)	  principle.	  (These	  points	  are)	  understandable	  (without	  further	  explanation	  here).	  	   4.	  (Fourth	  is	  a)	  refutation	  (focused	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  God)	  ought	  not	  (lack	  anything)	  which	  is	  required	  (for	  completeness	  and	  creation).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (as	  for)	  that	  God,	  what	  more	  is	  required	  while	  (he)	  creates	  sentient	  beings?	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  there	  is	  that	  which	  is	  required	  while	  creating,	  this	  then	  is	  not	  (any	  commonly	  understood	  notion	  of)	  God.	  If	  it	  is	  creation	  without	  (anything	  additional)	  which	  is	  required,	  then	  (this	  is)	  the	  same	  as	  the	  (trifling)	  play	  of	  small	  children.	  	   5.	  (The	  fifth	  is	  a)	  refutation	  (focused	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  an)	  agent	  that	  counters	  (a	  regress	  without)	  end.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  God	  self-­‐creates,	  sentient	  beings	  also	  ought	  to	  be	  thus.	  (But)	  if	  God	  is	  made	  by	  other,	  then	  (God)	  is	  not	  God,	  (but	  rather)	  is	  like	  sentient	  beings	  (who	  cannot	  self-­‐create).	  The	  two	  types	  of	  comparative	  inference	  (found	  in	  this	  section)	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  explanation).	  	   6.	  (The	  sixth	  is	  a)	  refutation	  (focused	  on	  the	  notion	  of)	  a	  God	  (whose	  creations)	  karmically	  deviate	  (from	  causal	  principles).	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  three	  (parts).	  Initially	  by	  means	  of	  a	  valid	  examination	  (he	  raises	  the	  problem).	  Second,	  (he)	  quotes	  a	  heterodox	  teaching.	  Third,	  (he)	  refutes	  that	  heterodox	  teaching.	  By	  maintaining	  that	  the	  activities	  of	  suffering	  can	  then	  create	  things	  (we)	  clearly	  know	  (such	  creation)	  is	  not	  God’s.	  Furthermore,	  (as	  found	  in	  the	  heterodox	  text,	  given	  just)	  one	  type	  of	  activity	  of	  suffering,	  why	  (is	  there)	  not	  just	  one	  type	  of	  received	  effect?	  This	  being	  so,	  (as	  mentioned	  in	  the	  text),	  upon	  first	  creating	  poisonous	  insects,	  (one)	  ought	  to	  know	  that	  due	  to	  karma	  (that	  event)	  is	  not	  connected	  to	  the	  
	   234	  
activities	  of	  heterodox	  (forms	  of	  ascetic)	  suffering.	  The	  first	  (point)	  then	  dispels	  God	  (from	  the	  place	  of	  a	  cause)	  by	  means	  of	  the	  activities	  of	  (ascetic)	  suffering.	  The	  subsequent	  (point)	  then	  dispels	  the	  activities	  of	  (ascetic)	  suffering	  (from	  the	  place	  of	  a	  cause)	  by	  means	  of	  valid	  (understanding	  of)	  karma.	  (These	  points)	  are	  understandable	  (without	  the	  need	  for	  further	  comment	  here).	  	   7.	  (The	  seventh	  is	  a)	  refutation	  (showing	  that)	  investigating	  the	  circumstances	  (of	  God’s	  creative	  activity	  entails)	  losing	  (the	  conditions	  for)	  creation.	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  three	  (parts).	  Initially	  (he)	  determines	  the	  circumstances	  of	  creation.	  Second,	  by	  the	  relation	  of	  two	  (possible	  circumstances	  for	  creation	  he)	  demands	  (an	  answer	  to	  the	  problem).	  Third,	  he	  explains	  the	  error	  of	  the	  two	  (types	  of)	  creation.	  First	  (of	  those	  two)	  is	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  notion	  that)	  self-­‐creation	  does	  not	  complete	  (the	  conditions	  required	  for	  creation).	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  is	  just	  that	  the	  circumstances	  (required	  for	  the)	  circumstances	  (of	  self-­‐creation	  form	  a	  regress)	  without	  end.	  The	  second	  (of	  the	  above	  two	  is	  a)	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  notion	  that)	  other-­‐creation	  deviates	  from	  the	  proposition	  (about	  God’s	  essential	  nature).	  “Circumstances”	  means	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  material	  world.	  	   8.	  (The	  eighth	  is	  a)	  refutation	  (pointing	  out)	  the	  lack	  of	  power	  of	  (whomever	  must)	  beseech	  another.	  Adjusting	  this	  (section	  of	  the	  heterodox	  text,	  it)	  ought	  (to	  be	  the	  case)	  in	  that	  text,	  (that	  it)	  says	  the	  circumstances	  of	  God	  have	  (qualities	  missing	  and)	  which	  are	  prayed	  for	  (by	  God)	  and	  consequently	  (God)	  is	  not	  God.	  Furthermore,	  this	  section	  should	  be	  inverted.	  It	  ought	  to	  say	  if	  (this)	  is	  God,	  why	  is	  there	  one	  (engaged	  in)	  ascetic	  practices	  (and)	  making	  the	  offerings	  (that)	  follow	  from	  beseeching	  for	  that	  which	  is	  wished?	  (This)	  reveals	  the	  good	  (result)	  goes	  with	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the	  wish	  since	  (it)	  is	  received	  from	  the	  request.	  Clearly	  (anyone	  so	  engaged)	  is	  not	  God.	  	   9.	  (The	  ninth	  is	  a)	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  idea	  that)	  that	  which	  is	  created	  is	  not	  fixed.	  [229c]	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (it)	  is	  like	  (when)	  an	  individual	  makes	  a	  cart	  (and	  once)	  it	  is	  already	  complete,	  (he)	  cannot	  subsequently	  transform	  it	  to	  make	  a	  boat.	  God	  first	  creates	  humans	  and	  after	  these	  humans	  (he)	  ought	  to	  create	  animals,	  and	  such.	  Yet,	  in	  fact	  (the	  appearance	  of	  humans	  and	  animals)	  accords	  with	  the	  various	  transformations	  of	  karma.	  Therefore,	  (they)	  are	  not	  (that	  which)	  God	  created.	  	   10.	  (The	  tenth	  is	  a)	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  idea	  of)	  bringing	  up	  effects	  to	  examine	  the	  cause.	  Therein,	  first	  (he	  provides	  a)	  hypothetical	  refutation.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  God	  created	  (humans)	  each	  one	  ought	  to	  be	  a	  single	  type	  and	  there	  ought	  not	  be	  differences	  such	  as	  being	  pretty,	  ugly,	  etc.	  Furthermore,	  (variations	  in)	  sinfulness	  and	  blessedness	  ought	  to	  both	  be	  lacking.	  Second,	  in	  the	  refutation	  that	  dismisses	  (the	  mistake	  he	  notes	  that	  even	  given	  the	  point	  just	  made)	  still	  yet,	  in	  fact,	  there	  are	  those	  who	  are	  sinful	  and	  blessed.	  Because	  that	  and	  this	  both	  admittedly	  exist,	  (this)	  is	  a	  refutation	  that	  dismisses	  (the	  error)	  by	  means	  of	  the	  principle.	  	   11.	  (The	  eleventh	  is	  a)	  refutation	  (based	  on	  a)	  proposition	  (concerning)	  the	  opposition	  of	  hate	  and	  love.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (if	  God	  created	  everyone	  then)	  everyone	  ought	  to	  be	  loving,	  (so)	  how	  does	  there	  come	  to	  be	  hatred?	  Furthermore,	  because	  there	  are	  the	  (karmically	  generated)	  attachments	  of	  the	  delusions	  of	  hatred	  and	  love,	  (one	  knows	  these)	  are	  not	  God’s	  (creations.	  If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  then)	  how	  (is	  God)	  able	  to	  create	  the	  myriad	  things?	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   12.	  (The	  twelveth	  is	  a)	  refutation	  that	  examines	  delusion	  by	  means	  of	  (emotional)	  matters.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  how	  do	  we	  know	  that	  (or	  this	  person)	  has	  (the	  characteristics	  of)	  love	  or	  hate?	  It	  is	  because	  (in	  the	  world	  we	  find)	  two	  (different)	  individuals	  who	  create	  suffering	  or	  pleasure	  (and	  hence)	  do	  not	  simply	  create	  happiness.	  Furthermore,	  because	  (they	  also,	  individually)	  cannot	  create	  (only)	  one	  type	  (of	  emotion),	  clearly	  (they)	  are	  not	  God’s	  (creations).	  	   13.	  (The	  thirteenth	  is	  a)	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  notion	  that)	  skillful	  means	  loses	  creative	  (power).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  (everything	  is)	  God’s	  creation,	  sentient	  beings	  ought	  not	  (be	  able	  to)	  further	  create	  things	  such	  as	  clothing,	  food,	  etc.,	  (or)	  furthermore,	  create	  various	  good	  and	  bad	  karmas.	  	   14.	  (The	  fourteenth	  is	  a)	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  notion	  that)	  without	  causes	  (one)	  loses	  effects.	  Therein	  (he)	  first	  (presents	  a)	  refutation	  with	  a	  hypothetical.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (if)	  first	  (there	  is)	  the	  effect,	  (then	  one)	  lacks	  (an	  effect)	  derived	  from	  a	  cause.	  (Alternately,	  if)	  subsequently	  (there	  is	  the)	  cause,	  (then	  one)	  lacks	  the	  capabilities	  (associated	  with	  subsequent)	  beneficial	  effects.	  Then	  (following	  the	  above	  points	  he	  presents	  a)	  refutation	  using	  the	  principle	  to	  dismiss	  (the	  error.	  This	  point)	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  	   15.	  (The	  fifteenth	  is	  a)	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  notion	  of)	  karmic	  equality	  between	  existent	  and	  nonexistent	  (causal	  conditions).	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  three	  (parts.)	  Initially	  (Nagarjuna	  presents	  the	  idea	  of	  their)	  equal	  existence.	  Second,	  (he	  presents	  the	  idea	  of	  their)	  equal	  nonexistence.	  Third,	  (he	  points	  out	  the	  problem	  of	  a	  regress)	  without	  end.	  (In	  that	  case	  a	  regress)	  without	  end	  accordingly	  (also)	  lacks	  a	  beginning.	  (If	  it)	  lacks	  a	  beginning	  (it)	  accordingly	  lacks	  a	  cause.	  Each	  of	  the	  above	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(points)	  has	  an	  (associated)	  inferential	  (conclusion.	  Those	  conclusions	  are)	  also	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  	   	   	   	   [Concluding	  Negation]	   	   	  	   The	  second	  (part	  of	  this	  section,	  the	  part)	  from	  “In	  this	  fashion…”	  (he	  provides	  the)	  concluding	  negation.	  	   The	  second	  (part	  of	  the	  concluding	  negation,	  the	  part)	  from	  “In	  this	  fashion	  (when)	  heterodox…”	  (he	  explains	  how	  to	  properly)	  understand	  the	  Sutra’s	  point.	  	   In	  the	  third	  (part	  of	  the	  concluding	  negation,	  that	  part	  that)	  refutes	  combined	  creation,	  (he	  shows	  this	  is	  a	  problem)	  because	  of	  including	  the	  preceding	  two	  errors.	  It	  is	  like	  two	  blind	  (men	  who,	  when)	  combined,	  do	  not	  form	  one	  (person	  with)	  sight.	  	   In	  the	  fourth	  (part	  of	  the	  concluding	  negation,	  the	  part	  that)	  refutes	  causeless	  (creation,	  he	  notes)	  because	  suffering	  is	  produced	  from	  sentient	  beings,	  it	  is	  not	  causeless.	  	   	   	   	   [Rejoinder]	  	   Third,	  from	  “For	  this	  reason…”	  the	  heterodox	  individual’s	  conclusion	  (attempts	  to)	  negates	  the	  Author’s	  (view)	  as	  (a	  form	  of)	  evidence	  that	  does	  not	  complete	  (the	  proof).	  	   	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  the	  Rejoinder]	  	   Fourth,	  from	  “Answer:…”	  the	  Author	  suggests	  the	  Sutra’s	  (meaning	  to)	  reveal	  the	  idea.	  	   (Question:)	  How?	  	   (Answer:)	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  The	  Buddha	  said	  suffering	  is	  produced	  from	  conditions	  (and)	  there	  are	  two	  intentions	  (in	  this).	  1.	  (He	  taught	  this)	  in	  order	  to	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The	  Gate	  of	  Contemplating	  the	  Three	  Times	  
The	  Eleventh	  (Gate)	  [The	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  [cont.	  166c]	  
	   Again,	  all	  dharmas	  are	  empty.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  Because	  (in	  regards	  to)	  cause	  dharmas	  and	  dharmas	  that	  have	  causes,	  	  (their)	  antecedent,	  subsequent,	  or	  simultaneous	  production	  cannot	  be	  obtained.	  (This	  is)	  as	  (the	  text)	  states:	  	  	   Whether	  dharmas	  are	  antecedent,	  subsequent,	  or	  both,	  	   	   these	  (possibilities)	  are	  each	  not	  established.	  	   (That	  being	  so,	  as	  for)	  these	  dharmas	  produced	  from	  causes,	  	   	   explain	  how	  they	  have	  (come)	  to	  be	  established.	  	  	   Antecedent	  causes	  and	  subsequent	  (effects)	  with	  causes,	  this	  situation	  is	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  there	  is	  an	  antecedent	  cause	  and	  subsequent	  product	  from	  that	  cause,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  antecedent	  cause	  there	  is	  (then)	  no	  (subsequent	  effect)	  with	  that	  cause.	  (That	  being	  the	  case,)	  for	  what	  (exactly	  does	  that	  antecedent	  event)	  constitute	  a	  cause?	  	   If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  antecedently	  there	  is	  (the	  product	  of)	  a	  cause,	  and	  subsequently	  the	  cause,	  at	  the	  time	  when	  there	  is	  no	  cause,	  the	  effect	  is	  already	  established.	  (At	  that	  point	  then)	  what	  is	  the	  use	  of	  the	  cause?	  	   If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  the	  cause	  and	  the	  dharma	  with	  a	  cause	  are	  simultaneous,	  this	  (relationship)	  also	  lacks	  causal	  (relation).	  Left	  and	  right	  do	  not	  mutually	  cause	  (one	  another).	  In	  this	  fashion	  due	  to	  simultaneous	  production,	  the	  cause	  is	  not	  the	  effect’s	  cause	  and	  the	  effect	  is	  not	  the	  cause’s	  effect.	  	  	   Therefore	  causes	  and	  effects	  of	  the	  three	  time	  (periods)	  are	  all	  unobtainable.	  	   Question:	  Your	  refutation	  of	  cause	  and	  effect	  dharmas	  of	  the	  three	  time	  (periods)	  is	  also	  not	  established.	  	  If	  antecedently	  there	  is	  refutation	  and	  subsequently	  there	  is	  [167a]	  the	  refutable,	  then	  (at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  refutation	  you)	  do	  not	  as	  yet	  have	  the	  refutable.	  (In	  that	  case)	  what	  does	  this	  refutation	  refute?	  	   If	  initially	  there	  is	  the	  refutable	  while	  subsequently	  there	  is	  the	  refutation,	  the	  refutable	  is	  already	  established	  so	  what	  is	  the	  use	  of	  the	  refutation?	  	   If	  the	  refutation	  and	  the	  refutable	  are	  simultaneous,	  this	  is	  also	  (a	  situation)	  without	  a	  cause.	  (It	  would	  be)	  like	  the	  horns	  of	  an	  ox	  simultaneously	  producing	  (one	  another).	  	  Because	  left	  and	  right	  are	  not	  mutual	  causes,	  in	  this	  fashion	  the	  refutation	  does	  not	  cause	  the	  refutable	  and	  the	  refutable	  does	  not	  cause	  the	  refutation.	  	   Answer:	  Your	  (notion	  of)	  the	  refutation	  and	  the	  refutable	  also	  has	  this	  (same)	  error.	  If	  the	  various	  dharmas	  are	  empty	  then	  there	  is	  no	  refutation	  and	  there	  is	  no	  refutable.	  	  You	  now	  (actually)	  expound	  (their)	  emptiness	  and	  accordingly	  establish	  that	  which	  I	  assert.	  If	  it	  was	  the	  case	  that	  I	  asserted	  that	  the	  refutation	  and	  the	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refutable	  certainly	  exist,	  I	  would	  (thereby)	  create	  this	  (very)	  difficulty.	  Because	  I	  do	  not	  assert	  that	  the	  refutation	  and	  the	  refutable	  certainly	  exist,	  it	  ought	  not	  (be	  claimed	  that	  I	  have)	  created	  this	  difficulty.	  	   Question:	  (We	  do)	  perceive	  antecedent	  causes	  –	  like	  a	  potter	  (who)	  creates	  a	  jar.	  Also,	  there	  are	  subsequent	  causes	  –	  like	  (the	  case	  where)	  due	  to	  the	  pupil	  there	  is	  then	  a	  teacher.	  Also,	  after	  educating	  pupils	  (then	  one)	  knows	  they	  are	  pupils.	  Also,	  there	  is	  simultaneous	  causation	  –	  like	  a	  lamp	  and	  illumination.	  (Therefore,)	  if	  (you)	  assert	  antecedent	  causes,	  subsequent	  causes,	  and	  simultaneous	  causes	  are	  not	  obtainable,	  this	  is	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  (So,	  why	  do	  you	  make	  such	  a	  claim?)	  	   Answer:	  Like	  a	  potter	  creates	  a	  jar?	  –	  this	  example	  is	  (definitely)	  not	  the	  case.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  If	  	  (we)	  do	  not	  yet	  have	  a	  jar,	  (then	  in	  regards)	  to	  what	  does	  the	  potter	  make	  a	  cause?	  Just	  like	  (such	  a)	  potter,	  all	  preceding	  causes	  cannot	  be	  obtained.	  Similarly,	  subsequent	  causes	  also	  cannot	  be	  obtained.	  If	  as	  yet	  there	  are	  no	  pupils,	  who	  (would	  we	  take)	  as	  this	  teacher?	  Therefore,	  subsequent	  (causes)	  are	  also	  not	  obtainable.	  If	  (one)	  asserts	  simultaneous	  causation,	  like	  a	  lamp	  and	  illumination,	  this	  also	  is	  similarly	  doubtful	  causation.	  (If)	  the	  lamp	  and	  illumination	  are	  simultaneously	  produced,	  (please)	  explain	  how	  they	  are	  mutual	  causes?	  	   In	  this	  fashion	  causes	  and	  conditions	  are	  empty.	  Therefore	  (we)	  must	  know	  
karmically	  active	  dharmas,	  karmically	  inactive	  dharmas,	  and	  collective	  productions	  [i.e.,	  sentient	  beings]	  are	  all	  empty.	  	   	  [End	  of	  Chapter	  Eleven	  of	  the	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  	   [Commentary	  by	  Fa-­‐tsang]	  	  
	   	   [The	  Name	  of	  the	  Gate]	  
	   [230a]	  First,	  as	  for	  explaining	  the	  name,	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  three	  times	  of	  present,	  past,	  and	  future,	  (if	  one)	  seeks	  the	  dharmas,	  extending	  (even)	  to	  time,	  both	  (the	  dharmas	  and	  their	  times)	  cannot	  be	  acquired.	  Therefore	  (this	  investigation)	  is	  taken	  as	  a	  “gate.”	  	   	   [Derivation	  of	  the	  Ideas]	  	   Second,	  as	  for	  deriving	  the	  ideas,	  the	  overall	  idea	  (of	  the	  chapter)	  is	  like	  the	  preceding	  (chapters).	  The	  specific	  ideas	  (though)	  were	  previously	  sought	  by	  the	  four	  phrases	  (of	  the	  tetralemma).	  Here	  (he)	  demands	  (further	  answers)	  by	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(considering)	  the	  three	  times.	  Therefore	  (this	  chapter)	  is	  derived	  (from	  the	  preceding).	  	   	   [The	  Propositions	  Clarified]	  	   Third,	  as	  for	  that	  which	  is	  clarified,	  (he)	  refutes	  dharmas,	  extending	  (the	  point	  even)	  to	  time,	  (and)	  thereby	  reveals	  true	  emptiness.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  completing	  contemplation,	  there	  is	  no	  lodging	  (for	  these	  misconceptions).	  	   	   [The	  Explanation]	  	   Fourth,	  in	  explaining	  (this)	  section	  (of	  the	  text	  there	  are)	  three	  (parts).	  First	  (he)	  presents	  the	  proposition.	  Second	  (he)	  explains	  the	  causes.	  Third,	  (he)	  concludes,	  categorically	  (dismissing	  the	  error).	  	   In	  regards	  to	  the	  second	  (part	  of	  this	  fourth	  section),	  the	  explanation,	  (there	  are)	  three	  (points).	  First,	  (he)	  investigates	  and	  presents	  (the	  key	  points	  in	  order	  to)	  open	  the	  section.	  Second,	  (he)	  establishes	  a	  verse	  (to)	  briefly	  reveal	  (the	  correct	  view).	  Third,	  (he)	  explains	  the	  verse	  to	  broadly	  set	  out	  (proper	  understanding).	  	   	   	   [Key	  Points]	  	   In	  the	  first	  (of	  the	  above	  three	  parts	  of	  the	  explanation,)	  as	  for	  (the	  phrase)	  “dharmas	  that	  have	  causes,”	  (such	  dharmas)	  are	  effect	  dharmas.	  (He	  uses	  this	  phrase)	  because	  of	  a	  desire	  (to	  show)	  hidden	  (and/or)	  manifest	  causes	  are	  not	  antecedent	  to	  effects.	  It	  must	  be	  (the	  case	  that)	  owing	  to	  the	  effect	  (one)	  therefore	  then	  speaks	  (of	  a	  preceding	  dharma)	  as	  a	  cause.	  For	  this	  reason	  (he)	  speaks	  of	  effects	  designating	  (them)	  as	  “(dharmas	  that)	  have	  causes”.	  (He	  does	  so)	  because	  (that	  which)	  leads	  to	  a	  cause	  becoming	  existent	  is	  the	  effect	  dharma.	  	   	   	   [The	  Verse]	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   Second,	  the	  upper	  half	  of	  the	  verse	  brings	  up	  the	  valid	  principle.	  The	  lower	  half	  investigates	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  circumstances	  (that	  would	  be	  required).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  causes	  and	  effects	  are	  antecedent,	  subsequent,	  (or)	  both	  present.	  Since	  it	  is	  the	  case	  (that	  for	  all	  those	  possibilities	  the	  key	  relationship)	  is	  not	  established,	  (regarding)	  dharmas	  that	  are	  produced	  from	  causes,	  (the	  opponent	  must	  explain)	  how	  (they)	  come	  to	  be	  established.	  	   	   	   [Explanation	  of	  the	  Verse]	  	   Third,	  in	  the	  explanation	  (of	  the	  verse	  there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  Initially	  (he	  presents	  a)	  valid	  refutation.	  Subsequently	  (he)	  refutes	  (the	  attempt	  at	  a)	  saving	  (rejoinder).	  	  	   	   	   	   [Valid	  Refutation]	  	   In	  the	  first	  (he)	  explains	  and	  refutes	  causes	  and	  effects	  of	  the	  three	  times.	  The	  section,	  accordingly,	  constitutes	  three	  (parts).	  	   (First,)	  the	  Sarvastivada	  claims	  causes	  are	  antecedent	  and	  effects	  subsequent.	  Furthermore,	  in	  tathagatgarbha	  (thought),60	  antecedently	  there	  exists	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  effect	  dharma.	  	  (According	  to	  both	  views)	  during	  subsequent	  periods	  (the	  effect)	  awaits	  conditons	  that	  assist	  with	  arising	  (but	  these)	  also	  are	  (a	  type	  of)	  “effects	  are	  antecedent	  and	  causes	  subsequent”	  (view).	  	  	   (Second,)	  furthermore,	  as	  (the	  notion	  of)	  collectively	  existent	  causes	  is	  extended	  to	  the	  Satyasiddhi	  school’s	  (view	  that)	  defilements	  of	  fertile	  production	  and	  (their)	  effects	  both	  (arise	  at	  the	  same)	  time,	  (this	  issue)	  also	  (includes)	  the	  simultaneity	  of	  cause	  and	  effect.	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   (Third,)	  furthermore,	  like	  seeds	  in	  the	  fundamental	  consciousness	  of	  (texts	  like	  the	  Vijnanavada’s)	  Treatise	  on	  Establishing	  Mind	  Only,	  (since	  with)	  the	  extinction	  of	  the	  preceding	  (there)	  is	  then	  (and	  only	  then	  the	  initiation	  of)	  producing	  the	  subsequent,	  (at	  that	  latter	  time	  the	  preceding)	  ought	  to	  be	  (already)	  dead	  (and	  gone).	  Comparative	  inferences	  (about	  the	  problem	  drawn	  from	  examples	  such	  as	  a)	  songbird	  that	  can	  sing	  are	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment).	  Furthermore,	  (there	  is	  the	  notion	  that)	  antecedently	  there	  are	  seed-­‐causes	  (which)	  subsequently	  then	  produce	  presently	  active	  effects.	  (This	  sort	  of	  idea)	  is	  also	  an	  antecedent-­‐subsequent	  (cause	  to	  effect	  viewpoint).	  Furthermore,	  similarly,	  the	  “seeds	  anticipate	  seeds”	  (views)	  are	  antecedent-­‐subsequent	  (causation	  views).	  The	  sense	  (of	  this	  idea	  is	  that	  the)	  anticipatory	  (function)	  is	  simultaneous	  –	  it	  is	  as	  if	  both	  (cause	  and	  effect)	  have	  (the)	  significance	  (of	  anticipating	  one	  another).	  	   Now,	  (Nagarjuna)	  carefully	  overcomes	  (the	  notions	  of	  the)	  three	  times	  and	  together	  (they)	  do	  not	  establish	  (causation).	  Even	  if	  (one)	  wanted	  to	  settle	  (the	  matter),	  in	  the	  end	  there	  is	  no	  road	  (that	  leads	  there).	  For	  this	  reason	  dharmas	  such	  as	  causes	  and	  effects	  are,	  in	  the	  end,	  empty.	  The	  passage	  (explaining	  this	  point)	  is	  also	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  	   	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  the	  Rejoinder]	   	   	  	   Second,	  in	  (the	  next	  part	  where	  he)	  refutes	  the	  (attempt	  at	  a)	  saving	  (rejoinder)	  there	  are	  four	  (parts).	  1.	  The	  heterodox	  (opponent)	  brings	  up	  a	  proposition,	  an	  example,	  and	  (attempts	  to)	  refute	  the	  difficulty.	  2.	  The	  Author	  counter-­‐refutes,	  completing	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  proposition.	  3.	  The	  heterodox	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(opponent)	  brings	  up	  the	  difficulty	  of	  present	  causal	  phenomena.	  4.	  (The	  Author	  presents	  an)	  answer	  examining	  present	  causelessness.	  	   	   	   	   	   [The	  Rejoinder]	  	   In	  the	  first	  (of	  the	  above	  four)	  the	  point	  of	  the	  heterodox	  (opponent’s	  rejoinder)	  considers	  the	  Author’s	  (view	  that)	  the	  three	  times	  of	  cause	  and	  effect	  do	  not	  establish	  production.	  The	  example	  (notes	  that)	  the	  Author’s	  (view	  of)	  the	  three	  time	  (periods	  found	  in	  the	  relations	  between	  that	  which	  is)	  refuted	  and	  (that	  which)	  may	  refute	  does	  not	  establish	  (the	  activity	  of)	  refutation.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (he	  claims)	  “If	  your	  three	  time	  (periods	  allow	  for)	  attaining	  mutual	  refutation,	  (then)	  the	  three	  time	  (periods)	  of	  my	  (view	  of)	  causes	  and	  effects	  (allow	  for)	  attaining	  mutual	  production.	  If	  your	  three	  time	  (periods	  pertaining	  to	  that	  which	  is)	  refuted	  and	  (that	  which)	  may	  refute	  do	  not	  complete	  (refutation),	  refutation,	  again,	  also	  does	  not	  attain	  (completion.	  So,	  in)	  refuting	  my	  meaning,	  my	  meaning	  is	  still,	  accordingly,	  established.”	  The	  heterodox	  (opponent’s)	  point	  is	  like	  this.	  	   	   	   	   	   [Counter	  Refutation]	  	   Second,	  in	  the	  answer	  (that	  follows)	  there	  are	  three	  (parts).	  	  	   Initially	  (Nagarjuna)	  counters	  and	  displays	  the	  (opponent’s)	  error.	  (He	  notes,)	  “Your	  current	  (view	  of)	  this	  difficulty	  also	  bears	  this	  charge.”	  Therefore,	  (he	  also)	  notes,	  “You	  also	  have	  (committed)	  this	  error.”	  	  	   Second,	  (Nagarjuna	  points	  out	  that	  the	  opponent)	  has	  helped	  complete	  (his)	  proposition.	  That	  is	  to	  say	  (he	  notes:)	  	  “If	  you	  consider	  the	  three	  time	  (periods	  view)	  as	  rebuking	  my	  ability	  to	  refute,	  leading	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  refutation,	  [230b]	  I	  now	  accept	  your	  charge	  and	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do	  not	  attach	  to	  having	  an	  ability	  to	  refute.	  If	  my	  ability	  to	  refute	  is	  destroyed,	  your	  meaning	  of	  production	  is	  then	  saved	  and	  for	  this	  reason	  there	  is	  no	  production	  of	  the	  three	  time	  (periods).	  Lacking	  a	  refutation	  of	  the	  three	  time	  (periods,	  we)	  clearly	  know	  (they)	  are	  empty.	  (As	  they)	  are	  empty,	  (this)	  therefore	  helps	  compete	  my	  proposition.	  How	  does	  it	  come	  to	  form	  a	  difficulty?”	  Furthermore,	  (he	  notes:)	  	  “If	  you	  utilize	  the	  three	  time	  (periods)	  to	  refute	  my	  refutation,	  you	  have	  already	  accepted	  that	  the	  three	  time	  (periods)	  do	  not	  come	  to	  be	  produced	  after	  all.	  (Hence	  you	  have)	  already	  completed	  my	  meaning	  in	  full.	  I	  lack	  (of	  nothing)	  more	  which	  is	  expounded.”	  	  	   Also,	  the	  One	  Hundred	  Verse	  Treatise	  says,	  “The	  refutation	  is	  as	  that	  which	  is	  refuted.”	  	  	   Also,	  the	  Nirvana	  Sutra	  says:	  “By	  my	  inequality	  (you)	  refute	  your	  (own	  thesis	  of)	  inequality.	  If	  equality	  (is	  the	  case)	  then	  (that	  notion)	  is	  my	  equality	  (as	  well).”	  	  	   All	  (the	  points	  in	  this	  text)	  are	  the	  same	  as	  these	  examples.	  Therefore	  (Nagarjuna)	  says.	  “If	  the	  various	  dharmas	  are	  empty...”,	  and	  so	  on.	  	   Third	  (Nagarjuna)	  selects	  a	  negative	  example.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (he	  tells	  the	  opponent:)	  	  “If	  I,	  like	  you,	  definitely	  grasp	  at	  the	  production	  of	  the	  three	  time	  (periods),	  (it)	  would	  come	  to	  be	  (as	  refutable)	  as	  my	  charge	  and	  refutation	  of	  your	  (position).	  Now	  (however,	  and)	  only	  for	  your	  erroneous	  attachment,	  I	  therefore	  refute	  your	  (position	  but	  do	  not	  commit	  the	  same	  error).	  In	  regards	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to	  my	  (refutation,)	  in	  fact	  there	  is	  no	  refutation.	  For	  this	  reason	  (the	  two	  approaches)	  are	  not	  comparable	  (and)	  your	  (claim)	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  difficulty	  (I	  must	  address).”	  	  Therefore	  (this	  is	  why	  the	  text)	  says	  “If	  I	  asserted…”.	  	   	   	   	   	   [Presently	  Caused	  Phenomena]	  	   Third,	  the	  heterodox	  opponent	  brings	  up	  the	  difficulty	  of	  presently	  caused	  phenomena.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  previously	  (the	  opponent)	  relied	  upon	  words	  to	  expound	  (the	  notion	  that	  Nagarjuna’s	  view)	  is	  not	  established.	  Now	  (he)	  uses	  the	  perceptions	  of	  (objects	  by)	  sight	  as	  real.	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  two	  (parts).	  Initially	  he	  verifies	  there	  are	  three	  (types	  of)	  causes.	  Subsequently	  he	  concludes	  (these	  three)	  are	  not	  (part	  of)	  the	  Author’s	  (view).	  	   In	  the	  preceding	  (of	  the	  above	  two	  parts	  there	  are)	  three	  (subpoints).	  In	  the	  first,	  the	  heterodox	  idea	  considers	  an	  antecedently	  existent	  pottery	  master	  as	  a	  cause	  and	  the	  subsequently	  created	  jar	  as	  the	  effect.	  In	  the	  second	  (the	  heterodox	  idea)	  considers	  the	  master	  as	  an	  effect	  and	  the	  student	  as	  a	  cause.	  Due	  to	  creating	  students,	  (the	  teacher)	  acquires	  the	  designation	  of	  “master.”	  Accordingly,	  taking	  this	  evidence	  there	  are	  effects	  antecedently	  and	  causes	  subsequently.	  In	  the	  third,	  (cause	  and	  effect)	  are	  like	  the	  brightness	  of	  a	  lamp	  (which),	  even	  though	  (it)	  has	  arisen	  at	  one	  time,	  thusly	  must	  cause	  the	  lamp	  to	  have	  (the	  quality	  of)	  brightness.	  (Given)	  this	  (we)	  know	  (they)	  are	  simultaneous	  even	  as	  together	  there	  is	  cause	  and	  effect.	  	   The	  second	  (of	  the	  two	  parts	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  part	  that)	  concludes	  (these	  three	  types	  of	  causes)	  are	  not	  (part	  of)	  the	  Author’s	  (view),	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	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   [Present	  Causelessness]	  	   Fourth,	  the	  Treatise’s	  Author	  investigates	  the	  answer	  of	  present	  causelessness.	  Therein,	  he	  explains	  and	  refutes	  the	  preceding	  three	  (points).	  The	  section	  accordingly	  constitutes	  three	  (parts).	  	  	   In	  the	  first	  (part	  he)	  initially	  records	  the	  reckoning	  and	  generally	  negates	  it.	  (In	  the)	  second	  (part	  he)	  explains	  the	  negation	  and	  validly	  refutes	  (the	  errors.	  In	  the)	  third	  (part,	  the	  part)	  from	  “Like	  a	  pottery	  master…,”	  (he)	  illustratively	  refutes	  the	  remaining	  dharmic	  (principles).	  	   In	  the	  second	  (of	  the	  above	  three	  parts)	  the	  presentation,	  explanation,	  and	  conclusion	  are	  all	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  	   In	  the	  third	  (of	  the	  above	  mentioned	  three	  parts,)	  as	  for	  the	  doubtful	  causation	  of	  simultaneity,	  since	  the	  lamp	  (and	  its)	  brightness	  exist	  (in	  the	  same)	  single	  (moment	  of)	  time,	  accordingly	  (we)	  certainly	  understand	  (that	  the	  problem	  is)	  in	  order	  to	  cause	  a	  lamp,	  there	  (must)	  be	  brightness,	  (but)	  in	  order	  to	  cause	  brightness,	  there	  (must)	  be	  a	  lamp.	  Due	  to	  this	  (the	  cause)	  is	  not	  determined	  and	  (Nagarjuna)	  consequently	  refers	  to	  the	  doubtful	  causation	  of	  simultaneity.	  	  	   Furthermore,	  (Nagarjuna)	  notes	  (that	  if)	  the	  lamp	  and	  brightness	  are	  existent	  (at	  the	  same)	  one	  time,	  (and)	  as	  before	  (we)	  take	  the	  lamp	  as	  the	  cause	  of	  brightness,	  (we)	  do	  not	  (also)	  get	  brightness	  as	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  lamp.	  (This	  point)	  counters	  (and)	  rebukes	  (the	  notion	  of)	  the	  lamp	  and	  brightness	  existing	  (as	  causes	  in	  the	  same)	  one	  (moment	  of)	  time.	  (This	  shows)	  brightness	  is	  a	  cause	  that	  cannot	  create	  a	  lamp	  and	  a	  lamp	  is	  also	  a	  cause	  that	  cannot	  create	  brightness.	  (Given	  this	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The	  Gate	  of	  Contemplating	  Production	  
The	  Twelfth	  (Gate)	  [The	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  [cont.	  167a]	  	   Again,	  all	  dharmas	  are	  empty.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  Because	  produced,	  not	  produced,	  and	  a	  time	  of	  production	  (all)	  cannot	  be	  attained.	  	  The	  presently	  produced	  already	  is	  not	  produced	  (as	  it	  already	  exists).	  The	  not	  (produced)	  is	  also	  not	  produced.	  A	  time	  of	  production	  is	  also	  not	  produced.	  (This	  is)	  as	  (the	  text)	  states:	  	  	   A	  produced	  effect	  is	  not	  then	  produced.	  	   The	  not	  produced	  is	  also	  not	  produced.	  	   Apart	  from	  this	  produced	  and	  not	  produced,	  	   	   a	  time	  of	  production	  is	  also	  not	  produced.	  	  	  	   “Production”	  designates	  the	  effect’s	  arising	  emergence.	  “Not	  yet	  produced”	  indicates	  (an	  effect)	  is	  not	  yet	  arisen,	  not	  yet	  emerged,	  and	  not	  yet	  existent.	  The	  “time	  of	  production”	  designates	  (the	  time	  when)	  the	  initial	  arising	  is	  not	  yet	  (fully)	  established.	  Among	  these,	  as	  for	  the	  nonproduction	  of	  an	  effect	  of	  production,	  this	  produced	  (effect)	  is	  produced	  already	  and	  (so)	  not	  (in	  need	  of)	  production.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:	  This	  must	  be	  the	  case)	  because	  there	  is	  the	  error	  of	  (a	  regress)	  without	  end.	  (The	  regress	  occurs)	  because	  the	  already	  created	  is	  created	  again.	  If	  there	  is)	  the	  production	  of	  the	  produced	  already,	  (that	  production)	  produces	  a	  second	  production	  (of	  the	  first).	  The	  second	  product,	  produced	  already,	  (in	  turn)	  produces	  a	  third	  production	  (of	  the	  second).	  The	  third	  product,	  produced	  already,	  produces	  a	  fourth	  production	  (of	  the	  third.	  In	  all	  these	  cases	  it)	  is	  like	  the	  initial	  production	  (wherein)	  already	  there	  is	  the	  second	  [167b]	  product.	  Production	  like	  this	  lacks	  an	  end	  and	  this	  situation	  is	  (simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  For	  these	  reasons	  the	  produced	  does	  not	  produce.	  	   Again,	  if	  you	  claim	  the	  produced	  already	  is	  produced	  (again),	  the	  product	  that	  is	  utilized	  to	  produce	  is	  (obviously	  already)	  produced.	  (Alternately,	  the	  idea	  that	  something	  that	  is)	  not	  produced	  (already)	  is	  still	  yet	  produced,	  this	  situation	  is	  (also	  simply)	  not	  the	  case.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:)	  The	  initial	  product	  is	  not	  produced	  but	  is	  (still)	  produced.	  (If)	  this	  (is	  the	  case)	  then	  there	  are	  two	  types	  of	  production	  because	  the	  produced	  already	  is	  produced	  and	  the	  not	  yet	  produced	  is	  (also)	  produced.	  (If	  this	  is	  the	  case	  then)	  your	  previous	  definitive	  assertion	  is	  now	  not	  definitive.	  (The	  problem	  is	  obvious	  if	  we	  note	  this)	  is	  like	  the	  created	  already	  that	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  created	  (again)	  and	  the	  burned	  already	  that	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  burned	  (again.	  Furthermore)	  the	  proven	  already	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  proven	  (again.)	  Similarly	  the	  produced	  already	  does	  not	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need	  to	  be	  further	  produced.	  Therefore,	  produced	  dharmas	  are	  not	  (further)	  produced	  and	  dharmas	  that	  are	  not	  produced	  also	  are	  not	  produced.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:	  This	  must	  be	  the	  case)	  because	  (the	  not	  produced)	  is	  not	  united	  with	  production.	  Furthermore,	  (there	  is)	  the	  error	  of	  all	  the	  not	  produced	  having	  products.	  If	  not	  produced	  dharmas	  produce	  then	  there	  is	  production	  apart	  from	  a	  product.	  (Given)	  this	  then	  (the	  produced)	  does	  not	  produce.	  If	  there	  is	  product	  apart	  from	  production,	  then	  there	  is	  the	  created	  apart	  from	  creating,	  gone	  apart	  from	  going,	  and	  eaten	  apart	  from	  dining.	  (If	  things	  work)	  like	  this	  then	  that	  destroys	  the	  worldly,	  conventional	  Dharma.	  (Clearly	  though,)	  this	  situation	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  Therefore	  dharmas	  (that	  are)	  not	  produced	  do	  not	  produce.	  	   Again,	  if	  dharmas	  (that	  are)	  not	  produced	  are	  produced,	  (then)	  all	  dharmas	  (that	  have)	  not	  been	  produced	  should	  be	  produced.	  (Given	  this	  then)	  all	  ordinary	  people	  who	  have	  yet	  to	  produce	  supreme	  perfect	  enlightenment	  should	  (have)	  produced	  it.	  (Also)	  though	  the	  defilements	  of	  an	  Arhat	  of	  Indestructible	  Dharma	  are	  not	  produced,	  they	  still	  (ought	  to	  be)	  produced.	  The	  horns	  of	  hares	  and	  horses,	  though	  not	  produced,	  still	  (ought	  to	  be)	  produced.	  (Obviously	  though)	  these	  situations	  are	  not	  the	  case	  and	  therefore	  (one)	  ought	  not	  assert	  that	  the	  not	  produced	  is	  produced	  	   Question:	  As	  for	  the	  not	  produced	  still	  being	  produced,	  (this	  is)	  as	  when	  there	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  causes	  and	  conditions	  –	  time,	  place,	  agent,	  skilfull	  means,	  implements,	  etc.,	  (such	  that)	  then	  the	  not	  produced	  is	  produced.	  It	  is	  not	  (the	  case	  that)	  all	  the	  not	  produced	  are	  still	  produced.	  Therefore	  (you)	  should	  not	  consider	  (the	  idea	  that)	  all	  the	  not	  produced	  are	  still	  produced	  as	  a	  difficulty.	  (So	  why	  do	  you	  assert	  the	  contrary?)	  	   Answer:	  If	  dharmas	  produce	  as	  time,	  place,	  agent,	  skillful	  means,	  and	  collected	  conditions	  combine	  to	  (initiate)	  production,	  among	  these	  an	  antecedent,	  definitive	  existent	  does	  not	  produce	  (the	  effect.)	  An	  antecedently	  nonexistent	  (thing	  also)	  does	  not	  produce	  (the	  effect).	  Furthermore,	  an	  (antecedently)	  existent	  and	  nonexistent	  (thing)	  also	  does	  not	  produce	  (the	  effect.	  So,)	  seeking	  production	  (among)	  these	  three	  types	  (of	  possible	  causes)	  we	  do	  not	  attain	  it.	  (This	  is	  just)	  as	  previously	  explained.	  Therefore	  dharmas	  not	  produced	  are	  not	  produced.	  The	  time	  of	  production	  also	  is	  not	  produced.	  	   (Question:)	  For	  what	  reason?	  	   (Answer:	  This	  must	  be	  the	  case)	  because	  (otherwise)	  there	  is	  the	  error	  of	  producing	  the	  produced	  and	  the	  error	  of	  the	  not	  produced	  still	  being	  produced.	  For	  
dharmas	  at	  the	  time	  of	  production,	  the	  produced	  part	  is	  not	  produced	  –	  as	  previously	  stated,	  and	  the	  part	  not	  produced	  also	  is	  not	  produced	  –	  as	  previously	  stated.	  	   Again,	  if	  there	  is	  a	  time	  of	  production	  apart	  from	  producing,	  then	  there	  ought	  to	  be	  a	  production	  of	  the	  time	  of	  production.	  Yet,	  in	  fact,	  apart	  from	  production	  there	  is	  no	  time	  of	  production.	  Therefore	  the	  time	  of	  production	  also	  is	  not	  produced.	  	   Again,	  if	  one	  asserts	  the	  time	  of	  production	  is	  produced,	  then	  there	  are	  two	  (times	  of)	  production.	  (In	  that	  case,)	  first	  (we	  would	  have)	  to	  consider	  the	  time	  of	  production	  as	  a	  production	  and	  second,	  (we	  would	  have)	  to	  consider	  the	  production	  of	  the	  time	  of	  production	  (as	  a	  production.	  Yet,	  in	  fact)	  there	  are	  not	  these	  two	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dharmas.	  (Accordingly,)	  how	  can	  we	  claim	  there	  are	  two	  productions?	  For	  these	  reasons	  the	  time	  of	  production	  also	  is	  not	  produced.	  	   Again,	  when	  there	  is	  as	  yet	  no	  production,	  there	  is	  no	  time	  of	  production.	  (Given	  this,	  then)	  what	  realm	  is	  production	  active	  within?	  If	  there	  is	  no	  realm	  of	  activity,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  production	  [167c]	  of	  the	  time	  of	  production.	  For	  this	  reason	  the	  time	  of	  production	  also	  is	  not	  produced.	  	   In	  this	  fashion	  the	  produced,	  not	  produced,	  and	  the	  time	  of	  production	  are	  all	  not	  established.	  Because	  dharmas	  that	  are	  produced	  are	  not	  established,	  there	  is	  no	  production,	  abiding,	  or	  extinction.	  Similarly,	  because	  production,	  abiding	  and	  extinction	  are	  not	  established,	  accordingly	  karmically	  active	  dharmas	  are	  not	  established,	  and	  karmically	  inactive	  dharmas	  are	  also	  not	  established.	  Because	  
karmically	  active	  and	  karmically	  inactive	  dharmas	  are	  not	  established,	  sentient	  beings	  are	  also	  not	  established.	  Therefore	  (one)	  should	  know	  all	  dharmas	  lack	  production	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  are	  in	  the	  end	  empty,	  quiescient.	  	  	  	   [End	  of	  the	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	  	   	  	   [Commentary	  by	  Fa-­‐tsang]	  	   	   [The	  Name	  of	  the	  Gate]	  	   First,	  as	  for	  explaining	  the	  name,	  (Nagarjuna)	  investigates	  and	  refutes	  the	  production	  of	  dharmas,	  thereby	  reaching	  (the	  conclusion)	  there	  is	  no	  production.	  Consequently	  (this	  section)	  takes	  (“production”)	  as	  the	  gate’s	  (name).	  	   	   [Derivation	  of	  the	  Ideas]	  	   Second	  [230c]	  as	  for	  the	  derivation	  of	  the	  idea,	  the	  preceding	  two	  gates	  incline	  towards	  refuting	  that	  which	  can	  produce.	  (So)	  this	  gate	  specifically	  refutes	  that	  which	  is	  produced.	  Therefore	  (this	  gate)	  derives	  (from	  the	  preceding	  two).	  	   	   [The	  Propositions	  Clarified]	  	   Third,	  as	  for	  that	  which	  is	  clarified,	  the	  correct	  contemplation	  of	  non-­‐production	  is	  that	  which	  this	  (gate)	  expounds.	  	   	   [The	  Explanation]	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   Fourth,	  as	  for	  explaining	  (this)	  section,	  (there	  are)	  four	  (parts.	  That	  is	  to	  say,)	  initially	  (he)	  presents	  (the	  point),	  secondly,	  (he)	  explains	  it,	  third	  (he)	  concludes,	  (and)	  fourth,	  (he)	  categorically	  (refutes	  the	  error).	  	   In	  the	  second	  (of	  the	  above	  four	  parts,	  the)	  explanation,	  (there	  are)	  three	  (points).	  Initially,	  (he)	  examines	  the	  proposition	  (to)	  open	  the	  section.	  Second,	  (he)	  establishes	  a	  verse	  (and)	  briefly	  presents	  (the	  key	  ideas).	  Third,	  (he)	  explains	  the	  verse	  and	  broadly	  distinguishes	  (among	  the	  key	  ideas).	  	  	   	   	   [Distinguishing	  the	  Key	  Ideas]	  	   In	  (the	  part	  that)	  broadly	  distinguishes	  (among	  the	  key	  ideas,	  there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  First	  (he)	  explains	  and	  reveals	  the	  three	  times.	  Subsequently	  (he)	  uses	  (key)	  prinicples	  to	  validly	  refute	  (the	  error).	  Therein	  (we	  find)	  three	  (subpoints).	  	   	   	   	   [The	  Already	  Produced]	  	   Initially	  (he)	  explains	  the	  already	  produced	  is	  not	  (further)	  produced.	  In	  this	  (part),	  initially	  (he	  provides	  a)	  valid	  refutation,	  then	  (he)	  refutes	  (the	  attempt	  at	  a)	  saving	  (rejoinder).	  	  	   In	  the	  preceding	  (of	  the	  aforementioned	  two	  parts,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  valid	  refutation,	  there	  are)	  three	  (subpoints).	  Initially,	  (he)	  presents	  (the	  idea).	  Second,	  from	  “How	  so?...,”	  (he)	  explains	  the	  refutation.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (he	  presents)	  a	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  heterodox	  idea)	  creates	  (a	  regress)	  without	  end.	  Because	  the	  previously	  produced	  is	  produced	  already,	  (this	  view	  entails)	  further	  producing	  the	  already	  produced.	  In	  this	  fashion	  (he	  follows	  the	  regress)	  up	  to	  the	  fourth	  (iteration)	  revealing	  it	  is	  an	  error	  of	  (a	  regress)	  without	  end.	  Third,	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from	  “For	  this	  reason…	  (he)	  concludes	  (noting	  that	  the	  produced	  already)	  is	  not	  produced.	  	   	   	   	   	   [The	  Rejoinder]	  	   (In	  the)	  second	  (of	  the	  two	  parts	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	  part	  that	  begins)	  from	  “Again…”,	  (he)	  refutes	  (the	  attempt	  at	  a)	  saving	  (rejoinder).	  Therein	  (he)	  initially	  records	  the	  saving	  (rejoinder	  and)	  generally	  negates	  it.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  heterodox	  individual	  (attempts)	  to	  save	  the	  preceding	  error	  of	  (a	  regress)	  without	  end	  and	  consequently	  says:	  	  “I	  (hold	  that)	  although	  the	  product	  is	  already	  produced,	  even	  so	  the	  product	  which	  is	  utilized	  to	  produce	  is	  not	  (yet)	  produced,	  even	  as	  (it)	  produces.	  As	  a	  result,	  this	  is	  not	  (a	  case	  of)	  the	  production	  of	  the	  already	  produced	  and	  consequently	  (there	  is)	  only	  one	  (sequence	  of)	  production	  without	  the	  error	  of	  (a	  regress)	  without	  end.”	  	   	   	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  the	  Rejoinder]	  	   Second,	  in	  the	  valid	  refutation	  (of	  the	  above	  rejoinder)	  first	  (Nagarjuna)	  refutes	  (the	  point),	  then	  (he	  provides)	  an	  illustration,	  then	  (he)	  concludes.	  	   In	  the	  first	  (of	  the	  above	  three	  parts,)	  as	  for	  (the	  notion	  that)	  the	  product	  is	  not	  (yet)	  produced	  and	  still	  produces,	  this	  is	  (the	  notion	  that)	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  product	  which	  is	  utilized	  (to	  produce)	  is	  the	  product	  of	  future	  production.	  Because	  (of	  this	  notion)	  there	  are	  two	  productions	  (-­‐	  i.e.,	  production	  of	  what	  is	  already	  produced	  and	  production	  of	  what	  is	  not	  yet	  produced).	  Earlier	  (though),	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  (the	  heterodox	  opponent)	  said	  there	  is	  only	  the	  production	  of	  the	  already	  produced.	  Given	  this,	  then	  (the	  heterodox	  viewpoint)	  is	  not	  settled.	  If	  (the	  heterodox	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attempt	  at	  the)	  saving	  (rejoinder)	  is	  allowed,	  it	  still	  falls	  into	  the	  earlier	  error.	  Therefore	  (Nagarjuna	  follows	  this	  point	  by)	  saying	  “The	  created	  already	  is	  not	  (further)	  created,…”,	  etc.	  	   	   	   	   [The	  Not	  Produced]	  	   Second	  in	  (the	  next	  part)	  explaining	  and	  refuting	  that	  the	  not	  produced	  does	  not	  produce,	  (there	  are)	  two	  (points).	  Initially	  (he	  provides	  a)	  valid	  refutation.	  Then	  (he)	  refutes	  (the	  attempt	  at	  a)	  saving	  (rejoinder).	  	   In	  the	  first	  (of	  the	  above	  two	  parts	  there	  are)	  four	  (subparts).	  The	  first	  concerns	  a	  refutation	  (that)	  dismisses	  erroneous	  characteristics.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  (one)	  allows	  for	  the	  combination	  of	  production	  and	  dharmas	  (we	  ought)	  not	  designate	  it	  “production	  of	  the	  not	  produced”.	  If	  (one)	  does	  not	  allow	  the	  combination	  of	  production	  and	  dharmas	  then	  (those	  dharmas)	  are	  dharmas	  lacking	  production.	  What	  (then	  is	  being)	  designated	  as	  “production”?	  Consequently	  it	  is	  stated	  (as	  we	  find	  in	  this	  section).	  	   The	  second	  (subpart	  of	  this	  section)	  corresponds	  to	  a	  refutation	  (that	  points	  out	  the)	  hypothetical	  dependency	  (between	  the	  unproduced	  and	  the	  product)	  is	  (karmically)	  inactive.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  dharmas	  which	  are	  not	  (yet)	  produced	  have	  productive	  (power,	  then)	  nirvana,	  (which)	  is	  a	  dharma	  lacking	  (present)	  production,	  also	  ought	  to	  create	  products.	  Emptiness,	  and	  so	  on,	  are	  also	  thus.	  	   The	  third	  (part	  of	  this	  section	  is	  a)	  refutation	  (based	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  idea)	  destroys	  (karmically)	  active	  (dharmic	  relations).	  (This)	  is	  also	  a	  refutation	  (pointing	  out	  this	  idea	  leads	  to)	  erroneous	  dharmas	  that	  deviate	  from	  (the	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traditional)	  stages	  (of	  karmic	  development.	  This	  part)	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  	   The	  fourth	  (part	  of	  this	  section	  is	  a)	  refutation	  (pointing	  out	  that	  the	  idea	  leads	  to)	  causelessly	  produced	  dharmas.	  Arhats	  of	  Indestructible	  Dharma	  are	  of	  an	  unmoveable	  nature.	  	  (They	  are)	  Arhats	  (who)	  choose	  to	  withdraw	  from	  (negative)	  characteristics,	  and	  so	  on.	  (But)	  by	  that	  proposition’s	  allowance,	  withdrawing	  (from)	  arousing	  defilements	  is	  not	  the	  cause	  of	  this	  (state	  of	  spiritual	  attainment).	  Furthermore,	  the	  (future)	  insight	  of	  common	  people	  ought	  to	  produce	  (what	  is)	  not	  (yet)	  produced.	  (This)	  creates	  a	  rebuttal	  of	  (what)	  ought	  to	  be	  produced.	  The	  defilements	  of	  Arhats	  are	  (a	  case	  of	  that	  which)	  ought	  not	  be	  produced	  still	  yet	  being	  produced.	  (Again,	  this)	  creates	  a	  rebuttal	  of	  (what)	  ought	  to	  be	  produced.	  	   	   	   	   	   [Refutation	  of	  the	  Rejoinder]	  	   Second,	  in	  (the	  next	  part	  where	  he)	  refutes	  (the	  attempt	  at	  a)	  saving	  (rejoinder),	  initially	  (he	  presents	  the)	  heterodox	  (attempt	  at	  a)	  save.	  The	  idea	  of	  the	  save	  is	  that	  earlier	  the	  Author	  (himself)	  created	  the	  difficulty	  of	  (that	  which)	  ought	  not	  be	  produced	  still	  yet	  being	  produced.	  The	  heterodox	  proponent	  does	  not	  accept	  (this	  characterization	  and)	  consequently	  (in	  essence)	  says,	  	  “It	  is	  not	  that	  everything	  not	  produced	  is	  still	  produced.	  There	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  causes	  and	  conditions	  (which	  was)	  originally	  nonexistent,	  (but)	  presently	  existent,	  (and	  that	  present	  combination	  is)	  designated	  “production”.	  How	  do	  (you)	  come	  to	  say	  (every)	  one	  (of	  these	  cases)	  inclines	  to	  nonexistence?	  (With)	  the	  nonexistence	  in	  my	  proposition	  there	  are	  two	  types.	  One	  is	  the	  nonexistence	  of	  the	  potentially	  existent.	  The	  second	  is	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absolute	  nonexistence.	  Among	  these	  two	  I	  expound	  on	  the	  nonexistence	  of	  the	  potentially	  existent.	  [231a]	  How	  is	  it	  (you)	  come	  to	  take	  absolute	  nonexistence	  as	  the	  difficulty?	  (For	  example,	  what	  I	  mean)	  is	  like	  the	  above	  (mentioned)	  common	  person’s	  insight	  which	  is	  (currently)	  not	  yet	  produced,	  yet	  still	  (will	  be)	  produced	  (in	  the	  future	  when	  the	  correct	  conditions	  obtain).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  (when)	  there	  are	  causes	  and	  conditions	  like	  meeting	  good	  friends,	  and	  so	  on,	  then	  (insight)	  is	  produced.”	  	   (The)	  second	  (part	  of	  this	  section	  is	  the	  part	  with	  the)	  valid	  refutation.	  In	  the	  refutation	  (there	  are)	  three	  (points).	  Initially	  (Nagarjuna)	  records	  the	  (attempt	  at	  a)	  saving	  (rejoinder).	  Secondly,	  he	  inquires	  about	  and	  rebutts	  (the	  idea).	  Third,	  (he)	  concludes	  and	  negates	  (the	  error).	  	  	   In	  the	  part	  concerning	  the	  rebuttal,	  if	  it	  is	  the	  case	  (one)	  says	  (this	  view)	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  absolute	  nonexistence,	  even	  while	  it	  is	  the	  nonexistence	  of	  the	  possibly	  existent,	  among	  conditions	  of	  this	  type,	  (those)	  that	  are	  existent	  are	  consequently	  produced,	  (and	  likewise,	  those)	  that	  are	  nonexistent	  are	  (also)	  consequently	  produced.	  Both	  (of	  these)	  are	  negative	  type	  (conditions	  and	  accordingly	  they)	  each	  do	  not	  complete	  production.	  (This	  conclusion)	  is	  as	  expounded	  in	  the	  previous	  gates.	  	   	   	   	   [The	  Time	  of	  Production]	  	   Third,	  in	  (the	  next	  part	  that)	  refutes	  the	  production	  of	  the	  time	  of	  production	  (there	  are)	  four	  (points).	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   First	  is	  a	  refutation	  (of	  a	  time	  of	  production)	  apart	  from	  the	  already	  and	  not	  yet	  (produced).	  The	  presentation	  and	  explanation	  (of	  this	  point)	  is	  understandable	  (without	  further	  comment	  here).	  	   Second	  is	  a	  refutation	  (pointing	  out	  that)	  apart	  from	  dharmas,	  there	  is	  no	  time.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  there	  is	  time	  apart	  from	  production,	  (then	  that	  time)	  potentially	  has	  the	  capability	  of	  producing	  dharmas.	  (But)	  since	  there	  is	  no	  time	  apart	  from	  the	  production	  (of	  dharmas),	  how	  is	  there	  the	  production	  of	  the	  time	  of	  production?	  	   Third	  is	  a	  refutation	  (pointing	  out	  the	  problem	  of)	  two	  productions	  (that	  must	  characterize	  any	  production)	  of	  dharmas	  of	  the	  three	  times.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  since	  there	  is	  a	  time	  of	  production	  (it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that)	  again	  there	  is	  (a	  time	  of)	  producing	  dharmas.	  Given	  this,	  then	  there	  are	  two	  (levels	  of)	  production.	  (With	  the)	  preceding	  part,	  because	  the	  time	  (of	  a	  dharma’s	  production)	  is	  nonexistent,	  dharmas	  are	  also	  nonexistent.	  (With)	  this	  (next)	  part,	  because	  dharmas	  exist,	  the	  time	  (of	  
dharma’s	  production)	  also	  exists.	  	  	   Fourth	  is	  a	  refutation	  (pointing	  out	  that)	  production	  lacks	  a	  realm	  of	  activity.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  realm	  of	  activity	  of	  that	  production	  is	  designated	  as	  the	  time	  of	  production.	  Since	  there	  is	  not	  yet	  that	  time,	  production	  lacks	  (the	  active	  circumstances	  that	  are	  referred	  to	  as)	  producing.	  	   	   	   [Conclusion]	  	   Third,	  from	  “Like	  this…”	  (Nagarjuna)	  generally	  concludes	  there	  is	  no	  production.	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   Fourth,	  (in	  the	  next	  part	  that)	  categorically	  dismisses	  (the	  error	  there	  are)	  five	  (points).	  1.	  (He)	  categorizes	  production	  and	  dismisses	  (notions	  of)	  abiding	  and	  extinction.	  2.	  (He)	  dismisses	  (the	  notion	  of)	  karmically	  active	  (dharmas).	  3.	  (He)	  dismisses	  (the	  notion	  of)	  karmically	  inactive	  (dharmas).	  4.	  (He)	  dismisses	  (the	  notion	  of)	  collective	  production.	  5.	  (He)	  generally	  concludes	  everything	  is	  empty	  (of	  own-­‐being).	  (End	   of)	   the	   second	   (section)	   of	   the	   roll	   (containing)	   A	   Record	   Conveying	   the	  
Meaning	  of	  the	  Tenets	  of	  the	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates.	  [End	  of	  this	  Commentary	  explaining	  the	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates]	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Endnotes	  	  	  1.	  Translation	  from	  Taisho	  #1826.	  Western	  temple	  of	  the	  Great	  Vow:	  One	  of	  the	  T’ang	  empire’s	  five	  great	  temples.	  The	  Western	  temple	  was	  located	  in	  Ch’ang-­‐an.	  	  2.	  The	  binomial	  translated	  here	  as	  “providing	  proofs”	  has	  an	  old	  meaning	  of	  giving	  silver	  rather	  than	  grain	  in	  payment.	  In	  other	  words,	  providing	  something	  of	  enduring	  value.	  3.	  “Central	  tenets	  and	  paths	  that	  are	  expounded”:	  The	  character	  I	  have	  translated	  as	  “paths”	  more	  literally	  means	  to	  “advance	  towards.”	  In	  Buddhist	  literature	  it	  is	  often	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  both	  the	  process	  of	  advancing	  and	  the	  destination.	  4.	   First	   of	   the	   ten	  bhumi’s.	   Fa-­‐tsang’s	   reference	  here	   is	  probably	  based	   in	   the	  26th	  chapter	  of	  the	  80	  chapter	  version	  of	  the	  Hua-­‐yen	  ching.	  That	  chapter	  titled	  the	  “Ten	  Stages”	   includes	   a	   lengthy	   description	   of	   the	   ten.	   The	   first,	   the	   stage	   of	   “joy”	   is	  characterized	  by,	  amongst	  others,	  a	  series	  of	  “great	  vows”	  –	  noteworthy	  here	  are	  the	  5th	   -­‐	   “to	   fully	   develop	   all	   beings…	   to	   establish	   them	   in	   omniscience”	   and	   the	   6th	   –	  “direct	   knowledge	   of	   the	   innumerable	   distinctions…”	   Due	   to	   these	   great	   vows	  
Bodhisattvas	   at	   this	   stage	   also	   ”based	   on	   compassion,	   kindness,	   and	  relinquishment,”	  acting	  for	  the	  “sake	  of	  the	  salvation	  and	  liberation	  of	  all	  beings…”	  “become	   expert	   in	   all	   learning”	   (See	   Thomas	   Cleary’s	   translation	   of	   the	   Hua-­‐yen	  
sutra,	  pg	  20.,	  for	  the	  full	  text)	  5.	  The	  binomial	  phrase	  rendered	  as	  “discursive”	  means	  “sastras”,	  “upadesas”,	  etc.	  6.	  Divakara:	  originally	  from	  central	  India	  he	  arrived	  in	  China	  in	  676	  and	  stayed	  until	  his	  death	  in	  688.	  He	  helped	  translate	  numerous	  Buddhist	  texts	  during	  those	  years.	  7.	  Silabhadra:	  Early	  7th	  century.	  Famous	  monk	  of	  Nalanda	  monastery	  in	  India.	  He	  taught	  Vijnanavada	  doctrines	  to	  the	  Chinese	  monk	  Hsuan-­‐tsang.	  Jnanaprabha;	  a	  student	  of	  Silabhadra	  who	  later	  became	  an	  advocate	  of	  Madhyamaka	  doctrines.	  8.	  This	  long	  phrase	  refers	  to	  the	  objects	  grasped	  at	  by	  parikalpita	  –	  the	  imagined/constructed	  nature.	  	  The	  following	  terms	  refer	  to	  paratantra,	  the	  dependent	  nature,	  and	  parinispanna,	  the	  perfected	  nature.	  These	  “Three	  Natures”	  are	  basic	  Vijnanavada	  teachings.	  9.	  Aryadeva:	  @	  2nd	  century	  ce.	  The	  foremost	  student	  of	  Nagarjuna.	  	  Bhavaviveka:	  490-­‐570ce.	  A	  key	  interpretaer	  of	  Madhyamaka	  doctrines.	  10.	  Ta-­‐ch’eng	  miao-­‐chih	  ching:	  It	  is	  unclear	  what	  text	  Fa-­‐tsang	  is	  referring	  to	  here.	  He	  also	  refers	  to	  this	  in	  his	  Commentary	  on	  the	  Awakening	  of	  Faith.	  	  11.	  Direct	  and	  inferential	  reasoning:	  These	  are	  the	  two	  types	  of	  knowledge	  that	  traditionally	  count	  as	  valid	  understanding	  in	  the	  Buddhist	  logical	  traditions.	  Direct	  reasoning	  is	  derived	  directly	  from	  and	  in	  correspondence	  with	  sense	  perception.	  Inferential	  reasoning	  is	  a	  more	  complicated	  category	  of	  knowledge	  that	  requires	  the	  use	  of	  a	  “mark”	  that	  logically	  connects	  the	  object	  perceived	  with	  the	  object	  inferred.	  A	  traditional	  example	  in	  the	  Indian	  logical	  traditions	  is	  the	  inference	  to	  a	  fire	  that	  is	  not	  directly	  perceived	  by	  means	  of	  the	  “mark”	  of	  the	  smoke	  which	  is	  perceived.	  12.	  Four	  Fruits	  of	  the	  Arhat	  Path:	  stream	  enterer,	  once	  returner,	  non-­‐returner,	  and	  
Arhat.	  13.	  Tathagata:	  “Thus	  Come	  One”	  –	  an	  appellation	  for	  the/a	  Buddha.	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14.	  Initial	  Teaching	  of	  the	  Mahayana;	  a	  reference	  to	  Fa-­‐tsang’s	  own	  hierarchial	  ranking	  of	  Buddhist	  teachings.	  The	  five	  are:	  Hinayana,	  Initial	  Mahayana	  (Vijnanavada	  and	  Madhyamaka),	  Final	  Mahayana	  (Tathagatagarbha	  and	  Buddha-­‐nature),	  The	  Sudden	  Teaching	  (Ch’an),	  The	  Perfect	  Teaching	  (Hua-­‐yen).	  15.	  There	  are	  various	  versions	  of	  this	  classification	  of	  the	  karmic	  nature	  of	  different	  people.	  A	  common	  version	  has	  the	  following	  list	  of	  five:	  Fixed	  Hearer,	  Fixed	  Solitary	  Buddha,	  Fixed	  Tathagata	  (aka,	  Mahayana,	  Bodhisattva),	  Undetermined,	  and	  No	  Nature.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  the	  karmic	  conditions	  of	  various	  individuals	  dispose	  them	  towards	  one	  of	  the	  five	  associated	  teachings.	  16.	  Transformation	  body:	  Once	  Bodhisattvas	  reach	  a	  certain	  stage	  of	  development	  they	  are	  karmically	  transformed	  in	  a	  way	  that	  also	  allows	  them	  to	  transform	  in	  order	  to	  help	  others.	  17.	  The	  long	  nailed	  Brahmacarin:	  member	  of	  the	  Vatsiputriyah	  –	  a	  controversial	  later	  subschool	  of	  Buddhism	  that	  advocated	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  karmic	  substratum	  for	  the	  self.	  18.	  Formal	  reasoning:	  pramana	  	  -­‐	  valid	  forms	  of	  knowledge.	  See	  note	  #11.	  19.	  Senika	  heresy	  –	  the	  view	  that	  there	  is	  an	  essential	  nature	  (mind,	  soul,	  spirit)	  in	  the	  body.	  20.	  Five	  worldly	  illuminations;	  grammar	  and	  composition,	  the	  arts	  and	  mathematics,	  medicine,	  logic,	  and	  philosophy	  21.	  The	  word	  “burdened”	  also	  connotes	  the	  pole	  slung	  across	  the	  shoulders	  to	  carry	  a	  load	  –	  hence	  the	  following	  sentence.	  22.	  Great	  Assembly:	  Mahasamghika	  –	  an	  early	  subschool	  of	  Buddhism	  in	  India.	  This	  school	  may	  have	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  later	  emergence	  of	  Mahayana.	  23.	  See	  note	  #8.	  24.	  Dharmadhatu	  of	  one	  flavor:	  the	  emptiness	  of	  a	  self-­‐nature	  of	  the	  entire	  realm	  (dhatu)	  of	  dharmas.	  25.	  Ten	  Stages:	  bhumis.	  See	  note	  #4.	  26.	  Dependent	  on	  other	  arisings	  nature:	  See	  note	  #8.	  This	  is	  paratantra.	  Later,	  starting	  on	  page	  50,	  he	  will	  address	  the	  other	  two	  natures	  –	  parikalpita	  (the	  “constructed/imagined”	  nature)	  and	  parinispanna	  –	  the	  “perfect’	  nature.	  27.	  “that	  to	  which	  	  	  general	  reckoning	  is	  attached.”	  –	  this	  refers	  to	  “parikalpita”	  –	  see	  note	  26.	  28.	  “The	  nonexistence	  of	  the	  real	  within	  the	  principle	  (of	  emptiness)”	  –	  this	  refers	  to	  
paratantra.	  See	  note	  26.	  29.	  He	  refers	  to	  parinispanna.	  See	  note	  26.	  30.	  Ayatanas	  –	  the	  six	  senses	  and	  their	  six	  respective,	  associated	  objects.	  31.	  Universal	  reckoning	  –	  parikalpita.	  See	  note	  26.	  Here	  the	  point	  is	  that	  notions	  of	  essentially	  existent	  senses/sense	  objects	  and/or	  nihilistic	  emptiness	  are	  both	  objects	  constructed	  by	  delusion.	  32.	  See	  note	  #4.	  33.	  I	  have	  flipped	  the	  order	  of	  the	  ideas	  in	  these	  two	  sentences.	  It	  seems	  to	  fit	  better	  with	  what	  follows.	  34.	  The	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Twelve	  Gates.	  35.	  Translated	  from	  Taisho	  #1568.	  I’ve	  omitted	  the	  summary	  of	  contents	  and	  Seng-­‐jui’s	  preface	  as	  they	  do	  not	  factor	  into	  Fa-­‐tsang’s	  explanation.	  Please	  note	  again	  that	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Fa-­‐tsang’s	  Commentary	  does	  not	  include	  Nagarjuna’s	  text.	  I	  have	  inserted	  it	  in	  the	  hopes	  it	  will	  make	  it	  easier	  to	  follow	  Fa-­‐tsang’s	  explanation.	  Please	  note	  as	  well	  all	  references	  to	  Taisho	  page	  numbers	  within	  the	  translation	  of	  Nagarjuna’s	  text	  refer	  to	  that	  text,	  not	  Fa-­‐tsang’s	  Commentary.	  You	  may	  wish	  to	  consult	  Hsueh-­‐li	  Cheng’s	  translation/explanation	  of	  this	  text	  for	  another	  point	  of	  reference.	  It	  is	  available	  on	  the	  web	  under	  the	  title	  Nagarjuna’s	  Twelve	  Gate	  Treatise.	  36.	  According	  to	  Taisho,	  this	  phrase,	  the	  title	  of	  the	  first	  section	  of	  Nagarjuna’s	  text,	  was	  originally	  attached	  to	  the	  title	  of	  the	  entire	  text.	  37.	  Karmically	  functional	  dharmas	  –	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  category	  of	  “samskrita”	  
dharmas.	  For	  the	  Sarvastivadins,	  samskrita	  dharmas	  comprise	  72	  of	  the	  75	  total	  types	  of	  dharmas.	  Samskrita	  	  -­‐	  “conditioned”,	  subject	  to	  and	  productive	  of	  conditioned	  arising.	  Also,	  subject	  to	  compounding	  or	  “collective	  conditioning.”	  These	  dharmas	  are	  karmically	  functional	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  dependently	  produced	  effects	  and	  they	  produce	  subsequent	  such	  effects.	  These	  types	  of	  dharmas	  are	  variously	  categorized	  into	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  five	  skandhas	  (“heaps”,	  “collections”),	  twelve	  ayatanas	  (“domains”,	  	  –	  the	  six	  senses	  and	  their	  corresponding	  objects),	  and	  eighteen	  dhatus	  (“realms”,	  “spheres”	  –	  the	  preceding	  twelve	  plus	  the	  associated	  six	  awarenesses).	  I	  have	  translated	  this	  as	  (karmically)	  “functional”	  because	  the	  text	  (as	  typical)	  uses	  the	  binomial	  “yuwei”	  (-­‐	  to	  be	  active,	  productive,	  functional)	  to	  render	  this	  Sanskrit	  term.	  Shortly	  both	  Nagarjuna	  and	  Fa-­‐tsang	  will	  bring	  up	  the	  topic	  of	  asamskrita	  dharmas	  (karmically	  “nonfunctional”	  –	  the	  opposite	  of	  the	  above).	  38.	  Agamas	  –	  collections	  of	  early	  Buddhist	  texts	  roughly	  corresponding	  to	  the	  
Nikayas.	  39.	  “Dharma”	  –	  The	  Chinese	  character	  also	  refers	  to	  rules,	  patterns,	  and	  laws.	  40.	  “Analysis”	  	  -­‐	  pramana,	  valid	  sources	  of	  knowledge.	  41.	  See	  Fa-­‐tsang’s	  Commentary	  on	  the	  Awakening	  of	  Faith	  for	  more	  on	  this.	  His	  discussion	  can	  be	  found	  on	  page	  95	  of	  my	  translation	  of	  the	  text	  (An	  English	  
translation	  of	  Fa-­‐tsang’s	  Commentary	  on	  the	  Awakening	  of	  Faith,	  the	  Edwin	  Mellen	  Press,	  2004).	  42.	  This	  binomial	  also	  means	  “to	  carry,”	  “transport	  towards,”	  “turn	  towards,”	  etc.	  43.	  Here	  the	  translation	  uses	  a	  few	  secondary	  meanings	  because	  they	  fit	  better	  with	  the	  actual	  verse	  and	  what	  Fa-­‐tsang	  says	  below.	  44.	  Proposition	  –	  same	  character	  translated	  above	  as	  “principle.”	  As	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  context	  that	  follows,	  here	  Fa-­‐tsang	  is	  referring	  to	  the	  parts	  of	  the	  three-­‐part	  formal	  syllogism	  (proposition,	  reason,	  example).	  This	  form	  of	  reasoning	  is	  a	  pramana	  if	  all	  the	  parts	  are	  logically	  sound.	  45.	  “Rejoinder”	  -­‐	  	  the	  Chinese	  character	  literally	  means	  “to	  save,”	  “to	  rescue.”	  46.	  The	  adjective	  here	  rendered	  “mooting”	  has	  primary	  meanings	  of	  “small,	  minute,	  etc.”	  Mooting	  is	  a	  loose	  rendering	  of	  secondary	  meanings	  associated	  with	  the	  connotations	  of	  questioning,	  judging,	  meaning,	  and	  hypothetical	  negatives.	  This	  meaning	  more	  clearly	  fits	  the	  nature	  of	  Nagarjuna’s	  questions	  in	  these	  two	  sentences.	  47.	  Fundamental	  consciousness	  	  -­‐	  alayavijnana.	  This	  is	  the	  “storehouse	  consciousness”	  that	  stores	  karmic	  impressions	  and	  serves	  as	  the	  basis	  upon	  which	  the	  other	  forms	  of	  consciousness	  arise.	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48.	  	  Samkhya	  and	  Vaiseshika	  –	  schools	  of	  Hindu	  philosophy.	  Nigrantha	  and	  Jnanaputra	  	  -­‐	  Hindu	  thinkers.	  49.	  Sarvastivada,	  Sautrantika,	  Mahasamghika,	  Fa-­‐hsiang	  Mahayana	  –	  schools	  of	  Buddhist	  philosophy.	  50.	  “Fa-­‐tsang	  has	  “yet,	  in	  fact…”	  The	  corresponding	  sentence	  in	  Taisho	  reads	  “Therefore	  effects	  such	  as	  a	  jar	  are	  not	  attainable	  after	  all.”	  	  	  51.	  Fa-­‐tsang	  has	  “not	  yet	  transformed.”	  The	  12	  Gate	  Treatise	  has	  “already	  transformed.”	  Fa-­‐tsang	  seems	  to	  have	  lost	  his	  place	  here	  and	  confused	  this	  and	  the	  preceding	  sentence	  with	  two	  that	  are	  found	  just	  earlier	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  previous	  refutation	  (i.e.,	  refutation	  of	  the	  attempted	  save	  in	  the	  sixth	  iteration	  of	  the	  argument).	  52.	  The	  phrase	  for	  “refined	  butter”	  also	  can	  refer	  to	  the	  refined	  qualities	  of	  the	  Buddha	  and	  Dharma.	  53.	  dharmas	  with	  karmic	  outflow	  =	  asrava	  dharmas.	  Those	  dharmas	  produced	  by	  and	  in	  turn	  producing	  a	  stream	  of	  outflows	  associated	  with	  the	  passions,	  delusion,	  suffering,	  etc.	  54.	  The	  Five	  Skandhas	  (collections/heaps)	  =	  five	  categories	  of	  dharmas.	  The	  five	  are:	  
rupa	  (form),	  vedana	  (sensation/feeling),	  samjna	  (idea),	  samskara	  (assorted/miscellaneous	  other),	  vijnana	  (consciousness/awareness).	  55.	  	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Middle	  Way	  –	  the	  Mulamadhyamakakarika.	  For	  a	  translation	  see,	  for	  example,	  Jay	  l.Garfield’s	  The	  Fundamental	  Wisdom	  of	  the	  Middle	  Way	  (New	  York,	  Oxford	  Univ.	  press,	  1995).	  56.Four	  Sramana	  Fruits:	  sramana	  –	  one	  who	  makes	  efforts	  towards	  enlightenment.	  	  Four	  fruits:	  stream-­‐winner,	  once-­‐returner,	  never-­‐returner,	  Arhat.	  All	  such	  individuals	  are	  considered	  “noble	  persons”	  –	  Arya-­‐pudgala.	  57.	  Sovereign	  Independence	  –	  This	  binomial	  is	  also	  used	  later	  to	  reference	  the	  Hindu	  notion	  of	  Isvara,	  or	  God.	  58.	  Eternal	  soul	  –	  atman.	  59.	  God	  -­‐	  Isvara.	  	  60.	  Tathagatagarbha	  thought	  -­‐	  a	  cluster	  of	  related	  ideas	  centered	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  everyone	  already	  has	  within	  them	  the	  “seed”	  (garbha)	  of	  Buddhahood.	  Becoming	  a	  Buddha	  (tathagata)	  is	  then	  the	  realization	  and	  manifestation	  of	  that	  antecedently	  existent	  potential.	  	  
